KULKARNI, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the advocates submitted that the matter may be heard finally on merits itself. Accordingly arguments on the final merits of the revision are heard and the revision is disposed of finally. ( 2 ) THIS is a revision by the Judgment debtor against the order dated 14-3-85 passed by the Civil Judge, Puttur, dakshina Kannada in Ex. case No. 17/85, issuing the warrant for delivery of possession. ( 3 ) THE respondents in the present revision were the plaintiffs in O. S 16/79 on the file of the Civil Judge, Puttur. The present revision petitioner was defendant No. 5 in the said suit. ( 4 ) THE parties have been referred to with reference to their position in o. S. 16/79. ( 5 ) THE plaintiffs had filed the suit for a declaration that the sale deed dated 3-12-76 regarding the plaint B schedule properties in favour of defendant No. 5 was not valid or binding on the family of the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 and for cancallation of the said document and for possession of B. schedule properties and for mesne profits from 3-12-76 and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No. 5 and his people from putting up any new works or building in the plaint 'b' Schedule properties. ( 6 ) THE suit was decreed by the civil Judge, Puttur on 28th August, 1984. The defendant No. 5 being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree filed an appeal viz. RFA 435/84 in this court. He filed I. A. 1 for stay in the said R. F. A. This court passed an order in the said R. F. A. on 7-11-34 as :"heard Sri B V. Acharya for appellant and Sri M. Gopalakrishna Setty for caveator respondents 1 and 2. Appeal admitted. The operation of the decree under appeal is stayed subject to the condition that appellant, within 12 weeks from to-day, deposits in the trial court the costs and also a sum of Rs. 8000/- towards the account of mesne profits. The appellant shall also, during the pendency of this appeal deposit, in the trial court, annually a sum of Rs. 1500/- towards the account of mesne profits. 8000/- towards the account of mesne profits. The appellant shall also, during the pendency of this appeal deposit, in the trial court, annually a sum of Rs. 1500/- towards the account of mesne profits. The first of such annual deposits shall be made on or before 31st of May, 1985 and for the successive years on or before 31st day of may each successive corresponding year. The deposits shall be subject to tne final result of the appeal and subject to final accounting, plus or minus. The respondents-plaintiffs shall be entitled to withdraw the deposits, as and when made, against furnishment of security to the satisfaction of the trial court Costs, however, shall be paid-over to Respondent-plaintiffs without security. "the 12 weeks mentioned in the above said order came to an end on 7-2-85, i A. 2 was filed on 23-1-1985 to modify the said order dated 7-11-84 end it was rejected on 7-3-85, The executing court issued a delivery warrant dated 14-3-85. According to learned counsel sri U. L Narayana Rao, the said delivery warrant was executed on 16-3-85 and the possession of the property excepting the residential house was delivered to the plaintiffs. Thereafter this court passed an order on 18-3-85 in the said r. F. A. as :"i. A. Ill is for extension of time to comply with the terms of the conditional order of stay made on 7-11-1984. Sri U. L. Narayana Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that in the meanwhile, even without an express order of this Court vacating the order of stay, respondent-plaintiffs have sued out execution and have taken possession of the garden portion of the suit property except the house. He further submitted that an express direction is necessary to stop further dispossession i. e. from the residential house. Sri Gopalakrishna Shetty wanted two weeks' time to file counter. Time granted. Respondents are prohibited from executing the decree any further and dispossessing the appellant from the residential portion of the property until further orders. "defendant No. 5, being aggrieved by the order directing the delivery of the property and by issuance of the delivery warrant dated 14-3-85, has approached this court with the present revision viz. CRP 4610/86. Time granted. Respondents are prohibited from executing the decree any further and dispossessing the appellant from the residential portion of the property until further orders. "defendant No. 5, being aggrieved by the order directing the delivery of the property and by issuance of the delivery warrant dated 14-3-85, has approached this court with the present revision viz. CRP 4610/86. ( 7 ) THE points that arise for consideration in this revision are : i) Whether the order passed by the executing court regarding the delivery of the property and issue of tne delivery warrant dated 14-3-85 is bad at law ? ii) Whether the said stay order dated 7-11 -84 was in force on the day when the executing court ordered the delivery of the property and issued delivery warrant dated 14-3-85 and when possession of the property was delivered to the plaintiffs ? ( 8 ) I have extracted above the conditional stay order passed R. F. A. According to learned counsel Sri narayana Rao for the revision petitioner, notwithstanding the prescription of 12 weeks to deposit the money and notwithstanding the non-depositing of the money within the period of 12 weeks, the stay continued and it did not cease to have effect. ( 9 ) HE referred me to Mahanth Ram das v Ganga Das, A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 882, supreme Court, in the course of discussion, extracted the order passed by the Patna High Court which reads thus :"the High Court office will calculate the amount of court-fee payable on the valuation we have given and communicate to the counsel for plaintiff-appellant what is the amount of the court-fee he has got to pay both on the plaint and on the memorandum of appeal. We grant the plaintiff three months time to pay the court-fee for