ORDER B.D. Agrawal, J. - These connected petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution give rise to certain common questions of law. 2. Vacancy occurred in the post of Assistant Octroi Superintendent, Nagar Palika, Mirzapur in September 1974, due to the then incumbent being promoted as the Octroi Superintendent. The petitioner (Jawahar Singh) and respondent 3. (Udai Raj Dube) were in the field of eligibility for consideration besides two others. Admittedly the petitioner is junior to the respondent. The appointment of the petitioner as the Revenue Inspector took place on Nov. 16, 1970, followed by confirmation dated Sept. 16, 1971: the respondent was appointed Revenue Inspector in 1963 and confirmed in 1965. The minimum education qualification required for the post of the Assistant Octroi Superintendent in the Nagar Palika is Intermediate or equivalent examination recognised by the U.P. Government. Preference is to be given to graduates and holders of the Local Self-Government Diploma or Diploma in Public Administration. The Administrator, Nagar Palika (the Board being superseded) by his order dated Sept. 16, 1977, directed the promotion to be given to Jawahar Singh the petitioner to the post of the Assistant Octroi Superintendent. Against this Udai Raj Dube - the respondent, filed a claim before the Public Services Tribunal, which, on Jan. 15. 1981, upheld his contention and found that the promotion given to Jawahar Singh was not according to law. The claim petition of the respondent was, therefore, allowed; the order dated Sept. 16, 1977, made by the Administrator was quashed and the authorities were directed to fill in the post afresh in the light of the Government instructions and rules. Aggrieved Jawahar Singh, the petitioner has approached this court and sought writ of certiorari for the order of the Public Services Tribunal being quashed and also mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the same. 3. In the other Writ Petition No. 1793 of 1980 vacancy arose in the post of Tax Inspector, Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, on April 4, 1977. Against this the respondent 3 (Hari Mohan) had been appointed Tax Collector, Nagar Palika, Jaunpur on May 25, 1966. He asserted the claim for appointment as Tax Inspector on ground of promotion. The Nagar Palika, however, invited applications through the employment exchange and held interview dated March 11, 1978. Through direct recruitment thus made the petitioner (Shridhar) was selected and given appointment on March 11, 1978. He asserted the claim for appointment as Tax Inspector on ground of promotion. The Nagar Palika, however, invited applications through the employment exchange and held interview dated March 11, 1978. Through direct recruitment thus made the petitioner (Shridhar) was selected and given appointment on March 11, 1978. Against this Hari Mohan (the respondent) lodged a claim before the Public Services Tribunal. He gave this up, however, on Dec. 23. 1979 pointing out that on his representation the State Government had directed the Commissioner, Varanasi Division to settle the matter and hence the claim petition was not being pressed for the time being. The Commissioner, Varanasi Division, made the order dated Feb. 13, 1980, whereby he quashed the appointment given by the Administrator, Nagar Palika dated March 11, 1978, to the petitioner and directed that the appointment to the post of Tax Inspector be made through the mode of promotion. Aggrieved against this the petitioner (Shridhar) has preferred this writ petition claiming writ of mandamus directing the Administrator, Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, not to give effect to the order dated Feb. 13, 1980, passed by the Commissioner and also writ of certiorari for this order being quashed. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. Before proceeding with the merits of the controversy raised in these connected writ petitions, it is convenient to make a reference to certain orders/notifications made by the State Government from time to time and which have been the subject matter of discussion in the course of arguments advanced on both sides. The earliest in point of time is Government Order dated April 10, 1950. The text whereof is Annex. II to the Writ Petition No. 1793 of 1980. This Government Order commences with reference to the report of the U.P. Pay Committee and the Government Resolution dated March 29, 1949, passed thereon. It is stated that, as contemplated under the report of the Pay Committee, the State Government was prescribing the minimum educational qualification for the posts vide annexure appended to this Government Order. It says then that to fill up the future vacancies of the posts indicated in the annexure promotion will not ordinarily be given from a lower to higher post unless the official holding the lower