Order Crl.M.P.No.5743 of 1986 has been filed by the first accused Pandurangan, in C.C.No.694 of 1985, relating to Crime No.155/84, to direct the J.F.C.M., Chengalpattu to deal with C.C.No.694 of 1985 as a P.R.C. and commit the same for trial to the Court of Sessions, Chengalpattu to be tried successively with S.C.No.90/85. 2. The first respondent is the State represented by the Inspector of Police, Thirukalikundram, Chengalpattu District. Respondents 19 to 35 and the petitioner in Crl.M.P.No. 5743 of 1986 are the accused in Crime No.156 of 1984, out of which Crl.M.P.No. 8542 of 1986 arises. Elumalai, a resident of Nemilikuppam, is the deceased in S.C.No. 90 of 1985 and has been wrongly impleaded as a respondent. Respondents 3 to 18 are the prosecution witnesses in S.C.No.90 of 1985, which relates to Crime No.156 of 1984, and they are residents of Nemilikuppam. 3. Crl.M.P.No.8542 of 1983 has been filed by respondents 3 to 18 in Crl.M.P.No.5743 of 1986 and another, to call for the records relating to C.C.No.694 of 1985 pending on the file of J.F.C.M., Chengalpattu, and quash the proceedings. The first respondent is the same as in Crl.M.P.No.5743 of 1986 viz., Inspector of Police, Thirukalikundram. 4. Crl.M.P.No.8923 of 1986 has been filed by one Chidambaram chetty, complainant in Crime No.155 of 1984 and who is an accused in Crime No.156 of 1984, to implead himself as a respondent in Crl.M.P.No.8542 of 1986. 5. For convenience sake and proper appreciation, petitioner and respondents 19 to 35 in Crl.M.P.No.5743 of 1986 will be referred to as ‘A’ part. Respondents 3 to 18 in the said petition, who are the petitioners in Crl.M.P.No.8542 of 1986, will be referred to as ‘B’ party. Deceased Elumalai was a member of the ‘B’ Party. 6. ‘A’ Party people belong to Sulerikattukuppam, a hamlet which is 11 kms. north of J-4 Mamallapuram Police Station, Thirukalikundram, Chengalpattu West District. ‘B’ Party people belong to the village Nemilikuppam, which is on the north of Madras-Mahabalipuram Road, and north of Sulerikattukuppam. Two persons viz., Ganapathy and Muthu, residents of Nemilikuppam, are alleged to have been obstracized by the villagers of Nemilikuppam, as per the version of ‘A’ party, on the ground that they have exposed the residence Nemilikuppam to the Customs Authorities about their involvement in smuggling of foreign goods and that they were given asylum by ‘A’ party. Two persons viz., Ganapathy and Muthu, residents of Nemilikuppam, are alleged to have been obstracized by the villagers of Nemilikuppam, as per the version of ‘A’ party, on the ground that they have exposed the residence Nemilikuppam to the Customs Authorities about their involvement in smuggling of foreign goods and that they were given asylum by ‘A’ party. As such there was ill-feeling between ‘A’ Part and ‘B’ Party. 7. While so, on 2.12.1984 at about 7.30 p.m., when ‘A’ Party people were fishing in the backwaters of Buckingham Canal on the northern bund, ‘B’ Party people came there armed with fe rule stick and other weapons. Elumalai Chetty (deceased), Panchanathan, Sekar, Radhakrishnan, Balasekar and others of ‘B’ Party were there. Elumalai Chetty beat one Chidambaram Chettyar belonging to ‘A’ Party on his head. ‘B’ Party people questioned ‘A’ Party people as to why they gave asylum to Ganapathi and Muthu. There was a bitter fight between the two parties and after beating ‘A’ Party people, ‘B’ party people ran away from the places. In the fight, persons belonging to ‘A’ Party viz., Pandurangan, Chandran, Varadarajan, Jagannathan and Panchanathan were injured. People of ‘A’ Party came to the spot and brought the injured to the Police Station at about 9.30 P.M., where Chidambaram Chetty of ‘A’ Party gave a complaint and the same was registered as Crime No.155 of 1984 under Secs.147, 148, 326 and 325 I.P.C. which resulted in filing of a charge sheet in C.C.No.694 of 1985 on the file of the J.F.C.M. Chengalpattu. 8. On the same day, at or about 10.30 p.m. Anbu belonging to ‘B’ Party appeared before the Mamallapuram Police Station and gave a complaint which was registered as Crime No.156 of 1984 under Secs.147, 148, 326 and 325, I.P.C., which resulted in filing of a charge sheet in S.C.No.90 of 1985, as Elumalai of ‘A’ Party died at 3.15 P.M., on 3.12.1984 at the hospital. 9. According to Anbu of ‘B’ Party, Ganapathy and Muthu of his village indulged in smuggling of foreign goods and brought discredit to the village. As such they were brought before the Panchayat. At the Panchayat they did not express any regret for their actions and refused to pay even the penalty and left the village. However, they were given asylum by ‘A’ Party people, and they continued their smuggling activities. As such they were brought before the Panchayat. At the Panchayat they did not express any regret for their actions and refused to pay even the penalty and left the village. However, they were given asylum by ‘A’ Party people, and they continued their smuggling activities. At or about 6 p.m. on 2.12.1984 Anbu and his grandfather the deceased Elumalai and other persons of ‘B’ Party went for fishing to the very same place where ‘A’ Party was already fishing. ‘A’ Party people objected ‘B’ Party people fishing in the very same spot. ‘B’ Party people asked ‘A’ Party people not to object their fishing. While representations were being made smoothly. ‘A’ Party people went into the village and brought more persons and threatened ‘B’ Party people. On seeing that ‘A’ Party people are more in number, ‘B’ Party people hastened to their village. However, ‘A’ Party people followed them and beat them very near the place Modern Building House is situate. Some persons belonging to ‘A’ Party people named in the complaint given by Anbu viz., Sekar son of Karuppan, Govindan, son of Karukku, Panchanathan, son of Rajendran, Ganapathy, son of Parthasarathy, and Muthu, were found armed with deadly weapons. Anbu was beaten by Rajendran on his head, right thigh and nose. Designu of ‘B’ Party was beaten by Muthu. Anbu's grand-father Elumalai was beaten by Sekar