Judgment A.N. Dikshita, J. 1. BY means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 11-11-1982 passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Bijnor, allowing the appeal preferred by respondent nos. 2 to 8 against the judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority dated 2 -2-1982 dismissing their application under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act (Act No. XIII of 1972) (hereinafter called the Act) and thus releasing the shop in their favour and granting six months' time to the petitioner to vacate it. 2. THE facts relevant to the instant controversy are that the petitioner is a tenant of a shop at Ghantaghar, Sadar Bazar, Bijnor, since 1955 wherein a retail cloth business is being run by him in the name and style of 'Fine Cloth House'. Prior to the petitioner this shop was occupied by one Evaz Ali who was doing betel and tobacoo business therefrom. THE shop was owned by one Ghasi Ram alias Ram Kumar (hereinafter called Ghasi Ram) who stayed at Saharanpur where he was in employment of a Cane Society. THE family of Ghasi Ram used to reside at Ambar Talab, Roorkee, the place of the residence of his in-laws. Ghasi Ram had an ancestral house situate in Mohalla Acharjan, Bijnor, where his brother Surendra Kumar, who was doing Arhat business, used to live while Ghasi Ram continued to stay at Saharanpur. Ghasi Ram expired in the district of Saharanpur sometime in the year 1972 leaving the respondent nos. 2 to 8 as his heirs. 3. THE landlords respondents nos. 2 to 8 filed an application under section 21 of the Act on 19-12-1977 before the Prescribed Authority, Bijnor, for the release of the shop which was in the tenancy and occupation of the petitioner on the ground that the said shop was required for the bona fide and genuine requirement of respondents nos. 3 and 4, Pradip Kumar and Dilip Kumar sons of Ghasi Ram. It was stated in the application filed under section 21 of the Act that Pradip Kumar, respondent no. 3 and 4, Pradip Kumar and Dilip Kumar sons of Ghasi Ram. It was stated in the application filed under section 21 of the Act that Pradip Kumar, respondent no. 3, was a student of 4th year in Shri Sanatak Ayurvedic College, Rohtak, Haryana, and would be eligible to practise in June 1979 and he required the shop in dispute for the purpose of opening a clinic. It was further stated that Dilip Kumar, respondent no. 4, who was appearing as a private candidate in the Intermediate Examination but being poor in studies he too intended to establish himself in some business from the said shop. This application which was filed as early as 19-12-1977 was got amended incorporating that Pradip Kumar who had been serving in the Government Hospital as an Intern would be completing his training on 22-6-1980. 4. THE petitioner filed a written statement and vehemently denied the averments as contained in the application for the release of the shop. It was categorically stated on behalf of the petitioner that the alleged need of the landlords was neither genuine nor bona fide as both Pradip Kumar and Dilip Kumar were permanently residing at Roorkee and in any case had no intention to settle at Bijnor nor do they propose to start any clinic or business in the shop in dispute. THE petitioner strenuously asserted that the respondents nos. 2 to 8 were interested in disposing of the property including the shop and were already having negotiations with some parties inclusive of Chaudhari Karan Singh of Jhalara and Chaudhari Shaukin Singh of Moghalpura. It was stated that the eviction of the petitioner was being sought to deliver vacant possession to the prospective purchaser which would fetch the respondents nos. 2 to 8 a higher price. Consequent to the amendment of the release application by respondents nos. 2 to 8 an additional written statement was filed by the petitioner. The averments after the amendment of the release application that Pradip Kumar was living in a rented house was denied and the petitioner alleged that Pradip Kumar was in fact residing with his uncle. The petitioner further alleged that respondents nos. 2 to 8 had already relinquished their share in favour of Surendra Kumar, brother of Ghasi Ram, and in view of this solitary fact it was clear that respondents nos. The petitioner further alleged that respondents nos. 2 to 8 had already relinquished their share in favour of Surendra Kumar, brother of Ghasi Ram, and in view of this solitary fact it was clear that respondents nos. 2 to 8 had no intention of permanently settling at Bijnor or opening a clinic or doing any business. It was further asserted on behalf of the petitioner that in fact Pradip Kumar genuinely intends to start medical practice with his maternal uncle, Dr. Chandra Prakash at Roorkee. 5. NECESSARY affidavits in support of the need of respondents nos. 2 to 8 were filed by Prakashwati, respondent no. 2 and Jag Mohan and Data Ram sworn as early as March 1978. Another affidavit in support of his bona fide need was filed by Pradip Kumar on 28-7-1980. 