ORDER Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. The prayer in the writ petition runs in the following terms: For the reasons mentioned in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate Orders, directions or writs as the case may be and in particular issue a writ in the nature of certiorari after calling for the concerned records from the 2nd respondent relating to G.O.Ms. No. 8 71, Labour and Employment Department dated 18.4.1980 (filed and marked as Exhibit 'A') quash the said Order dated 18.4.1980 issued by the 2nd respondent (Exhibit 'A')(ii) award costs and render justice. The Government Order referred to in the prayer in the writ petition is one made under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Central Act 14 of 1947' making the following reference for industrial adjudication to the third respondent: Whether the non-employment, of 53 Beedi Rollers in the Annexure II below is justified; if not to what relief he is entitled? To the relief if any awarded in terms of money if it could be so computed. The 53 beedi rollers referred to in the Order of reference are alleged to be the employees of the petitioner. There is no dispute by the petitioner that the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 (Central Act 32 of 1966) hereinafter referred to as the Central Act 32 of 1966' applies to the industrial premises of the petitioner, though a contention is raised that the 53 beedi rollers are not its employees. The primary ground of attack on the Order impugned, put forth by Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that with regard to the alleged non-employment of the 53 beedi rollers, there is a specific machinery provided for redressal and relief under Section 31 of the Central Act 32 of 1966 and that would exclude the provisions of Central Act 14 of 1947. In answer, Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that with regard to the alleged non-employment of the 53 beedi rollers, there is a specific machinery provided for redressal and relief under Section 31 of the Central Act 32 of 1966 and that would exclude the provisions of Central Act 14 of 1947. In answer, Mr. V. Venkataraman, Learned Counsel for the first respondent, would submit that Section 39(1) of the Central Act 32 of 1966 states that the provisions of the Central Act 14 or 1947 shall apply to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises and hence it cannot be stated that the provisions of the Central Act 14 of 1947 will stand excluded, even in the case of non-employment of an employee. 2. Section 31 of the Central Act 32 of 1966 reads as follows: 31. (1) No employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been employed for a period of six months or more, except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice: Provided that such notice shall not be necessary if the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held by the employer for the purpose. (2)(a) the employee discharged, dismissed or retrenched may appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there was no reasonable cause dor dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer or on the ground that such punishment of discharge or dismissal was severe. (b) The appellate authority may, after giving notice, in the prescribed manner to the employer and the employee, dismiss the appeal or direct the reinstatement of the employee with or without wages for the period during which he was kept out of employment or direct payment of compensation without reinstatement or grant such other relief as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. (3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the parties and be given effect to within such times as may be specified in the Order of the appellate authority. (3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the parties and be given effect to within such times as may be specified in the Order of the appellate authority. The language of Section 39 of the Central Act 32 of 1966 runs as follows: 39 (1) the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 shall apply to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), a dispute between an employer and employee relating to- (a) the issue by the employer of raw materials to the employees, (b) The rejection by the employer of beedi or cigar or both made by an employee, (c) The payment of wages for the beedi or cigar or both rejected by the employer, shall be settled by such authority and in such summary manner as the State Government may by rules specify in this behalf. (3) Any person aggrieved by a settlement made by the authority specified under Sub-section (2) may prefer an appeal to such authority and within such time as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette specify in this behalf. (4) the decision of the authority specified under Sub-section (3) shall be final. In my view, it is not necessary to delve on the larger issue as to whether the provisions of the Central Act 14 of 1947 stand totally excluded by virtue of the provisions of the Central Act 32 of 1966, though some submissions were made by both the sides from this angle. When we look into Section 39(1) of the Central Act 32 of 1966, we find that it does say that the Central Act 14 of 1947 shall apply to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises. But in the very same Act, namely, the Central Act 32 of 1966 there is a specific provision found in Section 31 as per the extract made above which has provided for and dealt with contingencies arising out of non - employment of an employee. Equally so, with reference to enumerated disputes Section 39(2) of the Central Act 32 of 1966 has provided a specified remedy. Equally so, with reference to enumerated disputes Section 39(2) of the Central Act 32 of 1966 has provided a specified remedy. When the Central Act 32 of 1966 was enacted, it is obvious that the Parliament did have before it the Central Act 14 of 1947 and it must be deemed to have taken note of all the contingencies that are likely to arise in the working out of the provisions of both the enactments. I If on the question of non - employment of an employee under the Central Act 32 of 1966 the provisions of the Central Act 14 of 1947 were intended to govern, the incorporation of Section 31 in the Central Act 32 of 1966 would be a redundancy. Certainly, this could not have been the intendent of the Central legislation. If we look into the scheme of the provisions and in particular Sections 31 and 39 of the Central Act 32 of 1966, we find that there could be a comfortable reconciliation between the two provisions which would not bring them into conflict with one another. Section 31 of the Central Act 32 of 1966 must be held to be a special provision intended to govern disputes arising in respect of every non-employment of an employee under that Act. Section 39(1) of the Central Act 32 of 1966 does have a place, but it will not be operative when dispute arises in respect of every non - employment, regarding which, as noted above, the special provision found in Section 31 of the Central Act 32 of 1966 must govern. Equally so, Section 39(2) of the Central Act 32 of 1966 has provided for a machinery to settle disputes with regard to enumerated matters set out therein. The maxim greneralia specialibus non - derogant is quite well known. The principle that general provisions should yield to the special provisions is not an arbitrary one but it is stated to have sprung from the common understanding of human race that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them, the intention is clear that the specified should prevail as regards those matters covered by it, while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should prevail. This would be the position in the case of construing different enactments one following up the other. This would be the position in the case of construing different enactments one following up the other. The rule does not stand excluded even with reference to construing the provisions found in the same statute. It can never be claimed and it is not claimed before me that the remedy under Section 31 of the Central Act 32 of 1966 is inadequate compared to the remedy under the Central Act 14 of 1947 . If we take note of the above principles, I am obliged to countenance the primary ground of attack put forward by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner on the Order of reference impugned in the writ petition. I have already stated that there is no need to go into the larger issue as to whether the provisions of the Central Act 14 of 1947 stand totally excluded by the provisions of the Central Act 32 of 1966. In this view, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.