post possesses the educational qualifications prescribed for the higher post. It says then that to fill up the future vacancies of the posts indicated in the annexure promotion will not ordinarily be given from a lower to higher post unless the official holding the lower post possesses the educational qualifications prescribed for the higher post. Where, however, a local body considers that an existing employee, though not educationally qualified, is entitled to promotion to the next higher post in the same class of service by virtue of long experience and capabilities the local Government may seek exemption from the State Government. There is illustration appended to this Government Order in the following words : "For instance suppose there is a confirmed employee holding the post of an Assistant Octroi Superintendent. In the normal course when post of Octroi Superintendent falls vacant the Assistant Octroi Superintendent should be promoted to that post, but if the present Assistant Octroi Superintendent is educationally unqualified, he cannot technically claim promotion to the post in Octroi Superintendent. If the Board, however, considers that by virtue of his long experience, grasp of work and his personal qualities, he will make a good Octroi Superintendent, the Board may approach State Government for his exemption x x x x x x " 6. The Government Order also incorporates the following :- "In the case of the post mentioned in the annexure promotion should as a rule be made from the lower to the higher posts or grades, as the case may be, in the same class of service, subject to the general orders contained in the above paragraphs. The prevailing practice of transferring at randum of officials in one class of service to another should be stopped." 7. The post of Assistant Octroi Superintendent is mentioned at serial No. 5 in the annexure to this Government Order. The prescribed minimum educational qualification, as stated above, is Intermediate or equivalent examination recognised by U.P. Government with a rider that graduates and holders of Diploma should be preferred. 8. From the notification dated April 27, 1957, issued by the State Government in continuation of notification dated Feb. 22, 1957, it would appear that in exercise of powers under S. 296(2)(b) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, the State Government framed certain rules relating to the educational qualifications for appointment, confirmation and promotion to various posts under the Municipal Boards. From the notification dated April 27, 1957, issued by the State Government in continuation of notification dated Feb. 22, 1957, it would appear that in exercise of powers under S. 296(2)(b) of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, the State Government framed certain rules relating to the educational qualifications for appointment, confirmation and promotion to various posts under the Municipal Boards. The rules required that the Municipal Board shall not appoint, confirm or promote any person to the specified posts unless he possesses the educational and other qualifications prescribed for the post. The qualifications for the post of the Assistant Octroi Superintendent are those which have been mentioned above already. Through the notification dated Jan. 17, 1958, issued also under S. 296(2)(b) the State Government prescribed the minimum and maximum age limit for recruitment to the post under the Municipal Board - the age prescribed being 18 and 28 years respectively. These notifications are Annexs. II and III respectively to Writ Petition No. 2039 of 1981. 9. On Dec. 9, 1959, the State Government through the Government Order reiterated the provisions made in the Government Order dated April 10, 1950 and said that the promotion of any person to the relevant post shall be governed by the principle laid down in the aforesaid Government Order (vide Annex. IV). Another Government Order was issued by the State Government on Jan. 30, 1972 (vide Annex. V) wherein it is specified that the provisions contained in the two notifications dated April 22, 1957 and Jan. 17, 1958, were being adopted as statutory directions within the meaning of S. 71 of the U.P. Municipalities Act and it was being directed that it shall be mandatory for the Nagar Palika to abide with the same. 10. Sri S.C. Budhwar, learned counsel for the Jawahar, contended to begin with that the decision given by the Public Services Tribunal, dated Jan. 15, 1981, is without jurisdiction. The submission made is that though a person in service or pay of a local authority, not being a Cantonment Board, is a public servant as defined in S. 2(b)(ii) of the U.P. Public Services Tribunals Act, 1976, the relevant provisions of the Act are inapplicable where such a public servant is of the category of a workman as defined in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (vide