Judgment RAMNANDAN PRASAD, J. 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgement and decree of affirmance passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Begusarai, dismissing the appeal preferred by the tenant appellant. The plaintiff-respondent had filed a title suit bearing Title Suit No. 81 of 1977 before the Munsif, 2nd Court, Begusarai, for eviction of the tenant-appellant from the suit premises and also for arrears of rent which was decreed. 2. The case of the plaintiff was that one Narain Ram had taken settlement of 1 katha and 5 dhoors of land of survey plot No. 440 situate in village Mukimpur from the ex-landlord more than 40 years ago. On scientific measurement, however, the area of the settled land was found to be larger. Narain Ram sold 8 dhoors to Hiraman Devi and 4 dhoors to Kaushalaya Devi out of the settled land and constructed a building on the remaining 1 katha 4 dhoors and 15 dhurkis. After his death in 1963, his only son Raghunath Saran along with the aforesaid Kaushalya Devi sold the suit house and land to one Devi Prasad Tulsiyan by a registered sale deed dt. 30-1-1974 and put him in possession. Soon after the purchase Debi Prasad Tulsiyan let out the house to the defendant on a monthly rental of Rs. 10.00 which the latter continued to pay to him till July 1976. On 9-8-1976 Debi Prasad Tulsiyan sold the house to the plaintiff respondent by a registered sale deed and since then the plaintiff is in possession of the land and house through the defendant, who continued to be his tenant He, however, made repeated requests to the defendant to vacate the house and to pay arrears of rent, but the defendant did not accede to his request. Hence, after serving a registered notice on the defendant, the plaintiff brought the present suit for eviction as well as for arrears of rent. 3. The defendant filed written statement in which he alleged that Narain Ram had acquired the land and had constructed the house in question on behalf of Thakur Yugal Kishore Sankarjee and had also installed Thakurjee in the building. Narain Ram, who was a Peon, retired from the service in 1958 and thereafter he went to village home in Saharsa District, after appointing the defendant as Shebait of the temple, and entrusting the suit house and the land to him. Narain Ram, who was a Peon, retired from the service in 1958 and thereafter he went to village home in Saharsa District, after appointing the defendant as Shebait of the temple, and entrusting the suit house and the land to him. It has been asserted by the defendant that he is in possession of the suit land and the house in the capacity of Shebait and not as a tenant. 4. The learned Munsif, eventually, by his judgement dt. 21st May, 1984, decreed for eviction after rejecting the claim of the defendant and holding that he was a tenant under the plaintiff on a monthly rental of Rs. 100/-. He also passed a decree for arrears of rent, as claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant preferred an appeal and his appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, who concurred with the findings arrived at by the learned Munsif. The defendant has preferred this second appeal. 5. While admitting this appeal, the following substantial, question of law was framed by this Court : "Whether the plaintiff can be called upon to pay ad valorem court fee in a suit for eviction under Sec.11 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act simply on the ground that the defendant sets up a plea of title in himself and in view of this defence the court has to go into the question of title for adjudicating the question of relationship of landlord and tenant." 6. When the appeal was taken for final hearing learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent raised a preliminary objection that the aforesaid question does not arise at all in the present appeal. It was submitted that the respondent was entitled to raise such a plea in view of Sub-Sec. (5) of S.100 of the Civil P.C. (hereinafter referred to as the Code), which is as follows : "The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question :" A plain reading of this Sub-Section makes it clear that such a plea can be raised on behalf of the respondent at the hearing stage and, Indeed the learned counsel appearing for the appellant did not dispute this legal position. So, at the outset it has to be seen whether the substantial question formulated in this appeal is involved in this appeal or not. 7. The term "substantial question of law" obviously means substantial question of law involved as between the parties in a case and not merely a question of law of general importance. A question of law is substantial as between the parties in a case if the decision turns one way or the other on the particular view of the law, and if it does not affect the decision, then it cannot be substantial as between the parties. 8. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiff should have paid ad valorem court fee on the valuation of the property involved in the suit, as the defendant denied the title of the plaint and claimed title in the deity and his own possession, on the suit property in the capacity of Shebait of the deity. It was submitted that in view of the claim put forward by the defendant the suit could not proceed, unless the plaintiff paid ad valorem court fee. But, the plaintiff instead of paying ad valorem court fee has paid the court fee on the annual rent of the building as provided under the Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977, besides on the arrears of rent. It was contended that it was necessary for the Court to go into the question of title in depth and in a full fledged manner for deciding the controversy between the parties and in such a situation the plaintiff was bound to pay ad valorem court fee. In support of this submission reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Sheo Shankar Prasad V/s. Barhan Mistry 1985 Pat LJR 358. In this decision a learned single Judge of this Court observed that : "....... before the court goes into the question of title, not incidentally, but in a full fledged manner the plaintiff should be asked to pay ad valorem court fee." 9. On the other hand, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant cannot be allowed to raise this question for the first time in second appeal, when such a plea was not raised at the earliest stage of the suit by the defendant. On the other hand, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant cannot be allowed to raise this question for the first time in second appeal, when such a plea was not raised at the earliest stage of the suit by the defendant. It was specifically pointed out that no such plea was taken in the written statement of the defendant and the judgement of the learned Munsif gives an impression that such a plea was never taken before the trial court. Indeed, no issue was framed on the question of title, obviously because it was not necessary to decide the question of title in such a suit. 10. There appears substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent, as there is absolutely no recital in the written statement of the defendant that the plaintiff should be asked to pay ad valorem court fee. Of course, the defendant had challenged the title of the plaintiff and had claimed title in himself, but he did not state in his written statement that the plaintiff should be called upon to pay ad valorem court fee. Indeed, the learned Munsif did not frame any issue either on the question of title or on the question of court fee and decided the question of title incidentally for determining the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Such a plea does not appear to have been pressed at the appellate stage also, as there is no discussion in this regard in the judgement of the appellate court as well. