JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, CJ. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by Ram Dhani Singh and Gulab Chandra is directed against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Duddhi dated 9-3-1977 cancelling the settlement of certain plots made in their favour by Bhoodan Yagya Samiti in the year 1959. 2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to this petition, as disclosed in various affidavits filed in the case, are that in the year 1959 Bhoodan Yagya Samiti acting under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act as it then stood, granted leases in respect of plots Nos. 1606M, 1608/1, 1604/2 and 1614 of village Majhauli, Pargana and Tahsil Duddhi, in favour of the petitioner No. 1 Ram Dhani Sing and in respect of plot No. 1604/3 located in the same village in favour of petitioner No. 2 Gulab Chandra. In due course the two petitioners obtained declarations to the effect that they had become Bhumidhars of respective plots leased out to them. 3. Sometimes in the month of May, 1976 one Sri Prem Bhai, member of the Bhoodan Yagya samiti, moved applications before the Collector, Mirzapur stating that the two petitioners had, in the year 1959, obtained leases in their favour by wrongly representing that they were landless persons. He, therefore, requested that appropriate action be taken under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. The Collector forwarded the application to Naib Tahsildar, Duddhi for making necessary enquiries. The Naib Tahsildar issued notices dated 21-6-76 to the petitioners mentioning that they had obtained the grants by wrongly describing themselves as landless persons and that the member of the Bhoodan Samiti had requested that the grants made in favour of the petitioners as well as the entries made on the basis thereof should be cancelled. The Naib Tahsildar also directed the two petitioners to appear before him on 28-6-76 and to file their objections, if any. The petitioners filed objections asserting that the grants made in their favour were quite regular and as they had already acquired Bhumidhari rights in respect of the plots, the said grants could not be cancelled. 4. After taking into consideration the objections filed by the petitioners, the Naib Tahsildar submitted a report dated 28-9-76 to the Sub-Divisional Officer through the Tahsildar. 4. After taking into consideration the objections filed by the petitioners, the Naib Tahsildar submitted a report dated 28-9-76 to the Sub-Divisional Officer through the Tahsildar. In that report he mentioned that various plots stood recorded in the revenue papers in the name of the two petitioners and that they had become Bhumidhars thereof. However, as the necessary material to verify the extent of area of land belonging to the two petitioners in the year 1959, was not available, it was not possible to take any action in the matter at that stage. It appears that subsequently, after making some verification, the Naib Tahsildar submitted another report on 25-2-1977. In this report he mentioned that the revenue records revealed that at the relevant time Ram Dhani Singh had ?rd share in certain plots along with his brothers Sukhdeo and Mahadeo and that the two petitioners could not, therefore, be considered to be landless persons. He also opined that as recommended by Prem Bhai, the grants which had been obtained by the petitioners in a fraudulent manner deserved to be cancelled. On 9-3-1977 the Sub-Divisional Officer made an endorsement below the said report to the effect "Yatha Prastavit", i.e., as `proposed'. This endorsement (order) resulted in cancellation of the grants made in favour of the two petitioners in the year 1959. Aggrieved, the two petitioners have approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners questioned the validity of the order (endorsement) dated 9-3-1977 on following grounds : (1) The Sub-Divisional Officer, Mirzapur had no jurisdiction to make an order cancelling a grant made under the provisions of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. (2) The order dated 9-3-1977 also stood vitiated without affording any hearing to the petitioners. 6. So far as the first ground is concerned, the power to cancel a grant made under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, flows from S. 15-A of the Act which came into force with effect from 21st January, 1975. (2) The order dated 9-3-1977 also stood vitiated without affording any hearing to the petitioners. 6. So far as the first ground is concerned, the power to cancel a grant made under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, flows from S. 15-A of the Act which came into force with effect from 21st January, 1975. The said section empowers the Collector to, on his own motion or on the basis of a report of the committee or on application of any person aggrieved by a grant of any land made under S. 14 of the Act, enquire into such grant and to, if he gets satisfied that the grant was irregular or was obtained by the grantee by misrepresentation or fraud, cancel the same. The expression `collector' has not been defined in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. However. S. 2(f)(i) of the Act lays down that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the words and expression not defined in the Act shall, in respect of areas where the right of intermediaries have vested in the State Government under S. 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, its Bhumidhars or Government lessees have the same meaning as assigned to them under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The controversy in the instant case relates to such an area. Accordingly the expression `Collector' in S. 15-A has to be given the same meaning as assigned to it in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 7. Section 3(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act defines `Collector' thus : "Collector means an officer appointed as Collector under the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 and includes an Assistant Collector of the First Class empowered by the State Government by a notification in the Gazette to discharge all or any of the functions of a Collector under this Act." It is not disputed that the Sub-Divisional Officer who cancelled the grant of the petitioners is not a person who has been appointed as a "Collector" under the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. Learned