the Trial Court and also for the High court. The time will be computed from the date counsel for appellant is informed of the calculation by the deputy Registrar of the High Court. If the amount is not paid within the time given, the appeal will stand dismissed. If the court-fee is paid within the time given, the appeal will be allowed with costs and the suit brought by the plaintiff will stand decreed with costs and the plaintiff will be granted a decree declaring. . . . . . . . ". If the amount is not paid within the time given, the appeal will stand dismissed. If the court-fee is paid within the time given, the appeal will be allowed with costs and the suit brought by the plaintiff will stand decreed with costs and the plaintiff will be granted a decree declaring. . . . . . . . ". It was this order that was commented upon by the Supreme Court. Supreme court has stated in paragraph No. 5 as :"the case is an unfortunate and unusual one. The application for extension of time was made before the time fixed by the High Court for payment of deficit court-fee had actually run out. That application appears not to have been considered at all, in view of the peremptory order which had been passed earlier by the Division Bench hearing the appeal, mainly because on the date of hearing the petition for extension of time, the period had expired. The short question is whether the High Court, in the circumstances of the case, was powerless to enlarge the time, even though it had peremptorily fixed the period of payment. If the Court had considered the application and rejected it on merits, other considerations might have arisen ; but, the High Court in the order quoted, want by the letter of the original order under which time for payment had been fixed. Section 148 is equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired. That the application was filed in the vacation when a Division Bench was not sitting should have been considered in dealing with it on July 13, 1954, when it was actually heard. The order, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed by the original judgment, would have operated from july 8, 1954. How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These order turn out, often enough to be in expedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, interrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. These order turn out, often enough to be in expedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, interrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time but was set upon and robbed by thieves the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time, or that the court was powerless to extend it. Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians. Cases are known in which Courts have moulded their practice to meet a situation such as this and to have restored a suit or proceeding, even though a final order had been passed. "what the Supreme Court held was that the court had got power under S. 148 read with 149 C. P. C. to extend the time for the payment of court-fee. Supreme court disapproved the High Court's order to the effect that if the party did not pay the court-fee within 3 months the appeal would stand dismissed and if the court-fee was paid within the said tima, the appeal would be allowed with costs and the suit brought by the plaintiff would stand decree with costs. Supreme Court thought that the prescription of such a condition smacked of being in terrorem. The order dated 7-11-1984 passed in RFA 435/84 does not say that if the deposit is not made within the time prescribed, the order would stand vacated. The nature of stay granted in R. F A. 435/84 is entirely different from the nature of the order considered in the said Supreme Court case. The facts available in the said Supreme Court case are different from the facts available in this case. ( 10 ) THE effect of this Supreme court decision was considered by the madras High Court in Dorai Swami chettiar and others v Govindaswamy Chettiar a. I. R. 1963, Madras 207 in the following terms :"sri M. S. Venkatarama Aiyar, who has argued this petition strenuously on behalf of the petitioners, invites my attention to Mahant Ram Das v gangadas, AIR 1961 SC 882 . There, a Division Bench of a High Court had fixed a certain time for payment of deficit court-fee but there was default. The High Court considered that once the time granted had run out, it could not further extend the time. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the High Court was not powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period for payment and reference was made to the terms of Ss. 148 and 149 C. P. C. I fail to see how the principle of this case is applicable to the facts in the instant petition. As I said, the interim order was a conditional one which means that unless the condition was performed on the prescribed date, the interim order could not survive. There is even a more insuperable difficulty. namely, factually delivery had been effected and the respondent had taken possession, and it is not possible, therefore, to grant the prayer of the petitioners to permit them to continue in possession under guise of extending the time for performing the condition relevant to the payment of the first insalment of Rs. 350/ -. "therefore, as already indicated above, the principle laid down in the Mahant rem Das's case by the Supreme Court will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel Narayana Rao referred me to Chinnamarkathian v ayyavoo. A. I. R. 1982, S. C. 137. The order which was the subject-matter of the discussion in the said Supreme Court case was one passed by the Revenue divisional Officer in the following terms :"in view of may findings above I hold that the respondents are in arrears of rent to the extent of rs. 2850/- for the years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61 to the petitioners. I direct under Secs. 3, 4 (a) that this amount be paid to the petitioners within six weeks from the date of this order failing which they