Judgment :- 1. One acre 80 cents of land along with seed bed and a tank for irrigation belonged to Vadavattath tarwad and held by plaintiff's husband on lease. Plaintiff applied before the Land Tribunal to purchase the landlord's right over these items. Ext. A2 is the purchase order and Ext. Al is the purchase certificate. They were only for the 1 acre 80 cents and not for the seed bed or tank. Plaintiffs case is they were only omissions in the order and certificate. Suo mote proceeding is now pending for assignment of those items. 2. In the property there were originally 40 palmyrah palm trees out of which 20 were admittedly either destroyed or cut and the balance trees were only 20. Defendant is a tapper and he was tapping the palm trees under permission from the owner. On the strength of Exts. A1 and A2 plaintiff filed the suit for injunction restraining defendant from tapping the palms and interfering with her possession. The suit was resisted by the defendant who claimed that the arrangement in his favour is a lease which will not terminate with the assignment in favour of the plaintiff. 3. Trial court found the assignment in favour of the defendant to be a licence. It was also found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for. Since the seed bed and tank were not included in Exts. Al and A2 the relief of injunction was not granted in relation to those items. So also it was found that the 1 acre 80 cents covered by Exts. Al and A2 contain only 8 palmyrah palm trees. Injunction was granted only against tapping those palms and entering the property. Suit was dismissed in other respects. Both parties went in appeal but both the appeals were dismissed. Defendant came up in second appeal and plaintiff filed cross appeal against the disallowed portion of her claim. 4. There is no merit in the cross appeal. In relation to the seed bed and tank the plaintiff is not having any locus standi to claim injunction because they were not so far assigned in her favour. Defendant came up in second appeal and plaintiff filed cross appeal against the disallowed portion of her claim. 4. There is no merit in the cross appeal. In relation to the seed bed and tank the plaintiff is not having any locus standi to claim injunction because they were not so far assigned in her favour. The finding of both the courts below on the evidence is that at present there are only 8 palm trees and the rest must have been either cut or destroyed, That finding also cannot be disturbed in second appeal, being finding on facts by appreciation of evidence. Hence cross appeal has only to be dismissed. 5. The only other question to be considered is whether the decree for injunction restraining the appellant from entering the property and tapping the 8 palmyrah palms has to stand or not. Appellant says that he was permitted by the landlord to tap 40 palmyrah palm trees in consideration of payment of Rs. 40 per annum and the transaction is a lease under which he is entitled to fixity of tenure. According to him that right will not vest in the Government under S.72 and it cannot be assigned to the plaintiff. His stand is that he is neither a landlord nor an intermediary aid hence under S.72 his rights cannot vest in the Government. He has also pointed out that since his right did not vest in the Government and was not assigned to the plaintiff it is not possible for the plaintiff to claim that she is a tenant within the meaning of S.2(57) because she did not obtain complete right of enjoyment. These questions will spring up for consideration only if the appellant is able to establish that he had the right to tap the trees, whether it be a lease or licence. The tapping arrangement itself is denied and the appellate court found on the evidence that this arrangement itself was not established by the appellant. I am not in a position to find that it was otherwise. If so the appellant cannot be a lessee or even a licensee and his position could only be that of a rank trespasser who could undoubtedly be restrained by injunction. 6. Even conceding 'that there "was such an arrangement it cannot be a lease but only be a licence. If so the appellant cannot be a lessee or even a licensee and his position could only be that of a rank trespasser who could undoubtedly be restrained by injunction. 6. Even conceding 'that there "was such an arrangement it cannot be a lease but only be a licence. I was told that there is a decision of the Madras High Court which says that tapping of a tree is equivalent to taking its income by a process of manual and mechanical labour and device and since tree rooted on earth is immovable property the arrangement could only be a lease under which the lessee is entitled to fixity of tenure. I did not have the opportunity of reading that decision. Even if there is such a decision it cannot in any way improve the case of the appellant in view of the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. S.3(1)(xii) of the Act says that nothing in Chap.2 shall apply to any transaction relating only to the usufruct of trees or to the tapping of coconut or other palm trees or to the tapping of rubber trees. If so such an arrangement whether it is a lease or licence under the common law cannot be taken as an arrangement conferring fixity of tenure under the Act. The claim must be rejected for that and that reason alone. S.3(1)(xii) only means that the Legislation in its wisdom did not want to confer any rights on persons who had to their credit only a permission for tapping. 7. Under S.72 of the Act all the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of a holding held by a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the various provisions of S.72, vest in the Government free of all encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries and subsisting on the date notified by the Government. That means when once the land has vested in the Government (in this case there is no dispute that the land vested in the Government) it will be free of all encumbrances created by the land owners or intermediaries. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. That means when once the land has vested in the Government (in this case there is no dispute that the land vested in the Government) it will be free of all encumbrances created by the land owners or intermediaries. