JUDGMENT A. N. Dikshita, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the award dated 21-7-1978 and the order dated 4-8-1978. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are ; Petitioner No. 2 was employed with respondent No. 3 as a permanent substitute weaver in shift 'B' in its weaving department at the relevant time. 3. Petitioner No. 2 was also Joint Secretary of petitioner No. 1 and was its representative on the Provident Fund Trustees Board. On occasions the petitioner No. 2 had to espouse the cause of the workmen and had also to agitate for the vindication of the grievances of the workmen thus embittering his relations with the respondent No. 3 which was on the look out for dismissing him. 4. An industrial dispute in regard to the payment of bonus arose between the workmen and the employees of the respondent No. 3 and which was referred and pending adjudication before the Labour Court, Lucknow in Adjudication Case No. 306 of 1974. The petitioner No. 2 a workman was a party in the said dispute within the meaning of worked as enjoined under Section 6 (E) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the U.P. Act). 5. During the pendency of the aforesaid dispute the petitioner No. 2 was dismissed for misconduct by respondent No. 3 w. e. f. 19-10-1975 though without obtaining either prior permission of the Labour Court or the subsequent approval of the authorities as contemplated in the U.P. Act. An application under Section 6 (F) alleging that the petitioner No. 2 has been dismissed contrary to the provisions enshrined under Section 6 (E) of the U.P. Act was filed before the Labour Court. This application was contested by the respondent No. 3. It was further alleged by the petitioner No. 2 that on the basis of a fictitious charge-sheet the petitioner No. 2 has been dismissed from service on a cooked up allegation that he instigated workmen of shift 'A' to go on strike. The petitioner No. 2 contended that he has been dismissed without any departmental inquiry having been held by respondent No. 3. 6. The petitioner No. 2 contended that he has been dismissed without any departmental inquiry having been held by respondent No. 3. 6. Respondent No. 2 initially held that the inquiry held by respondent No. 3 was not fair but came to the conclusion while allowing latter's application, that respondent No. 3 may produce its evidence to substantiate the charges against the petitioner No. 2 resulting in his dismissal. 7. After necessary evidence was adduced on behalf of the parties respondent No. 2 came to the conclusion that the dismissal of petitioner No. 2 was neither wrongful nor unjust nor the quantum of punishment was excessive. 8. The case of the petitioner is that he has been wrongfully dismissed from service by respondent No. 3. The proceeding under Section 6 (E) being pending the respondent No. 3 had no such right or authority to dispense with his services without any prior permission or subsequent approval. 9. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 denying the allegations as contained in the writ petition. Respondent No. 3 has maintained that the dismissal of petitioner No. 2 from service was wholly legal and absolutely justified and in any case would not be deemed to be contrary to law. 10. As the respondent No. 2 found the preliminary inquiry not fair respondent No. 3 filed an application on 8-10-1976 before respondent No. 2 that for any technical defects or material omission the inquiry is held to be vitiated than the respondents be allowed to prove their case by producing necessary evidence so as to sustain the order of dismissal. This application was, however, allowed by respondent No. 2. 11. Respondent No. 3 further contended that petitioner No. 2 had at no stage during the proceedings before the Labour Court spelt out that the strike was justified or legal. Even no issue was framed to that effect nor any evidence was led in support of the fact that the strike was legal. However, even if the petitioners contend that a controversy was pending in regard to the payment of bonus still the contention of respondent No. 3 is that a notice was liable to be given to respondent No. 3 for resorting to strike and in the absence of such a notice the strike was wholly illegal. 12. However, even if the petitioners contend that a controversy was pending in regard to the payment of bonus still the contention of respondent No. 3 is that a notice was liable to be given to respondent No. 3 for resorting to strike and in the absence of such a notice the strike was wholly illegal. 12. After necessary evidence tendered by the parties the respondent No. 2 vide its award dated 21-7-78 held that the action taken by respondent No. 3 against petitioner No. 2 is fully justified. Instigation of workmen to go on strike amounts to grave misconduct. The punishment awarded to him cannot be considered to be excessive in the totality of the circumstances. Respondent No. 2 further repelled the allegation that the dismissal is the outcome of ill-will and mala fide intention. 