Judgment :- 1. In this batch of 119 Original Petitions, the challenge is against the Government Order, G. O. (MS) 127/84/Pw. F & P. dated 12-11-1984 revising the fees and other charges leviable in the matter of registration and renewal of contractors and also conditions governing the same. O.P. No.279 of 1986 was treated as the main case and Mr. V.M, Kurian, Advocate for the petitioners therein, submitted the leading arguments in these batch of cases. The counsel, who appeared in the other cases, substantially adopted the same arguments. Separate arguments advanced by other counsel are also dealt with herein. Since the attack in all the Original Petitions is against the Government Order aforesaid, and the legal arguments advanced were general in nature, it is not necessary to highlight the individual facts in the various Original Petitions. We will take up the facts in O. P. No. 279 of 1986. There are 17 petitioners in this O. P. They are registered (Government) P.W.D. Contractors in category "A". It is stated that the Government have framed rules for registration of contractors and conditions governing registration. Only registered contractors are entitled to submit tenders for contract work. By G.O. (P) 47/PW dated 4-2-1971 (Exhibit P1), Government have prescribed details regarding the forms, security or earnest money deposit, further security to be made by the selected contractor and a certain percentage to be withheld at the time of interim payments, to be released on satisfactory completion of the work. The contractors are classified into four categories as A, B, C and D. The solvency certificate or bank guarantee to be furnished for category 'A' is Rs. 50,000/-, for category 'B' Rs. 25,000/-, for category 'C' Rs. 7,500/-and for category 'D' nil. The registration fees for the 4 categories are Rs. 200, Rs. 150, Rs. 100 and Rs. 50/-respectively. With regard to Electrical Contractors there is some modification. The petitioners obtained registration by furnishing solvency certificate or Bank guarantee and are carrying on the profession of Government Contractors. The first respondent-State unilaterally revised the fees and charges for taking up works in the P.W.D., by G.O. (MS) 127/84/PW/F& P dated 12-11-1984, evidenced by Ext. P2. 100 and Rs. 50/-respectively. With regard to Electrical Contractors there is some modification. The petitioners obtained registration by furnishing solvency certificate or Bank guarantee and are carrying on the profession of Government Contractors. The first respondent-State unilaterally revised the fees and charges for taking up works in the P.W.D., by G.O. (MS) 127/84/PW/F& P dated 12-11-1984, evidenced by Ext. P2. It resulted in the upward revision in the cost of tender forms, fees for registration of contractor's, quantum of earnest money and security deposit, and insisted cash deposit instead of solvency certificate or bank guarantee for registration and renewal of contractors. The alternations and changes made in Ext. P2, in the conditions and also in the upward revision, in the cost of tender forms, fees for registration etc., are attacked in these batch of Original Petitions. 2. Mr. V.M. Kurian, who appeared for the petitioners in OP. No. 279 of 1986. attacked Ext. P2 as illegal and arbitrary. It was submitted that the cash deposit is only to improve the receipts of Government. The increase made in the cost of tender forms, registration fees, earnest money and security deposit, are unjustified. The main attack was against the insistence of cash deposit, instead of bank guarantee or solvency certificate, and the enhancement made in the registration fees. 3. Counsel for the petitioners in O. P. No. 2331 of 1986, Mr. Abdul Gafoor; besides supporting the arguments of Mr. V. M. Kurian, submitted that on its own terms Ext. P2 cannot be enforced till the Chief Engineer submits bis proposal. It was further submitted that Ext. P2 applies only to P.W.D. Contractors and not to other Contactors like Forest Contractors and Abkari Contractors. So, Ext. P2 is discriminatory and violates Art.14 of the Constitution of India. The further submission made was that Ext. P2 will apply only for registration and not for renewal. 4. Mr. Rajasekharan Nair, Counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 1747 of 1986 and Advocates M/s. Nandakumara Menon, K.C. John, M.P.R. Nair, M.M. Abdul Aziz, K. Ramkumar, besides adopting the arguments of Mr. V. M. Kurian, further contended that the insistence of the cash deposit and the increased revision in the charges for the tender forms, registration fees etc., are measures to increase the Revenues of the State and to improve the receipts of the Government and really impositions like "taxes". V. M. Kurian, further contended that the insistence of the cash deposit and the increased revision in the charges for the tender forms, registration fees etc., are measures to increase the Revenues of the State and to improve the receipts of the Government and really impositions like "taxes". There is no authority to make such a levy. They are not intended for the due performance of the contract. Mr. K.T. Sankaran, Counsel for the petitioner in O.P. No. 2287 of 1986, while adopting the arguments of. Mr. V. M. Kurian, contended that vast powers to refuse renewal of registration already exist and the Government need not have gone to the 'extent' of insisting cash payment for proper and due compliance of the work entrusted to the Contractors. 