shall ba evicted from the suit lands. "the Supreme Court said that such an order smacked of being in terrorem and was like the law of the Medes and the persians. Learned counsel Narayana Rao laid more stress on paragraph 14 of the said judgment, wherein it is stated as :"it was seriously contended by Mr. "the Supreme Court said that such an order smacked of being in terrorem and was like the law of the Medes and the persians. Learned counsel Narayana Rao laid more stress on paragraph 14 of the said judgment, wherein it is stated as :"it was seriously contended by Mr. Natesan as to what is there in the scheme of the Act and especially in the language of sub-sec. (4) (b) which would make it impermissible for the revenue Divisional Officer simultaneously passing an order determining rent in arrears and directing that if the tenant fails to pay the amount within the time prescribed by the court eviction shall follow as a matter of course. If this construction of sub-sec. (4) (b) as canvassed by Mr. Natesan is adopted the Revenue Divisional officer would be denying to himself a more beneficial jurisdiction conferred upon him, namely to extend the time for making the payment if on evaluation of circumstances so placed before him he is satisfied that a further extension is not only just but not to grant it would be harsh and unjust and would be defeating the object for which the Act was enacted. An analogous provision may be noticed. It is well accepted principle statutorily recognised in Section 148 of Civil P. C. that where a period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may expire. If a Court in exercise of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing, denying or witholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in disregard of the jurisdiction in that while granting time simultaneously the court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend time. The principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessiate extension of time. The principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessiate extension of time. "while making the said observations, the Supreme Court referred to its own previous decision reported in ( AIR 1961 sc 882 ). The discussion even in Chinna-markathian's case relates to a composite order by which the Divisional Officer fixed a time within which the tenants were required to pay failing which they would have to vacate. The fixation of time by the Revenue Divisional Officer was only by way of abundant caution and equity. Ths order in R. F. A. 435/84 does not prescribe that if the payments as ordered were not made in time as presented, the stay would stand vacated and it is strictly in accordance with law and with the principles laid down by the supreme Court its,elf. Therefore, the said supreme Court decision also would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. ( 12 ) LEARNED Counsel Narayana Rao then referred me to Mulraj v Murti raghunathji, AIR 1967. SC 1386. What was considered in the said Supreme court decision is as to from what date the order of stay would be effective. The discussion in paragraph 8 is to the following effect :"we ate of opinion that the view taken In Bessesswari Chowdhurany's case (18s6-97) I Cal WN 226 is the correct one. An order of stay in an execution matter is in our opinion in the nature of a prohibitory Older and is addressed to the court that is carrying out execution. It is not of the same nature as an order allowing an appeal and quashing execution proceedings. That kind ot order takes effect immediately it is passed, for such an order takes away the very jurisdiction of the court executing the decree as there is nothing left to execute thereafter. But a mere order of stay of execution does not take away the jurisdiction of the court. All that it does is to prohibit the court from proceeding with the execution further, and the court unless it knows of the order cannot be expacted to carry it out. But a mere order of stay of execution does not take away the jurisdiction of the court. All that it does is to prohibit the court from proceeding with the execution further, and the court unless it knows of the order cannot be expacted to carry it out. Therefore, till the order comes to the knowledge of the court its jurisdiction to carry on execution is not affected by a stay order which must in the very nature of things be treated to be a prohibitory order directing the executing court which continues to have jurisdiction to stay its hand till further orders. "it further lays down in paragraph 11 that the executing court if it has done something even after the passing of the stay order and before it is communicated to it, can set right the matter by invoking the jurisdiction under S. 151 C. P. C. The present case does not attract the principle laid down in the said case. The only question involved in the present case is whether the conditional order passed on 7-11-84 in the R. F. A. 435/84 was still in force and in operation on the day when the delivery warrant was ordered or when the delivery warrant was issued or when actually the Decree-Holder was put in possession of the property. Therefore, the said Supreme court case also would not be of much help to the revision petitioner. ( 13 ) HE then referred me to U. Kariyappa v Devarajulu Naidu. 