Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs are the appellants. O.S. 28/79 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Thodupuzha was filed by them for recovery of possession of 6 acres 67 cents of land and a building standing thereon on the strength of their previous possession alleging dispossession by the defendants. The defendants denied possession and dispossession alleged by the plaintiff's and contended that they are in independent possession. They also pleaded that the suit is not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in S.20A of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, here-in-after called 'the Act'. The trial court accepted the entire case of the plaintiffs, but dismissed the suit solely on the ground that it is not maintainable in view of S.20A of the Act. In A.S. 40/81 the only point urged and considered was whether the suit is maintainable. The District Judge, Thodupuzha agreed with the Subordinate Judge in this respect and dismissed the appeal. Hence the plaintiffs have come up in second appeal. 2. Admittedly, the plaint Schedule.6 acres 67 cents is land belonging to the Government. Item No. 2 is a building standing thereon. That was constructed by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were in possession from the year 1959 onwards. Item No. 2 was registered in the Panchayat in the name of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that the Ist defendant was appointed as a watcher to look after the property and building. While so, he asserted hostile title and attempted to take forcible possession of the property. Therefore the plaintiffs filed O.S. 68/74 against him for injunction and the suit was decreed evidenced by Ext. A8 decree. The further case of the plaintiffs is that thereafter defendants I and 2 approached the Tahsildar for Land Assignment and got an order of assignment of the plaint schedule property in their favour. It is said that this order was obtained mis-representing facts regarding possession. Plaintiffs filed a petition and consequently the assignment in favour of the defendants was cancelled on 8-12-1977. The suit was filed on the allegation that on 11-12-1977 defendants reduced the property to their possession by force. Mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 500/- per year was also claimed by the plaintiffs. 3. Defendants contended that the plaint schedule property in O.S. 68/74 is not the same as the plaint schedule property in this case. The suit was filed on the allegation that on 11-12-1977 defendants reduced the property to their possession by force. Mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 500/- per year was also claimed by the plaintiffs. 3. Defendants contended that the plaint schedule property in O.S. 68/74 is not the same as the plaint schedule property in this case. They claimed that the 1st defendant is in possession of 3.42 acres and 2nd defendant is in possession of 3.25 acres and their possession is independent of the plaintiffs. First defendant denied the fact that be was watcher of the plaintiffs. They also contended that they are not aware of the cancellation of the assignment in their favour. Second defendant contended that he was not a party to O. S.68/74. They claimed to have effected valuable improvements and contended that in case of eviction they are entitled to get value of improvements. 4. Both sides adduced oral and documentary evidence. Plaintiffs produced Exts. Al to All (a) and examined PWS.1 to 4. First defendant was examined as DW.1 and the defendants produced Exts. B1 to B10. Considering the entire evidence the trial court came to the following findings. (1) Plaint schedule property in O. S.68/74 and the plaint schedule property in this case are one and the same. (2) The plaintiff was in possession of the property from the year 1959 onwards. (3) The 1st defendant was an employee of the plaintiff and be was paying house tax for plaint schedule item No. 2 building in the name of the 1st plaintiff for and on his behalf. (4) The defendants are trespassers and they are not entitled to get value of improvements, and (5) If the plaintiffs were entitled to get recovery of possession they would have been entitled to get mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 500/- per year. After entering all these findings the suit was dismissed, as already stated, solely on the ground that it is not maintainable on account of S.20A of the Act. 5. From the judgment of the appellate court it is seen that the only finding of the trial court which was under challenge before the appellate court was the one relating to maintainability of the suit on account of S.20A of the Act. Therefore the appellate judge considered only that aspect. 5. From the judgment of the appellate court it is seen that the only finding of the trial court which was under challenge before the appellate court was the one relating to maintainability of the suit on account of S.20A of the Act. Therefore the appellate judge considered only that aspect. I said so only because at the fag and of the arguments before me, there was an attempt on behalf of the respondents to pray for a remand of the case to the appellate court for consideration of the other contentions. I shall advert to that aspect later. 