13. Counsel for the parties have been heard at length learned counsel for the petitioner Sri K.P. Agarwal urged that even assuming that there was a strike in 'A' shift even then it would be deemed to be justified as respondent No. 3 was not complying with the terms and conditions of the agreement that the bonus would be paid by a particular date and which having not been paid gave room for agitation resulting in the strike. The contention that even assuming that there was a strike, it was justified, was never raised before respondent No. 2. Further the contention that petitioner No. 2 was wholly justified in instigating the workers who resorted to strike appears to be wholly misconceived and is ill merited. The plea regarding justification for strike has been raised for the first time before this Court. Respondent No- 2 on the basis of the material before it had come to the conclusion that petitioner No. 2 had instigated the workers resulting in the strike and had thus committed grave misconduct warranting dismissal from service. The punishment awarded was found to be neither excessive nor arbitrary nor the outcome of bad faith. The justification for strike was thus not espoused before respondent No. 2 and it would not be permissible to raise it for the first time in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which is an extraordinary jurisdiction. However, the strike cannot be justified as the dispute regarding payment of bonus was already pending adjudication before the Labour Court, Lucknow in Adjudication Case No. 306 of 1974. However, the strike cannot be justified as the dispute regarding payment of bonus was already pending adjudication before the Labour Court, Lucknow in Adjudication Case No. 306 of 1974. Even the date for payment had not expired. Any grievance in respect of the dispute pending in the adjudication case before the Labour Court, Lucknow, cannot be deemed to be justified. Further Section 30 (1) of the Payment of Bonus Act postulates for providing necessary remedy in case bonus is not paid. Adverting to the contention of the petitioner that the strike was justified it is to be seen whether such a fact was ever pleaded and if so was it ever proved. In the complaint filed by petitioner No. 2 before the Labour Court no such plea of justification was ever raised. Even in the statement of petitioner No. 2 recorded before the Labour Court there is not a whisper as regards justification of strike. Another interesting fact which cannot be lost sight of is that initially petitioner No. 2 denied his participation in the strike but later on admitted his participation. Having perused the material before this Court it is found that no plea of justifiability of strike was ever raised before respondent No. 2. The findings of respondent No. 2 as regards the participation of the petitioner No. 2 in the strike and instigating the workers to resort to strike are findings of fact recorded by respondent No. 2 and this Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would not examine such findings of fact unless they are found to be perverse or contrary to the provisions of law. 14. However as regards the raising of the plea in regard to the justification for resorting to strike by the petitioner as stated above it is being sought to be raised for the first time before this Court. This question as to whether the strike was justified or not requires investigation into the facts and would not be a pure question of law and has to be determined on the basis of the facts and material available before respondent No. 2. Any circumstance compelling petitioner No. 2 for resorting to strike was also not significantly brought to the notice of respondent No. 2. Any circumstance compelling petitioner No. 2 for resorting to strike was also not significantly brought to the notice of respondent No. 2. Such a plea cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time before this Court warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in a dispute between Niranjan Lal Bhargava & Co. and Dy. Labour Commissioner and others, 1979 (39) FLR 11, where it has been held that questions which are not pure questions of law and require investigation into fact cannot be raised for the first time when such facts were not pleaded or raised before the authority. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed strong reliance in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, 1980 (40) FLR 152 . The standing order as applicable in that case would read as under so far as it is relevant : "24. The following acts and omissions on the part of a workman shall amount to misconduct : (b) going on an illegal strike or abetting, inciting, instigating or acting in furtherance thereof." 16. While interpreting the same provision the Supreme Court found that the workmen were justified in resorting to strike which otherwise was not illegal. However, the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (supra) is distinguishable as the standing orders of respondent No. 3 which are recited here in below as for as relevant speak of acts or omissions which would be treated as misconduct : "23. The following acts or omissions will be treated as misconduct : (b) Striking work, either singly or with other operatives without giving 14 days' previous notice. 17. It is thus clear that if a workman resorts to striking the work then it would be deemed to be misconduct. The case relied upon and the dictum laid down in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha. (supra) is thus of no avail to the petitioner. Admittedly within the postulates of Clause 23 of the Standing Orders applicable to the petitioners it is clearly shown that the petitioners had struck work and had instigated other workmen to go on strike as found as a matter of fact by respondent No. 2. 