5. Briefly, stated, the attack against Ext. P2 by the petitioner's counsel centered round five points. They are. (1) Ext. P2 is illegal and arbitrary. The upward increase in the charges for the tender form, registration fees, earnest money and security deposit as also the insistence of cash deposit is intended to improve the receipts or revenues of the Government. This is unauthorised. (2) Ext. P2 cannot be enforced till the Chief Engineer submits his proposal. (3) Ext.P2 applies only to PWD. Contractors and not to Forest Contractors and Abkari Contractors. This is discriminatory. (4) Ext. P2 will apply only for registration and not for renewal and (5) There are vast powers to refuse renewal and the Government need not have gone to the extent of insisting cash deposit for the proper compliance of the works entrusted to the Contractors. 6. The learned Advocate General, Mr. P. V. Ayyappan, sought to sustain Ext. P2. It was argued that under Ext. P1, by Clause.3 (b), solvency certificate or bank guarantee was insisted as a condition or pre-qualification for registration. By Ext. P2, by a modification, instead of "solvency certificate or bank guarantee", "cash deposit" was substituted. It was so done since on the basis of experience and after review of the recommendation of the one man Commission, who was appointed to submit a report, it was felt that the solvency certificate ceased to be a reliable index of the financial soundness of the possessor and the land shown in the solvency certificate rarely fetch the value claimed by them. It was further intended to guard against further encumbrance on the property offered as security. It was further intended to guard against further encumbrance on the property offered as security. Cash deposit is a simple and more effective method. This is a policy decision. It was also contended that the fees and rates levied in the P.W.D. and other Departments were fixed long ago, and required revision. The Government appointed a Revenue Board member as a One Man Commission to study the various aspects involved in the matter in depth and submit recommendations to Government. The recommendations submitted by the Commission were examined in detail by the Government and Ext. P2 order was passed. It was issued after consideration of the various factors involved in the matter. Ext. P2 order was passed for preventing the misuse of the facility provided to the P.W.D. Contractors in carrying out the Civil works entrusted to them and to safeguard the interests of the Government. The upward revision of the price of tender forms, fee for registration of contractors and the rate of security etc., was made due to the general increase in prices on the basis of the recommendation of the One Man Commission. The change in the procedure cannot be attached as arbitrary or unfair. It is only a change in the policy of the Government to safeguard the interest of the Government more fruitfully. It was done due to administrative reasons. There is no discrimination. It is upto the Contractors to decide whether they are going to avail themselves the facility of being registered as P.W.D. Contractors. The opportunity is available to all citizens to enter into the contract. All persons who want to get themselves registered are treated alike. Art.14 and 19 of the Constitution are not violated. No person is excluded from the operation of Ext. P2 for taking up contracts in the departments under the State of Kerala. 7. On hearing the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the view that the attack against Ext. P2 is without force. The State has to attend to a variety of matters in its day-to-day administration. Most of the activities, to be attended to. have their impact on the economic and general activities of various institutions and the people of this country. It is only legitimate for the State to adjust its general affairs and economic policies geared to the best advantage of the community as a whole. Most of the activities, to be attended to. have their impact on the economic and general activities of various institutions and the people of this country. It is only legitimate for the State to adjust its general affairs and economic policies geared to the best advantage of the community as a whole. We have to bear in mind that in the matter of registration of contractors and the conditions governing registration, the State has to select the best and the well merited, for efficient, due and prompt performance, in the larger interests of the community as a whole. It is a matter of common knowledge that many of the projects, programmes and other works are being effectuated through award of contracts, to many persons and the amounts involved are very substantial. The stakes are very high. Many follow up actions or programmes depend upon the successful completion of the projects or programmes. The award of contracts to competent, well equipped, merited, worthy persons is necessary for the efficient and successful culmination thereof. It need hardly be stated that in the entire gamut, care and caution, to ensure economic and proper returns is necessary. The entire fabric from the beginning to end has its impact on the economic activity of the State and its citizens. In scrutinising the validity of Ext. P2 and the attack based on Art.14 and 19 of the Constitution, on such an economic oriented activity of the State, we have to bear in mind the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in R. K. Garg v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 2138) and the recent decision reported in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [ (1986) 4 SCC 566]. At page 605, para 34 of the later decision the Supreme Court observed as follows: "We had occasion to consider the scope of interference by the Court under Art.14 while dealing with laws relating to economic activities in R. K. Garg v. Union of India. We pointed out in that case