Judgment :- Sengottuvelan, J. 1. " This reference made by Swamikkannu, J. involves the interpretation of. the provisions contained in Sec.6 of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act 31 of 1976, which is as follows: "6. Debtors to apply in certain cases: (1) A debtor referred to in clause (f) of Sec.4 may make an application to the Tahsildar having jurisdiction over the area within which such debtor ordinarily resides, for an order releasing the mortgaged property and for the grant of a certificate of redemption: Provided that, no application shall be made under this Sub-section after the 13th day of December 1979, and every application for an order releasing the mortgaged property and for the grant of certificate of redemption shall be made in accordance with and within the time specified in Sub-sec. (1A). (1A) (a) and (b).......... (c) Every such application shall be made before the expiry of the period of twelve months from 13th day of December, 1979 (hereinafter in this section referred to as the said date); Provided that the Tahsildar may in his discretion allow further time not exceeding one month for making any application if he is satisfied that the debtor had sufficient cause for not making the application in time, but no application shall be made after the expiry of thirteen months from the said date. (2)(a) On receipt of an application under Sub-sec(1A) the Tahsildar after giving a reasonable opportunity to the creditor concerned and the debtor to make their representations and if he is satisfied- (i) that the debtor is entitled to relief under Sec.4, shall pass an order releasing the mortgaged property and grant a certificate of redemption in the prescribed form which shall be admissible as evidence of such redemption in any proceedings before any Court or other authority. (ii) that the debtor is not entitled to relief under Sec.4, shall pass an order dismissing the application; Provided that, the Tahsildar may, if he deems fit, hold a summary enquiry before passing an order under the clause. (ii) that the debtor is not entitled to relief under Sec.4, shall pass an order dismissing the application; Provided that, the Tahsildar may, if he deems fit, hold a summary enquiry before passing an order under the clause. An order under this clause shall be communicated to the creditor concerned and the debtor within such period as may be prescribed; (b) The Tahsildar shall also direct the creditor or the transferee of the creditor- (i) to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the debtor on or before the date specified in the order, if the debtor is not already in possession of the mortgaged property; and (ii) to produce on or before the date specified in the order, the mortgage deed or other document and the Tahsildar shall make an endorsement of redemption on the mortgage deed or other document; (2A)(a) The Tahsildar, shall, as soon as may be, after the expiry of thirteen months from the said date, publish in such form and in such manner a list of debtors who have made applications under sub-Sec(1A). (b) Where any debtor referred to In clause (f) of Sec.4. has not made any application in accordance with the provisions of, and within the time specified in Sub-sec(1A), then such debtor shall not be entitled to relief under this Act. (3) Pending orders under Sub-sec(2) no creditor or the transferee of the creditor shall transfer or otherwise assign his interest in, or exercise his right of foreclosure in respect of the property mortgaged by debtors. (4) Where the mortgaged property has been transferred or any right therein has been assigned to any of the institutions referred to in clause (g) of Sec.13 by the creditor the Tahsildar shall recover from the creditor such amount as is due to such institution in respect of land revenue, and shall pay the same to the said institution." The abovesaid section enables the debtor as defined in Sec.3(f) of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act 31 of 1976 who has executed a mortgage, to obtain a certificate or redemption by making an application to the Tahsildar as contemplated in Sec.6. In the present case, the plaintiff claiming herself as an agriculturist labourer filed the suit for injunction restraining the defendant, respondent herein, from enforcing the mortgage by bringing the property for sale in pursuance of the mortgage. In the present case, the plaintiff claiming herself as an agriculturist labourer filed the suit for injunction restraining the defendant, respondent herein, from enforcing the mortgage by bringing the property for sale in pursuance of the mortgage. The trial Court after considering the materials placed before it came to the conclusion that in view of Sec6 of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act 31 of 1976 the plaintiff, the appellant herein, has chosen the wrong forum and as such, she is not entitled to any relief. As against the said judgment, the plaintiff-appellant filed an Appeal in A.S.No.347 of 1977 on the file of the First Additional City Civil Judge, Madras. The learned First Additional City Civil Judge also concurred with the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Hence the above second appeal is filed challenging the legality and correctness of the judgments of the Court below. Originally the above second appeal came before Swamikkannu, J., who felt the need for an authoritative pronouncement, on the question whehter a mortgagor coming within the definition of debtor as defined in Act 31 of 1976 and where the mortgage debt is wiped out as per Sec.4 of the Act 31 of 1976, can file a suit in a civil Court restraining the mortgager from bringing the hypothecation to sale by enforcing the mortgage. 