with an iron rod on his head and Elumalai fell down. Once again Sekar beat Elumalai with the iron rod on his stomach and testicles. Govindan and Ganapathy stabbed Elumalai with ‘shilackole’ on the left hand. Rajendran beat Elumalai on his stomach with an iron pipe. Muthu beat Elumalai on his buttocks. They also beat Panchanathan and another. ‘B’ Party also beat ‘A’ Party people as a result of which ‘A’ Party people also received injuries. Thereafter, ‘A’ Party people ran away and Anbu gave a complaint at 9.30 P.M. which was registered as Crime No.156 of 1984 under Secs.147, 148, 326 and 325 I.P.C. Later, the offence was altered into one under Sec.302, I.P.C., since Elumalai died at 3.15 p.m. on the next day in the hospital. Thereafter, ‘A’ Party people ran away and Anbu gave a complaint at 9.30 P.M. which was registered as Crime No.156 of 1984 under Secs.147, 148, 326 and 325 I.P.C. Later, the offence was altered into one under Sec.302, I.P.C., since Elumalai died at 3.15 p.m. on the next day in the hospital. The prosecution filed two separate charge sheets; the charge sheet relating to Crime No. 155/84 is pending enquiry in C.C.No.694 of 1985 before the J.F.C.M. Chengalpattu, and the charge sheet relating to Crime No.156/84 is pending enquiry in S.C.No.90 of 1985 before the Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu. Under these circumstances, ‘A’ Party has filed CrI.M.P.No.5743/86 to convert C.C.No.694/85 as a P.R.C. and commit the same for trial to the Sessions Court to be tried simultaneously with S.C.No.90 of 1985. ‘B’ Party has filed Crl.M.P.No.8542 of 1986 to quash C.C.No. 694/85 on the ground that the prosecution has not followed the procedure in P.S.O. 588(A). 10. The questions that arise for consideration in these petitions are: 1. Whether the complaints given by ‘A’ Party and ‘B’ Party are case and counter to be tried by the same Court? 2. Whether C.C.No.694/85 pending on the file of the J.F.C.M., Chengalpattu, is liable to be quashed on the ground that the prosecution has not followed the procedure prescribed in P.S.O.588(A)? In order to find out the answer for the first point, one has to see whether the facts as presented can be styled as a case and counter. In case, the answer is in the affirmative, the next question that arises for consideration is whether they have to be tried by the same Court or by different Courts. There is no definition of the term ‘case and counter case’. The term in its general import stands for cases registered on the basis of rival versions of the same incident. The same incident may not form a single incident, but also constitute several incidents in the course of the same transaction. To call a series of acts as acts that have taken place in the course of the same transaction, there must be a connection between the series of acts before they could be regarded as forming part of the same transaction. It may be that be noticed, that the term ‘same transaction’ is not defined anywhere in the Code. It is very difficult to define precisely what the expression means. It may be that be noticed, that the term ‘same transaction’ is not defined anywhere in the Code. It is very difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Before a transaction be regarded as ‘same transaction’ it would necessarily depend upon the facts of each case and it seems to be a difficult task to define such expression which the legislature had deliberately left undefined. It was understood that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose or design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it might be possible to infer that they form part of the ‘same transaction’. If several acts committed by several persons, say in a case of a riot, may show unity of purpose or design so as to indicate a strong circumstance that those acts form part of the same transaction. The connection between a series of acts seems to be an essential ingredient for those acts to constitute the ‘same transaction’. The Kerala High Court in Augustine v. State Augustine v. State 1982 Crl.L.J.(Crl.) 403:1982 K.L.T. 351:1982 Crl.L.J. 1557(F.B.) had occasion to embark to define the term ‘case and counter case’. The Full Bench observed as follows:--- “The term in its general import stands for cases registered on the basis of rival versions of the same incident. Such cases need not always be registered on the basis of police reports. In respect of a particular occurrence, the police on getting information may register a case against a certain individual, say a person by name A. It may so happen that A himself sustained some injuries. A might approach the police and launch a complaint regarding his version of the occurrence and how he sustained the injuries. The two versions may be conflicting. Still the police may register a case and investigate it along with the main case already registered. After questioning witnesses the investigating officer may find that the version given by A is false. What the officer generally does is to file a charge-sheet in the main case and a refer report in the case registered on the basis of the Statement of A. A would naturally feel aggrieved by the conduct of the Police. 11. It may also happen that even though A gave a statement the police did not register a case based on his statement. 11. It may also happen that even though A gave a statement the police did not register a case based on his statement. In both the above contingencies A is not left without his remedy. He may present a complaint before Court setting out how, according to him, the occurrence took place and he sustained the injuries and the Magistrate may take the complaint to file and proceed with it. The main case based on the Police report and that based on the complaint give conflicting versions of the same incident and are therefore described as ‘case and counter-case’. In one the prosecuting agency will be the State while in the other it is the private complaint. The decision, Achuthan v. Bappu Achuthan v. Bappu 1961 K.L.T. 412; represents the above type. There can also be case and counter case where both the prosecuting agencies are private individuals. Thus A may sustain injuries at the hands of B and in the course of the same transaction B may sustain injuries at the hands of A. Both A and B would be having their own versions of the occurrence which would be conflicting with each other. In such cases if A and B prefer complaints against each other, those cases also come under the purview of ‘Case and counter-case’. 