Judgment :- This is an application filed by the petitioner in this Original Petition titled as a petition under Section 2(c) (ii) and (iii) and S. 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and Art. 215 of the Constitution of India. The office has not numbered this petition since normally application for taking proceedings for contempt of this court has to be filed in accordance with the statutory provisions under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 2. The petitioner tells me that this petition is maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Art. 215 of the Constitution. Of course, this petition poses a question whether a single Judge of this court is barred from initiating proceedings for contempt in view of the provisions of S. 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act. I do feel that this is an intricate question and I feel that this question need not be considered at length in these proceedings since I am of the view that the facts disclosed in the petition do not deserve any initiation of contempt proceedings against the Chief Minister of the State. I feel that I should remember at the very threshold the true nature and scope of contempt jurisdiction. The essence of the power to punish for contempt is no doubt in the larger public interest of preventing any unlawful interference with the administration of justice and to uphold the dignity and the grandeur of the law and not so much for the protection of individual Judges as such. 3. This general principle has been stated succinctly in Attorney-General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. (1979) 1 All ER 745 at p. 749 by Lord Diplock thus: - "... although criminal contempts of court may take a variety of forms they all share a common characteristic : they involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of court, not the individual court or Judge who is attempting to administer it." 4. Since the petitioner has invoked Art. 215 of the Constitution, what deserves to be highlighted is the fact that so far as superior courts are concerned, the power to punish in contempt action is inherent in them by the very nature of the functioning of the court itself. Since the petitioner has invoked Art. 215 of the Constitution, what deserves to be highlighted is the fact that so far as superior courts are concerned, the power to punish in contempt action is inherent in them by the very nature of the functioning of the court itself. This principle is reflected in the adage that every court of record has inherent power to punish the contempt of it. This principle has been rigorously and consistently recognised and followed from times immemorial by the common law of England. I have no doubt as regards this principle, the position in India is indeed not different. I do not want to quote precedents because practically every High Court in India has exercised its jurisdiction as an inherent power in the Court of Record. If authority is needed for, so clean and clear a proposition, I would instructively refer to that great case Sukhdev Singh v. Chief Justice S. Teja Singh and Judges of Pepsu High Court, AIR 1954 SC 186 : (1954 Cri LJ 460). 5. Judicial precedent apart, it is also necessary to mention that statutory recognition of this legal position has been formulated as early as in 1935 in S. 220(i) of the Government of India Act, 1935. It declared that every High Court shall be a Court of Record. Finally we see the epitome of this principle in Art. 215 of the Constitution of India which gives constitutional imprimature to this position in these words :- "Art. 215 - High Courts to be Courts of Record - Every High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself." 6. I say all these only to highlight that the contempt jurisdiction springs not from any enactment as such nor from the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, but is a necessary adjunct of all the Courts of Records which has been consistently so held by judicial precedents and finally recognised by the constitutional provision in Art. 215 of the Constitution and the statutory provision in Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. I may also refer to S. 22 of the 1971 Act which postulates that the provisions contained in the Act are supplementary to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts. I may also refer to S. 22 of the 1971 Act which postulates that the provisions contained in the Act are supplementary to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to contempt of courts. This also is a reiteration of the inherent power to punish contempt of it by Courts of Record. 7. In view of all what I have said above. I think I am bound to examine the question whether the petitioner can file a civil miscellaneous petition in this original proceedings in the form of giving information of certain facts for invoking the jurisdiction of this court for initiating contempt action on its own motion. 8. Now I have to refer to S. 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. It reads thus :- "Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases. - (1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in S. 14, Supreme Court or the High Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by - (a) the Advocate-General, or (b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General, (or) (c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi such Law Officer as Central Government may, by notification of the official Gazette specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in writing of such Law Officer. (2) In the case of any criminal contempt of subordinate court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, specify in this behalf. (3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the contempt of which the person charged is allege to be guilty." 9. In is clear that the sub-section delineates the limit to three types of motion. The section plainly keeps out and puts under a ban a private citizen from setting criminal contempt in motion unless he makes the motion with the consent of the Advocate General. In is clear that the sub-section delineates the limit to three types of motion. The section plainly keeps out and puts under a ban a private citizen from setting criminal contempt in motion unless he makes the motion with the consent of the Advocate General. So far as criminal contempt of this court is concerned, a controlling rein has been anchored to the power of taking action for contempt at the instance of a private citizen. The clear intention behind this restraint is to eliminate vindictiveness, malice or a desire to harass by exploiting the contempt of court action. Of course, the High Court or the Supreme Court must initiate the action itself if so satisfied or the Advocate General must intervene, and make a motion or must give his consent in writing for the making of a motion by a private citizen. The power of an initial screening is given to the Advocate General, for the obvious reason that the Advocate General being highest law officer in the State, is rightly considered to be the most competent functionary with whom this power can safely be entrusted with, since be will be jealously guarding the dignity of the court. I am of opinion that S. 15 places clearly a statutory bar on a citizen moving the High Court or the Supreme Court for taking action for punishment for criminal contempt without complying with the third alternative mentioned in the section. But, I feel that under certain peculiar circumstance, a party to a proceeding can make a motion in the form of giving information to the court praying the court itself to take action on its own motion. I can treat this application as an application of laying information about certain facts which the petitioner feels, would amount to contempt of this court, for this court's examination as to whether this court should initiate action on its own motion. 10. Petitioner submits that the Chief Minister of the State has committed contempt of this court in regard to a pending matter before this court. To substantiate his case, the petitioner has produced an except of a Malayalam Daily - Mathrubhumi - copy of which is produced in the case marked as Ext. P6. He says that the statement contained in the except produced is what has been said by the Chief Minister and published by the Daily. To substantiate his case, the petitioner has produced an except of a Malayalam Daily - Mathrubhumi - copy of which is produced in the case marked as Ext. P6. He says that the statement contained in the except produced is what has been said by the Chief Minister and published by the Daily. His further case is that the statement referred to Ext. P6 will come under Section 2(c) (ii) and (iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Whether what is published in the Daily was in fact said is not certain now. Assuming what has been published has been said by the Chief Minister, the question is whether it will amount to contempt of court within the mischief of S. 2(c) (ii) and (iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The statement alleged to have been made by the Chief Minister is only to the effect that the news of lathi charge at always is an unnecessary exaggeration. There is no sign of any lathi charge there. The petitioner wants me to held that the above statement would prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings that is pending before this court, namely O.P. No. 8561 of 1986 and that it interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice. What does or does not constitute a contempt of court is mostly a question of fact in the circumstances linked with each case. Though it cannot be said that Judge are never influenced or embarrassed by extraneous publication, a trained mind of the Judge is always prepared to ignore extraneous matters and may not be embarrassed or influenced by each and every statement that appears in the media. Further the alleged statement, in my view, can never have any influence in the matter of deciding the issue in the case. According to me, even if the statement is wholly true and even if the Judge has been and read and remembered the statement, it is inconceivable that he would be influenced consciously or unconsciously by it. A Judge, though in no sense, neither transmundane and preter human or super natural or preter natural, has by his training no difficulty in putting out of his mind things and facts which are not evidence in a case. A Judge, though in no sense, neither transmundane and preter human or super natural or preter natural, has by his training no difficulty in putting out of his mind things and facts which are not evidence in a case. I have no hesitation to say that the alleged statement, even if it is wholly true, will even not by a long short come within the animus of S. 2(c) (ii) and (iii) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. I hold that the alleged statements certainly do not justify the title of contempt of court and therefore I dismiss the application. Application dismissed.