6. REPUDIATING the alleged bona fide and genuine requirement of respondents nos. 2 to 8 the petitioner filed his own affidavit and the affidavits of Surendra Kumar (betel seller), Khalil Ahmad and Ghulam Yazadani showing that the petitioner had earned a goodwill in the textile trade from the said shop. Dheer Singh Panwar, Shaukin Singh and Karan Singh also filed their affidavits on behalf of the petitioner decrying the requirement of respondents nos. 2 to 8 for the release of the shop in question and also highlighting the hardship that would be caused to the petitioner in case he was evicted from the shop in dispute. To castigate the alleged genuine requirement of respondents nos. 2 to 8 affidavits of Habibur Rahman, Pritam and Shri Krishna, Advocate, were filed on behalf of the petitioner to support his contention that respondents nos. 2 to 8 were proposing to dispose of and sell the shop in dispute and were actively negotiating for the finalisation of the transaction. The petitioner to supplement his allegation in regard to the proposal for the sale of the shop heavily relied upon a Mukhtarnama dated 14-10-1977 which was executed by respondents nos. 3 to 8 in favour of their mother Smt. Prakashwati, respondent no. 2. The petitioner relying on this document alleged that it evidenced the utter absence of any need much less a bonafide one of respondent nos. 2 to 8 for the said shop. 3 to 8 in favour of their mother Smt. Prakashwati, respondent no. 2. The petitioner relying on this document alleged that it evidenced the utter absence of any need much less a bonafide one of respondent nos. 2 to 8 for the said shop. It was further stated on behalf of the petitioner that during the pendency of the proceedings Pradip Kumar had opened a clinic in Civil Lines, Bijnor, which was inhabited by a number of doctors where they were running their clinics. The opening of this clinic by Pradip Kumar in Civil Lines, Bijnor was admitted by him but to out-wit this allegation it was submitted by him that as the locality was suitable only for specialised persons in medical profession he had put in an advertisement for the sale of this clinic. It was stated by Pradip Kumar that he was not flourishing in his profession in the area of Civil Lines, Bijnor and had compulsively shifted his clinic to Bokhara on the outskirts of the town sometime in December 1981 or January 1982 occupying there two shops. The Prescribed Authority vide his judgment and order dated 26-2-1982 dismissed the application for release. It was found by the Prescribed Authority that the need of Pradip Kumar was neither genuine nor bone fide. This conclusion was based in view of the fact that Pradip Kumar is still holding the possession of the clinic in Civil Lines known as Prakash Clinic and also two shops at Bokhara on the outskirts of the town. Initially advertisements were made by Pradip Kumar as regards the opening of the clinic with an intention to invite patients while later on advertisements were made in the papers for utilising the services of a doctor to run Prakash Clinic. The Prescribed Authority besides considering the above facts placed much reliance on the Mukhtarnama dated 14-10-1977 which authorised respondent no. 2 Smt. Prakashwati, mother of respondents nos. 3 to 8 to dispose of and sell the shop and do necessary formalities in respect thereof. Evidence which was filed in support of the negotiations ensued between Smt. Prakashwati and the prospective purchasers or the Intermediaries was also considered by the Prescribed Authority and thereby finding that the need of the respondents to establish Pradip Kumar in the disputed shop was not at all genuine while it smacks of some ulterior motive. Evidence which was filed in support of the negotiations ensued between Smt. Prakashwati and the prospective purchasers or the Intermediaries was also considered by the Prescribed Authority and thereby finding that the need of the respondents to establish Pradip Kumar in the disputed shop was not at all genuine while it smacks of some ulterior motive. The filing of the release application on 19-12-1977 within two months of the execution of the Mukhtarnama was found to be highly motivated and the allegation of the petitioner that the shop is being sought to be vacated only to fetch higher price after giving vacant possession to the prospective purchaser was found credible. No evidence was filed to support that Dilip Kumar wants to set up some business in the shop in question, and moreso in view of the fact that he is residing at Roorkee. The need of Pradip Kumar was thus found to be neither genuine nor bona fide by the Prescribed Authority. As regards the comparative hardship the Prescribed Authority found that irreparable hardship would be caused to the tenant (petitioner) in view of a significant fact that he is in possession of the shop where from he is transacting business for the last 22 years. The shop being the only bread giver of the tenant (petitioner) would cause him great hardship in case he is evicted therefrom. As regards the hardship that may be caused to respondents nos. 2 to 8 in denying Pradip Kumar the fruits of this shop it was found that as Pradip Kumar is already having two shops on the outskirts of the Town near Bukhara outpost and as such the hardship to the petitioner would be greater. The Prescribed Authority finally found the need of respondents nos. 2 to 8 to establish Pradip Kumar to be neither genuine nor bona fide. On the other hand it was also found by the Prescribed Authority that respondents nos. 2 to 8 intend to sell the shop at a higher price on seeking the eviction of the tenant (petitioner) for delivering the vacant possession. The application under section 21 of the Act was thus rejected vide judgment and order dated 26-2-1982. 