2. In so far as the right of the appellant to move the civil Court for the reliefs contained in the Act 31 of 1976 is concerned there are no reported decisions of this Court. But there are decisions which have been rendered on analogous provisions contained in Act 13 of 1980. It is not disputed that both the Acts 13 of 1980 and 31 of 1976 contain similar provisions. The earlier decision is that of Ratnam, J., reported in Perumal v. Chinna Kuppanna Gounder, (1981)2 M.L.J. 1: 94 L.W. 317: A.I.R. 1981 Mad. But there are decisions which have been rendered on analogous provisions contained in Act 13 of 1980. It is not disputed that both the Acts 13 of 1980 and 31 of 1976 contain similar provisions. The earlier decision is that of Ratnam, J., reported in Perumal v. Chinna Kuppanna Gounder, (1981)2 M.L.J. 1: 94 L.W. 317: A.I.R. 1981 Mad. 271, where it has been held as follows: " "A fair interpretation of Sec.4(1)(a) to (d) of the Act 13 of 1980 coupled with the absence of a provision enabling the Tahsildar to deal with in any manner matters pending before civil Courts, would inevitably lead to the conclusion that where matters are pending before the civil Court, be they suits or decrees already passed and in the process of execution or other proceedings the civil Court will have to consider the claim of a person that he is a debtor and afford relief. Secs.5 and 6 of the Act provide for the machinery to work out relief in two specified cases, viz., pledge and mortgage and cannot therefore be made application to cover cases of indebtedness of a debtor on other claims. Secs.5 and 6 appear to apply to cases where the creditor or the debtor has not resorted to Court, On the return of the articles pledged by the debtor to the creditor, the relationship of pledger and pledgee is terminated. Likewise, the redemption of a mortgage provided for under Sec.6, if permitted by the Tahsildar, would snap the relationship of mortgagor and the mortgagee between the debtor and the creditor and a certificate of redemption granted by the Tahsildar in the prescribed form would be evidence of redemption. That would mean that the relationship of mortgagor and the mortgagee no longer subsists and the mortgage cannot form the subject-matter of a suit before a civil Court. In other words, the exercise of the powers conferred on the Tahsildar under Secs.5 and 6 of the Act and the granting of relief under Secs.4(1)(e) and (f) of the Act would really wipe out the cause of action itself for the institution of the suit, be it on a pledge or on a mortgage not already forming the subject-matter of suits before the civil Court, car be adjudicated upon by the Tahsildar exercising powers under Secs.5 and 6 of the Act and in no other case. In all other cases, where matters have come before the civil Court either as a suit or a decree in the process of execution or other proceeding, when a suitor puts forth a claim that he is a debtor within the meaning of the Act, the civil Court has necessarily to investigate and ascertain whether such claim is made out or not, and thereafter proceed to grant relief under Sec.4(2)(a) to (d) of the Act or refuse it. In the course of such proceedings, even if a Tahsildars certificate which is relevant only for purposes of Secs.5 and 6 of the Act is relied upon by a person claiming to be a debtor, that would be just a piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence and has no higher probative value. The conclusion is irresistible that apart from cases covered by Secs.5 and 6 of the Act, the Tahsildar has no power under the Act to adjudicate upon other claims and all other matters have to be dealt with by the civil Courts before which suits, execution or other proceedings have been either initiated or are pending." This view had been affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in K.V.S.P. Subramania Chetti v. R.D.O., Arantangi, (1982)2 M.L.J. 375 : (1982)95 L.W. 466 : A.I.R 1983 Mad. 26: I.L.R. (1983)2 Mad.222, where the Division Bench held as follows: "Under Sec.4(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act no civil Court shall entertain any suit or other proceedings against the debtor for the recovery of any amount of a mortgage debt and according to Sec.4(1)(e) all suits and proceedings at the commencement of the Act against any debtor for the recovery of any such debt shall abate. However, the prohibition on the civil Court to entertain a suit and the abatement of all existing suits and other proceedings will arise only if the debtor is found entitled to the benefits of the Act. Therefore, the civil Court wherein suits or other proceedings are pending against the debtor has to come to a conclusion as to whether the debtor is entitled to the benefits of the Act or not. Therefore, the civil Court wherein suits or other proceedings are pending against the debtor has to come to a conclusion as to whether the debtor is entitled to the benefits of the Act or not. Secs.5 and 6 of the Act do not use a nonobstante clause giving the Tahsildar a power to override the decision of the civil Court as regards the question whether a party before the civil Court is a person entitled to the benefits of the Act, and the Tahsildar acting under Secs.5 or 6 of the Act cannot be expected to render decision on the question whether the debtor is entitled to the benefits of the Act and call upon the civil Court to abide by that decision. In a suit or a proceeding initiated by a creditor in a civil Court, the court has to decide the question as to whether the defendant in that suit or proceeding is a debtor as defined in the Act, as a jurisdictional issue has to be decided only by the Court itself before pronouncing its decision on the question of maintainability of the suit or proceeding or on the question of abatement." The above decisions rendered under Act 13 of 1980 are equally applicable to cases arising under Act 31 of 1976 in view of the fact that the provisions in both The Acts are analogous. 