Judgment :- 1. The first defendant is the appellant. 2. The suit out of which the appeal arises, was for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to cut and remove the rafters and reapers of their building protruding into the plaintiff's property. 3. The plaint property is a portion of a larger property which originally, belonged to one Ammalu Amma. By Ext. P1 partition, the property was divided into 3 portions. They are the properties described in A, B and C schedules attached to Ext. P1. B schedule is the plaint property. As per Ext. P1 the extent of the B schedule property is 51/3 cents. The defendants purchased A schedule property and constructed a building on the property in 1964. 4. The plaintiff caused a lawyer notice to be served on the defendants on 20-6-1973 calling upon them to cut and remove the projecting rafters and reapers. The defendants failed to comply with the request which resulted in the filing of the suit. 5. The courts below have concurrently held that the reapers and rafters of the building of the defendants do project into the property of the plaintiff and therefore they are liable to be cut and removed. The courts below consequently have granted the decree, prayed for in the plaint. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised two contentions; (1) The suit is liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the plaintiff, inasmuch as he has acquiesced in the construction of the building and thereafter allowed the defendant to occupy the building without raising any objection for 10 years, cannot maintain the suit and (2) In any event, the suit is barred by limitation as the same was filed after 10 years of the offending construction. 7. While considering point No. 1, it is necessary to bear in mind the facts narrated in this regard in the written statement. The building was constructed with the consent of the plaintiff. The construction was completed in consultation with the plaintiff. The plaintiff knew that the building was constructed on the property in the exclusive possession of the defendants. 7. While considering point No. 1, it is necessary to bear in mind the facts narrated in this regard in the written statement. The building was constructed with the consent of the plaintiff. The construction was completed in consultation with the plaintiff. The plaintiff knew that the building was constructed on the property in the exclusive possession of the defendants. The plaintiff by his conduct has made it clear that he had no objection in the building being constructed in the manner in which it was constructed and therefore after 10 years of the construction he shall not be permitted to rake up a case that the reapers and rafters of the building project into his property and therefore the same should be removed. He has further stated that to the knowledge of the plaintiff, he had made arrangements to collect the eaves drop from the building right from the day when the construction of the building was completed. In these circumstances, the suit is liable to be dismissed, he submits. 8. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the appellant had not raised the contention based on the principle of acquiescence before the courts below and therefore he shall not be allowed to raise the same for the first time in the second appeal. In short, the learned counsel submits that the appellant has not raised any such contention in the written statement and therefore the above argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is liable to be rejected. 9. On going through the written statement, I am of opinion, that the defendant has definitely pleaded such a case. Not only that, he had also pressed into service the said pleadings before the courts below. 9. On going through the written statement, I am of opinion, that the defendant has definitely pleaded such a case. Not only that, he had also pressed into service the said pleadings before the courts below. The appellate court, in any event, has considered this point; or else there was no need for the appellate court to discuss the law pertaining to this aspect in Para.7 of the judgment thus: "There is of course some delay with the plaintiff since the plaintiff could have filed the suit much earlier, but I am not of opinion that the delay is so much as to deprive the plaintiff of the remedy which is otherwise available to him, and according to the plaintiff he bad been objecting to this from the very beginning and the defendant had promised to set right the same and he waited considering the position and status of the defendant and his respect towards him. We have also to bear in mind that the projections are not of such a serious nature as to call for immediate action and the delay is certainly not such as to amount to waiver and abandonment of the rights sought to be enforced or acquiescence in the act complained of. What has been sought to be removed are only the projecting eaves and rafters and if the plaintiff waited for a few years hoping that the defendant might set right the roof and thereby wanted to avoid a litigation I cannot find fault with the plaintiff. We have already seen that there is clear projection into the property belonging to the plaintiff and there is no justification at all to allow the same to continue." The plaintiff therefore was aware of the fact that the defendants had raised the above case before the courts below. Therefore it cannot be said that the plaintiff has been taken by surprise when this contention was reiterated by the appellant before this Court. The plaintiff, it would appear, had even resisted the above contention in any event, before the lower appellate court. 10. The question thus arising for consideration is whether the equitable relief of mandatory injunction prayed for in the suit, is liable to be rejected by applying the principle of acquiescence. What then is acquiescence. The plaintiff, it would appear, had even resisted the above contention in any event, before the lower appellate court. 10. The question thus arising for consideration is whether the equitable relief of mandatory injunction prayed for in the suit, is liable to be rejected by applying the principle of acquiescence. What then is acquiescence. Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 4th Edn., p. 334, has explained acquiescence thus: "As soon as a man with full knowledge, or at least with sufficient notice or means of knowledge of his rights, and of all the material circumstances of the case freely and advisedly does anything which amounts to the recognition of a transaction or acts in a manner inconsistent with its repudiation, or lies by for a considerable time and knowingly and deliberately permits another to deal with the property, or incur expense under the belief that the transaction has been recognised, or freely or advisedly abstains for a considerable lapse of time from impeaching it, there is acquiescence." 11. In a case where acquiescence is established the equitable relief of mandatory injunction prayed for will be refused. - S.41 (g), Specific Relief Act, provides that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent even a continuing breach if the plaintiff has acquiesced in it. Similarly the maxim that he who seeks equity, must do equity envisaged in S.41 (i) disentitles a person from getting the equitable relief unless he establishes that his own acts and dealings in the matter have been fair and honest. 12. Now turning to the facts of the case, could it be said that the plaintiff has come to the court with clean hands? Has he proved that his own acts and dealings in the matter have been honest and fair? Has he not acquiesced in the construction of the building, the protruding rafters and reapers of which are now sought to be cut and removed? While considering these aspects it should be said that the evidence available on record is only one way. For more than 9-10 years the plaintiff has slept over his alleged rights. The delay or the laches on the part of the plaintiff are beyond explanation because, it has come out in evidence that the defendants constructed the building with the consent of the plaintiff. If that be the position, the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the suit. 13. The delay or the laches on the part of the plaintiff are beyond explanation because, it has come out in evidence that the defendants constructed the building with the consent of the plaintiff. If that be the position, the plaintiff is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the suit. 13. It therefore follows that the plaintiff by his conduct has made it clear that it was with his consent the defendants constructed the building. The plaintiff therefore is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in the suit. 14. In the light of the above finding, it is unnecessary for this Court to go into the 2nd point namely whether the reliefs prayed for are barred by limitation. For the reasons stated above, the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside. The second appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances, no order as to costs. Allowed.