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1986 DIGILAW 477 (KER)

VESUDEVAN v. STATE OF KERALA

1986-12-09

VARGHESE KALLIATH

body1986
Judgment :- Petitioner challenges in this Original Petition an order of the second respondent-Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Palghat. The order is dated 21-8-1986. Copy of the order is Ext. P7. By Ext. P7 order, the second respondent has declared that the petitioner is disqualified to be a member of the Managing Committee of the third respondent-Co-operative Bank under rule 44(1) (c) (i) read with rule 44(2) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the "Rules". 2. The petitioner submits in this petition that he does not merit any disqualification under rule 44 (1) (c) (i) of the Rules. The brief facts of the case as disclosed in the petition are as follows: 3 The petitioner took a gold loan from the Bank on 26-3-1985. Hi defaulted the re-payment of the loan and the default continued far more than 90 days. This circumstance was held to bi sufficient for disqualifying the petitioner. As I said earlier, the loan was taken on 26-3-1985 and it was fixed that the amount has to be re-paid on or before 25-3-1986. But it was not re-paid. It was re-paid only on 12-7-1986. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits before me that being a loan secured by deposit of gold, so long as the deposit of gold continues, the petitioner can never be treated as a defaulter even it the petitioner does not pay the amount in time or continues the default of non-payment of the debt for a period of more than 90 days. The petitioner wants me to examine this question. 5. The petitioner had approached this court on a previous occasion when a notice was served asking his explanation for not taking action to declare him as a defaulter. This court disposed of the Original Petition with a direction to the second respondent to pass orders, after fully and properly considering the reply of the petitioner. Further this court directed that the resultant order shall not be implemented for a period of two weeks after the communication of the order to the petitioner. Obviously, on the above direction, the second respondent has considered the question and passed the order now impugned in this Original Petition. 6. Further this court directed that the resultant order shall not be implemented for a period of two weeks after the communication of the order to the petitioner. Obviously, on the above direction, the second respondent has considered the question and passed the order now impugned in this Original Petition. 6. True, the action for disqualification was initiated at a time when the petitioner has paid the amount due under the loan, though the payment was 90 days after the due date. On this fact, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner should not be considered as a person who has incurred disqualification. I do not think that this position is correct. This question has been considered by this court on more than one occasion. 7. Rule 44 of the Rules concerns the disqualification from being a member of the committee. Rule 44 (1) specifically deals with the disqualification at the time of election, and rule 44 (2) after the election. Rule 44(1) and rule 44(2), relevant for the consideration of this case read as follows: 44. "Disqualification for membership of committee.- (1) No member of the society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under S.28 if he: (c)(i) is in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him or loan in which he has stood surety, for such period, as is prescribed in the bye-laws of the society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months or is a defaulter to the society or to any other society; or (ii) has been sentenced for any offence other than an offence of a political character or an offence not involving moral delinquency such sentence not having been reversed or offence pardoned and a period of three years has not elapsed from the date of expiration of the sentence; or (2) A member of the committee shall cease to hold his office as such, if he - (a) becomes disqualified under sub-rule (1), . (b) ceases to be a member of the society; or (c) is subsequently seen to be disqualified under sub rule (1) on the date of election itself." 8. In this case rule 44(2) is attracted. This disqualification complained of is a disqualification that arose subsequent to the election. (b) ceases to be a member of the society; or (c) is subsequently seen to be disqualified under sub rule (1) on the date of election itself." 8. In this case rule 44(2) is attracted. This disqualification complained of is a disqualification that arose subsequent to the election. There is no difficulty for holding that it is possible for an elected member also ins-arcing a disqualification which will render him unfit to hold the post. This aspect of the matter is perfectly made clear in sub-clause (2) of Rule 44. When sub-clause (2) of rule 44 mandates by saying that a member of the committee shall cease to hold his office as such if he becomes disqualified under sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (1) enumerates the circumstances and conditions which will render a member disqualified to hold the post of a member of the committee. I feel no doubt (bat a member if he incurs the disqualification stated in rule 44 (1), he will not be entitled to hold the office of a member of the committee. This is whet has been held in Madanamohanan Kartha v. Elamkulam S. Co-op. Bank (7983 K. L. T. 640). The Division Bench held: "An elected member can be in default subsequent to his election." 9. Now the question is whether the petitioner has done anything to fasten the disqualification. The courageous contention of the petitioner is that in regard to a gold lean so long as the gold is in deposit with the Cooperative Bank, there cannot be any default in the matter of re-payment of the gold loan. It has to be noted that when the loan was taken, a time was stipulated for the re-payment of the loan. When the loan is not re-paid, within the time stipulated, plainly there is a default, a default in regard to a vital condition in the matter of re-payment of the loan. 10. Rule 44(1)(c)(i) of the Rules indicates that the member will be considered as a defaulter to the Bank or the Society as the case may be, in respect of any loan, if not re-paid, for such period as is prescribed in the bye-laws of the society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months. The importance is given to the period fixed for re-payment. If the re-payment is not dones a stipulated the borrower becomes a defaulter. The importance is given to the period fixed for re-payment. If the re-payment is not dones a stipulated the borrower becomes a defaulter. of course, the continuation of non-payment for a little time may not make the borrower disqualified for holding the membership of the committee. But if the loan is not re-paid for a considerable period, namely, three months as fixed by the rules, a member incurs the liability of being disqualified. 11. The only other question that has to be considered is whether a gold loan will come within the meaning of loan. The rule deals with "in respect of any loan". I fir d it extremely difficult to accept the contention of the petitioner that gold loan is not a loan at all. There is no good reason for accepting the contention. The general acceptance of the term loan, imparts a positive act of leading coupled with an acceptance by the other party of the money as a lean. It is a contract by which in consideration of the lender lending the money to him, the borrower promises to re-pay the amount. Ext. R4(a) is the application for obtaining a loan on the security of gold.