S. 1(4)(e) of the Act, 1976). The Supreme Court in the Corporation of Nagpur Case, AIR 1960 SC 675 , took the view of that the Tax Department of the Corporation is industry and considering the nature of the service rendered by them, the employees of the Tax Department are also entitled to benefits under the Industrial Disputes Act. This same was the view endorsed in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : (1978 Lab IC 467); (See also Abdul Wahab Shaikh Lal Bhai v. G.E. Patankar, 1980 Lab IC 623 (Bom)) where it was held following these decisions that the Octroi Department of the Municipality is industry. Even if the nature of the job of the Assistant Octroi Superintendent is supervisory in character the wages drawn by him fall below the prescribed limit and, therefore, it has been urged; he is a workman within the meaning of Section (z)(iv) (Section 2(z)(iv)?) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 11. For the respondent (Udai Raj Dube) the learned counsel Sri S.P. Gupta argued, in reply, that no objection on the score of the jurisdiction was raised by the petitioner or on behalf of the Nagar Palika for that matter before the Tribunal and hence the petitioner may not now be heard to agitate for the first time on this aspect in the writ petition filed by him. In support of this he places reliance on Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397 . In that case there was no objection to the transfer of the cases to the Income-tax Officer who decided the same; the parties had submitted to the jurisdiction and it was held in face of this acquiescence that it was not open to agitation in writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Such conduct of the petitioners, it was pointed, disentitled them to the relief at the ends (hands) of the Supreme Court on ground that the order of transfer was unconstitutional and void. This may not be the position where there is, however, inherent lack of jurisdiction asserted. In such a case the omission by a party to raise before the authority the relevant facts-to decide the question of jurisdiction cannot clothe it with jurisdiction (Poineer Traders v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, AIR 1963 SC 734 ; T.C. Kotal v. State of J & K. AIR 1967 J and K 98 (FB)). 12. In such a case the omission by a party to raise before the authority the relevant facts-to decide the question of jurisdiction cannot clothe it with jurisdiction (Poineer Traders v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, AIR 1963 SC 734 ; T.C. Kotal v. State of J & K. AIR 1967 J and K 98 (FB)). 12. Assuming, therefore, that the decision given by the Tribunal in the instant (case) was without jurisdiction, this in itself makes no material difference in the result of the case because as will presently appear the conclusion reached by the Tribunal is otherwise just and fortified on merits and that does not justify interference by this Court in its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. Upon merit the stand taken by Sri Budhwar is that the directives issued by the State Government from time to time under S. 71 of the Municipalities Act (as it was prior to the amendment made by the U.P. Act 26 of 1964) are of no relevance. They, it is contended, do not bind the Nagar Palika. This line of reasoning is adopted also by Sri Shashi Nandan learned counsel for the petitioner in the other writ petition. In this same connection it has been argued before me that the other Government Orders, referred to above, are of no assistance to the respective respondents. The notification dated April 22, 1957/April 27, 1957, provides only for the educational qualifications in respect of certain class of employees including the Assistant Octroi Superintendent and the Tax Inspectors. In the notification dated Jan. 17, 1958, the provision made by the State Government concerns the age limit of this class of employees. The Government Order dated Jan. 30, 1972, issued though subsequent to S. 71 being amended purports to incorporate and refer to the notifications dated April 22/27, 1957, and Jan. 17, 1958 only. In other words these notifications of April, 1957 or the Government Orders dated Jan. 30, 1972, do not in terms refer to the criteria which may be adopted for purposes of promotion among this class of employees. Section 71 of the Municipalities Act, before being amended by the U.P. Act 26 of 1964, read as under : "71. Except as provided by Ss. 30, 1972, do not in terms refer to the criteria which may be adopted for purposes of promotion among this class of employees. Section 71 of the Municipalities Act, before being amended by the U.P. Act 26 of 1964, read as under : "71. Except as provided by Ss. 57, 66, 68 and 70 and subject to any general or special directions as the State Government may from time to time issue board may, by resolution, determine what servants are required for the discharge of the duties of the board and the salaries to be paid to them respectively." Subsequent to the amendment brought by the U.P. Act 26 of 1964, aforementioned, this section now reads as follows : "Except as provided by Ss. 57, 66, 68 and 70 and subject to any general or special directions as the State Government may from time to time issue board may, by special resolution, determine what servants are required for the discharge of the duties of the board and their qualifications and conditions of service." 