6. The main question that has to be considered is the bar under S.20A of the Act. S.20A(1) of the Act reads: "No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding for the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of Government, whether a puramboke or not. or the recovery of any fine, assessment, or prohibitory assessment or the value of any trees destroyed or appropriated or any compensation or damages, payable under this Act or cost of eviction or removal of encroachments, or any portion of such fine, assessment, prohibitory assessment, value of trees, compensation, damages or cost." The Section bars jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain suits or proceedings relating to ever so many matters of which we are concerned in this case only with suits of the first category namely suits for eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the Government, whether a puramboke or not. The prohibition contained in S.20A will have to be considered in the light of the other provisions contained in the Act and Rules. S.3 and 4 of the Act define property of Government and Puramboke. S.5 says that land which is the property of Government should not be occupied without permission. S.7 provides for punishment for unauthorised occupation of Government land. S.8 provides for assessment of levy on lands which are the property of the Government unauthorisedly occupied. S.9 also provides for liability for unauthorised occupation. S.11 provides that unauthorised occupants are liable to summary eviction by the Government. Under the Rule making power provided in S.13 rules were also framed by the Government for the purposes mentioned above. S.8 provides for assessment of levy on lands which are the property of the Government unauthorisedly occupied. S.9 also provides for liability for unauthorised occupation. S.11 provides that unauthorised occupants are liable to summary eviction by the Government. Under the Rule making power provided in S.13 rules were also framed by the Government for the purposes mentioned above. As to how unauthorised occupants are to be dealt with, the Act and Rules provide a complete code in themselves. The prohibition contained in S.20A comes in the background of these provisions. What is provided is that no civil court has jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding for the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the Government. All the matters dealt with under S.20A are those for which provisions are made in the Act and Rules. Summary eviction of unauthorised occupants is the right of the Government and as already stated it is provided in S.1). What is meant by the prohibition in S.20A is that the rights vested in the Government for eviction, recovery of fine, assessment, prohibitory assessment etc and provided under the Act and the Rules cannot be made the subject-matter of suits or proceedings before civil courts. The effect of the prohibition against suits for eviction is that the right conferred on the Government for eviction and the methods provided for that purpose in the Act and Rules should not be superseded by somebody else filing suits before civil courts. If a person is in unauthorised occupation of the land belonging to the Government the right to evict him and otherwise deal with him is within the sole competence of the Government. Prohibition is only regarding matters provided for in the Act and the Rules. 7. If somebody other than the Government forcibly evicts a person in unauthorised possession of land belonging to Government, that is a contingency for which provision is not made in the Act and the Rules. The right of such a person to recover possession is not a matter for which provision is made in the Act or Rules. 7. If somebody other than the Government forcibly evicts a person in unauthorised possession of land belonging to Government, that is a contingency for which provision is not made in the Act and the Rules. The right of such a person to recover possession is not a matter for which provision is made in the Act or Rules. The prohibition contained in S.20A cannot affect the common law rights of such a person to seek relief against the trespasser to recover possession through the court of law on the strength of his possessory title though it did not mature into statutory title. A different interpretation of S.20A will only encourage lawlessness which would never have been the intention of the legislature. S.20A can have application only in relation to matters for which provisions are made in the Act and Rules and not otherwise. It may not have any application to the general rule that all disputes of a civil nature, the cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred by law, could be entertained by a civil court. An unauthorised occupant of a Government land who acquired possessory title has a valid title against all the world except the Government which is the actual owner. He could be evicted only by the Government. If he is forcibly evicted by somebody else his right to recover possession is not in any way affected by S.20A of the Act. 8. Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law. Apart from ownership it has got all the legal incidents attached to it. Even before acquiring statutory rights by adverse possession or otherwise he has got well defined rights in the property. As against the whole world except those who are having better right or title than him his possessory title will bold good and must be allowed to be in force. Possession is not title only against those who are having better right or title. Possessory title is heritable, devisable and transferable. Possessory title is distinct from proprietary title. If dispossessed without recourse to law possessory title is good even as against the true owner provided a suit is brought within six months of dispossession under S.9 of the Specific Relief Act on the strength of the possessory right. Possessory title is heritable, devisable and transferable. Possessory title is distinct from proprietary title. If dispossessed without recourse to law possessory title is good even as against the true owner provided a suit is brought within six months of dispossession under S.9 of the Specific Relief Act on the strength of the possessory right. Title or better title may not be a defence in such a suit in which all questions of title are foreign to the scope of the enquiry. Bar of suits beyond six months of dispossession in a suit brought merely on the strength of dispossession is applicable only when it is against the true owner. Against all others there is the period of limitation fixed under the Limitation Act within which a suit for possession can be brought on the strength of possession alleging dispossession. Against them possessory title is good title. The normal rule is that if a suit is brought within six months of dispossession under S.9 of the Specific Relief Act on the strength of previous possession, title need not be alleged and proved. But if the suit is brought beyond six months of dispossession the plaintiff cannot recover merely on the strength of possession, but he has to prove title also. But that rule is applicable only if the person who dispossessed him is having title or better title. A rank trespasser having no right cannot set up his own possessory title obtained by force as a defence because it is later than and consequently inferior to the possessory title of the plaintiff. Earlier possessory title is better than possessory title obtained later by dispossession without recourse to law. The expediency of this doctrine of possessory ownership is that if it were not for such a rule, force and fraud would be left to determine all disputes as to possession between persons of whom neither could show an unimpeachable title to the thing as the true owner of it. Existing possession, however acquired, is protected against any interference by a mere wrongdoer. Wrongdoer cannot defend himself by showing a better title in a third person under whom he himself is not claiming. 9. Not only the Specific Relief Act but the Code of Criminal Procedure also provide for safeguarding possessory title. Existing possession, however acquired, is protected against any interference by a mere wrongdoer. Wrongdoer cannot defend himself by showing a better title in a third person under whom he himself is not claiming. 9. Not only the Specific Relief Act but the Code of Criminal Procedure also provide for safeguarding possessory title. The Magistrate having jurisdiction under S.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can step in to maintain such possession until eviction in due course of law or to restore possession if the possessor has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed with-m two months preceding. Over and above the statutory provisions, the rule of English Law that possession is good title against any one who cannot show a better title has been recognised and accepted by Courts in India. The decisions in Narayanan v. Mathai (1966 KLT and Rev. Father K. C. Alexander v. N.S.S. Ltd. (1966 KLT 333), both dealing with cases of dispossession of persons in occupation of Government lands without title by trespassers, considered and affirmed the above positions. On that point Narayanan v. Mathai (1966 KLT 1) said: "Possession by itself is a substantive right recognised by law and has legal incidents attached to it apart from ownership. Even before the acquisition of statutory title by adverse possession for the requisite period under the Limitation Act, the possessory owner has well-defined rights in property. It is now settled beyond all dispute that this interest is heritable, devisable and transferable This interest is referred to as possessory title as distinct from proprietary title. A person having such interest must be allowed to enforce those rights against ail the world except those who have a better title or better right than himself. Possession is evidence of ownership and is itself the foundation of a right to possession. It is a good title against all the world except the person who can show a better title. Therefore a person in juridical possession, if dispossessed by a trespasser without title, can recover possession on the sole ground of his prior possession even beyond six months from the dale of dispossession". The decision in Rev. It is a good title against all the world except the person who can show a better title. Therefore a person in juridical possession, if dispossessed by a trespasser without title, can recover possession on the sole ground of his prior possession even beyond six months from the dale of dispossession". The decision in Rev. Father K C. Alexander v. N. S. S Ltd. (1966 KLT 333) laid down the law thus: 'A person in possession, even if he be a trespasser, can, on the strength of his possessory title, get back possession from any person (except the true owner) who dispossesses him. if he brings a suit within the 12 years limited by law-if he brings it within six months under S.9 of the