12. It is now well recognised that cases and counter-cases of the above type should be tried and disposed of by the same Court, trial in one being followed by the other and the judgment in both being pronounced in quick succession. The underlying principle is that since the cases relate to the same occurrence and the witnesses in one may figure as accused in the other case and they may give conflicting versions, for grasping the real facts and for a proper appreciation of the evidence, it is always desirable that the two cases are tried by the same Court. The case law leading to the above practice has been discussed in detail by Ramaswami, J., in Ramakrishnayya v. State Ramakrishnayya v. State (1953(2 MLJ. 425:A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 442:1954 Crl.L.J. 610 …… “In riot cases where there are factions the police on investigation may find that each of the rival parties overstepped the bounds of law and committed offences of independent nature. 425:A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 442:1954 Crl.L.J. 610 …… “In riot cases where there are factions the police on investigation may find that each of the rival parties overstepped the bounds of law and committed offences of independent nature. In such cases there is nothing wrong in filing separate charge-sheets against each because one would not necessarily be false if the other were true. We are not now concerned with the procedure to be followed in such cases also. In the case and counter-case of the type we are concerned the rival versions put forward may not stand together and if the main case is true, the counter-case would necessarily be false. The question that is posed is whether in such cases it is incumbent on the part of the police to see that charge-sheets are filed in both in spite of the fact that as a result of Investigation they form the opinion that one of the versions is false.” The aforesaid decision is relied on by the learned counsel for ‘B’ Party and he contends that the versions of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Parties are not case and counter-case. In order to form a case and counter-case, there should be two versions in respect of the same incident. However, I find the aforesaid decision is in conformity with the series of decisions rendered by this Court that case and counter-case of the above type should be tried and disposed of by the same Court; trial in one case being followed by the other and judgment being pronounced in both in quick succession. The other decision relied on by the learned counsel for ‘B’ Party which is reported in Ramakrishnayya v. State Ramakrishnayya v. State 1954 M.W.N.(Crl.( 9:A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 442 elaborately deals with the procedure that has to be followed in case and counter-case. The said decision refers to various decisions of various High Courts and the learned Judge who rendered the judgment has observed with reference to the decision of this Court in Lakshminarayana v. Suryanarayana Lakshminarayana v. Suryanarayana 1932 M.W.N. 634 as follows: “This case is an authority for the proposition that case and counter must be committed to the sessions.” In Goriparthi Krishtamma IN RE. Goriparthi Krishtamma IN RE. 1929 Mad. Cr. Cas. Goriparthi Krishtamma IN RE. 1929 Mad. Cr. Cas. 238, Waller and Cornish, JJ., held as under: “A case and a counter case arising out of the same affair should always, if practicable, be tried by the same Court. Each party represent themselves as having been innocent victim of the aggression of the other. Neither will, as prosecution witnesses admit that they retaliated on the other, for the obvious reason that they are themselves on trial, in the other case. As accused, they do not, as a rule, let in any defence evidence, relying on the evidence they have given in the other case as prosecution witnesses. The result is that no Court can grasp the real facts unless it tries both cases.” The sum and substance of the decision rendered in the decision in Ramakrishnayya v. State Ramakrishnayya v. State 1954 M.W.N.(Crl.) 9 is that where the same Public Prosecutor conducts the case and counter-case before the Court of Sessions, it would be an embarassment for him, inasmuch as he has to Jet in evidence in one case to prove the guilt of the accused persons who would be the prosecution witnesses in the other case, wherein the accused persons would be the prosecution witnesses in the earlier case. In order to relieve the Public Prosecutor from such an embarrassing situation, the learned Judge, after considering various decisions in his judgment, set out certain principles, for the police to follow in such an eventuality, as follows: “If complaints of the offence of rioting be given by both the parties during investigation, the investigating officer should enquire into both of them and adopt one or the other of the two courses, viz., to charge the case where the accused were the aggressors or to refer both the cases if he should find them untrue in material particulars. If he finds that the choice of either course is difficult, he should seek the opinion of the Public Prosecutor of the District and act accordingly. A Magistrate before whom such a case is charged by the police and a private complaint from the party whose case was referred, should hear both the cases together and commit both the cases to the Sessions even if only one of them is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. A Magistrate before whom such a case is charged by the police and a private complaint from the party whose case was