7. FEELING aggrieved against the judgment and order dated 26-2-1982 respondents nos. 2 to 8 preferred an appeal to the Court of District Judge, Bijnor, as contemplated under section 22 of the Act. The application under section 21 of the Act was thus rejected vide judgment and order dated 26-2-1982. 7. FEELING aggrieved against the judgment and order dated 26-2-1982 respondents nos. 2 to 8 preferred an appeal to the Court of District Judge, Bijnor, as contemplated under section 22 of the Act. The appeal was transferred to the Court of 1st Additional District Judge for disposal according to law who by his judgment and order dated 11-11-1982 allowed the appeal setting aside the judgment and order passed by the Prescribed Authority. While disposing of the appeal respondent no. 1 found the need of Pradip Kumar to be genuine and bona fide and in view of the fact that comparative hardship would be caused more to respondents nos. 2 to 8 in case the application is not allowed while comparing it with that of the petitioner who may acquire a shop elsewhere being a man of status and paying income tax and can start his business by even paying higher rent. The application for the release of the said shop was thus allowed. The tenant was, however, allowed to vacate the disputed shop within a period of six months with a direction to hand over actual and peaceful physical possession of the said shop to the respondents failing which he (tenant-petitioner) shall be evicted by the court at his costs. 8. THE petitioner has preferred this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing the judgment and order dated 11-11-1982 passed by respondent no. 1 by which the appeal preferred by respondents nos. 2 to 8 was allowed and the judgment and order dated 26-2-1982 passed by the Prescribed Authority was set aside and the shop in question was released in favour of respondents nos. 2 to 8. A counter-affidavit by one Sri H. B. Gupta, husband of respondent no. 5, has been filed stating therein that he is competent to file this affidavit as he has been doing Pairvi on behalf of respondents nos. 2 to 8 in the above writ petition. It has been admitted on behalf of respondents nos. 2 to 8 that Ghasi Ram was working as Recovery Officer at Roorkee, Saharanpur, in the Cane Department and that he died in 1972. 2 to 8 in the above writ petition. It has been admitted on behalf of respondents nos. 2 to 8 that Ghasi Ram was working as Recovery Officer at Roorkee, Saharanpur, in the Cane Department and that he died in 1972. The allegation of the petitioner in respect of the settling of the shop to some other person for a higher consideration by respondents nos. 2 to 8 has been denied but the occupation of a shop in Civil Lines, Bijnor, by Pradip Kumar has not been denied. Further it is also admitted on behalf of respondents nos. 2 to 8 that Pradip Kumar has two shops on the outskirts of Bijnor near Bokhara outpost. The shop in Civil Lines had to be vacated as it was carrying a heavy rent which was beyond the means of Pradip Kumar. As regards the shop in village Bokhara it was stated that it was unsuitable for medical profession as Bokhara was a small village and the villagers go to the doctors in Bijnor town. It has been reiterated that Ayurvedic degree is regarded as a technical education and not a professional one as erroneously alleged by the petitioner. A supplementary counter-affidavit was filed by Sri H. B. Gupta on behalf of respondents nos. 2 to 8. In the supplementary counter-affidavit it has been stated that respondent no. 4 Dilip Kumar has now obtained a diploma in Engineering in the year 1981. Having obtained diploma Dilip Kumar too wants to start his own business in the shop in dispute. As regards the shop in possession of Pradip Kumar near village Bokhara it has been stated that a notice dated 19-3-1983 (Annexure 2 to supplementary counter-affidavit) for his ejectment has been served on Pradip Kumar by the landlord of the shop Sri Munnu Singh. In view of the likely eviction from the shop in village Bukhara no other place would be available. This affidavit was filed on 21-5-1983. Another affidavit has been filed by Pradip Kumar, respondent no. 3, on behalf of respondents nos. 2 to 8 on 8-10-1985. In the affidavit filed by Pradip Kumar it has been stated that a ration card was got prepared in his name on 15-4-1983 while the other respondents got their ration cards on 6-8-1984. A gas connection was also obtained on 17-11-1984. The family pension payable to Smt. Prakashwati, respondent no. 2 to 8 on 8-10-1985. In the affidavit filed by Pradip Kumar it has been stated that a ration card was got prepared in his name on 15-4-1983 while the other respondents got their ration cards on 6-8-1984. A gas connection was also obtained on 17-11-1984. The family pension payable to Smt. Prakashwati, respondent no. 2, is also being paid by the Treasury at Bijnor. All these facts stated in para 2 of the affidavit filed by Pradip Kumar are to the effect that they have intention to reside at Bijnor. In para 