JUDGMENT 1. - Inspite of a clear finding of adulteration in Milk, the accused-respondent has been acquitted of the offence under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 on an untenable technical ground that the quantity of Milk sent for analysis was not sufficient and was in violation of Rules. 2. Since the facts giving rise to this appeal are not in dispute so also the law, the only question which requires consideration and adjudication is whether the accused-respondent should be convicted and if the answer is in affirmative then what would be the sentence to be imposed against the accused. 3. Interestingly enough, the guidelines laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in series of cases are not uniform, due to different facts. 4. The question, whether rule 22 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as `the Rules') is directory or mandatory; is now settled by the decision of the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. Allassorry Mohd, AIR 1978 S.C. 933 and the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Rajal Das G. Pamanani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 S.C. 189 now stands overruled by the decision of a larger bench consisting of five Judges of the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. Allassorry Mohd. (supra). The decision of larger bench in State of Kerala v. Allassorry Mohd. (supra) now holds the field from 1978 onwards, where it has been held that rule 22 of the Rules is directory and not mandatory. 5. Since the Public Analyst had no difficulty in analysing the sample of food stuff inspite of insufficient quantity, the legal and logical consequence of it is that the accused-respondent is guilty of adulteration according to the report of the chemical Analyst in this case. 6. The present one is a case of economic offences and social crime of serious magnitude where is the health of kids and children are or can be jeopardised. It requires deterrent and exemplary punishment for `social justice'. 7. Let me now examine the Supreme Court decision.In State of Kerala v. Allassorry Mohd. 6. The present one is a case of economic offences and social crime of serious magnitude where is the health of kids and children are or can be jeopardised. It requires deterrent and exemplary punishment for `social justice'. 7. Let me now examine the Supreme Court decision.In State of Kerala v. Allassorry Mohd. (supra) the five Apex Judges of the Apex Court, after laying down the law correctly, did not make any consequential order, relying upon the earlier decision in Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation v. Cherukattial Gopalan, AIR 1971 S.C. 1725 where the appellant has argued the appeal only as a test case and the State did not challenge the acquittal of the respondents.In Ramdas Bhikaji v. Sadanand and others, AIR 1980 S.C. 126 their Lordships of the Supreme Court reversed the acquittal of the accused and convicting the accused for the offence of Food Adulteration, sentenced the accused only to pay fine of Rs. 2000/-.In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Proprietress Singh Cheung Company, 1982 (1) S.C.C. 487 , the case was remanded to the trial court relying upon the decision of larger bench in State of Kerala v. Allassory Mohd. (supra). In Municipal Corporation v. M/s. New Kwalily Sweet House, AIR 1985 S.C. 329 which was a case of Suji (semoline), the view taken by the courts below was held to be unsupportable but no interference was made. 8. It would, thus, be seen that the task of this Court has become extremely difficult. This becomes all the more difficult case because Shri Vyas submits that after the amendment introduced by the Amendment Act Mo. 34 of 1976, now the court is left with no option but to sentence the accused with imprisonment. New amended section 20-AA of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, reads as under:- "20-AA. Application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Nothing contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless that person is under eighteen years of age." 9. Section 20-AA prohibits the application of Probation of Offenders Act unless the accused is not 18 years of age as the Law Commission of India in its 47th report recommended the exclusion of the Act to social and economic offences by suitable amendments. In this respect, reliance can be placed upon the decisions in P.K. Tejani v. M.R. Dange, AIR 1974 S.C. 228 , Ram Prakash v. State of H.P., AIR 1973 SC 780 and Prem Ballah v. State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1977 S.C. 56 10. I have considered the principles laid down in the cases (supra) so also the various changes in the recent trends. Normally, in such cases, if there would have been clear decision earlier, the accused would have been sentenced to imprisonment as provided under the law. 11. In view of the authoritative decisions of the Apex Court, for no fault of the accused, the conviction could not be recorded and the sentence could not be imposed at the appropriate time in 1977. It would be too harsh to send the accused to jail now in 1986 on account of the change of the law laid down by the Apex Court. Moreover, even what action should be taken after the change of law in such cases which were decided as per the decisions in Rajal Das G. Pamanani v. State of Maharashtra (supra) is not certain because as mentioned above, in some cases, fine has been imposed and in some cases remand has been directed in some of the cases, no interference has been made while laying down the correct law by the Apex Court. 12. The second point on which acquittal is based is equally frivolous. It has been held that though the sanction for prosecution is on the record, but it is not a valid sanction. The reason given by the trial court is that it is a carbon copy and not original. 13. A perusal of Ex. P6 would show that the name of Shri D.D. Sharma, Administrator, Municipal Board, Peepar City filled up and so also the name of accused Pokar Ram son of Kalu Ram with his address. Similarly, the name of the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate has been filled up. It has been signed by the Administrator, Municipal Board, Peeper City and sealed. P6 would show that the name of Shri D.D. Sharma, Administrator, Municipal Board, Peepar City filled up and so also the name of accused Pokar Ram son of Kalu Ram with his address. Similarly, the name of the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate has been filled up. It has been signed by the Administrator, Municipal Board, Peeper City and sealed. The signatures are original and, therefore, it cannot be said that it is a carbon copy, though form certainly is a carbon copy. 14. The trial court has held that since Ex. P6 was received by post by the inspector, who has been examined as P. 1, it cannot be said that it is a carbon copy of the original. In my opinion, Ex. P6 is not a carbon copy of the sanction because it is signed by the authority competent to give sanction and even that part has not been challenged even. 15. In view of the above, I have got no hesitation in setting aside the judgment of the trial court and holding Pokar Ram guilty under section 7/16 of the Act. 16. It is, therefore, in the interest of justice to convict the accused-respondent for the offence under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 17. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed setting aside the impugned judgment of the trial court; the accused-respondent is convicted for the offence of adulteration of milk under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and in view of the circumstances pointed out above, the accused is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- in default, 3 months' R.I. The fine shall be deposited in the Court within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the record by the trial court, failing which the accused shall undergo the sentence of three months' R.I., as mentioned above. The trial court is directed to proceed further accordingly.Appeal allowed. *******