14. Far back on April 10, 1950, the State Government issued the order, the relevant extract whereof I have given above already. That envisages filling in of higher posts in a department of the municipality by promotion on the principle of seniority-cum-merit. The position is further elucidated in this behalf and clarified beyond a shadow of doubt it would appear, in the subsequent Government Order dated Dec. 9, 1959, which is Annex. IV to the Writ Petition No. 2039 of 1981. In this Government Order it is reiterated that promotion be made by strict observance of what is provided for in the Government Order dated April 10, 1950, and also that x x x x x "the reference to the words efficiency, merit and seniority appearing in the Government Order dated April 10, 1950, should usually mean that the senior most person or persons should be considered for filling out the posts and if it is found necessary to supersede any person or persons it should invariably be done for adequate reasons to be recorded in writing in orders. The principle of seniority subject to the rejection of unfit should be followed invariably." 15. This then was the criterion which the State Government laid down for purposes of promotion in the department and reiterated the same in 1959. The principle of seniority subject to the rejection of unfit should be followed invariably." 15. This then was the criterion which the State Government laid down for purposes of promotion in the department and reiterated the same in 1959. For the petitioners there is reliance placed on Rameshwar Prasad v. Municipal Board. Pilibhit, AIR 1958 All 841 . Therein the learned single Judge found in the light of the unamended S. 71 reproduced above that the Government Order dated 10-4-1950, was ultra vires the powers of the State Government. It was observed in this connection (at p. 843) :- "This section would show that the State Government, no doubt, can issue general or special directions to a Board with regard to the determination of the strength of the servants, the discharge of their duties and the salaries to be paid to them respectively. This section does not to my mind confer on the State Government the power to fix minimum qualifications required from persons who were appointed either Octroi Moharrirs or Assistant Moharrirs. In that view of the matter I am of the opinion that the State Government could not have issued Order No. 765/IX-XIX I.M.P. 250-1949, dated 10th April, 1950." 16. To my mind, with utmost respect, the expression "what servants" appearing in S. 71 is, without strain put upon the language employed, capable of admitting wider interpretation. In the context much may be said in support of the view that the expression covers not merely the strength of the service and the salaries to be paid but also the minimum qualifications required, the quality of the staff that is taken in the service and the criterion which is to be adopted to fill in the higher levels in the service. My attention is drawn, for the petitioners, however, to two other unreported decisions, namely, Ram Kripal Garg v. State of U.P. (Writ Petition No. 4556 of 1965 dated 16-9-1966) and Inder Bahadur v. Municipal Board. Mirzapur and others (Writ Petition No. 235 of 1970 dated 20-10-1972) in which Rameshwar Prasad (supra) was followed. I do not feel it necessary to probe into this further or to suggest reference in the matter to a larger Bench because even upon accepting that the Government Order dated April 10, 1950, was beyond the powers of the State Government, and that the Government Order dated Dec. I do not feel it necessary to probe into this further or to suggest reference in the matter to a larger Bench because even upon accepting that the Government Order dated April 10, 1950, was beyond the powers of the State Government, and that the Government Order dated Dec. 9, 1959, is only a continuation of the same, the ultimate result as will presently appear does not vary. Subsequent to the amendment brought in S. 71 also the State Government issued a directive in March, 1972, to the effect that promotion among the serving employees be made on the criteria of seniority-cum-educational qualifications. There is no dispute that S. 71, as amended, does empower the State Government to issue general or special directions. including in regard to the qualifications and conditions of service. It appears Udai Raj Dube (respondent) was only High School at that time and had sought exemption from the minimum educational qualification of being Intermediate. This was declared by the State Government, which, at the same time in the order, reiterated, the general formula for observance in the matter of grant of promotion. 