Specific Relief Act, he can recover possession even from the true owner. It must follow that an earlier possessor has a prior and. therefore, a better title than the later possessor and can, unless his title has been extinguished by limitation, recover not merely from the trespasser who dispossessed him but from any subsequent trespasser. Just as a true owner who is dispossessed can within the period, limited by law, bring a suit for possession against the person in possession notwithstanding that the latter is not the immediate, but only a subsequent intruder irrespective of the number or nature of the intervening adverse possessory titles, so can a possessory owner against all but the true owner. It does not make any difference, then, that, in between, there was an interval during which the true owner was in possession, nor would that extinguish the title of all earlier possessory owners so as to entrench a subsequent trespasser and give him good title against all but the true owner. For. the title of a possessory owner springs from the fact of his possession and that is not erased by the true owner regaining possession. For. the title of a possessory owner springs from the fact of his possession and that is not erased by the true owner regaining possession. The possessory owner's title continues to exist; only it is an imperfect title which is of no avail against the perfect title of the true owner; but against the inferior title of any subsequent possessor, it is a good title The reason why the earliest possessor within the twelve years is allowed to recover from the latest is that he has a prior and, therefore a better title, a title which becomes absolute the moment the title of the rightful owner is barred; it is not that he is entitled to evict the trespasser who dispossessed him and that trespasser the next until the latest is reached; and, therefore, it should rinks no difference that, in between, there was an interval when the true owner was in possession from whom no recovery was possible So long as the actual possessor is only a subsequent trespasser with an inferior title, an earlier possessor can recover on the strength of his superior title" 10. Against these decisions the learned counsel for the respondents wanted to rely on a Full Bench decision of the Travancore High Court in Govindan Neelacunden v Govindan Peruman (9 TLR 169) That was a case based on the Viruthi Proclamation issued by Maharaja of Travancore on 16-5-1886 more than a century ago. A' that time revenue settlement was in progress. Viruthi lands were lands of the Maharaja over which the tenants bad no right at all. They were only tenants at will. They did not have even the right to claim possessory title or convey the same. Until settlement was finalised the provision was that the viruthi holders should approach the settlement peshkar. It was under these circumstances that the provision contained in Regulation.8 of the Proclamation was introduced. That provision stated "No Viruthicar shall be at liberty to alienate, by sale, gift or mortgage or otherwise, the Inam given to him for the Viruthi service. All such alienations shall be null and void, and the Government shall have the power of resuming any such alienated Viruthi Inam, and restoring it to the holder, or otherwise disposing of it as to whom may seem fit. All such alienations shall be null and void, and the Government shall have the power of resuming any such alienated Viruthi Inam, and restoring it to the holder, or otherwise disposing of it as to whom may seem fit. No action shall lie respecting any such land in any Court of Law." The Viruthi holders were holding the property for services at the will of the Maharaja and the above-said provision effected a complete bar of the jurisdiction of the civil court in such cases. The above-said decision was interpreting the last sentence in that clause. It said that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to entertain such suits At the same time T. Kunhiraman Nair, J. had added a note to that judgment. It is stated that the effect of the provision as interpreted by the Full Bench is to deprive a class of petty land - holders in the state of the" protection afforded by the civil courts established by the country for settlement of disputes of a civil nature, while the declared general policy of Government has always been to make the possession of landed and other property as secure as possible. Much water has flown under the bridge after the above decision was rendered. Further that decision happened to be rendered entirely under a different provision of law and entirely under different legal setup, That decision cannot have any application to the 'acts of the present case. Therefore I am definitely of opinion that the trial court as well as the appellate court fundamentally went wrong in finding that the suit is not maintainable on account of S.20A of the Act. I find that the suit is perfectly maintainable and the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs prayed for. 11. I have already stated that there was a request for a remand of the appeal to the lower appellate court since it did not decide the questions involved in the case other than the bar of suit under S.20-A of the Act. It is true that the only question considered by the appellate court was maintainability of the suit under S.20A In the normal course I ought to have acceded to the request and remanded the appeal in