3 of this affidavit Pradip Kumar has admitted that he is doing retail and wholesale medical business of Chemist and Druggists in the name and style of Doctors Medical Stores, Bijnor. It is thus stated that an ordinary person cannot get retail licence to sell medicines which is granted to technical hand and registered pharmacists. Respondent no. 3 is a qualified registered Pharmacist from Madhya Pradesh Government. A rejoinder-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner on 18-11-1985 in reply to the counter-affidavit filed by Sri H. B. Gupta, the supplementary-counter-affidavit filed by Sri H. B. Gupta and the affidavit of Pradip Kumar. All the allegations as contained in the affidavits filed on behalf of respondents nos. 2 to 8 have been denied. It has further been stated on behalf of the petitioner that respondents nos. 2 to 8 have two shops which have been converted into one by removing the partition wall. Another fact which could not see the light of the day during the proceedings before the respondent no. 1 is that respondent no. 3 has opened a Chemist and Druggists shop in the name and style of Doctor's Medical Store in Civil Lines, Bijnor which is situated in a very suitable area as other Chemists and Druggists shops, Clinics and Nursing homes are existing in the same vicinity and quite close to a Government Hospital which is under construction. Annexure I to this rejoinder-affidavit is a photostat copy showing the name of respondent no. 3 as well as the names of the other Chemists and Druggists shops. This shop is in between the two shops of medical practitioners. 9. AN application supported by an affidavit was again filed on behalf of the petitioner, a copy whereof was served on Sri Jagdish Prasad, clerk of Sri Virendra Singh, Advocate. 3 as well as the names of the other Chemists and Druggists shops. This shop is in between the two shops of medical practitioners. 9. AN application supported by an affidavit was again filed on behalf of the petitioner, a copy whereof was served on Sri Jagdish Prasad, clerk of Sri Virendra Singh, Advocate. The main plank on which this application has been filed is that on 10-11-1982 Sri G. S. N. Tripathi, 1st Additional District Judge, Bijnor, had no jurisdiction to hear the case and to deliver the judgment and order dated 11-11-1982 allowing the appeal. It is stated that Sri G. S. N. Tripathi had become Special Judge vide notification dated 12-10-1982 and in consequence thereof he took over as Special Judge on 23-10-1982. The court of 1st Additional District Judge, Bijnor, on the appointment of Sri G. S. N. Tripathi as Special Judge became vacant. However, on 23-11-1982 the District Judge, Bijnor, transferred the pending work of the vacant court of 1st Additional District Judge, Bijnor, to the court of Special Judge, Bijnor, presided over by Sri G. S. N. Tripathi. it is thus stated on behalf of the petitioner in the affidavit that Sri G. S. N. Tripathi, was only a Special Judge and not the 1st Additional District Judge between 23-10-1982 and 23-11-1982 while the appeal was heard on 10-11-1982 and the judgment delivered on 11-11-1982. No counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents nos. 2 to 8 to this affidavit inspite of service of a copy thereof. 10. LEARNED counsel for the parties have been heard at length on more than one occasion. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that the judgment and order passed by respondent no. 1 is patently illegal and suffers from apparent error on the face of the record inasmuch as the application of the provisions of the Act have not been correctly done. It has been submitted that respondent no. 1 misconstrued the provisions of Rule 16 (2) (d) of the Rules framed under the Act. The findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority have been upset and reversed in a very sketchy manner without the appreciation of the facts and such a conclusion arrived at by respondent no. 1 would be only perverse. Respondent no. 1 did not exercise a judicial approach in setting aside the judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority. The findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority have been upset and reversed in a very sketchy manner without the appreciation of the facts and such a conclusion arrived at by respondent no. 1 would be only perverse. Respondent no. 1 did not exercise a judicial approach in setting aside the judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority. Further the documents relied upon by the petitioner in regard to the sale of the premises in dispute have been set at naught without any cogent reasons. The plea of the petitioner that respondents nos. 2 to 8 had no intention to reside at Bijnor or to do any business or pursue any profession has not been properly dealt with. The need for starting a clinic was found to be genuine by respondent no. 1 singularly on the allegation that respondent no. 3 has started a clinic elsewhere and as such he has a right to start the same in his own house. As regards the comparative hardship which would be caused to the parties, respondent no. 1 had summarily come to a conclusion that the petitioner being a man of status paying income tax could seek accommodation elsewhere to run his cloth business. Learned counsel for the respondents nos. 2 to 8 strenuously submitted that the findings recorded by respondent no. 1 as regards the bonafide need as well as comparative hardship are findings of fact and do not require any consideration by this Court. Learned counsel has further laid stress on the fact that in view of the provisions of rule 16 (2) (d) respondent no. 1 was within his competence to give due consideration to the need in view of the fact that respondent no. 3 had completed his medical education and the provisions of rule 16 (2) (d) would be applicable. Subsequent facts in the opening of the Chemists and Druggists shop have been admitted and it has been justified that respondent no. 3 is sincerely pursuing the profession and has every intention to reside at Bijnor. 