Judgment :- 1. Thangam Pillai Trust, represented by its trustee Sivaperumal, is the appellant in this second appeal, which is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Madurai, in A.S. No. 203 of 1976. That appeal arose out of a suit instituted in O.S. No. 226 of 1975, District Munsifs Court, Madurai Town, by N.K. N.K.R. Dharma Trust, Madurai, represented by its Managing Trustee N.L.S. Seethalakshmi Animal, the first respondent in this second appeal. In that suit, N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust sued for recovery of possession of the property bearing door No. 15-J in Srinivasaperumal Koil Street, Madurai, belonging to it and for recovery of arrears of rent and also for damages for use and occupation. One C. Thangam Pillai was the defendant in that suit. According to the case of N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust, the site over which the superstructure bearing door No. 15-J was put up belonged to it and was let out to one S.R. Rajendran for a period of five years under the terms and conditions contained in a rent deed marked as Exhibit A1 dated 20-3-1949. On 20-7-1949, under Exhibit B1, the lessee S.R. Rajendran in turn entered into another rent deed in favour of one Pillani Ammal, wife of Thangam Pillai, in and by which S.R. Rajendran created a sub-lease in her favour. Pursuant to that, Pillani Ammal appears to have put up a superstructure and also died some time in 1965. Thangam Pillai and his daughter were the two legal heirs left behind by Pillani Ammal and under Exhibit B20 dated 26-3-1970, the daughter Sarojini released her interest in the superstructure in favour of her father Thangam Pillai, the defendant in O.S. No. 226 of 1975. Thereafter, under Exhibit B21 dated 30-4-1970, Thangam Pillai executed a deed of trust in and by which he created a trust over the superstructure and constituted himself as a trustee. While matters stood thus, on 7-8-1970, the original lessee S.R. Rajendran surrendered his interest in the site and Thangam Pillai became the lessee and he died on 19-2-1978. Alleging that the tenancy in favour of Thangam Pillai commenced on and from 7-8-1970 by attornment after the surrender by S.R. Rajendran and that he had not paid the rents at all, N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust issued a notice under Exhibit A2 dated 27-12-1974 terminating the tenancy in favour of Thangam Pillai and demanded surrender of possession. Alleging that the tenancy in favour of Thangam Pillai commenced on and from 7-8-1970 by attornment after the surrender by S.R. Rajendran and that he had not paid the rents at all, N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust issued a notice under Exhibit A2 dated 27-12-1974 terminating the tenancy in favour of Thangam Pillai and demanded surrender of possession. Since Thangam Pillai did not comply with the demand so made, N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust, Madurai, instituted the suit O.S. No. 226 of 1975, District Munsifs Court, Madurai Town, praying for the reliefs set out earlier. 2. Thangam Pillai resisted the suit contending that he was entitled to the benefits of Madras City Tenants Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act,) though it was not clearly stated whether the benefits of S.3 or S.9 of that Act were claimed. 3. Before the trial Court, on behalf of N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust, Exhibits A1 to A4 were filed and P.W.1 was examined, while, on behalf of Thangam Pillai, Exhibits B1 to B29 were marked in evidence and he also gave evidence as D.W.1. On a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the trial Court found that Thangara Pillai became exclusively the owner of the superstructure and was also the tenant of the vacant site long prior to the coming into force of the Act and, therefore, entitled to the benefits of that Act, that the suit was bad for the nonjoinder of other trustees as parties, that the notice to quit was not valid and, therefore, N.K.N.K.R Dharma Trust was not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for in the suit. On these conclusions, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by this, N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 203 of 1976, Sub Court, Madurai. During the pendency of that appeal, the second respondent herein was impleaded as the second respondent to that appeal. On a re-consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the learned Subordinate Judge, Madurai, took the view that Thangam Pillai, even long before his becoming a tenant in respect of the site on 7-8-1970, had parted with the superstructure on 30-4-1970 and therefore, not entitled to project any claim under S.9 of the Act, that there was no infirmity in the frame of the suit and that the notice to quit was valid. On these conclusions, the appeal was allowed and N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust was granted a decree for recovery of possession and for arrears of rent upto 12-2-1975. The mesne profits subsequent to 12-2-1975 were directed to be determined in appropriate and separate proceedings. It is the correctness of this that is challenged by the appellant, who was not a party to the proceedings before the Courts below. 4. During the pendency of the second appeal, the Managing Trustee of N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust, Madurai, who instituted the suit O.S. No. 226 of 1975, N.L.S. Seethalakshmi Ammal, died and the third respondent in the second appeal has been brought on record in her place by an order of this Court in C.M.P. No. 9764 of 1984 dated 10-4-1985. 