counsel appearing for the State relied upon the second part of the definition and contended that any Assistant Collector of the First Class who has, by means of a notification published in the Gazette, empowered by the State Government to discharge all or any of the functions of the Collector under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act is also covered by the expression "Collector" as defined in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and such an Assistant Collector, therefore, would also be `Collector' within the meaning of the word as used in S. 15-A of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act and will be fully competent to make an order cancelling a grant made under S. 14 of the Act. 8. It is not disputed that the Sub-Divisional Officer who passed the order was an Assistant Collector of First Class. The State Government issued notification No. 1756/I- 1073-53 dated June 11, 1953 published in the U.P. Gazette Part I page 698 dated 20th of June, 1953 which ran thus :- "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (4) of section 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Act I of 1951), the Governor is pleased to empower all the Sub-Divisional Officers in Uttar Pradesh except those in the districts of Almora, Garhwal, Tehri Garhwal and Rampur to discharge all the functions of a "Collector" under the said Act." Learned standing counsel urged that as under the aforesaid notification the State Government has empowered the Sub- Divisional Officers to perform all the functions of a Collector under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, he became a Collector within the meaning assigned to the word in S. 3(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. As in S. 15- A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act the word `Collector' has the same meaning as assigned to the word under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the Sub-Divisional Officer, who became Collector for the purposes of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, became entitled to perform the functions of the Collector under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act as well. 9. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner refuted the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the State and contended that the provisions contained in U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act to the effect that the words and expressions not defined in the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act shall have the meaning assigned to them in U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act are, in substance, directed towards incorporation of the definition of the word `Collector' as given in the U.P. Jamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act itself. He invited our attention to Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Maniram v. State, AIR 1952 All 40 wherein it has been held thus : "When certain sections of an Act are incorporated into a subsequent Act, the legal effect of the incorporation is, in the words of Lord Esher, M. R., "to write those sections into the new Act just, as if they had been actually written in it with the pen, or printed in it, and the moment you have those clauses in the later Act, you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all in Re Woods Estate, `(1886) 31 Ch D 607 at p. 615" Applying aforementioned dictum and treating the definition of the word `Collector' in S. 3(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act as being verbatim contained in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act itself, and without referring to the provisions contained in U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the expression used in the context of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act means an officer appointed as Collector under the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 as also an Assistant Collector of the First Class empowered by the State Government by a notification in the Gazette to discharge all or any of the functions of the Collector under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. Since the State Government has not issued any notification empowering the Sub- Divisional Officer to discharge or perform any function of "Collector" under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, he was not competent to discharge any such function. 10. Since the State Government has not issued any notification empowering the Sub- Divisional Officer to discharge or perform any function of "Collector" under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, he was not competent to discharge any such function. 10. In reply, learned counsel for the State submitted that when in S. 3(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the legislature assigned to the word `Collector' the meaning as including "any Assistant Collector of the First class empowered by the State Government by a notification in the Gazette to discharge all or any of the function of the Collector under this Act," the word `this' was obviously meant to refer to U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and nothing else. Accordingly in substance what the provision means to convey is that an Assistant Collector of the First class who has been empowered by the State Government to discharge any of the functions of a Collector under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would also be deemed to be a Collector within the meaning of the expression used in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The meaning of the expression would not change merely because the said expression has been incorporated in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. 