11. AFTER hearing learned counsel for the petitioner and the vehemence with which the legality of the order passed by respondent no. Subsequent facts in the opening of the Chemists and Druggists shop have been admitted and it has been justified that respondent no. 3 is sincerely pursuing the profession and has every intention to reside at Bijnor. 11. AFTER hearing learned counsel for the petitioner and the vehemence with which the legality of the order passed by respondent no. 1 has been maintained by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents I have no doubt in my mind as regards the applicability of rule 16 (2) (d) in the instant case which have not been correctly applied by respondent no. 1. Rule 16 (2) (d) for a better appreciation is reproduced below : "(d) where a son or unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter or daughter of a male lineal descendant of the landlord has, after the building was originally let out, completed his or her technical education and is not employed in Government service, and wants to engage in self employment, his or her need shall be given due consideration." A bare reading of this rule would clearly reveal that it was enjoined for the purposes of a person or his heirs who had completed his technical education. Such completion of technical education shall be consequent to the letting out of the building. It was on the completion of such technical education that the rule provides that such person is not employed in Government service and wants to engage in self employment. These two aspects must be primarily satisfied whereafter the rule provides that the need shall be given due consideration. Unless either of the conditions as enjoined in this rule is not satisfied the question of giving any due consideration would not arise. In the instant case neither of these two conditions as postulated in this rule are satisfied and as such giving of due consideration would not arise. Respondent no. 3 at the time when the application under section 21 of the Act was filed was studying in the Medical (Ayurvedic) College. Such an essential of the words "completed his or her technical education" was thus wanting. No doubt an amendment was made consequently but this aspect was not considered by respondent no. 1 satisfactorily. Secondly medical education would not come within the ambit of the words technical education. The medical profession which respondent no. Such an essential of the words "completed his or her technical education" was thus wanting. No doubt an amendment was made consequently but this aspect was not considered by respondent no. 1 satisfactorily. Secondly medical education would not come within the ambit of the words technical education. The medical profession which respondent no. 3 wanted to pursue would not be attracted or be synonymous with the word technical. Medical education and technical education are wholly different. In Webster's Dictionary (Unabridged) the word 'medical' means as under : " 1. Pertaining to or employed in the Science, study or practice of medicines, or the art of healing diseases. 2. Medicinal ; as, the medical properties of a plant (rare). Similarly the word 'technical' in the said dictionary means : " 1. Having to do with the practical, industrial, or mechanical arts or the applied Sciences; as, technical schools offer courses in welding engineering etc. A medical examiner in this dictionary means : " (a) A corner or similar public officer ; (b) A physician who examines applicants for life insurance. " Further 'doctor' as per this dictionary means : "a physician or surgeon, a person licensed to practice any of the healing arts, as an osteopath, a witchdoctor or medicine man." A clinic has been explained in this dictionary as : "a place where patients are studied or treated by physicians specialising in various ailments and practising as a group ; as a cancer clinic, a tuberculosis clinic. The dispensary or out patient department of a hospital or medical school where patients are treated free or for a small fee." Applying and co-relating the meaning of these words it is clear that medical education is completely at variance with technical education. Respondent no, 3 being a medical practitioner or a doctor is as such not a person who may be called a technician or on completion of his medical education may be deemed to have completed his technical education. Respondent no. 1 erred in law in giving due consideration in respect of the need of respondent no. 3 for opening a clinic disregarding that more than 3 shops are available with the respondent no. 3. 