5. Mr. K. Alagiriswami, learned counsel for the appellant, raised two contentions in support of this second appeal. His first contention was that the appellant would be entitled to claim the benefits of S.9 of the Act. However, Mr. P. Ananthakrishnan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent, submitted that on the undisputed facts, even deceased Thangam Pillai was not entitled to claim the benefits of S.9 of the Act, as he had parted with the superstructure by the execution of Exhibit B21 dated 30-4-1970, long before he became a tenant on 7-8-1970. Reliance in this connection was also placed upon the decision in Rajalakshmi Ammal v. MaduraiTownVayalaga Vellalargal, etc. Sabhal 1. There is no dispute that the site in question belonged to N.K.N. K.R. Dharma Trust, Madurai, and it was leased to S.R. Rajendran under Exhibit A1 dated 20-3-1949, who in turn sub-leased it in favour of Pillani Ammal, under Exhibit B1 dated 20-7-1949. Equally, there is no dispute that Pillani Ammal put up a superstructure thereon and died in 1965 leaving behind her Thangam Pillai, her husband and a daughter of the name of Sarojini. On the death of Pillani Ammal, Thangam Pillai and Sarojini succeeded to the superstructure and as a result of the release deed executed by Sarojini in favour of her father Thangam Pillai on 26-3-1970, Thangam Pillai no doubt became exclusively entitled to the superstructure. However, under Exhibit B21 dated 30-4-1970, Thangam Pillai executed a trust deed with reference to the superstructure and impressed the superstructure with the character of trust property. There is no dispute regarding the execution of Exhibit B21. However, under Exhibit B21 dated 30-4-1970, Thangam Pillai executed a trust deed with reference to the superstructure and impressed the superstructure with the character of trust property. There is no dispute regarding the execution of Exhibit B21. Thus, when Thangam Pillai executed the trust deed under Exhibit B21, he ceased to be the owner of the superstructure. On the surrender of the leasehold interest by the original lessee S.R. Rajendran in whose favour N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust had granted a lease under Exhibit A1, Thangam Pillai became the lessee of the site. In other words, at the time when Thangam Pillai secures some interest in the site the superstructure standing thereon did not belong to him as he had created a trust in respect of the superstructure under Exhibit B21 dated 30-4-1970. It is in the background of the above facts that the claim of Thangam Pillai that he was entitled to the benefits of the Act has to be considered. It may be immediately mentioned that thangam Pillai did not prefer any application under S.9 of the Act. Nor did he claim that he was entitled to the payment of compensation in respect of the superstructure. In so far as the claim of compensation for the superstructure is concerned, the Trust was the ownet thereof under Exhibit B21 dated 30-4-1970 and, therefore, Thangam Pillai could not have claimed the benefit of compensation under the Act. If at all, Thangam Pillai could have claimed any benefits under the Act, it was under S.9 of the Act. Though no independent application invoking the benefits of S.9 of the Act was filed by Thangam Pillai, even taking his claim in the written statement that he was entitled to the benefits of the Act as one falling under S.9 of the Act, he was not entitled to any relief. In Rajalakshmi Ammal v. Madurai Town Vayalaga Vellalargal etc., Sabhai 1, Ramaprasada Rao, J., (as he then was) held that in order to claim the benefits of S.9 of the Act as a tenant, a person should primarily satisfy that he had erected the superstructure on the demised land and that he continued to be the owner thereof on the date when he made the application. It was also further laid down that a person who had admittedly parted with his title to the superstructure cannot project any claim under S.9 of the Act. It was also further laid down that a person who had admittedly parted with his title to the superstructure cannot project any claim under S.9 of the Act. This decision would squarely apply on the facts of this case, as under Exhibit B21 dated 30-4-1970 Thangam Pillai had parted with the superstructure, even before he became a tenant on 7-8-1970. Applying the principles laid down in the decision referred to above, the conclusion is irresistible that Thangam Pillai himself could not have claimed the benefits of S.9 of the Act. 6. The appellant in the second appeal is a trust created by Thangam Pillai under Exhibit B21 and the trust property comprised the superstructure. In other words, the appellant trust has not acquired any interest in the site over which the superstructure stood. Applying the same reasoning referred to earlier, the appellant also cannot claim the benefits of S.9 of the Act. It has also to be remembered that even on the footing that Thangam Pillai became a tenant of the site with effect from 7-8-1970, on his death on 19-2-1978, his leasehold interest in the site would have devolved upon his daughter Sarojini and not on the appellant-trust and thus looked at from any point of view, the appellant-trust cannot project any claim to the benefits of S.9 of the Act. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. 7. Learned counsel next contended that this would be a fit case in which relief should be given to the appellant applying S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondent submitted that the benefit of S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act can be claimed only in cases of forfeiture of the lease for non-payment of rent and not to a case like this, where the tenancy had been determined by a proper notice to quit under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In other words, the submission was that S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to cases of forfeiture falling under S.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act and not to cases of determination of the tenancy by notice to quit falling under S.111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. In other words, the submission was that S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to cases of forfeiture falling under S.