that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. We pointed out in that case that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. We observed that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. We quoted with approval the following admonition given by Frank-further, J. in Morely v. Dond (354 US 457). In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct: When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability. What we said in that case in regard to legislation relating to economic matters must apply equally in regard to executive action in the field of economic activities, though the executive decision may not be placed on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment insofar as judicial deference is concerned. We must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is necessarily empitic and it is based on experimentation or what one may call 'trial and error method' and, therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any rigid 'a priori' considerations or on the application of any strait jacket formula. The Court must while adjudging the constitutional validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters grant a certain measure of freedom or 'play in the joints' to the executive. "The problem of government" as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Metropolis Theatre Co. v. State of Chicago (57 L Ed. 730) are practical ones and may justify, if they dp pot require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. "The problem of government" as pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States in Metropolis Theatre Co. v. State of Chicago (57 L Ed. 730) are practical ones and may justify, if they dp pot require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere. errors of government are not subject to pur judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void. The Government, as was said in Permian Basin Area Rate cases, is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The Court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or malafide " (emphasis supplied) It cannot admit of any doubt that the executive should have a certain amount of freedom and is entitled to make appropriate adjustments or make policy decisions to suit the particular circumstances or needs in order to fulfil its commitments necessarily involving "economic programmes or plans or activities." We shall examine the various points of attack in the above background. 8. It was first contended that Ext. P2 is illegal and arbitrary. The upward increase in the cost of tender forms, registration, earnest money and security deposit were attacked as arbitrary and unjustified. The insistence of cash deposit, instead of bank guarantee or solvency certificate, was attacked as uncalled for and unfair. There is. no force in these submissions. These changes were made based on the recommendations of the One Man Commission. The price of tender forms, registration fees and other conditions, were fixed long ago, as early as 1971. Times have changed since then. It is a matter of common knowledge that prices of all goods and commodities, service charges, salaries to personnel, establishment charges, managerial charges etc., have gone up since then, in certain cases, in alarming proportions. The pattern of life itself has undergone a vital change. The increase in the cost of tender forms, earnest money and security deposit were out of sheer necessity due to the general increase in prices of goods and commodities. The pattern of life itself has undergone a vital change. The increase in the cost of tender forms, earnest money and security deposit were out of sheer necessity due to the general increase in prices of goods and commodities. The cash deposit was insisted, instead of bank guarantee or solvency certificate, and the change in the procedure was a policy decision, to safeguard the interest of the Government and render the contracts more meaningful and effective. The State has pleaded that the Solvency Certificate ceased to be a reliable index of the financial soundness of the possessor and the land shown in the solvency certificate rarely fetch the value claimed by them. On these facts, we are unable to bold that the upward increase in the cost of tender forms, registration fees, earnest money and security deposit and also the insistence of the cash deposit, instead of bank guarantee or solvency certificate, were done arbitrarily. The cost of the tender forms, registration etc., should be commensurate with the increased cost, labour etc., and the security should be related to the performance of the contract. It cannot be doubted that over the years there is a general increase in prices of all goods and commodities and the revision of the price of tender forms, fees for registration etc., should reflect the increase in prices in general. We are also of the view trial on the basis of facts disclosed in these cases, the substitution, of a pre-qualification condition for registration of a Government Contractor from one of solvency certificate or bank guarantee, as a cash deposit, cannot be attacked as illegal, arbitrary or unreasonable. That all these steps were taken after deliberation, by appointing a very senior Officer (Member, Board of Revenue) as a One Man Commission and it is after considering his report, these changes were made, is not disputed. The steps were taken, not at the "ipse dixit" of the Government but after a close study of all aspects involved in the matter, is clear. It was argued that in Ext. P2, it is captioned as "measures to improve the receipts of the Government"; so, the upward revision in the price of tender forms, fee for registration of contractors