17. The crux of the matter in the case of Jawahar Singh is moreover different. A perusal of the impugned order dated Sept. 16, 1977 (vide Annex. VI to the writ petition) passed by the Administrator, Nagar Palika amply demonstrate on its face that though the Administrator purported to adopt the criterion of seniority-cum-merit, this was not carried through in conformity with the recognised norms thereof. The question is whether he does observe this criterion in conformity with the accepted norms. 18. In the impugned order the Administrator finds that there were the following Tax Inspectors, in the order of seniority, eligible for promotion as the Assistant Octroi Superintendent :- 1. Jafar Khan, 2. Udai Raj Dube, 3. Keshav Chand Srivastava and 4. Jawahar Singh. 19. For Jafar Khan it is pointed that there was some stricture given by the Court on Oct. 11, 1976 and an inquiry was pending in that connection. Udai Raj Dube is ruled out with the observation that he was Intermediate and had once been suspended. This suspension. it is relevant to state. was for a brief period from April 15, 1971 to May 21, 1971 only. In regard to Keshav Chand Srivastava all that is said is that he is Intermediate. Udai Raj Dube is ruled out with the observation that he was Intermediate and had once been suspended. This suspension. it is relevant to state. was for a brief period from April 15, 1971 to May 21, 1971 only. In regard to Keshav Chand Srivastava all that is said is that he is Intermediate. For Jawahar Singh too it is pointed that he had once been suspended. But then giving weight to his being M.A. the promotion given is to him by-passing the rest including the respondent. From this account it is manifest that the Administrator does not adopt the formula of merit-cum-seniority: there is significantly no outsider or third person taken into consideration besides the four departmental candidates. It is difficult to hold that in face thereof the Administrator did not have to abide by the accepted rules of seniority-cum-merit. In State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310 : 1976 Lab IC 395 it was observed by the Supreme Court : "With regard to promotion the normal principle is of either merit-cum-seniority or seniority-cum-merit. Seniority-cum-merit means that giving the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of administration the senior though the less meritorious shall have priority. This will not violate Articles 14. 16(1) and 16(2)." 20. Under the criteria of seniority-cum-merit, a senior is entitled to promotion unless it can be said that he is unfit for the same. The seniority-cum-fitness principle implies in other words that the senior person unless unfit should get the promotion (vide State of Mysore v. Syed Mahmood, 1968 Serv LR 333 : (1968 Lab IC 1291) (SC): Hari Datt v. State of H.P.. (1974) 1 Serv LR 208 (FB) and Banwari Lal v. Union of India. 1982 Lab IC 1137 (All). Having opted for the criteria of seniority-cum-merit it was incumbent upon the Administrator to abide by the same. Jawahar Singh, the junior most, could not have been given preference without those senior to him, including the respondent being considered unfit for promotion. I am conscious that the assessment relevant is of the appointing authority: the court may not substitute its satisfaction in this behalf nor should this be taken as the expression of opinion in favour of any one candidate or the other. I am conscious that the assessment relevant is of the appointing authority: the court may not substitute its satisfaction in this behalf nor should this be taken as the expression of opinion in favour of any one candidate or the other. The thing relevant is that having opted the formula of seniority-cum-merit, the Administrator has fallen short and failed to carry it through in its full significance. Consideration implies necessarily the application of mind confined to the relevant facts. 