Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the trial Magistrate issuing summons to the Public Analyst at the fag end of the trial. He is directed to appear with documents for showing the date of analysis of the sample. This petition under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code') is to quash the aforesaid order. 2. The petitioner is facing a charge for an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. After the close of the evidence of the prosecution, and after questioning the accused under S.313 of the Code the trial Magistrate posed the case for judgment. But instead of pronouncing judgment on that day the learned Magistrate passed an order for issuing summons to the Public Analyst. The Magistrate has stated in his order that on going through the report of the Public Analyst it appeared to him that for a just decision of the case the Public Analyst should be summoned as a court witness for ascertaining the date of analysis. 3. The petitioner challenges the order on the main ground that the attempt is to fill up a lacuna in the prosecution evidence, The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that even if the material sought to be produced is a vital record having great relevance in deciding the guilt of the accused, re-opening of the case for affording an opportunity for the said purpose would result in miscarriage of justice. The said contention has been advanced on the strength of the observation of a learned single judge in Chandran v. State of Kerala (1985 KLT 452). The learned single judge observed that "recalling and re-examining a witness like the investigating officer for production and proof of a vital record having great relevance in deciding the guilt of the accused and that too after conclusion of the evidence cannot be said to be essential for the just decision of the case. A reading of the decision shows that the said observation is made with reference to the latter part of S.311 of the Code. 4. S.311 of the Code confers power on the court to summon any person at any stage of any inquiry or trial. A reading of the decision shows that the said observation is made with reference to the latter part of S.311 of the Code. 4. S.311 of the Code confers power on the court to summon any person at any stage of any inquiry or trial. The second part of the Section is mandatory in tone that the court shall summon any person "if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case". The Section consists of two limbs. In the first limb the power is discretionary. But the phraseology used in the section indicates the wide ambit for exercise of the discretion. The profuse use of the term "any" in the section and the manner in which that word is used are indicative of the legislative intent to widen the scope of discretion of the court. "Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness or recall and re-examine any person already examined.." (emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968 SC 178) bad interpreted that the employment of the word 'any' in the section is clearly indicative of the width of the powers of the court in that sphere. Hidayatullah, J. (as be then was) who delivered the judgment in Govan's case has observed that S.540 (the said section corresponds to S.311 of the Code) is intended to be wide as the repeated use of the word 'any' throughout its length clearly indicates. A useful portion of the decision for this context can be extracted below: The section is in two parts. The first part gives a discretionary power but the latter part is mandatory. The use of the word 'may' in the first part and of the word 'shall' in the second firmly establishes this difference. As the section stands, there is no limitation on the power of the Court arising from the stage to which the trial may have reached, provided the Court is bona fide of the opinion that for the just decision of the case, the step must be taken. It is clear that the requirement of just decision of the case does not limit the action to something in the interest of the accused only. It is clear that the requirement of just decision of the case does not limit the action to something in the interest of the accused only. The action may equally benefit the prosecution", (emphasis supplied). The decision is also authority for the position that a court cannot be assailed on the ground that the court is trying to fill up the lacuna in prosecution evidence when the court takes action under S.311 of the Code. Even if it turns out to be for the benefit of prosecution the court cannot shirk its responsibility to bring in materials or evidence which help the court for a just decision of the case. 5. The criticism that the court is trying to fill up lacuna in prosecution evidence when it exercises powers under the Section is partly due to an obsolete thinking about the role of the court in adversary system of trial. It was considered at least in some quarters that the function of a court is merely to judge the cause after silently observing or watching the performance by the rival sides in a ease. Gone are the days when court was supposed to be only a silent umpire. In a criminal court mainly three functionaries are involved in the endeavour to reach the final goal, namely, dispensation of criminal justice Prosecution and the defence are two of them and the court is the third important (if not the most important) functionary. The court has to play a dynamic role in the endeavour to reach the final goal. Of course it must be done by keeping within the bounds provided by law. The language used in S.165 of the Evidence Act, and the powers envisaged in S.311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are sufficiently eloquent informants of the dynamic role which the court is expected to function in a trial. Of course it must be done by keeping within the bounds provided by law. The language used in S.165 of the Evidence Act, and the powers envisaged in S.311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are sufficiently eloquent informants of the dynamic role which the court is expected to function in a trial. The aforesaid function of the court in a trial cannot be explained more pithily and more tersely than what the Supreme Court said in Ram Chander v. The State of Haryana (AIR 1981 SC 1036): "The adversary system of trial being what it is there is an unfortunate tendency for a judge presiding over a trial to assume the role of a referred or an umpire and to allow the trial to develop into a contest between the prosecution and the defence with the inevitable distortions flowing from combative and competitive elements entering the trial procedure. If a Criminal Court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice. the presiding judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine. He must become a participant in the trial by evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witness in order to ascertain the truth." (emphasis supplied) 6. In this case, the learned Magistrate has expressly stated in the Impugned order that the examination of the Public Analyst is necessary for the just decision of the case. There can be no allegation that the learned Magistrate has acted without bona fides. Accordingly this petition is dismissed. I direct the learned Magistrate to dispose of the case, after examining the Public Analyst and after taking such steps as are legally necessary, without any further delay. Dispatch the records forthwith.