referred, should hear both the cases together and commit both the cases to the Sessions even if only one of them is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. If, however, the Magistrate feels that there is no acceptable evidence in both the cases, he should discharge the accused. If, however, in one case a more serious offence like Sec.148, I.P.C. is made out then in the interest of justice, both the cases should be sent to the First Class Magistrate, for disposal, and he may commit both the cases, or discharge the committal case and himself try the other or if he finds the committal case after recording into both and convict or discharge or acquit, the accused in both the cases. The Sessions Judge should, if both the cases had been committed, hear them in succession with different assessors and come to independent conclusions keeping as far as possible the evidence in the one case distinct from the other. If in respect of an occurrence, there is a variation in time, or place, or other circumstances warranting a reasonable inference that they are not parts of the same transaction, but that the earlier occurrence may even be a motive for the later one, then the two cases may be tried separately and the aforesaid rules of procedure need not be applied. If in respect of a single incident, two different versions are offered, and they are substantially divergent from one another, then it is the duty of the investigating officer to find out which version is true and charge that case only leaving the other version to be prosecuted if so advised after referred a charge-sheet being served on the complainant and in such cases also the rules for enquiry and trial as in case and counter should be followed. If in trials not exclusively triable by a Court of Session, a Magistrate has to hear and dispose of the cases himself and he frames charges in one case and does not frame any charges at all in the other, it cannot be considered that the Magistrate had made up his mind in the other case by not framing the charges and some kind of reasonable apprehension cannot be said to be created in the minds of the accused in respect of the other case where charges had been framed and transfer asked for on that ground. The fact that in a similar case the Magistrate came to a particular conclusion on the evidence in that case is no ground for a transfer; RAJANI KANTA KUTTI v. EMPEROR RAJANI KANTA KUTTI v. EMPEROR (1909) I.L.R. 46 Cal. 904. interest on bias should not be inferred from the opinions formed by the Magistrates on evidence judicially recorded: GHULAMALI v. EMPEROR GHULAMALI v. EMPEROR (1920)31 Crl.L.J. 866 and MALLAD v. NIZAM-AD-DIN MALLAD v. NIZAM-AD-DIN (1919)29 Crl.L.J. 934. The principle maintained universally by all High Courts is that the accused has no reasonable ground for apprehension that he will not have a fair trial merely because the Judge in an ancillary proceeding arising out of a counter-case has expressed certain views upon the evidence in that case as to which of the two versions is correct. The basis of the ruling is that Judges are presumed to be upright men who will approach each case from the point of view of that case alone and not permit their minds to be affected in any way by anything that has gone before that case. It cannot be believed that Judges are so easily prejudiced that because one incidental part of the case before them has been decided in a previous case, they will shut their eyes entirely to anything that may be alleged in favour of the accused in a subsequent trial; AMRIT MANDAL v. EMPEROR AMRIT MANDAL v. EMPEROR A.I.R. 1916 Pat.33. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge in this case was wholly incorrect and has resulted in his not grasping the facts of the entire transactions which took place that day and this has materially prejudiced the accused. I do not mean to imply that the counter case is true. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge in this case was wholly incorrect and has resulted in his not grasping the facts of the entire transactions which took place that day and this has materially prejudiced the accused. I do not mean to imply that the counter case is true. Obvious the counter case is a counter-blast and bears on its face very many indicia of untruths. The motive put forward in that complaint does not explain the occurrence as it took place. The eye-witnesses mentioned therein are all the partisans of the complainant in that case. That complaint does not show how the extensive Injuries to the P.Ws. in this case and the death of Narayya were caused. In fact in this case contrary to his own dying declaration, complaint and sworn statement, D.W.5 has taken upon himself the role of the assailant of Narayya and the infliction of the injuries in the right of private defence. I have already mentioned how the gun which is introduced by the other side was found by the Circle Inspector to be a padding. That case itself has been charge-sheeted by the police as mentioned by the Circle Inspector not because he considered it to be true but because his superiors found it polite to do so. It is enough for our purpose to point out that by not observing the procedure laid down by the High Courts the trial of this case has become a lopsided affair and the learned Sessions Judge has disabled himself from grasping the entire facts of the case and which has resulted in material prejudice to the accused.” In the aforesaid decision, the learned Judge set aside the conviction on the ground that the prosecution witnesses, who are the accused in the other case, would not incriminate themselves and throw any light as to how the injuries were caused to the accused persons and the accused persons could not put forward their case effectively because their case is still pending. The learned Judge further stated as follows: “The net result of this analysis is that the prosecution evidence in this case for bringing the offence to the accused consists of partisan evidence unsifted by investigation, lopsided in Its presentation in Court and incapable of being properly treated by reason of not committing to the Sessions Court both the case and the counter.” Hence the aforesaid decision is an authority for the proposition that a case and counter should be tried by the same Court and if one case is to be tried by a Court of Sessions, the other case must necessarily be tried by the same Sessions Judge and Judgments pronounced simultaneously. Therefore, there is no force in the contention of the learned counsel for ‘B’ Party that in cases of case and counter-case, the prosecution has necessarily to drop one complaint and refer the other one necessitating the person aggrieved by this procedure to prefer a private complaint. 