JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - In this group of petitions the question raised is whether the direction given by the Regional Transport Authority to the petitioners who are stage carriage operators plying in hill areas to replace their vehicles which are more than ten years old is legally sustainable. As the controversy raised in these petitions is identical we are disposing of the petitioners by a common judgment. 2. The Regional Transport Authority in each of these cases has caused a notice to be issued to the petitioners calling upon them to replace their vehicles which are more than ten years old. The petitioners contend that the condition imposed by the Regional Transport Authority is arbitrary and has no legal sanction. It is submitted that the resolution passed by the Regional Transport Authority deciding to enforce the aforesaid condition against the operators plying vehicles which are more than ten years old apart from being arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction is also bad for noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of cl. (xxi) of S. 48(3), Motor Vehicles Act, which enjoins that the Regional Transport Authority shall not vary the conditions of permits or attach any further condition thereto without giving a month's notice to the holder of the permit. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed in which the stand taken is that the condition imposed is perfectly valid and proper and is designed to subserve public safety. It is further asserted that traffic hazards over the roads in hill areas are a menace and have been posing a serious problem for the authorities demanding an immediate action such as has been taken in the present case, namely, insistence on the condition that the vehicles plying in these areas shall not be more than ten years old. Lastly, it is submitted that the decision of the Regional Transport Authority in based on a judgment of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in which the validity of this condition has been upheld. 4. It is not disputed that the petitioners are plying stage carriages in hill areas falling in the regions of Dehradun, Nainital and Saharanpur and the impugned notices have been issued in pursuance of the resolutions passed by the Regional Transport Authorities, Dehradun and Saharanpur following the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. 5. 4. It is not disputed that the petitioners are plying stage carriages in hill areas falling in the regions of Dehradun, Nainital and Saharanpur and the impugned notices have been issued in pursuance of the resolutions passed by the Regional Transport Authorities, Dehradun and Saharanpur following the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner, we find no merit in any of the contentions raised by the petitioners. Indeed, in our opinion, the controversy stands concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 800 : 1980 All LJ 352. Precisely, the same argument was advanced before their Lordships of the Supreme Court. There the petitioners were grantees of permits plying mini buses as contract carriages. They were aggrieved by the imposition of a condition fastened in their permit that the vehicles shall not be more than seven years old. The validity of this condition was assailed on the ground that the Regional Transport Authority had no power to impose such a condition. It was urged that in any case such a condition had no nexus with the statutory purpose. Their Lordships unhesitatingly rejected this submission and held that the condition imposed was not only fully authorised by the statute and was desirable in the larger interest of the pedestrians and other traffic on the roads but was clearly warranted by the phenomenal increase in the accidents on the roads. It was observed that securing human safety clearly fell within the purview and purpose of the statute. We cannot resist quoting a passage from that decision which, to our mind, applies with greater force to the situation in hand inasmuch as there can be no denying that far greater care must be taken to prevent road accidents in the hill areas having regard to the conditions of roads in those areas and the possibility of accidents taking place if the vehicles plying in those areas are not perfectly fit for use by the travelling public. This is how their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated the law. "Section 51(2)(x) authorises the impost of any condition, of course, having a nexus with the statutory purpose. It is undeniable that human safety is one such purpose. This is how their Lordships of the Supreme Court stated the law. "Section 51(2)(x) authorises the impost of any condition, of course, having a nexus with the statutory purpose. It is undeniable that human safety is one such purpose. The State's neglect in this area of policing public transport is deplorable but when it does act by prescribing a condition the court cannot be persuaded into little legalism and harmful negativism. The short question is whether the prescription that the bus shall be at least a seven year old model one is relevant to the condition of the vehicle and its passengers' comparative safety and comfort on our chaotic highways. Obviously, it is. The older the model, the less the chances of the latest safety measures being built into the vehicle. Every new model incorporates new devices to reduce danger and promote comfort. Every new model assures its age to be young, fresh and strong, less likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less susceptible to wear and tear and mental fatigue leading to unexpected collapse. When we buy a car or any other machine why do we look for the latest model? Vintage vehicles are good for centenarian display of the curious and cannot but be mobile menaces on our notoriously neglected highways. We have no hesitation to hold from the point of view of the human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty." 6. The above decision, in our considered view, completely covers the controversy at hand. Indeed the ratio applies with, greater validity to the present set of cases for the reasons stated above. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, sought to distinguish the above decision on the ground that there the condition complained of had been imposed from the very beginning in the permit issued to the petitioners. In the present case the impugned condition is being sought to be imposed subsequently. The submission appears to be devoid of any merit. In our opinion, in so far as the considerations which weighed with their Lordships of the Supreme Court are concerned the same apply with equal force to the imposition of the condition by a subsequent order of the concerned authority. The submission appears to be devoid of any merit. In our opinion, in so far as the considerations which weighed with their Lordships of the Supreme Court are concerned the same apply with equal force to the imposition of the condition by a subsequent order of the concerned authority. If such a condition can be validly imposed from the inception we see no reason why the same cannot be imposed subsequently on discovery of the fact that unless some action was taken continued loss of human lives and sufferings arising from road accidents cannot be checked. 8. Learned counsel next submitted that cl. (xxi) of S. 48(3) obligates the Regional Transport Authority to give a month's notice before imposing a new condition in the permit of the petitioners. We are not impressed by this argument. 9. In the first place we find that the petitioners in each of these cases were granted six months' time to replace their vehicles which were more than ten years old. If the petitioners had some objection to the imposition of this condition they had ample time to approach the Regional Transport Authority for the withdrawal of this condition. The submission hence lacks any real substance and seems to be formalistic and hypertechnical in the facts of the present case. Secondly, we have heard learned counsel for the petitioners on merits as regards the validity of the impugned condition. This Court having rejected the petitioners' arguments on merits there hardly remains any substance in the objection that the petitioners were denied the opportunity contemplated under cl. (xxi) of S. 48(3) of the Act. 10. Lastly, learned counsel relying on a supplementary affidavit which was filed by the petitioners in the course of arguments sought to raise a submission founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. It was urged that in the hill areas of Garhwal as well as Kumaun the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation has been allowed to ply buses which are more than ten years old. This tantamounts to discrimination. 11. We are unable to agree. In the first place we have some hesitation in relying on this supplementary affidavit filed as it was in the course of arguments. The allegations are vague and general and do not inspire confidence. No material has been furnished which may indicate that any exception has been made in the case of U.P. State Road Corporation. In the first place we have some hesitation in relying on this supplementary affidavit filed as it was in the course of arguments. The allegations are vague and general and do not inspire confidence. No material has been furnished which may indicate that any exception has been made in the case of U.P. State Road Corporation. Secondly, there is nothing to indicate that the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority which is of general application has been made inapplicable to the buses being plied by the State Road Transport Corporation. On the material on the record, therefore, the submission does not merit any serious consideration. 12. For the reasons stated above, these petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. The interim orders are hereby vacated.