JUDGMENT H.N. Seth, CJ. - In these three petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution by petitioners Braj Kishore and Ram Kumar (Writ Petition No. 149 of 1976), Hari Krishna, Basant Lai, Banshidhar and Tara Devi (Writ Petition No. 161 of 1976), and Ram Kishore and Surendra Kumar (Writ Petition No. 162 of 1976), common questions of facts and law are involved. They can, therefore, be dealt with and disposed of by a common judgment. 2. During the months of April, and May, 1968 the petitioners obtained grants under S. 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act in respect of various plots situated in village Jahangirabad, Pargana Ghatampur, District Kanpur, from Bhoodan Yagna Samiti. On 17-5-1972 Tahsildar Ghatampur submitted a report to Collector, Kanpur and on the basis thereof the Additional Collector, Kanpur issued notices to the petitioners under S. 15A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act requiring them to show cause why the settlements obtained by them be not cancelled on following grounds. (i) As the petitioners did not reside in the village where the plots were situated. They had obtained the grants fraudulently and by misrepresenting facts. (ii) As the petitioners did not fall in the category of landless persons it was not proper to make the grants in their favour. (iii) The grants had not been approved by the Government of U.P. 3. The petitioners filed objections before the Additional Collector contending that the grants made in their favour were valid and in accordance with rules. They neither suppressed any fact nor did they commit any fraud in claiming themselves to be entitled to the grants on the ground that they were landless persons. They claimed that in the circumstances grants made in their favour did not deserve to be cancelled. 4. After considering the objections filed by the petitioners, the Additional Collector came to the conclusion that under the provisions of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act settlement of land could be made only in favour of a poor landless agricultural labour and not in favour of persons like the petitioners who were quite well off and who resided in the city of Kanpur, owned property and carried on business there. In his opinion such persons did not fall in the category of landless persons and the grants made in their favour in the year 1968 were irregular and liable to be set aside. In his opinion such persons did not fall in the category of landless persons and the grants made in their favour in the year 1968 were irregular and liable to be set aside. In the result the Additional Collector, by his order dated 1-1-1976 quashed the grants made in favour of the petitioners. Aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. Before us, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners questioned the validity of the order of the Additional Collector dated 1-1-1976 cancelling the grants made in their favour, on following two grounds. (i) that the Additional Collector who made the order dated 1-1-1976 was not competent to perform the functions of "Collector" under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act and to cancel a grant made under S. 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act. (ii) The ground given by the Additional Collector for cancelling grant made in favour of the petitioners in the year 1968 is not tenable in law. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited our attention to the provisions contained in S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act which empowers the Collector to, cancel a grant of any land made under S. 14 of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act if he feels satisfied that the grant was irregular or was obtained by the grantee by misrepresentation or fraud. According to the learned counsel the `Collector' who is appointed under S. 14 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, is an authority quite separate and distinct from an Additional Collector appointed under S. 14A of the Act. He contended that under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act the power to cancel a grant vests in the `Collector' and cannot be exercised by an Additional Collector. 7. We find no merit in aforementioned submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 14A of the U.P. Land Revenue Act empowers an Additional Collector to exercise such powers and discharge such duties of a Collector in such cases or class of cases as the Collector concerned may direct. Sub-sec. (4) then lays down that the U.P. Land Revenue Act and every other law for the time being applicable to a Collector shall apply to every Additional Collector, when exercising any powers of discharging any duties under sub-sec. Sub-sec. (4) then lays down that the U.P. Land Revenue Act and every other law for the time being applicable to a Collector shall apply to every Additional Collector, when exercising any powers of discharging any duties under sub-sec. (3), as if he were the Collector of the district. This provisions makes it absolutely clear that in cases, whether they pertain to U.P. Land Revenue Act or to any other law, assigned by the Collector to an Additional Collector, the Additional Collector is fully entitled to perform the functions of the Collector. Accordingly in cases assigned to him by the Collector, the Additional Collector is fully competent to exercise the functions of a Collector under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act and it cannot be said that the Additional Collector lacked jurisdiction to pass an order cancelling the grant made in favour of the petitioners on the ground that he was not the Collector of the district. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners then urged that the Additional Collector could have had jurisdiction to act under S. 15-A of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act only if the Collector had assigned those cases to him. He contended that in the instant case there is absolutely no material on the record to indicate that the Collector had authorised the Additional Collector to deal with the cases of the petitioners. This point has not been specifically raised by the petitioners either in the proceedings in which they were required to show cause why the grants made in their favour be not cancelled nor in the petitions filed before this Court. There is presumption of validity of official acts and in the circumstances no occasion arose for the respondents to place on record the facts showing that the Collector had in fact assigned the cases of the petitioners to the Additional Collector. In the result we are of opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to question the validity of the order dated 1-1-1976 on the ground that it was beyond Additional Collector's jurisdiction. 9. Coming now to the second ground of attack we find that S. 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act as it stood in the year 1968, enabled the Bhoodan Yagna Samiti to make grants of land vested in it to landless persons. 9. Coming now to the second ground of attack we find that S. 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act as it stood in the year 1968, enabled the Bhoodan Yagna Samiti to make grants of land vested in it to landless persons. It may be that at that time the petitioners were residing and carrying on their business at Kanpur but then it is not the case of the respondents that they possessed any land. The finding recorded that at the time of grant the petitioners were not landless in the sense that they did not own or possess any land at that time. In the case of Matoley v. State of U.P. reported in 1986 All LJ 645 in Division Bench of this court took the view that S. 14 of the Act as it stood in the year 1956 enabled the Samiti to settle the land vesting in it with landless persons. The section neither specified that such landless persons had also to be agricultural labours nor did it provide that they had to be residents of the district in which the concerned land was located. We also find that S. 14 of the Act as it stood in 1968 did not provide that before a landless person could qualify for the grant, he must also be a poor labour. The said Division Bench also held that under S. 15-A the qustion whether the grant made in favour of the grantee was regular or not, the provision of the Act as it stood at the time when the grant was made has to be looked into. The requirement that the grantee should be a landless agricultural labour was not there in the year 1968. At that time any landless person irrespective of the vocation which he was following and the place where he was residing was eligible for the grant. The requirement that in order to qualify for the grant the landless person should also be agricultural labourer as introduced in S. 14 of the Act for the first time in the year 1975. Following the Division Bench decision in Matoley's case we are clearly of opinion that the Additional Collector was not justified in cancelling the grant made in favour of the petitioners on the ground that they did not qualify for it as poor agricultural labour residing in the village. Following the Division Bench decision in Matoley's case we are clearly of opinion that the Additional Collector was not justified in cancelling the grant made in favour of the petitioners on the ground that they did not qualify for it as poor agricultural labour residing in the village. There is nothing in the order of the Additional Collector to indicate that he ever doubted the petitioners' case that at the time of the grant they did not own or possess any land. Apart from saying that at the time of the grant the petitioners were not poor agricultural labour residing in the village, the Additional Collector did not record any other finding from which any inference that while obtaining the grant the petitioners had suppressed facts or committed fraud could be drawn. Accordingly the finding of the Additional Collector that the petitioners were guilty of suppression of fact and commission of fraud is based on absolutely no material whatsoever. 10. In the result we accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the reasons given by the Additional Collector for cancelling the grants made in petitioners' favour in the year 1968, are non-existent and not tenable in law. 11. In the result, all the three petitions succeed and are allowed. The order dated 1-1-1976 in the case of all the petitioners is quashed.