12. DURING the pendency of the case before respondent no. 1 as well as during the pendency of this petition certain new facts have cropped up which require consideration. 3 for opening a clinic disregarding that more than 3 shops are available with the respondent no. 3. 12. DURING the pendency of the case before respondent no. 1 as well as during the pendency of this petition certain new facts have cropped up which require consideration. Catena of decisions are to the effect that subsequent events which have arisen require adequate consideration. Similar view was expressed in Smt. Jai Devi v. 6th Addl. District Judge, 1985 (2) ARC 549. As new facts have been brought before this court it would be appropriate that such facts are examined afresh. Respondent no. 3 has admittedly opened a Chemists and Druggists shop. Other shops are also available with him. The need of a clinic or that of a business by opening a Chemists and Druggists shop stands satisfied. However, it is necessary that this aspect that the need stands satisfied also requires consideration. In the case of Gautam Chand Jain v. Smt. Sushila Kumari, 1985 (2) ARC 259 the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that in view of the landlords having in possession various shops in the town for housing a clinic their need would stand satisfied. The intention of the Legislature was to provide an umbrella of protection to tenants against their frivolous evictions from the accommodations in their tenancy and occupation. Such a protection cannot be lightly removed when the Prescribed Authority found the need of respondent no. 3 for opening a clinic as neither bona fide nor genuine. Admittedly a tenant cannot be evicted on the mere ipse dixit of a landlord. In permitting a tenant to be thrown at the mercy of the landlord the very intention of the statute would thus stand frustrated. As regards the comparative hardship that would be caused to the petitioner in case the application is allowed, suffice it to say that the conclusions drawn by respondent no. 1 are wholly erroneous and without consideration of material facts on record. The Prescribed Authority rightly came to the conclusion that greater hardship would be caused to the petitioner in case he was evicted from the shop in question. However, respondent no. 1 are wholly erroneous and without consideration of material facts on record. The Prescribed Authority rightly came to the conclusion that greater hardship would be caused to the petitioner in case he was evicted from the shop in question. However, respondent no. 1 came to the conclusion that merely because a tenant is paying income tax and as such would be deemed to be a man of status positioning himself to occupy any other accommodation is nothing but conjecture divorced from the relevant record showing that the petitioner can occupy any other shop in the town. It would have been more appropriate had the relevant material been examined by respondent no. 1 as regards the extent of business carried on by the petitioner, the good will that has been earned by him, the financial loss that may be caused by shifting from the shop in dispute, the amount of credit in which sales of cloth were made, the likelihood of the return of such amounts are all material facts requiring consideration. 13. AS regards the plea of jurisdiction raised on behalf of the petitioner I do not propose to express any opinion on this point for the simple reason that I propose to remand the case and even if there was lack of jurisdiction on the part of 1st Additional District Judge, Bijnor, this time, I hope it will be cured. 14. BEFORE parting with this case it is made clear that respondent no. 1 or the Prescribed Authority, in case respondent no. 1 further sends the case to Prescribed Authority, should examine the bonafide need of respondent no. 3 for opening a clinic as well as the comparative hardship that would be caused to the petitioner in case he is evicted therefrom. No other point was urged or canvassed before me except in regard to the need of respondent no. 3 for opening a clinic or in regard to the comparative hardship that may be caused to the petitioner. 15. IN view of the above discussion the petition succeeds and deserves to be allowed. 16. IN the result the petition is allowed with costs, the judgment and order dated 11-11-1982 passed by respondent no. 1 is quashed and the case is remanded back to respondent no. 1 for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made above as well as the provisions of law. 16. IN the result the petition is allowed with costs, the judgment and order dated 11-11-1982 passed by respondent no. 1 is quashed and the case is remanded back to respondent no. 1 for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made above as well as the provisions of law. However, in case respondent no. 1 finds that it would be appropriate to have a thorough probe he should further remand the case to the Prescribed Authority for consideration of the facts and material as existing on record afresh. A Commissioner may also be appointed to find out the extent of accommodation and the nature of business carried on by the parties. Petition allowed.