13. The further contention of the learned counsel for ‘B’ Party is that, since the above procedure has not been followed by the police in C.C.No.694/85 in which ‘B’ Party are the accused persons, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. Even in this contention, I see no force. The ‘B’ Party has not approached this Court for quashing C.C.No.694/85 as soon as the charge sheet was filed in that case. Because the accused persons in S.C.No.90 of 1985 have approached this Court for converting C.C.No.694/85 into a P.R.C. and thereafter to commit the same to the Sessions Court for trial along with the Sessions Case, ‘B’ Party has come forward with this petition to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.694/85. In other words, if ‘A’ Party had not filed Crl.M.P.No.5743/86 ‘B’ Party would not have come forward with Crl.M.P.No.8542/86. The net result would be, there would be separate proceedings, according to learned counsel for ‘B’ Party since both the cases relate to different incidents. 14. In the circumstances stated above, the next point arises for consideration in this case is whether ‘A’ and ‘B’ parties give different versions for the same incident, or of two separate incidents, one unconnected with the other. If the versions of both the parties relate to the same incident, then both the cases have to be tried by the same Court. That is the procedure favoured by this Court as well as various High Courts. If the versions of both the parties relate to the same incident, then both the cases have to be tried by the same Court. That is the procedure favoured by this Court as well as various High Courts. If for any reason, should the Judge feel that he is likely to be embarrassed by the adoption of this procedure, he will no doubt get a transfer of the counter case to the file of another Sessions Judge. What must be made clear is i) that the trial must be separate and separate Judgments delivered ii) that the conclusion in each case must be founded on the evidence let in, in that case alone. If the Judge considers himself unable to detach himself from the facts of the counter case, a transfer may be necessary to relieve the Judge from his embarrassment. This is made clear in the Full Bench decision of our High Court in Mounaguruswami Naicker and others IN RE. Mounaguruswami Naicker and others IN RE. 1933 M.W.N. 10. However, in the instant case, the prosecution has not referred the complaint given by ‘A’ Party as a mistake of fact so as to enable them to prefer a private complaint, but filed a separate charge sheet which resulted in C.C.No.694/85 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chengalpattu. It has to be decided whether the police should necessarily file a complaint as a mistake of fact, in case the Investigating Officer feels that one of the complaints is false or whether he has to follow the procedure stated in Ramakrishnayya v. State Ramakrishnayya v. State 1954 M.W.N.(Cr.) 9 which has been incorporated in P.S.0.588-A. As far as filing of two separate charge sheets by the prosecution is concerned, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Augustine v. State Augustine v. State 1982 MLJ.(Crl.) 403:1982 Crl.L.J. 1557 cited by learned counsel for ‘B’ party, observes in Paragraph 3 at page 1559 as follows: “No doubt there are instances where the Police do file separate charge-sheets in respect of the same transaction, one in the main case and the other in the counter-case registered on the basis of the statement of the accused in the main case. Whenever such charge-sheets are filed, the practice, it appears, has been to see that the prosecutions in the main case and the counter-case are conducted by two different prosecutors, and the cases are disposed of simultaneously.” Having observed so, the Full Bench concludes as follows: “In the light of the discussions we held that if in respect of a transaction relating to an offence a case and a counter-case happen to be registered by the police, based on conflicting versions given by rival persons, it is not incumbent on the part of the Investigating officer to file separate charge-sheets in both the cases. The investigating officer is expected to file a charge-sheet only in the case where, It appears to him as a result of Investigation that an offence has been committed.” From the above, it is seen that filing of separate charge sheets by the prosecution is not treated as an illegality in case and counter-case, but referring one complaint as mistake of fact is considered to be a desirable course. It is true that the practice of filing charge sheets by the police based on private complaint regarding identical incidents, with a view to exhibit a separate of impartiality should not be welcomed. Reilly, C.J., in (1940)18 Mys.L.J. 229, observed as follows: “And how did the police come to put in these two contradictory charges, one of which they must have known in essence false? It has been suggested by the learned Government Advocate that the Police Officers may have had some idea that they ought to be impartial in the matter. That means nothing except that they ought to be impartial between truth and falsehood. If that is the impartiality they exercise, they will destroy their own cases, and incidentally they will destroy their own reputation. The powers of Investigation given to the police by the Code of