21. For the respondent it has been urged, not without force, that the decision arrived at by the Administrator is blurred due to the extraneous considerations or the pressure brought to bear upon him at the political level. From the record it would appear that Jawahar Singh (petitioner) had made applications to Government wherein he had asserted that he was the sole candidate eligible to be promoted as the Assistant Octroi Superintendent since he was a graduate and others were not so. On one of these applications dated August 31, 1977, there was the recommendation of Member of Legislative Assembly followed by the note of the Minister of State for Rural Industries, U.P. dated Sept. 1, 1977, to the effect that the applicant was entitled to be accorded promotion and that in his favour there is also the recommendation of the department and that the Minister be informed after promotion being given to the petitioner accordingly. The Minister for Local Self-Government also made endorsement on the other application (the contents whereof were the same) and asked for being informed as well. In the order dated Sept. 16, 1957, impugned in this case, the Administrator proceeds to make a reference to the directives appearing on both these applications. To what extent these notings influenced the decision reached by the Administrator may be a matter of speculation alone. But it remains undeniable, reading the contents of the order in its entirety, that the Administrator failed to abide by the accepted criteria of seniority-cum-fitness. The direction given by the Public Services Tribunal dated Jan. 15, 1981, thus meets the substantial ends of justice. The conclusion to which this Court would arrive upon merit, independently of what the Tribunal has said. would not be materially different. The direction given by the Public Services Tribunal dated Jan. 15, 1981, thus meets the substantial ends of justice. The conclusion to which this Court would arrive upon merit, independently of what the Tribunal has said. would not be materially different. Interference by the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution may be regarded justified where the Tribunal acts wholly without jurisdiction and such act results in manifest injustice, but not where the order is found proper, equitable and just (vide Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., ( 1952 SCR 583 ) : ( AIR 1952 SC 192 ): Parahu v. DDC, (1964 All WR 155) : (1964 All LJ 240) and Pooran Singh v. Addl. Commr. Agra, ( AIR 1957 All 276 ). 22. Taking up now the other writ petition No. 1793 of 1980 I have dealt with above already the contention of Sri Shashi Nandan to the effect that the orders of the State Government issued under S. 71 prior to the amendment made by the U.P. Act 26 of 1964 are invalid and hence inoperative in regard to the criteria to be adopted for purposes of promotion. Learned counsel next assailed the order dated Feb. 13, 1980, passed by the Commissioner, Varanasi Division (vide Annex. IV to the writ petition) alleging that there was no jurisdiction in the Commissioner to sit in judgment over the order of the Administrator dated March 11, 1978, whereby Shridhar (petitioner) was appointed as Tax Inspector through direct recruitment and secondly that there was no opportunity given to the petitioner even though the representation made by the respondent (Hari Mohan) came to be decided by the Commissioner against the petitioner. I do not find substance in these contentions. 23. Sri V.K. Burman, counsel appearing in this case, who adopted the other arguments of Sri Gupta in the other writ petition, submits rightly that the Commissioner is prescribed authority appointed as such by the State Government within the meaning of S. 2(17)(ii) of the Municipalities Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner made a reference to. S. 34 submitting that this may have no application since order impugned dated March 11, 1978, made by the Administrator is not claimed to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury to the public or to any class or body of persons lawfully employed. Learned counsel for the petitioner made a reference to. S. 34 submitting that this may have no application since order impugned dated March 11, 1978, made by the Administrator is not claimed to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury to the public or to any class or body of persons lawfully employed. It was argued also that S. 77-A could be of no avail to the Commissioner because this was in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by him in a matter of disciplinary proceeding. Section 77-A envisages power of appellate authority in an appeal against an order of dismissal, removal or other punishment. This was also so held in the unreported decisions (vide Vidya Sagar Gupta v. Commissioner, Gorakhpur, W.P. 2159 of 1972 dated 28-8-1973 and Ram Dhani Singh Tyagi & others v. State of U.P. Special Appeals Nos. 11 & 17 of 1976 dated 16-12-1976 cited by the learned counsel. It appears to be overlooked, however, that there is supervisory power conferred upon the Prescribed Authority under S. 32 of this Act. The powers granted therein are fairly wide covering as they do the provision that the Prescribed Authority may, inter alia, "(b) by order in writing call for and inspect a book or document in the possession or under the control of a board or of such committee; (c) by order in writing require a board or such committee to furnish such statements, accounts, reports or copies of documents, relating to the proceedings or duties of the board or committee, as it thinks fit to call for; and (d) record in writing for the consideration of a board or of such committee, any observation it thinks proper in regard to the proceedings or duties of the board or committee." 