Judgment K.N. Misra, J. 1. THIS writ petition is directed against the judgment dated 5-8-1985 passed by the District Judge, Lucknow dismissing application for restoration filed by the petitioner wherein a prayer was made for recalling order dated 21-3-1984 by which the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed in default with costs to the respondents. 2. BRIEFLY stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner had filed appeal under Section 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short the Act) directed against the order dated 6-6-1977 passed by the Competent Authority (Ceiling), Bareilly declaring 450.5 Sq. metres land as surplus vacant land under the Act. This appeal was filed in the Court of District Judge, Lucknow within limitation and registered as Civil Appeal No. 331 of 1978. The appellant, who is resident of Bareilly city, had engaged two local lawyers of Lucknow Sri K.K. Bajoria and Sri S.K. Chaurasia, Advocates, for conducting his appeal and the learned Advocates were paid their full fees which was settled for conducting the appeal on behalf of the appellant. It appears that after admission and registration of the appeal no date of hearing was given and the appeal was kept without date although sub-section (2) of Section 33 of the Act enjoins on the appellate authority to decide the appeal as expeditiously as possible. It appears that after lapse of about six years, a notice was issued to the learned counsel for the appellant fixing 21st March, 1984 for hearing in the appeal. This notice is said to have been served on the learned counsel for the appellant, but since they did not put in appearance on the date fixed, the learned District Judge, vide order dated 21-3-1984 dismissed the appeal in default with costs to the respondent. The order is quoted below : "On this date fixed for disposal of this old appeal, the appellant as also his counsel remained absent till 16.17 hours. I have waited enough. There is no other alternative but to order dismissal of the appeal in default. Mr. K. K. Srivastava is present for the respondent. ORDER-The appeal is dismissed in default with costs to the respondents. Sd/- P. Narain District Judge, Lucknow. I have waited enough. There is no other alternative but to order dismissal of the appeal in default. Mr. K. K. Srivastava is present for the respondent. ORDER-The appeal is dismissed in default with costs to the respondents. Sd/- P. Narain District Judge, Lucknow. 21-3-1984" It is not disputed that in this appeal which was filed in the year 1978, no date of hearing was fixed earlier and this appeal was fixed for the first time for hearing on 21-3-1984 and that on that date it met its fate having been dismissed in default. No notice regarding date of hearing in the appeal was issued to the appellant, who was resident of Bareilly city and notice was issued to the learned counsel for the appellant, but since they did not put in appearance inspite of service of notice on them, the learned District Judge dismissed the appeal in default. 3. ALTHOUGH service of notice on the learned counsel for the appellant would be deemed to be sufficient service of notice of hearing of the appeal on the appellant in view of the provisions contained in Order 3 Rule, 5, Code of Civil Procedure, but since after a lapse of about six years this appeal was listed for the first time for hearing on 21st March, 1984, and, as such, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the learned District Judge should have got a notice issued to the appellant as well especially when his counsel had not put in appearance on the said date of hearing fixed after a long period of about six years. 4. LEARNED standing counsel in reply urged that in view of the aforesaid provisions the service of notice on the appellant's counsel was quite enough and the learned District Judge committed no error in dismissing the appeal in default. LEARNED counsel further urged that the District Judge had committed no error in dismissing the restoration application by order dated 5-8-1985 as notice fixing 21-3-1984 for hearing in the appeal was served on the learned counsel for the appellant and it was not at all essential to issue notice to the appellant. LEARNED counsel further urged that the District Judge had committed no error in dismissing the restoration application by order dated 5-8-1985 as notice fixing 21-3-1984 for hearing in the appeal was served on the learned counsel for the appellant and it was not at all essential to issue notice to the appellant. There was nothing on record to show as to whether any of these two lawyers were approached by the applicant during the period of six months after dismissal of the appeal to know from them as to why there was no appearance put in the appeal when notice was served on them. LEARNED standing counsel, thus, urged that no error has been committed by learned District Judge in passing the impugned order rejecting the restoration application. Further in reply to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner should not be made to suffer on account of any laches or inaction on the part of his lawyers and the appeal deserves to be restored and decided on merits, learned Standing Counsel urged that since there was nothing on record to indicate as to why the learned counsel for the appellant had not put in appearance inspite of service of notice, and, as such, in the absence of sufficient cause shown for their non-appearance, the learned District Judge committed no error in rejecting the restoration application. I have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the impugned orders passed by the District Judge, I find that the impugned orders passed by the District Judge cannot be sustained. 