Criminal Procedure are extensive and very responsible. They are given for the purpose of ascertaining the truth, not for dressing up cases with any evidence true or false which happens to be available. If a private person was in the habit of recklessly bringing criminal accusations without caring whether they were false or true, he would be regarded as hopelessly dishonourable, as one with whom no honest man would associate. Do Police Officers wish to be regarded in that way? If a private person was in the habit of recklessly bringing criminal accusations without caring whether they were false or true, he would be regarded as hopelessly dishonourable, as one with whom no honest man would associate. Do Police Officers wish to be regarded in that way? This impartiality means nothing really but that they do not care whether their case is true or false.” With due respect to the learned Chief Justice, I am of the view that the learned Chief Justice went too far in condemning the Police and laying greater burden on the Investigating Agency and has observed that the powers of investigation given to the police by the Code of Criminal Procedure are given for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and not for dressing up cases with any evidence true or false which happens to be available. No doubt, powers given to the Investigating Agency are extensive and responsible, but the purpose of ascertaining the truth from the given fact is solely given to the Courts. If the Investigating Agency's version is to be accepted as true, then there is no need for Courts to find out the truth. There are cases in which police have to act cautiously, especially in cases of rioting, placing the entire materials that they have come across before the Court, so as to bring to light the probable true version of their investigation. The learned Judge who delivered the judgment in Ramakrishnayya v. State Ramakrishnayya v. State 1954 M.W.N. (Crl.) 9 while commenting upon the conduct of the Investigating Officers with reference to the facts of the presented before Court, had observed as follows- “The police obviously stampeded by these moves on the part of both the sides and apparently frightened that they would be falsely accused of partnership If they charged one side only have charged both the cases with the singular result that in regard to the same rioting at the same place and at the same time, they have put forward two diametrically opposed versions as truthful versions and the circle Inspector who was examined as P.W.23 in this case has unabashedly explained this as follows-----” “I thought that the accused were the aggressors and I was consulting my superiors whether the prosecution party should be prosecuted. Finally it was settled that the Court should decide it. Finally it was settled that the Court should decide it. Hence, the delay in filing the charge sheet In the counter-case.” However, the learned Judge acquitted the accused on the ground that the learned Sessions Judge has disabled himself from grasping the entire facts of the case because he has not tried the counter case and this has resulted in material prejudice to the accused. 15. Laws are made for the benefit of not only the individual but also the Society as a whole. In a given case, where the Police instead of referring a case as a mistake of fact elected to file charge sheets in both the cases, no prejudice would be caused to either side. There is no charm in setting that the Police should not file separate charge sheets in cases of doubt and should elect to refer one case as a mistake of fact of their choice and allow the aggrieved party, by such a course, to file a private complaint and later on ask for transfer of the C.C to the Sessions to be tried along with the case in which the Police thought, is the true version. The chances of the Investigating Agency suppressing the real case on the ground that they felt that the case in which they have filed the charge sheet is the true one, cannot be ruled out. There cannot be a hard and fast rule in case of rioting as to how the Investigating Agency should conduct themselves. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure either. Under these circumstances, in case the Investigating Agency feels that it is very difficult to find out as between the two versions which one is true, it would be in their interest to place both the complaints before the Court so as to enable the Court to come to the correct conclusion. In a case like the instant one, one has to find out whether the allegations made by both the parties relate to one transaction or incident or a series of incidents so as to make them to form one transaction. If the versions given by both the parties relate to different incidents, there is no difficulty in allowing both the cases to be proceeded with before the respective Courts. If the versions given by both the parties relate to different incidents, there is no difficulty in allowing both the cases to be proceeded with before the respective Courts. In cases where the allegations made by either party constitute a single transaction or incidental and they have put forward two diametrically opposite versions as truthful versions, one has to apply his mind and find out whether the facts narrated by either party constitute a single incident or not. If they constitute a single incident, the counter-case is necessarily to be tried along with the other case and if the main case is being tried before the Court of Sessions, the counter case even though is not exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, has necessarily to be transferred to the Court of Sessions, for the purpose of having a whole picture for assessing the truth and adequacy of evidence. 