24. It is unacceptable that in exercise of these supervisory powers the Commissioner could not take into consideration the representation of the respondent directed against the recruitment to the post of the Tax Inspector being made directly instead of proceeding on the criteria of seniority-cum-merit confined to the departmental candidates alone. Since the Commissioner took decision on the point of principle or the norm to be adopted in this behalf without indicating his preference for any one candidate it may not be said that the order is vitiated due to opportunity of hearing not being provided to the petitioner. Since the Commissioner took decision on the point of principle or the norm to be adopted in this behalf without indicating his preference for any one candidate it may not be said that the order is vitiated due to opportunity of hearing not being provided to the petitioner. There is no indication any-where that the post of the Tax Inspector or the Assistant Octroi Superintendent, for that matter, is a selection post for which merit alone may be the criteria. The order of the Commissioner accords with the generally accepted formula for giving promotion there is no violation of any service rules of the State. Assuming that the Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, too was not bound by the State Government's Orders dated April 10, 1950/ Dec. 9, 1959, and it was open to the authority to adopt the criteria they thought best, the Commissioner acted within his jurisdiction in opting the criteria of seniority-cum-fitness. 25. Sri Burman also urged that the petitioner (Shridhar) should have availed the alternative remedy of approaching the Public Services Tribunal and the petition deserves dismissal on this account. I am unable to attach weight to this contention. The petition has admitted long back on Feb. 26, 1980, at the preliminary hearing and has also been tagged for decision with the other Writ Petition No. 2039 of 1981. Affidavits have been exchanged in the light thereof and the case argued as well on both sides at length upon merit. This apart for the reasons discussed above, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in these matters has itself been doubted and on that account too it would neither be just nor reasonable to relegate this petitioner at this stage to the Public Services Tribunal. 26. Assuming that the decision recorded by the Public Services Tribunal dated Jan. 15, 1981, in the one case and the order of the Commissioner dated Feb. 13, 1980, were rejected on the plea that these authorities were incompetent in this respect, I wonder whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Court could not be called upon to issue a direction itself to similar effect. The powers of the Court in relation to orders of the Government or an officer of the government, who has been conferred any power under any statute. The powers of the Court in relation to orders of the Government or an officer of the government, who has been conferred any power under any statute. which apparently confer on him absolutely discretionary powers, are not confined to cases where such power is exercised or revised to be exercised on irrelevant considerations or on erroneous ground or mala fides (vide M/s Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa, (1975) 2 SCC 649 : 1975 Lab IC 1608). The Court has the power to make an order intended to remedy defects of justice; accordingly it will issue to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is special legal right and no legal remedy to enforce that right. This Court may reach injustice wherever it is found and has the power also to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements arising in a case Dwarakanath v. Income-tax Officer, AIR 1966SC 81. In Comptroller and Auditor General of India v. K. S. Jagannathan, (1986) 2 SCC 679 at p. 692: (1987 Lab IC 262 at p. 271) recently delivered the Supreme Court thus laid down the principles applicable : "There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion." 27. Viewed from all these angles these petitions would deserve to be dismissed. It is high time that the State Government considers issuing express directions in the light of S. 71 of the Municipalities Act (as amended) so as to cover expressly matters relating to qualifications and conditions of service also relating to municipal servants and thereby eliminate a source of recurring conflict raised in courts from time to time on this account. 28. The petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.