11. The argument raised by the learned standing counsel though attractive is, in our opinion, not sound. In the first place, as laid down in the Full Bench case of Maniram v. State, AIR 1952 All 40 (supra) the legal effect of incorporation of a section in a subsequent enactment is that the incorporated provision has got to be taken to have been actually written in the new enactment with pen or printed therein. Accordingly we have to take it that the legal effect of incorporation is that the words contained in S. 3(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act have been written or printed in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act exactly in the same way in which they find place in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Accordingly while incorporating the definition of the word `Collector' as given in U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, it is not possible to substitute in place of word `this' the words "U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act". Accordingly while incorporating the definition of the word `Collector' as given in U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, it is not possible to substitute in place of word `this' the words "U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act". The word `this' used in the section may in the context of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act mean "U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act" but the same word if written in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act would, in the context of that Act, mean "U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act". In the result we find substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that unless there is some notification by the State Government empowering the Sub-Divisional Officer to perform the functions of a Collector under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, he would have no jurisdiction to cancel a grant made under S. 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. 12. There is yet another way of looking at the matter. A plain reading of S. 3(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act clearly brings out that even while defining the expression "Collector" as including an Assistant Collector First Class empowered by the State Government to perform any or all of the functions of a Collector under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the Assistant Collector so empowered will be treated to be a Collector only for the specific purposes for which he had been so empowered and for no other purpose. It necessarily follows that even if, as asserted by the learned standing counsel, the word this used in s. 3(4) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act continues to, despite the said section being incorporated in the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, refer to U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and continues to retain the identical meaning, the Assistant Collector of First Class so empowered to perform the functions of a Collector under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, will be competent to perform the functions of a Collector under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act only and not those of the Collector under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. It will, therefore, not be possible to treat an Assistant Collector of first Class who has not been empowered by the State Government to perform the functions of Collector under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act to be a Collector for that purpose. Undoubtedly the Sub-Divisional Officer, respondent No. 3, in the present case has not been authorised by the State Government to perform the functions of a Collector under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. The impugned order passed by him, therefore, stands vitiated and is liable to be quashed as having been made without jurisdiction. 13. We find that there is merit in the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners as well. For this purpose we may assume (although we have held it otherwise) that apart from the Collector appointed under the U.P. Land Revenue Act, the Sub-Divisional Officer also was competent to perform the functions of the Collector under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. Sub-section (3) of S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act lays down that no order cancelling a grant made under S. 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act shall be made except after giving an opportunity of being heard to the grantee or to any other person known to the Collector to be claiming under the grantee. The section read as whole makes the legislative intendment clear. It clearly envisages that before a person acting as a Collector cancels a grant made under S. 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, he has got to afford an opportunity of being heard to the grantee. We find that in the instant case Sri Prem Bhai made a complaint to the Collector alleging that the grant made in favour of the two petitioners was irregular. The Collector forwarded the papers to the Naib Tahsildar for making an enquiry. It was at this stage that the Naib Tahsildar called upon the petitioners to appear before him and to file such objections as they liked. The petitioners appeared before the Naib Tahsildar and contended that the grants made in their favour were not liable to be cancelled. The Naib Tahsildar submitted a report to the Sub-Divisional Officer mentioning therein that unless further enquiry was made, it was not possible to decide whether or not the grant made in favour of the petitioners was irregular. The petitioners appeared before the Naib Tahsildar and contended that the grants made in their favour were not liable to be cancelled. The Naib Tahsildar submitted a report to the Sub-Divisional Officer mentioning therein that unless further enquiry was made, it was not possible to decide whether or not the grant made in favour of the petitioners was irregular. Thereafter the Naib Tahsildar was again called upon to scrutinise the records and this time he submitted a report to the effect that petitioner No. 1 was not a landless person at the time of the grant and recommended that the grant made in favour of both the petitioners deserved to be cancelled. There is no averment in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents to show that before passing the impugned order the Sub-Divisional Officer himself held or authorised the holding of any enquiry wherein an opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioners. In the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer appears to have been made in contravention of mandatory provisions contained in Section 15-A(3) of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act and as such deserves to be quashed on this ground as well. 14. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The order dated 9-3-1977 as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ petition is quashed.