16. With the above background, now I proceed to decide whether the complaints given by ‘A’ Party and ‘B’ Party are case and counter to be tried by the same Court. As far as the prosecution is concerned, it has taken Crime No.156/85 as a case counter to Crime No.155/85, but elected to file a separate charge sheet for reasons best known to them probably with a view to avoid any adverse remark being passed about their impartiality to either side. A perusal of the records and the complaints given by ‘A’ and ‘B’ parties show that the allegations as stated by them constitute a single incident, though each party tried to suppress facts that are not to their advantage. The time of occurrence of the incident in both the F.I.Rs. is stated to be 7.30 p.m. on the same day. The time mentioned in the inquest report in Crime No.156/84 is also 7.30 p.m. The place of meeting of both parties is mentioned as ‘Kazhanivazhi’ where ‘A’ Party people were already fishing. ‘B’ Party also admits having gone to the place where ‘A’ party was fishing. The prosecution witnesses viz., Panchanathan and Oothukattan of ‘B’ party, in crime No.156/84, have stated the time of occurrence as 7.30 P.M. and the place as ‘Buckingham Canal’. In Crime No.155/84, the complainant Chidambaram Chetty has stated that he was beaten by the deceased Elumalai. ‘B’ Party also admits having gone to the place where ‘A’ party was fishing. The prosecution witnesses viz., Panchanathan and Oothukattan of ‘B’ party, in crime No.156/84, have stated the time of occurrence as 7.30 P.M. and the place as ‘Buckingham Canal’. In Crime No.155/84, the complainant Chidambaram Chetty has stated that he was beaten by the deceased Elumalai. However, no mention is made by ‘A’ Party about the injury caused on Elumalai (the deceased), whereas the version of ‘B’ Party is that, when they went to fish in the very same spot where ‘A’ Party people were already fishing, they were objected to and while they have tried to pacify each other, some people belonging to ‘A’ Party went inside the village and returned mustered with more people with a view to attack ‘B’ party as a result of which ‘B’ party returned to their village, but ‘A’ Party chased ‘B’ party. In the melee that has taken place, Elumalai received fatal injuries. The question that arises for consideration is whether ‘B’ party are the aggressors or ‘A’ Party, and whether Elumalai of ‘B’ Party received the fatal injuries first or whether the complainant in ‘A’ party was beaten by the deceased Elumalai. P.Ws.1 to 13 in Crime No.155/84 relating to C.C.No.694/85 are accused persons in Crime No.156/84 relating to S.C.No.90/85 and are arrayed as Accused Nos.6, 1, 2, 4, 3, 7, 5, 18, 19, 14, 11, 13 and 8. Of the aforesaid persons, P.W.7 who is Accused No.5 in S.CNo.90/85 alone is not injured. Of the prosecution witnesses in S.C.No.90/85, P.Ws.1, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 11 are accused in C.C.No.694/85 and they have been arrayed as Accused 3, 10, 8, 4, 12 and 5 respectively. Both the parties agree with reference to the place where they have first met. According to ‘A’ Party, Elumalai beat one of the members of ‘A’ Party and ranaway from the place. According to ‘B’ Party, no fighting has taken place at the place where they have first met ‘A’ Party, but some of the people belonging to ‘A’ Party went inside the village and returned to the spot armed with deadly weapons mustering their strength. According to ‘B’ Party, no fighting has taken place at the place where they have first met ‘A’ Party, but some of the people belonging to ‘A’ Party went inside the village and returned to the spot armed with deadly weapons mustering their strength. ‘B’ Party returned to the village and they were chased by ‘A’ Party and in the rioting that ensued Elumalai suffered injuries and succumbed to the same and some of the people belonging to ‘B’ Party suffered injuries. Both the complaints mention the time and place of occurrence as 7.30 p.m. at ‘Kazhanivahi’, but the fatal injury is alleged to have been received by Elumalai at a different place, described as Modern Building House, which is not far away from the place where both the parties have first met. Under these circumstances, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the cases put forward by ‘A’ and ‘B’ parties are really case and counter-case. 17. Coming to the second question raised, according to learned counsel for ‘B’ Party is that C.C.No.694/85 on the file of the 3.F.C.M. Chengalpattu, is liable to be quashed, inasmuch as the prosecution has not followed the procedure under P.S.0.588-A or in any event has not followed the procedure prescribed by the decision in Ramakrishnayya v. State in Ramakrishnayya v. State 1954 M.W.N. (Crl.) 9 In support of his contention, he also relied on the decision of Kader, J., in Vellapandy Thevar v. State Vellapandy Thevar v. State 1984 L.W.(Crl.) 257 It is no doubt true that the learned Judge in the decision cited later has quashed the proceedings on the. ground that the Investigating Officer has failed to give a final report in accordance with P.S.O.588-A. The counter complainant in that case was advised to seek remedy before Court, if aggrieved by the disposal of the case by the Police as pointed out in P.S.O.588-A. In opposition, learned counsel for ‘A’ Party contended that P.S.0.588-A has no statutory force and as such the Investigating Agency is not bound to follow that and, in support of his contention, placed reliance on the decision of Singaravelu, J., in Ranganathan V.R. v. State Ranganathan V.R. v. State 1985 L.W.