1973 (2) my. L. J. 417. It was case where the munsiff directed the tenant to deposit a sum of Rs. 3720/- within one week from the date of order failing which I. A. 2 would automatically stand dismissed. The order dated 7-11-84 passed in RFA 435/84 is not to that effect at all. The court in RFA 435/84 has fixed a period of 12 weeks as the time within which the appellant should deposit the money. There is no order passed in terrorem in the said R. F. A. at all. Therefore, the order which was the subject-matter of discussion in the said Kariyappa's case is entirely different from the order passed in the said R. F. A, ( 14 ) LEARNED Counsel Gopalakrishna shetty drew my attention to Superior bank Limited, Muzaffarnagar v Budh Singh and others, Indian Cases, Vol. 83 (1924) 1028. Therefore, the order which was the subject-matter of discussion in the said Kariyappa's case is entirely different from the order passed in the said R. F. A, ( 14 ) LEARNED Counsel Gopalakrishna shetty drew my attention to Superior bank Limited, Muzaffarnagar v Budh Singh and others, Indian Cases, Vol. 83 (1924) 1028. The subject-matter of discussion in the said Allahabad Case was ths order passed by the District judge in the following terms which is found at page 1029. "i order that the South faced compound be not sold provided the applicant guarantees to make up the amount outstanding to Rs. 1960/- odd if the sale of the other house does not fetch that amount. "the Allahabad High Court held :"a conditional order for stay of execution does not come into force till the condition is fulfilled, and a sals held after the passing of such an order, but before the condition is fulfilled, is not affected by the order. "allahabad High Court has said at page 1030 as :"coming to the merits of the case we are of opinion that the sale which took place on the 17th of August, 1922 should not have been set aside. In the first place we have to consider the wording of the actual order for stay passed by the lower Appellate court which has been set forth in full in the opening portion of our judgment. It is clear that that order was not an absolute order for stay which came into effect as soon as it was passed. It is clear that the order was contingent on the applicant guaranteeing to make up the amount outstanding to Rs. 1640/- odd. The order was obviously addressed to the Execution court where the guarantee had to be given. We are of the opinion that so long as the condition required for coming into effect of that conditional order was not fulfilled the order did not come into effect. The facts recited by us make it clear that on the day fixed for sale all that the Execution court did was to postpone the sale for two days. The judgment debtors offered no guarantee to the Execution court and none was teken. It is clear, therefore, that there was no absolute stay order in force at the time when the sale actually took place at 2 p. m. that afternoon. The judgment debtors offered no guarantee to the Execution court and none was teken. It is clear, therefore, that there was no absolute stay order in force at the time when the sale actually took place at 2 p. m. that afternoon. In this view, therefore, the sale was not at all illegal. " ( 15 ) HE then referred me to Doraiswami chettiar and others v Govindaswamy chettiar, A. I. R. 1963, Madras 207. The facts in the said case were as follows :-"the petitioner in that petition should deposit a sum of Rs. 2,000/- within a specified time and furnish security within same time for a sum of Rs. 1,000/- and further desposit in the trial court every year a sum of Rs. 350/- the first payment to be made on 1st July, 1962. It was subject to these conditions that the stay of the execution was granted. The petitioner though he complied with the other conditions failed to deposit the sum of Rs. 350/- within the time stipulated. The petitioner, in the said case, filed an application praying to extend the time for depositing the sum of Rs. 350/- by reviewing the earlier order, if necessary and "relieve the petitioners of the consequences resulting from the non-payment on the due date and allowing them to continue in possession of the suit properties. "the Madras High Court held :"it seems to me to be obvious that this prayer cannot be granted, for where a conditional order has been made and the condition is not complied with, even though there is no clause in the order providing for the effect of default, the interim order ceases to operate. In such circumstances, there was no impediment in the way of the respondent executing the decree for possession, and the delivery of possession of the trees to the respondent on 4th July, 1962 was, therefore, proper and lawful. "the said decision was rendered by the Madras High Court after considering the Supreme Court decision reported in 1961 SC 882. In view of the said madras High Court decision even if the conditional stay did not prescribe any default clause, the conditional order would cease to be effective on the expiry of the period prescribed. "the said decision was rendered by the Madras High Court after considering the Supreme Court decision reported in 1961 SC 882. In view of the said madras High Court decision even if the conditional stay did not prescribe any default clause, the conditional order would cease to be effective on the expiry of the period prescribed. ( 16 ) IN this case, no payment or deposit as ordered on 7-11-84 has been made by the appellant before the expiry of 12 weeks or till today. Even the application I. A. Ill dated 17-3-85 for extension of time filed by the appellant had been rejected on 1-9-1986. This application for extention of time has been filed after the expiry of 12 weeks prescribed by the order dated 7-11-84 and after the possession was delivered. Even the application I. A. 2 dated 23-1-85 filed for modification of the order had been rejected in the first appeal. Therefore, under these circumstances, the said conditional order dated 7-11-84 passed in the said R. F. A. , was not at all in force on the day where the executing court ordered the delivery of the property and issued the delivery warrant dated 14-3-85 and where the possession of the property was delivered to the plaintiff. ( 17 ) IN this case the executing court issued the warrant for delivery on 14-3-85 and the possession was delivered to the plaintiffs on 16-3-85. Therefore, the executing court cannot be said to have committed any irregularity or illegality in passing the order for delivery of possession or in issuing delivery warrant or in handing over possession of the property to the plaintiffs. ( 18 ) IN the result, the order impugned in the revision does not call for any interference and the revision is dismissed. Petition is dismissed. --- *** --- .