Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal against the order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode in M.A.C. No. 522 of 1980. The first appellant is the brother of now deceased Rajan and the other appellants are his sisters. Deceased Rajan was a school teacher working in the Ganapat High School, Calicut. He met with a fatal motor accident at 1.30 p. m. on 4-5-1976 while he was walking along the Kozhikode-Cannanore road. The appellants preferred claims against the owner, driver and the insurance company of the vehicle K.L.K. 5843 for compensation. 2. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal came to the conclusion that the 2nd respondent, the driver of the lorry, was negligent in driving the vehicle. Therefore the 1st respondent, the owner, was held vicariously liable to pay compensation to the appellants and the 3rd respondent, the insurance company, was directed to pay the amount by virtue of the insurance policy. The Tribunal ordered to pay a sum of Rs. 9000/ as compensation and the appellants have seriously assailed the inadequacy of the quantum of compensation. 3. The claim of the appellants is purported to have been based on S.2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1885. An application under S.110A of the Motor Vehicles Act for compensation can be based under S.1A or 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act. However, the cause of action under S.1A and 2 are distinct and different. This has been explained by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami AIR 1962 SC 1) The court held: "The cause of action under S.1 and that under S.2 are different. While under S.1 damages are recoverable for the benefit of the persons mentioned therein, under S.2 compensation goes to the benefit of the estate; whereas under S.1 damages are payable in respect of loss sustained by the persons mentioned therein, under S.2 damages can be claimed inter alia for loss of expectation of life. Though in some cases parties that are entitled to compensation under both the sections may happen to be the same persons, they need not necessarily be so; persons entitled to benefit under S.1 may be different from those claiming under S.2. Though in some cases parties that are entitled to compensation under both the sections may happen to be the same persons, they need not necessarily be so; persons entitled to benefit under S.1 may be different from those claiming under S.2. Prima facie as the two claims are to be based upon different causes of action, the claimants whether the same or different, would be entitled to recover compensation separately under both the heads: If a person taking benefit under both the sections is the same, he cannot be permitted to recover twice over for the same loss. In awarding damages under both the heads, there shall not be duplication of the same claim, that is, if any part of the compensation representing the loss to the estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss under S.8, that portion shall be excluded in giving compensation under S.2 and vice versa." 4. The proviso to S.2 of the Fatal Accidents Act makes it clear that the executor, administrator or representative of the deceased may insert a claim for and recover any pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased occasioned by such wrongful act, neglect or default. The pecuniary loss in fact is the actual financial benefit of which the dependents have been deprived. The mode in which the measure of damage is to be calculated for the economic loss sustained by the estate was considered by the Supreme Court in C. K. S. Iyer v. T. K. Nair (AIR 1970 SC 376). The Court held: "Compulsory damages under S.1A of the Fatal Accidents Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries and that under S.2, the measure of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate: There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable." 4A. The mode of ascertainment of damages is not free from doubt. It is beset with certain difficulties. It depends on many imponderables. The pecuniary loss which the court is to assess is the loss which will be sustained in future. This involves calculation as to what benefit in money" worth would have accrued to the person from whom the action is brought from the deceased, if the deceased had survived but has been lost by reason of his death. The pecuniary advantage which has been lost need not have been received in the form of money or goods, but may have been derived from the service rendered by the deceased. A reasonable expectation of the pecuniary benefit can be established by showing that the deceased had in the past contributed to the dependants. However, the mere speculative 'possibility alone is not sufficient to base a claim. It is a question of fact to be decided considering the facts and circumstances of each case. 4B. Generally damages have to be assessed as at the date of deceased's death. But the court has to take into consideration subsequent events also The normal nature of calculating the compensation is to assess the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself and his dependants first, and then deduct therefrom such part of his income, as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon him whether for maintenance or for pleasure. Then ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependants. The difference between the income and expenditure incurred by him on his dependants is the amount he saves every year. The capitalised value of the income, subject to the deductions, is the pecuniary loss caused to the estate. Then ascertain what part of his net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of the dependants. The difference between the income and expenditure incurred by him on his dependants is the amount he saves every year. The capitalised value of the income, subject to the deductions, is the pecuniary loss caused to the estate. The multiplier adopted for capitalising the basic figure is usually a vexed problem for the court. The multiplier necessarily must remain flexible figure for the judge to decide and reasonably be determined by having regard to the deceased's expectation of life, his age and health, the probable duration of his earning capacity, the possibility of his earning capacity being expanded or shrunk in the future, the expectation of life of the dependants and the probable duration of the continuance of the deceased's assistance to the dependants. The possibility of his liberality might have grown or wilted is also a relevant consideration. "Much of the calculation necessarily must be in the realms of hypothesis "and in that region arithmetic is a good servant but a bad mister" since there are so often many imponderables. In every case "it is the over-all picture that matters and the court must try to assess as best as it can the loss suffered by each dependant having regard to all the circumstances but subject to the fact that "it is the wood that has to be looked at, and not the individual trees". (See page 999 of Charles worth & Percy on Negligence' Edn. 7.) 5. In the instant case deceased Rajan was a Physical Education Teacher and he was aged 35 at the time of his death. His employment was permanent and he was naturally entitled to get all the benefits due to a Government servant, such as, gratuity, pension, provident fund etc. Rupees 460/- was the monthly salary received by him during the relevant time. It is conceded by the appellants' counsel that the salary was revised subsequently and a teacher working in the same grade would be now receiving Rs. 1200/- per month. The first and 2nd appellant gave evidence before the Tribunal that they were receiving financial help from the deceased. The Tribunal assessed that the monthly saving of the deceased would have been Rs. 50/- and a multiplier of 15 was taken and on that basis the compensation was quantified at Rs. 1200/- per month. The first and 2nd appellant gave evidence before the Tribunal that they were receiving financial help from the deceased. The Tribunal assessed that the monthly saving of the deceased would have been Rs. 50/- and a multiplier of 15 was taken and on that basis the compensation was quantified at Rs. 9,000/-. The counsel for the appellants contended that the compensation awarded was meagre and inadequate. There is no evidence to show as to what was the amount contributed by the deceased towards Provident Fund and other insurance policies, if any. The Tribunal held that the accident occurred while the deceased was returning from a hotel after taking his lunch and on that basis it was observed that the deceased was having independent residence and was not supporting the appellants. The reasoning adopted by the Tribunal is not correct. If the salary of the teachers underwent steep rise, it could reasonably be assumed that the deceased also would have been in a position to save at least Rs. 250/- per mensem. This would have devolved on his estate. The appellants being the brother and the sisters of the deceased are really entitled to claim compensation towards the loss of estate. The only loss of estate would have been Rs. 250 x 12 3000/- per annum. The Tribunal had adopted a multiplier of 15, which we feel is quite consistent with the age and occupation of the deceased. Therefore an award of Rs. 45.000/- is passed against respondents jointly and severally. The 3rd respondent being the insurer shall pay the compensation amount. 6. The first appellant is the elder brother and he deposed that the deceased was residing with him and helping him financially. Appellants 2 to 4 were given in marriage and were residing separately. Therefore the total compensation is apportioned in the following manner. The first appellant is entitled to receive Rs. 15000/- and appellants 2 to 4 are entitled to receive Rs. 10,000/- each. An award is passed accordingly. The M.F.A. is allowed to the extent indicated above. The appellants are entitled to costs.