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act and not to cases of determination of the tenancy by notice to quit falling under S.111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. Reliance in this connection was also placed by the learned counsel upon the decisions in Ambalal v. Babaldas 2, Santosh Kumar v. Smt. Chinmoyee Sen 3, Meenakshisundaram v. Paul Asaro 4 , and Geetabai v. B.D. Manjrekar 5. It was also the further submission of the learned counsel that the granting of the relief under S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act is discretionary and the discretion ought not to be exercised in favour of the Trust or even Thangam Pillai, for, they had been making a profit out of the property belonging to N.K.N K.R. Dharma Trust by not remaining in possession by themselves, but leasing it out at high rents to others. 8. There is no dispute that in this case a notice to quit had been issued under Exhibit A2 dated 27-12-1974 and that had been served on Thangam Pillai on 30-12-1974 as shown by Exhibit A3. No argument was raised regarding the validity of the notice to quit before this Court. It has, therefore, to be taken that there was a valid notice to quit under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the determination of the leases of immovable property. S.111(g) enumerates cases of determination of a lease by forfeiture. Under S.111(h), provision is made for the determination of a lease on the expiration of a notice to quit. It is, therefore, clear that forfeiture and notice to quit are two distinct and separate modes by which a lease could be determined. Under S. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, relief against forfeiture for nonpayment of rent is provided for. S.114 has thus no reference whatever to the determination of a lease by the issue of a notice under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is one of the modes of determination under S.111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. S.114 has thus no reference whatever to the determination of a lease by the issue of a notice under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which is one of the modes of determination under S.111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. In as much as on the facts of this case there is no question of forfeiture for non-payment of rent, the appellant cannot be relieved against the so-called forfeiture for non-payment of rent. In Ambalal v. Babaldas 1, the scope of S.111(g) and 114 of the Transfer of Property Act came to be considered. It was laid down that relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent contemplated by S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act applies only to a case where there is a determination of the lease under S 111(g) and not where it has been determined under clause (h) of S.111, namely, by a notice to quit under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was also further pointed out that the right of forfeiture is exercised under S.111(g) during the subsistence of the tenancy, while, in a case falling under S.111(h), the determination takes place by a notice to quit resulting in the lease not subsisting any longer and no question, therefore, of relief against re-entry by forfeiture can arise. To similar effect is the decision in Meenakshisundaram v. Paul Asari 2. In that case also, a notice terminating the tenancy was issued to the tenant as he was in arrears of rent and no payment was made by the tenant; nor did he vacate the premises. While the trial Court decreed ejectment, the appellate Court purported to apply the provisions of S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act and allowed the tenant to remain in possession on deposit of the arrears. In considering the question whether S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act can be applied, it was pointed out referring to Riyasat Ali Khan v. Mirza Wahid Beg and another 3, that there is no scope for the application of S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act in the case of the determination of a tenancy for non-payment of rent. In considering the question whether S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act can be applied, it was pointed out referring to Riyasat Ali Khan v. Mirza Wahid Beg and another 3, that there is no scope for the application of S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act in the case of the determination of a tenancy for non-payment of rent. In Geetabai v. B.D. Manjrekar 4, the distinction between termination by forfeiture and termination by a notice to quit was pointed out and it was laid down that S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act does not come into play, unless there is a forfeiture pursuant to a forfeiture clause in the agreement and when there is no such provision, S. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be invoked at all. In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it follows that the benefit of S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot at all be claimed. There is yet another aspect which has to be borne in mind. Granting of relief under S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act is a matter of exercise of discretion and if the conduct of the tenant is such that it disentitles the tenant to claim relief in equity, then, the relief ought not to be granted in his favour. In this case, even in paragraph 7 of the written statement there is a clear admission that Thangam Pillai was never in possession of the property at all, but had been realising the rents out of the same. In other words, Thangam Pillai was never in possession of the property at all, but had been realising the rents out of the same. In other words, Thangam Pillai was making profits out of the property to the detriment of N.K.N.K.R. Dharma Trust. Even viewed as a matter of exercise of discretion, no relief could be given to the appellant under S.114 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thus, the second contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant also cannot be accepted. No other point was urged. 9. Consequently, the second appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. The Court places on record the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. P. Ananthakrishnan Nair who appeared as Amicus Curiae at the instance of the Court on behalf of the third respondent.