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1986 DIGILAW 479 (ALL)

Balbhadra Singh v. S. K. Viswad

1986-07-25

R.A.MISRA

body1986
ORDER 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This petition has been moved with the prayer that proceedings for civil contempt be initiated against the respondents and they may be punished under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. 3. The Stamp Reporter has reported that the period during which proceedings could be initiated has expired on 6th April, 1986. His report is based on the fact that the order which is alleged to have been disobeyed is dated 5-4-1985 and section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act lays down that no proceeding for contempt shall be initiated after expiry of a year from the date of the commission of the contempt. The order dated 5-4-1985 passed by this Court in Writ Petn. No. Nil of 1985 "Balbhadra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh" directed that the petitioner shall be paid the suspension allowance without any further delay. It is urged that the copy of this order was served upon the respondent on 6th April 1985. The respondent was required to pay the suspension allowance without further delay. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the aforesaid direction for payment of the allowance without further delay, the respondents could make the payment within six months from the date when they received the copy of the order and as this period of six months expires on 6th Oct. 1985, so the petition for contempt would be within time up to 6th Oct. 1986 under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. I am unable to agree with this contention. When the court directs an act to be done without any further delay it means that the act shall be done without loss of any time. In the instant case the respondent was required to pay the allowance and when he received the order on 6th April, 1985, he should have paid the same without loss of any further time. Loss of two or three weeks for payment of allowance under the prevailing circumstances may be considered reasonable and condoned but loss of anytime beyond one month would certainly be culpable and obviously the respondents committed civil contempt when they failed to pay even up to one month after the receipt of the copy of the order of this Court. Loss of two or three weeks for payment of allowance under the prevailing circumstances may be considered reasonable and condoned but loss of anytime beyond one month would certainly be culpable and obviously the respondents committed civil contempt when they failed to pay even up to one month after the receipt of the copy of the order of this Court. So in any event the contempt was committed by 6th May, 1985 when, according to the petitioner, the respondents failed to pay the suspension allowance and the period during which proceedings for civil contempt could be initiated has expired on 6th May, 1986. It is not possible to initiate proceedings thereafter. 4. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on, "Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of M.P." AIR 1984 SC 1688 to say that the period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. In Bhagirath Kanoria's case provisions of Sections 468, 472 and 473 of the Cr. P.C. have been considered and it has been held that non-payment of the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund before the due date, is a continuing offence and, therefore, the period of limitation prescribed by section 468 cannot have any application. In the instant case as held above the offence, to wit civil contempt has been committed in any event, according to the allegations of the petitioner on 6th May, 1985 and as provided by section 20 the Contempt of Courts Act, the proceedings for civil contempt cannot be initiated after the expiry of the period of one year from that date. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act does not prescribe any limitation. It prohibits initiation of proceedings by High Court. So ratio of decision of Bhagirath Kanoria's case is not at all applicable in the instant case. Moreover, the offence in the instant case is not a continuing offence. It has been committed when the respondents failed to pay the allowance without further delay and as discussed above this delay could not be extended beyond a period of one month in any case. In this view of the matter it is not possible to initiate proceedings for civil contempt after one year of the commission of the contempt. 5. The prayer for the same is consequently rejected.