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. If so the subsequent assignment of the right, title and interest to the tenant also must be free of all encumbrances even if such encumbrances were there on the notified date. Vesting purges all the encumbrances. The argument that plaintiff was not a tenant within the meaning of S.2(57) is equally unacceptable even taking for granted that the appellant had to his credit a permission for tapping from the landlord. That will not in any way affect the possession and enjoyment of the land including trees by the tenant. Permission for tapping cannot in any way affect the possession of trees by the landlord or his tenant. Permission is only a licence to do a particular thing namely tapping which will not in any way oust the possession of the landlord or the tenant or give exclusive possession of the trees to the holder of permission. He can only tap the trees and he cannot do anything else with them. If the trees are capable of enjoyment otherwise the landlord or the tenant can put them to such enjoyment. Therefore the argument that on account of the permission for tapping in favour of the appellant the respondent/ plaintiff ceased to be a person having possession and enjoyment and as such excluded from the definition of tenant is without any force, even granting that there was such a permission or licence. 8. When the right, title and interest of the landlord vested in the Government as on 1-1-1970 that vesting covers the entire rights over the land, trees and everything else including all residuary rights and the easement, if any, attached thereto also. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant. The decision in Pareekutty v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT. SN. Case No. 40) said. "The lands included in the lease constitute the holding of the tenant. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant. The decision in Pareekutty v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT. SN. Case No. 40) said. "The lands included in the lease constitute the holding of the tenant. The right of the landowner over the reserved trees would, in our opinion, fall within the description "of right, title and interest in respect of holdings" because it cannot be said that the right of the landowner over a standing tree is not part of his right over the holding. The expression "holding" as defined in the Act connotes the land let out. The landlord's right over the trees standing on that land is attributable to his ownership of the holding. The words "in respect of" used in the section are of very wide import and if there is a connection or inter-relation between the landlord's right to the trees and his ownership of the holding let out by him, the provisions of the section get attracted". 9. Therefore the right, title and interest of the landowner in the holding of a tenant includes everything whether handed over to the tenant, reserved with the landlord or otherwise dealt with by him. After the vesting and assignment there is no question of any other right, interest or title subsisting with anybody else. Trees and everything on the land will go with it. The above decision was followed in Abdulla Haji v. Mayan (1981 KLT 615) wherein it was observed: "Holding is defined in S.2(17) to mean a parcel or parcels of land held under a single transaction by a tenant from a landlord and shall include any portion of a holding which the landlord and the tenant have agreed or are bound to treat to treat as a separate holding. The holding therefore is land held by the tenant under a landlord. The vesting of rights in the Government under S.72 relates to all rights, title and interest of the landlord and the intermediary in the holding. Hence there is a statutory vesting of the right, title and interest of the landlord and the intermediary in the Government and the cultivating tenant is entitled to assignment of such rights under S.72 B of the Act. It is clear that the rights of the Intermediary in respect of certain coconut trees reserved in the holding for his enjoyment do not survive the statutory vesting." 10. It is clear that the rights of the Intermediary in respect of certain coconut trees reserved in the holding for his enjoyment do not survive the statutory vesting." 10. The maxim "quic quid "plantar solo cedit" means whatever is affixed to the soil belongs thereto. It applies not merely to buildings but to trees also. If trees are planted by a person in the land of another, the owner of the soil becomes owner of the trees also as soon as they have taken root. What is embedded to earth such as buildings alone could be taken out, if at all, from that principle. Trees planted by a tenant in the leased premises attach to the land and pass with it in the absence of contract to the contrary. It was so held in Rev. Fr. K. C. Alexandar v. State of Kerala (1965 KLT 666). 11. These questions do not arise in this case because the appellant himself has no claim over the trees except the right to tap. After the vesting and assignment there is no question of any right surviving in favour of the landlord or anybody else. When the trees passed on to the tenant by the assignment then what remains is only the question of the appellant continuing to exercise the right of tapping. When the vesting under S.72 has the effect of erasing all the encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and vesting all the right, title and interest in the Government and when all these rights are validly assigned to the tenant there is no question of tapping right, if any, granted by the landowner continuing. That right, if any, also must be deemed to have been terminated. Further it could only be a licence and when it is terminated there is no question of the licensee any more exercising his rights under the permission. He cannot enter the property anymore for that purpose. Injunction was rightly granted by the courts below. The second appeal has no merits and it is hereby dismissed. Cross appeal is also dismissed. In the circumstances, I do not make any order as to costs.