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that the appellant was entitled to raise this plea at this stage, as it raises a question of jurisdiction and goes at the root of the case. He developed his argument by saying that if the ad valorem court fee on the value of the suit property was payable in the suit, the Munsif would have no jurisdiction to try the suit as the value of the suit property is much beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif. 12. I am afraid, an objection regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction of a court cannot be raised for the first time at the stage of second appeal or even at the first appellate stage, if the same was not raised at the earliest opportunity in the suit itself. 12. I am afraid, an objection regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction of a court cannot be raised for the first time at the stage of second appeal or even at the first appellate stage, if the same was not raised at the earliest opportunity in the suit itself. This position has been made crystal clear by Sub-Section (2) of S.21 of the Civil P.C. which has been incorporated in the Code in 1976 and S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act. 13. S.21(2) of the Code reads as follows :- "No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 14. S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act reads as follows :- "Procedure where objection is taken on appeal of revision that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional purposes- (1) Notwithstanding anything in S.578 of the Civil P.C. (14 of 1882) a objection that by reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower appellate count which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercises jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an appellate court unless - (a) the objection was taken in the court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the Lower Appellate Court in memorandum, of appeal to that Court, or (b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to tie recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was overvalued or under valued, and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits. (2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in Cl.(a) of Sub-Sec. (1), but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in Cl.(b) of that Sub-Section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeals as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or Lower Appellate Court. (3) If the objection was taken in that manner, and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court I with respect to the hearing of appeal; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a court competent to entertain the suit or appeal. (4) The provisions of this Section with respect to an appellate court shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to a court exercising revisional jurisdiction under S.622 of the Civil P.C. (14 of 1982) (1882?), or other enactment for the time being in force. (5) This Section shall come into force on the first day of July, 1887." 15. So, it is manifast that no objection as to the competence of court with reference to the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction can be ordinarily allowed to be taken by the Appellate or Revisional Court in view of the provisions of Sub-Sec. (2) of S.21 of the Code unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and, at any rate, at or before the settlement of issues unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. In the present case the defendant had filed a written statement setting up his defence in the court of Munsif. Although this written statement is a long one, he did not take this plea therein. The judgement of the learned Munsif also does not show that he had raised this plea at or before the settlement of issues. It also cannot be said that there has been a failure of justice consequent upon the failure of the defendant to raise this plea before the stage of the settlement of the issues. The judgement of the learned Munsif also does not show that he had raised this plea at or before the settlement of issues. It also cannot be said that there has been a failure of justice consequent upon the failure of the defendant to raise this plea before the stage of the settlement of the issues. S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act also reiterates the same principle. That being the legal position, the defendant cannot be allowed to raise the plea of want of pecuniary jurisdiction in the trial court for the first time at the stage of the second appeal. 16. The object of the legislature in enacting S.21 of the Code and S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act was to ensure that the time and labour spent by court in deciding a case should not be wasted, if the party concerned had joined the issue and gone to the trial upon the merits without objecting to the pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction of the Court at the earliest opportunity. S.11 of the Suits Valuation Act and S.21 of the Code provide an exception to the general rule relating to the jurisdiction and lay down that a party, who has not taken objection as the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court at the time specified therein, cannot be allowed to dispute that jurisdiction afterwards. In the present case, as stated above, the defendant did not take any objection as to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif in his written statement and went to trial on merits and now that the judgement of that court as well as of the first appellate court has gone against him, he cannot be allowed to raise the plea of want of pecuniary jurisdiction in the Munsif at such a late stage, and, more so, when such a plea was not pressed even before the appellate court. 17. In view of the discussions made above, the defendant cannot be allowed to raise the question of want of pecuniary jurisdiction in the Munsif to try the suit, after allowing him to go into the merit of the case without raising the question of jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity. 17. In view of the discussions made above, the defendant cannot be allowed to raise the question of want of pecuniary jurisdiction in the Munsif to try the suit, after allowing him to go into the merit of the case without raising the question of jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity. True, as a matter of general principle the question of jurisdiction, which goes at the root of the case can be raised at any stage, but the want of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction as sought to be made in this case, is not such question and the judgement of the trial court cannot be reversed or set aside on that ground alone when no such plea was raised at the earliest stage in view of the provisions of the Civil P.C. and the Suits Valuation Act, referred to above. When the judgement of the learned Munsif cannot be set aside on the ground of want of pecuniary jurisdiction in him to try the suit, it is not at all necessary in this appeal to go into the question as to whether the plaintiff should have been called upon to pay ad valorem court fee on the market valuation of the suit property or not. 18. That being so, the substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission cannot be said to be involved in the present case. It may be that this question is a question of general importance, but all questions of general importance cannot be said to be substantial questions of law in a particular case between the parties, unless those questions are involved in that case. From the discussions made above it is clear that the result of this appeal will not be affected in any way by the decision on the substantial question formulated at the stage of admission. That being so, the said substantial question is not at all involved in the present case and as such it has to be held that there is no substantial question to be decided in this second appeal. This second appeal has, therefore, to be dismissed as being without any merit. 19. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to the costs of this appeal. S.SANDHAWALIA, J. 20 I agree.