order to enable the appellate court to enter its findings on the other issues which were decided by the trial court. It is true that the only question considered by the appellate court was maintainability of the suit under S.20A In the normal course I ought to have acceded to the request and remanded the appeal in order to enable the appellate court to enter its findings on the other issues which were decided by the trial court. But in the peculiar circumstances of this case, I do not think that it is necessary to concede that request. Even before me the only issue argued on behalf of the respondents was the bar under S.20A of the Act. The prayer for remand on the ground that the appellate court has not considered the other issues came only after the arguments were fully over namely even after the counsel for the appellants replied to the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents. This must definitely have been the position before the lower appellate court also. That is clear from the judgment of the District court in which the only point formulated for consideration is whether the suit is maintainable on account of S.20A of the Act. That means this must have been the only question that was argued before that court. If both sides did not address any arguments before the lower appellate court on the other findings it must be taken that they have accepted those findings and courted a decision only on the maintainability subject to those findings If that be the case the respondents cannot now gain time by making a request for remand. I am conscious of the fact that, I am not having the advantage of the findings of the appellate court on the other issues involved. But in the above circumstances, I do not wish to delay the matter further by a remand. 12. In Para.7 of the judgment the trial court has considered the entire evidence and found that the property included in OS. 68/ 74 and the present suit both of which were filed by the same plaintiffs is one and the same. In that suit the present plaintiff was found to be in possession and he was given a decree for injunction against the 1st defendant evidenced by Ext. A8., The case of the plaintiffs that the 1st defendant was their employee was also considered by the trial court in the light of the entire evidence including the deposition of the Ist defendant. A8., The case of the plaintiffs that the 1st defendant was their employee was also considered by the trial court in the light of the entire evidence including the deposition of the Ist defendant. It was found that he was an employee of the 1st plaintiff and that on behalf of the first plaintiff he was paying building tax for plaint schedule item No. 2. Considering the evidence the trial court found that from 1959 the plaintiffs were in possession and that they were dispossessed by the defendants as alleged. Therefore it is a clear case in which the plaintiffs were unauthorisedly dispossessed by the defendants while they were in possession of the land, whether unauthorisedly or not. On this finding I do not think that there is any reason for interference. 13. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that admittedly they are now in possession and there was an order of assignment in their favour by the Tahsildar. It is said that even though the assignment was subsequently cancelled and even though the respondents were defeated in the appeal also, they are attempting to move the Government and their rights cannot be affected by an adverse decree passed by this Court. I do not think that there is any merit in that contention also. The trial court found that the possession obtained by the defendants was by force by dispossessing the plaintiffs while they were in possession. It was on the strength of such possession that they were able to get assignment. When these facts were brought by the plaintiffs to the notice of the Special Tahsildar who ordered the assignment, the assignment itself was admittedly cancelled on 8-12-1977. Now the defendants admit that they filed an appeal against that order and got defeated. What they now want is to move the Government. If they are so entitled they can move the Government. But that fact need not stand in the way of this suit being disposed of on the merits. So far as this suit is concerned, the evidence is clinching. Plaintiffs had possessory title over the Government land. They could have been evicted only by the Government and not by the defendants. Defendants have taken law into their hands and unauthorisedly trespassed upon the property. Plaintiffs are definitely entitled to evict them from the property and re-gain their possession. So far as this suit is concerned, the evidence is clinching. Plaintiffs had possessory title over the Government land. They could have been evicted only by the Government and not by the defendants. Defendants have taken law into their hands and unauthorisedly trespassed upon the property. Plaintiffs are definitely entitled to evict them from the property and re-gain their possession. The second appeal is therefore allowed and the decisions of both the courts below dismissing the suit on the basis of S 20-A of the Act are hereby set aside. The suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiffs for recovery of possession with mesne profits as prayed for in the plaint. Rate of mesne profits will be Rs. 500/- per year The appellants will get costs throughout from the defendants. Allowed.