3. Swamikkannu, J. in the instant case, seems to have felt a doubt whether the appellant is entitled to file a suit in the civil Court for an injunction restrain-ing the creditor from bringing the mortgaged properties to sale. The abovesaid two decisions of this Court lay down the proposition before it will have to decide whether the person concerned is a debtor entitled to protection under the Act. If one is found to be debtor as defined under the Act, then he win be entitled to the reliefs under the Act and for that purpose he need not approach the appropriate authorities under the Act. 4. The question that arises in this second appeal is whether subsequent to the coming into force of Act 31 of 1976 one can file a suit for an injunction restraining the creditor from bringing the mortgaged properties of the debtor to sale. 4. The question that arises in this second appeal is whether subsequent to the coming into force of Act 31 of 1976 one can file a suit for an injunction restraining the creditor from bringing the mortgaged properties of the debtor to sale. The debtor is defined in Sec.3(f) of Act 31 of 1976 and is as follows: "3(f) debtor means " (i) a landless agricultural labourer; or (ii) a rural artisan; or (iii) a small farmer, who has borrowed or incurred any debt before the commencement of this Act." Sec4 of the Act lays down that any debt payable by the debtor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged. 5. Certain powers are given to the Tahsildar under the Act. The definition of Tahsildar occurring in Sec.3(m) is as follows: "3(m) Tahsildar includes a Deputy Tahsildar in independent charge of a taluk or sub-taluk and any other officer of the revenue department not below the rank of a Deputy Tahsildar empowered by the State Government to exercise the powers and perform the functions of a Tahsildar under this Act;" 6. The Tahsildar is empowered under Sec.4 of the Act to order the return of the property pledged by debtors. Sec.6 provides for the granting of a certificate of redemption in case of mortgage of immovable property by debtors. On the granting of a certificate of redemption by the Tahsildar the cause of action with reference to the mortgage comes to an end. 7. We have to consider whether the Secs.5 and 6 will bar the suit under appeal. Secs.5 and 6 apply only to redemption of pledges and mortgages. There is no provision in the Act empowering the Tahsildar to declare a debt as discharged. Hence in a case of a simple money debt a debtor can definitely file a suit for a declaration that he is a debtor and that the debt is discharged. In this case, we are faced with the question whether the mortgagor is entitled to file a suit for injunction. In the case of pledges and mortgages the Tahsildar can entertain an application by a debtor and direct the return of the pledged articles or grant a certificate of redemption. A certificate of redemption wipes out the mortgage debt. In this case, we are faced with the question whether the mortgagor is entitled to file a suit for injunction. In the case of pledges and mortgages the Tahsildar can entertain an application by a debtor and direct the return of the pledged articles or grant a certificate of redemption. A certificate of redemption wipes out the mortgage debt. We will have to consider whether the existence of the abovesaid two provisions will bar the institution of a suit by a debtor for an injunction restraining the creditor from bringing the mortgaged property of the debtor to sale. As already stated, the power given to the Tahsildar is limited for ordering the return of pledged articles and for issuing a certificate of redemption. The Tahsildar is not empowered to grant the relief of injunction prayed for in the suit. 8. Sec4 of the Act lays down that any debt payable by a debtor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged. But the Tahsildar is not given the power to decide whether a debt stands discharged under the provisions of the Act. Any certificate of redemption issued by the Tahsildar will only be an effective answer to a mortgage claim, Sec.6 enables a debtor to redeem the mortgage properties without paying the debt by making an application to the Tahsildar. The existence of such a provision will not bar any creditor to get the reliefs which he is entitled to protect himself from any action that may be filed by the mortgagee. The Tahsildar is not empowered to grant the relief which a creditor is entitled to under Sec.4 of the Act, and he can only issue a certificate of redemption. 9. The present suit is certainly not barred by any of the provisions of Act 31 of 1976. The provision contained in Sec.6 relates only to the issue of a redemption certificate in respect of the mortgage which is only an answer to the mortgage claim. Since the mortgage debt stands discharged on the commencement of the Act as per Sec.4, the debtor is entitled to protect himself from any debt by the mortgage. Such a legal right is not taken away by the provisions contained in Sec.6 of the Act. 10. The conclusion of both the courts below that the suit for injunction is barred in view of Sec.6 of the Act is not sustainable. Such a legal right is not taken away by the provisions contained in Sec.6 of the Act. 10. The conclusion of both the courts below that the suit for injunction is barred in view of Sec.6 of the Act is not sustainable. Hence the second appeal will have to be allowed and since there is no positive finding by the trial Court whether the appellant is a debtor as defined in Act 31 of 1976, the matter is remanded to the trial Court for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made above. 11. Court fee paid on the memorandum of second appeal is directed to be refunded to the appellant. There will be no order as to costs.