5. IT is no doubt correct to say that in view of the provisions contained in Order 3 Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure, any process served on the pleader who has been duly appointed to act for any party shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader represents in the proceedings pending in the court, and, unless the court otherwise directs it shall be taken to be effectual for the purpose as if the same would have been given to the party in person. Thus, the learned District Judge could no doubt pass order dismissing the appeal in default with costs to the respondents on whose behalf appearance was put in on the date fixed for hearing in the appeal. Thus, the learned District Judge could no doubt pass order dismissing the appeal in default with costs to the respondents on whose behalf appearance was put in on the date fixed for hearing in the appeal. But the above quoted order dated 21-3-1984 indicates that the learned District Judge, after waiting for a long time for the appearance of the counsel for the appellant had reluctantly dismissed the appeal as in his opinion there was no other alternative but to dismiss the appeal with costs. Learned District Judge, however, omitted to consider that after a lapse of about six years the appeal was fixed for hearing for the first time on 21-3-1984. During this long period no date was fixed for hearing in the appeal and it was kept without date. In these circumstances, it would have met the ends of justice better if learned District Judge would have ordered that notice be issued to the appellant for personal service on him so that the appellant, who resided in Bareilly city, would have put in appearance and engaged another counsel to contest the appeal on merits, which was fixed for hearing for the first time on 21-3-1984 after a lapse of about six years. 6. IT is quite evident that in the present case learned District Judge had himself committed default in not properly proceeding to decide this appeal expeditiously which was enjoined on him to do as provided under Section 33 (2) of the Act. I am, therefore, constrained to observe that the learned District Judge in utter disregard to the guide-lines provided in the said provision for deciding appeals expeditiously had kept it without date for about six years right from its presentation and when he woke up and ventured to decide it, he found that he was left with no option but to dismiss it in default as the counsel for the appellant had failed to put in appearance inspite of service of notice on them. Although technically the appeal could be dismissed on said ground but in the circumstances of the case narrated above, especially when the appeal was listed for hearing after a very long time, it would have been quite expedient in the interest of justice to have issued notice to the appellant either simultaneously while issuing notice to the counsel or thereafter when the counsel had not responded to attend the case inspite of service of notice on them so that the appellant would have got an opportunity to prosecute his appeal. Such a course could be adopted in the interest of justice because no party can be made to suffer on account of laches and inaction on the part of his counsel, though it may be wilful and unexplainable default on the part of his counsel. Thus instead of dismissing the appeal a notice would have been issued to the appellant, he could have got an opportunity of approaching his lawyers to ascertain as to why they had not put in appearance and he could have engaged another counsel to conduct his appeal which was listed for hearing for the first time on 21-3-1984 after being kept without date for about six years. Thus, in the circumstances of the present case, such a course of issuing notice to the appellant deserved to be adopted being quite expedient in the interest of justice, and, therefore it deserved to have been kept in mind while considering the application for restoration moved . by the appellant for restoring the appeal dismissed in default vide order dated 21st March, 1984. Learned District Judge had apparently dismissed this appeal in default quite reluctantly as he had felt to be left with no other option when the appellant's counsel despite service of notice on them had failed to put in appearance. But, there lies the error on his part because there was no legal impediment in adopting the course of adjourning the case to some other date directing the notice to be issued to the appellant himself. Such a course deserved to be adopted being expedient in the interest of justice especially in the circumstances of the present case when the appeal was kept without date for about six years and it was listed for the first time on the said date. 7. Such a course deserved to be adopted being expedient in the interest of justice especially in the circumstances of the present case when the appeal was kept without date for about six years and it was listed for the first time on the said date. 7. LEARNED District Judge has rejected the restoration application on the ground that since the two lawyers who were engaged for conducting the appeal on behalf of the appellant were served with a notice for the date fixed for hearing on 21-3-1984, but they failed to put in appearance and so the appeal had to be dismissed in default. LEARNED District Judge has observed that notice to the counsel shall be deemed to be sufficient information in the eye of law and there is nothing to show that any of those two lawyers were approached by the applicant for six months after the dismissal of the appeal to know from them as to why they had not put in appearance, hence there is no ground to restore the appeal. It has further been held that if there has been a breach of contract reached between the counsels and the client, the latter has got a remedy elsewhere. The nonappearance of the counsels, in his opinion, was not sufficient ground for the restoration of the appeal especially when the cause for their non-appearance has not been shown at all by the applicant, who did not care to contact any of them for this long period of six months. 8. THE above reasoning on which the impugned order is based is absolutely not sound and cannot be sustained. In this connection reference may be made to the cases of M/s. Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate, Jaipur v. THE Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 1348 , Rafiq v. Munshilal, AIR 1981 SC 1400 and Smt. Lachi Tewari v. Director of Land Records, AIR 1984 SC 41 . In Rafiq v. Munshilal (Supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :- "THE disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appears through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned advocate to do the rest of the things. THE party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the court's procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of hearing of the appeal the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job." The petitioner, who resides in Bareilly city had engaged two local lawyers practising in Civil Courts, Lucknow for the purpose of filing and conducting his appeal in the Court of Distt. Judge, Lucknow. The appellant had also made full payment of the fees of the learned advocates who had filed appeal in the year 1978. The appeal was, however, kept without date although it deserved to be disposed of expeditiously as mandated under sub-section (2) of Sec. 33 of the Act. It was for the first time that the appeal was fixed for hearing on 21-3-1984 after a lapse of about six years. It was, therefore, not expected that the appellant should have run off and on from Bareilly city to meet his counsel at Lucknow and enquire about the date fixed for hearing in the appeal although notice was served on the learned counsels for the appellant for appearance on 21-3-1984, but it is not disputed that the counsel had not intimated the appellant about the said date of hearing. The appellant learnt about the dismissal of the appeal on 18th September, 1984 when he moved an application for inspection engaging another counsel and thereupon filed the restoration application the very next day on 19th September, 1984. The appellant learnt about the dismissal of the appeal on 18th September, 1984 when he moved an application for inspection engaging another counsel and thereupon filed the restoration application the very next day on 19th September, 1984. It has been averred in para 2 of the restoration application that the appellant had made full payment of the fees of the learned advocates, but it was applicants misfortune that the two learned Advocates did not prove worthy of the applicant's confidence reposed in them and although notice for hearing in the case on 21-3-1984 was issued and served on them on 5th March, 1984, but none of them chose to put in appearance in the case on 21-3-1984 nor they ever thought it fit to communicate the applicant about the date of hearing fixed in the case. The appellant-applicant has, thus, very clearly mentioned in the application that there was no fault on his part in not putting appearance on the date fixed for hearing in the appeal. The learned Advocate who had been paid their full fee failed to put in appearance inspite of service of notice on them and they had also not intimated the appellant about the date of hearing although notice was served on them on 5th March, 1984. It is, therefore, clear that there had been laches and inaction on the part of the learned counsels and the appellant should, therefore, be not made to suffer on account of the laches and inaction on the part of his lawyers who were engaged to conduct this case. In these circumstances a lenient view deserved to be taken in the matter of restoration of the appeal so as to advance substantial justice. Courts discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut-out hearing. The learned District Judge, therefore, should not have rejected the restoration application on mere technicalities and the discretion deserved to have been exercised in the matter for hearing the appeal on merits and in not making the appellant to suffer on account of the laches and inaction on the part of the lawyers whom he had engaged to conduct his appeal. 9. IT is no doubt correct to say that if the lawyers had committed breach of confidence reposed in them by the appellant, then the appellant may have remedy elsewhere. 9. IT is no doubt correct to say that if the lawyers had committed breach of confidence reposed in them by the appellant, then the appellant may have remedy elsewhere. But that would not be an adequate remedy for redressing his grievance, because if an action is taken by the client filing a suit for damages against his lawyers for his callous indifference and negligence shown in conducting the case, he may get a decree for damages against him or if he approaches the Bar Council in the matter then the lawyer may be sacked and his registration may be cancelled, but that would certainly not repair the damage done to him nor it would operate to restore the appeal for hearing it on merit. He would once for all stand deprived of the opportunity of contesting the case on merits relating to property in question. Thus, though there may be a remedy available elsewhere to the client against the lawyer for his negligence or inaction but it would not be an adequate remedy and the restoration application would, thus, deserve to be considered keeping in mind that the courts' discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranji Das v. Mohan Singh, 1978 ARC 496 wherein the order passed by trial court setting aside exparte decree passed eight years ago was maintained and the order passed by High, Court reversing order of trial court was set aside. In such circumstances it would be quite expedient in the interest of justice to restore the appeal so that the appellant be not made to suffer on account of negligence and inaction on the part of his lawyers. 10. IN view of the facts and circumstances stated above I am of the opinion that the application for restoration moved by the appellant deserved to be allowed and the appeal deserved to be restored to be decided on merits. Thus, the impugned order dated 5-8-1985 passed by the learned District Judge, Lucknow rejecting the restoration application and order dated 21-3-1984 dismissing the appeal in default deserve to be quashed. Thus, the impugned order dated 5-8-1985 passed by the learned District Judge, Lucknow rejecting the restoration application and order dated 21-3-1984 dismissing the appeal in default deserve to be quashed. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated 5-8-1985 contained in Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition and order dated 21-3-1984 contained in Annexure No. 2 passed by the District Judge, Lucknow, are hereby quashed and the Misc. Appeal No. 331 of 1978 Parmeshwar Das Saxena v. Competent Authority, Urban Ceiling, Bareilly is directed to be restored and decided expeditiously. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.