(Crl.) 86 wherein the learned Judge, who went into the question of statutory force of P.S.O., held that P.S.O. has no statutory force but only a set of rules framed for the guidance of Investigating Officers and that, therefore, violation of the P.S.O. in the matter of Investigation will not constitute an illegality. The learned Judge, while commenting upon the decision of Kader, J., referred to above, observed that he was not in agreement with the reasoning of Kader, J. On going through both these decisions, I find that before Kader, J., the statutory force of the P.S.O. was not questioned and it was taken for granted that P.S.O. has statutory force, whereas, before Singaravelu, J., the statutory force of P.S.O. itself was questioned and the learned Judge held that it has no statutory force and gave cogent reasons for the same. Instead of stating that before Kader, J., the validity of P.S.O., was not urged, Singaravelu, J., has observed as if Kader, J., had decided the statutory force of P.S.O. and gave reasons for such a finding. In my view, the following observation of Singaravelu, J.: “With respect, I am unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge and my reasons are……” is merely a slip, for the reasons stated above. Further, P.S.O.588-A has been added to P.S.O.588 by G.O.Ms.No.182, Home, dated 23.1.1-958. In my view, the following observation of Singaravelu, J.: “With respect, I am unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge and my reasons are……” is merely a slip, for the reasons stated above. Further, P.S.O.588-A has been added to P.S.O.588 by G.O.Ms.No.182, Home, dated 23.1.1-958. P.S.0.588-A carries asterisk mark and in the prefatory note to Madras Police Standing Orders, Volume 1, 1960, it is stated: “Orders marked with asterisk are issued by the Inspector-General of Police under Sec.9 of the Madras District Police Act, 1859 (XXIV of 1859), with the approval of the Government.” According to learned counsel for ‘A’ Party, even if P.S.O.588-A is taken to have statutory force, that will only enable the authority concerned to frame Standing Orders as contemplated under Sec.9 of the Madras District Police Act, which enables the Director-General of Police to make rules so as to control the police force in the state and it reads as under: “The Director General may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the State Government, frame such orders and regulations as he shall deem expedient, relative to the general government and distribution of the force, the places of residence, the classification, rank and particular service of the members thereof; their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements and other necessaries to be furnished to them; to the collecting and communicating intelligence and information; and all such other orders and regulations relative to the said Police-force as the said Director-General shall, from time to time, deem expedient for preventing abuse or neglect, and for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of all its duties.” Sec.9 of the Tamil Nadu (Madras) District Police Act does not enable the Director General of Police to frame a, P.S.O. in the nature of P.S.O.588-A. Hence, I entirely agree with the view expressed by Singaravelu, J., and I find that P.S.O. 588-A has no statutory force and the non-observance by the Investigating Officer to follow this P.S.O. is not an illegality. Since there is no conflicting view between the decisions of Kader and Singaravelu, JJ., for the reasons stated above. I am not referring this aspect to a Division Bench. Since there is no conflicting view between the decisions of Kader and Singaravelu, JJ., for the reasons stated above. I am not referring this aspect to a Division Bench. I am of the view that in case the question of statutory force of P.S.O. had been urged before Kader, J., 1 am sure that the learned Judge's view would be in agreement with the view expressed by Singaravelu, J., subsequently. Whatever may be the binding nature of the Judgment of Kader, J., I find there is no conflict in the views expressed by the learned Judges, since Kader, J., has not gone into the question of vires of P.S.O.588-A. 18. The next point raised by learned counsel for ‘B’ party is that even in the absence of P.S.O.588-A, the investigating Officer has to follow the procedure prescribed in Ramakrishnayya v. State Ramakrishnayya v. State 1954 M.W.N. (Crl.) 9 The point that was stressed in the decision cited, is that it would be an embarrassment for the same Public Prosecutor to conduct the case and counter-case. The aforesaid decision, far from helping the ‘B’ Party, is in favour of ‘A’ Party. I have gone through the decision in extenso and have extracted several portions touching the points in question extensively for a proper understanding of the aforesaid decision. The decision is not against filing two charges, but cautions against such a course and brings to light the various anomalies that would arise in filing two charges. To avoid such a contingency, it is open to the Sessions Judge to take steps to appoint a Special Public Prosecutor to conduct one of the cases, so that he may have the entire evidence and grasp the real facts regarding both the cases before him, by taking evidence independently, to enable each party to represent that they are innocent victims of the aggression of the other. Since there is no hard and fast rule as to how a case and counter-case should be tried. I find it is not necessary that the complaint given by ‘A’ party should be referred as a ‘mistake of fact’ so as to enable ‘A’ party to file a private complaint and then transfer the same to the Court of Sessions for trial. Such a course will only consume time. I find it is not necessary that the complaint given by ‘A’ party should be referred as a ‘mistake of fact’ so as to enable ‘A’ party to file a private complaint and then transfer the same to the Court of Sessions for trial. Such a course will only consume time. The first information report in C.C.No.694 of 1985, by one of the persons belonging to ‘A’ Party may itself be treated as a private complaint. Since the matter has to be heard before the Sessions Court, the learned J.F.C.M., need not follow the procedure contemplated under Sec.244, Cr.P.C. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, C.C.No.694/85 pending on the file of the J.F.C.M., Chengalpattu, is transferred to the Court of Sessions, Chengalpattu, to be tried with S.C.No.90 of 1985 successively. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to take immediate steps to have a Special Public Prosecutor appointed to conduct one of the cases. 20. In the result, Crl.M.P.No.5743 of 1986 is allowed to the extent indicated above; Crl.M.P.No.8923 of 1986 for impleading, is allowed, and Crl.M.P.No.8542 of 1986 is dismissed. B.S. ----- Petitions allowed.