18. (supra) is thus of no avail to the petitioner. Admittedly within the postulates of Clause 23 of the Standing Orders applicable to the petitioners it is clearly shown that the petitioners had struck work and had instigated other workmen to go on strike as found as a matter of fact by respondent No. 2. 18. However, in resorting to strike the misconduct is inherent therein and respondent No. 2 found that petitioner No. 2 had committed a gross misconduct in resorting to such strike when the matter was already under adjudication as has been discussed above. 19. On the question of payment of bonus the petitioner abruptly called for a strike and thus inviting their workmen to join with him and thus paralysing the working of the mill. The petitioners were aware that a dispute in respect of the payment of bonus was pending adjudication and as such there cannot be a cogent much less valid reason or justification to resort to strike thus committing gross misconduct. In a dispute between Chura Kulam Tea Estate Private Ltd. v. Its Workmen and another, 1969 (II) LLJ 407 (SC). it has been held that there is no justification for such a strike which is illegal. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners has failed to satisfy me that the findings recorded by respondent No. 2 are perverse or that they are contrary to the provisions of law resulting in miscarriage of justice. Reliance in regard to the justification of strike has been placed by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of Swadesh Industries Ltd. v. Its Workmen, (1960) (II) LLJ 78 (SC).This authority is of no avail to the petitioners as it has been held in that case that whether the strike was justified or not is a question of fact. Respondent No. 2 on the material before it found the strike to be illegal. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that respondent No. 2 committed manifest error of law in himself assuming the jurisdiction to enquire into the misconduct. This plea an in is ill-merited. At the instance of respondent No. 3 an application for conducting the inquiry was moved and it was allowed by respondent No. 2. There is thus no illegality in assuming such jurisdiction to hold inquiry by the respondent No- 2 into the misconduct committed by petitioner No. 2. 22. This plea an in is ill-merited. At the instance of respondent No. 3 an application for conducting the inquiry was moved and it was allowed by respondent No. 2. There is thus no illegality in assuming such jurisdiction to hold inquiry by the respondent No- 2 into the misconduct committed by petitioner No. 2. 22. On the application of respondent No. 3 which was allowed by respondent No. 2 the latter himself conducted necessary inquiries and permitted the parties to adduce evidence so as to justify the dismissal of petitioner No. 2 on the ground of misconduct. The respondent No. 2 thus conducted necessary inquiries in the misconduct of petitioner No. 2 and on the basis of material produced as well as taking into account the evidence which was produced before him found that the petitioner No. 2 had in fact been guilty of misconduct warranting dismissal. The respondent No. 2 had arrived at the conclusion that the action of the management is neither mala fide nor the outcome of bad faith and it has rightly, concluded that the order dismissing the petitioner No. 2 from service was justified. In the instant case the inquiry has been conducted by respondent No. 2 and the conclusions arrived at by respondent No. 2 do not smack of any impropriety and the conclusions arrived at by the respondent No. 2 are reasonable one. Neither the procedure adopted by respondent No. 2 was unfair nor contrary to the requirements of law nor any procedural irregularities have been committed by respondent No. 2 in holding an inquiry at the instance of the respondent No. 3 to the action of respondent No. 3 in dismissing the petitioner No. 2 from its services. The above view finds support from the decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v L. B. Singh, AIR 1972 SC 1031 . Such a view has also been held in the matter of a dispute between Chhail Bihari Saxena and others and Labour Court, Bareilly and another decided by this Court on 7-6-86 in Civil Misc. Writ petition No. 68548 of 1981(1986 1 Labour Law Notes 926). 23. Ltd. v L. B. Singh, AIR 1972 SC 1031 . Such a view has also been held in the matter of a dispute between Chhail Bihari Saxena and others and Labour Court, Bareilly and another decided by this Court on 7-6-86 in Civil Misc. Writ petition No. 68548 of 1981(1986 1 Labour Law Notes 926). 23. However, if the inquiry which was held by the respondents be held to be unfair even then the story would not and there in favour of the workmen as it is well settled now that the management may still satisfy the Tribunal/Labour Court about the misconduct. Such a view has taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (supra). In this case it has been held by the Supreme Court that an error or a wrong order cannot be righted merely because it is wrong while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The order sought to be challenged can be quashed if it is vitiated by error of law on the face of the order, jurisdictional incompetence, perverse misreading of facts or absence of legal evidence. 24. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 ., it has been held that where there is some evidence that the authority entrusted with their duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding under evidence. The authorities ceased with the matter or the sole Judges of fact and if there had been some legal evidence on which such findings can be based the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in the proceedings for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. 25. While challenging the orders passed by Labour Court under Article 226 of the Constitution it is true that the jurisdiction is too wide but at the same time such jurisdiction has to be exercised with great circumspection. 25. While challenging the orders passed by Labour Court under Article 226 of the Constitution it is true that the jurisdiction is too wide but at the same time such jurisdiction has to be exercised with great circumspection. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the Court cannot constitute itself into an appellate court over the order passed by the Tribunal and re adjudicate the issue or the questions of fact decided by the Labour Court. In the matter of dispute between Sadhu Ram and Delhi Transport Corporation, 1983 (11) LLJ 385 (SC), it has been held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constit `ution has to be exercised with caution and not as an appellate forum. It has further been held that it will not entitle the High Court to interfere with the finding on the jurisdictional fact which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. 26. Sri V. B. Singh learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that even otherwise the strike which has been resorted to on 29-9-1975 would not be justified for the non-payment of bonus as the settlement arrived at for the payment of such bonus was by 31-10-1975. There is no dispute that the strike was resorted to without notice. 27. In the dispute between India Marine Service (Pvt.) Ltd. and Their Workmen, 1963 (I) LLJ 122 , it was held by the Supreme Court that the dismissal of the workmen in the interest of discipline inviting misconduct is justified. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioners then urged that the punishment awarded was too excessive and highly severe. In support of the contention reliance has been placed upon Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and others. (supra). This case also is of no help to the petitioners as it is not open to this Court to examine the circumstances which have been adequately and reasonably examined by respondent No. 2. The petitioner No. 2 had not only participated in an illegal strike but had also fomented it as has been found by respondent No. 2. The trouble was fomented by petitioner No. 2 and the workmen were instigated to join such an illegal strike which was found by respondent No. 2 to be such and the petitioner No. 2 was found guilty of misconduct. The punishment is thus awarded by respondent No. 2 cannot be assailed. The trouble was fomented by petitioner No. 2 and the workmen were instigated to join such an illegal strike which was found by respondent No. 2 to be such and the petitioner No. 2 was found guilty of misconduct. The punishment is thus awarded by respondent No. 2 cannot be assailed. 29. The petitioner on account of the misconduct in resorting to an illegal strike has been dismissed from service for such misconduct. The Labour Court found that the award of punishment for the misconduct neither suffers from propriety nor adequacy nor does it suffer from excessiveness or too severity. It will be beyond the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to enter into the quantum of punishment as has been held in the case of M/s. Hind Construction and Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1965 SC 917 . 30. It may not always be open while exercising to pierce the veil of the order passed by the Labour Court/Tribunal and have a close look at all the circumstances and come to a decision as regards the fact that the order was passed on account of certain misconduct by the petitioner or not. This is a finding of fact which could not be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution unless the conclusion is perverse. Such a view was taken in the dispute between Mahendra Singh Dantwal and Hindustan Motors Ltd. and others, 1976 (II) LLJ 259 by the Supreme Court. 31. In view of the above it is settled that the scope of interference with the findings of the departmental authorities is much more restricted and more so when such findings of fact have been recorded by the appropriate forum (Labour Court, respondent No 2). The findings arrived at by the respondent No. 2 can be interfered with only if they are based upon no evidence or based upon extranuous or irrelevant evidence or otherwise perverse. This view finds adequately support in the case of Mrs. Khushiram Behari Lal & Co. v. Assessing Authority Sangrur and another, AIR 1976 SC 2372 . 32. In view of the above discussions this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.