etc., cannot be due to the general increase in prices as recommended by the One Man Commission. It was argued that in Ext. P2, it is captioned as "measures to improve the receipts of the Government"; so, the upward revision in the price of tender forms, fee for registration of contractors etc., cannot be due to the general increase in prices as recommended by the One Man Commission. So also, the insistence of cash deposit in the place of solvency certificate or bank guarantee was not as a measure for prompt execution or meaningful effectuation of the contract. There is no force in these submissions. The One Man Commission, who evaluated all aspects, recommended the changes made. That due to the long lapse of time since the earlier fixation of the prices of tender forms, fees etc., and the norms or guidelines for the registration or renewal of registration, the necessity to vary them to keep in conformity with the rise in prices, pattern of business or trade, life in general etc., would naturally have been adverted to or borne in mind in suggesting the reforms or changes. To bring the prices of the forms, charges, for registration etc. in tune with the rise in prices, and also to bring the earnest money and security deposit more pragmatic in changed conditions of life, it necessarily involved measures to improve the receipts of Government from these sources. It cannot be considered as a general levy-"a tax", as contended by the petitioners. On the other hand, these measures are only fair and necessary regulations, in public interest and serves a public purpose. We repel the contention to the contrary. 9. The second contention is that Ext. P2 on its own terms cannot be enforced till the Chief Engineer submits his proposals. It should be noted that Ext. P2 has only stated that the Chief Engineer should submit to Government necessary proposals for amending the relevant provision in the PWD. Code/Manual. The proposal of the Chief Engineer is not a condition precedent to enforce Ext. P2. The third argument that Ext. P2 applies only to PWD. Contractors and not to Forest Contractors and Abkari Contractors and so it is discriminatory and opposed to Art.14, is devoid of force. It is common ground that Ext. P2 applies to all PWD. Contractors. They form a distinct class. We are of the view that contractors other than PWD. P2. The third argument that Ext. P2 applies only to PWD. Contractors and not to Forest Contractors and Abkari Contractors and so it is discriminatory and opposed to Art.14, is devoid of force. It is common ground that Ext. P2 applies to all PWD. Contractors. They form a distinct class. We are of the view that contractors other than PWD. Contractors, functioning under different circumstances cannot be said to be of the same class of persons and we are of opinion that Ext. P2 is based on a reasonable classification. The Forest Contractors and Abkari Contractors function under different statutes and statutory orders and they cannot be said to be similarly situate in all respects like the PWD. Contractors. It cannot be said that Ext. P2 is discriminatory. No material was placed before us to show that all such contractors are similarly placed. The fourth point relates to the plea that Ext. P2 will apply only for registration and not for renewal. Every "renewal" implies, registration. In this view of the matter, the argument that Ext. P2 will not apply for renewal lacks force. The last and the fifth point, raised was that there is vast power to refuse renewal otherwise and the Government need not have gone to the extent of insisting cash deposit for the proper compliance of the works Entrusted to Contractors. We are not in the realms of wisdom but of legality. Ext. P2 is a policy decision The wisdom or policy of the legislature or the executive is not open to scrutiny unless the measure violates any one of the constitutional guarantees or is otherwise illegal. The sole question is whether Ext. P2 is competent% The fact that the Government have gone further than it ought to, or could have achieved the same purpose in some other method or in some other manner, is not for this court to evaluate or decide, especially in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. The sole question is whether the Government is competent to pass Ext. P2. We have no doubt in our mind that the Government is fully competent to pass Ext. P2 order. It does not violate any law. It does not militate against any constitutional guarantees. We repel the contention to the contrary and hold that the policy decision evidenced by Ext. P2. We have no doubt in our mind that the Government is fully competent to pass Ext. P2 order. It does not violate any law. It does not militate against any constitutional guarantees. We repel the contention to the contrary and hold that the policy decision evidenced by Ext. P2 cannot be said to be patently arbitrary or discriminatory or mala fide or otherwise illegal. 10. In the result, the attack against Ext. P2 fails. There is no merit in these Original Petitions. The O.Ps. are without force. They are dismissed with costs, including Advocate's fees in each case, which we fix at Rs. 250/-. O. P. No. 2705 of 1986 is dismissed, but without costs, since this O. P. is not admitted. 11. At the close of arguments, our attention was invited to G. O. Ms. No. 46/86/Pw & T dated 29-3-1986. By the said order, the Government have extended the time till 31-12-1986 for payment of cash deposit for registration of P.W.D. Contractors. No arguments was advanced nor any relief was prayed for on the basis of this G. O. We only record this aspect which came to our notice. The Original Petitions are dismissed with costs, as stated above.