Judgment :- 1. This appeal is brought by the Southern Railway from the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Trichur awarding a sum of Rs. 19,200/- as compensation to the claimant who is the widow of a workman of the railway who died on 17-3-1975 at about 4.15 p.m. The evidence, as accepted by the Commissioner, is that the workman drank a glass of water at 7 a. m. from a drum kept in the railway premises. The water in the drum was intended for the workmen to drink. The workman was on his way to the work spot, and had collected his tools before drinking the water. Another workman also bad drunk water at about the same time from the same drum. Both fell sick with acute gastro-enteritis and were removed to the hospital. The other workman survived, but the workman, whose widow is the respondent-claimant, succumbed to the disease at 4.15p.m. Those facts are not in dispute. The Commissioner at the end of the enquiry found that the railway was liable in terms of S.3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and awarded the aforesaid sum of Rs. 19,200/- as compensation. 2. Counsel for the railway submits that there was no causal connection between the drinking of the water and the death. In any view, be submits that drinking the water was not an act connected with the work of the deceased and, therefore, the accident by which his death was caused did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. He further contends that in any view the Commissioner awarded compensation with reference to a Schedule which was not in force on the date of the death. 3. If a workman is injured or killed by reason of his contact with, or exposure to, a matter or energy in the place of his work, then the accident by which he was injured or killed arose put of or in the course of his employment. Even if the accident did not arise from anything connected with his employment, but from something out of it, namely, the collapsing of a neighbouring wall or the capsizing of a boat in which he was working under orders of his employer, the accident arose out of a risk incidental to the employment. Even if the accident did not arise from anything connected with his employment, but from something out of it, namely, the collapsing of a neighbouring wall or the capsizing of a boat in which he was working under orders of his employer, the accident arose out of a risk incidental to the employment. If quenching thirst was inherent in the nature of his work and water was provided by the employer for such purpose in the employer's premises, and the workman suffered injury or death as a result of drinking the water, that was an event which arose out of and in the course of his employment. In this connection the observation of a Division Bench of this Court in George v. Sumathi,1975 KLT 784 is apposite: "The principle enunciated in the cases cited above shows that if a workman is killed or injured by the happening of an event, in the premises where he is employed under orders of his master or in accordance with the contract of service, the accident necessarily arises out of and in the course of the employment. It is immaterial if the event itself was caused by an act of God like storm, lightning or earth quake. What directly caused the death of the workman in the present case was the capsizing of the boat in which he was working under orders of his employer. Being drowned in such circumstances is one of the inherent clangers of fishing at sea. The accident arose out of a risk incidental to the employment. It was a risk which his contract of service required him to face, and it is immaterial that it was a risk which was shared by all members of the public who chose to go to sea. The remoter cause of the storm was not the immediate or direct or proximate cause of his death; yet by the very nature of his employment, the deceased was exposed in a special degree to suffer the consequences of what flowed from the perils of the sea such as storm and such consequences were, as Lord Atkin puts it, 'sufficiently associated with his employment' so as to make the employer liable under the Act." See also the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in M. F. A. No. 517 of 1981. (1986 KLT. 1329.) 4. (1986 KLT. 1329.) 4. It cannot be gainsaid that it was part of the responsibility of the railway to provide drinking water for the workmen. The drum containing water was kept for that purpose. The deceased was at the relevant time within the railway premises after collecting the tools for proceeding to the work spot. If drinking the water was the cause of his death, the cause and the effect arose out of and in the course of his employment. The medical and other evidence clearly show that death was caused by gastro-enteritis which itself was caused on account of the water which the deceased had drunk a few hours before his death. Contamination of the water was thus the direct, immediate and proximate cause of his death. There is thus clear evidence to support the Commissioner's finding that death was the result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. On the basis of that finding the Commissioner rightly, in our view, awarded compensation. 5. The further question is as regards the quantum awarded. It is true that the quantum was determined with reference to the schedule which came into force subsequent to the date of the death but in force on the date of the award. S.4 of the Act provides that the amount of compensation must be calculated with reference to Schedule.4 Column.1 S.4A says that compensation has to be paid when it falls due. S.4A(3) says: "Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it full due, the Commissioner may direct that, in addition to the amount of the arrears, simple interest at the rate of six percent per annum on the amount due together with, if in the opinion of the Commissioner there is no justification for the delay, a further sum not exceeding fifty percent of such amount, shall be recovered from the employer by way of penalty." (emphasis supplied) Interest and penalty thus become payable in case of default and they have to be computed with reference to the date on which compensation became due. Compensation does not become due until it is awarded. It has to be computed with reference to the schedule which prescribes the method. Compensation does not become due until it is awarded. It has to be computed with reference to the schedule which prescribes the method. Thus there is force in the contention that compensation must be calculated with reference to the schedule in force on the date of the award, although the liability itself arose under the relevant substantive provisions in force on the date of the accident. However, this is an aspect on which we do not wish to express a final view in the absence of any such ground having been taken by the railway is the proceedings before the Commissioner. 6. In the circumstances, we see no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed with costs.