JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Does a member of the Executive Council of the University elected by its Court under Cl. (f) of S. 20 of State Universities Act (hereinafter referred to as Act) retain his seat after expiry of three years mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 till his successor is appointed by virtue of sub- sec. (2) of S. 65 of the Act is the question which has been debated in this petition at some length. 2. Executive council is one of the authorities of the University mentioned in S. 19. Under S. 20 it consists of Vice- Chancellor, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, if any, two Deens by rotation, few selected members, four elected members of Court and four nominated members of academic eminence. Term of Deens and selected members is one year, of elected members 3 years and nominated members 2 years. Term of member of the Executive council representing Court under Cl. (f) comes to an end after expiry of three years. It was probably for this reason that petitioner who was elected by the Court as one of the four representatives in its first meeting held on 13th March, 1983 was not given intimation of the Executive council meeting which was fixed in April, 1986. On coming to know of this petitioner approached this Court for directing to opposite parties to treat him as a member of Executive council till his successor was appointed. Claim of petitioner is that action of opposite party was illegal as his successor has not been appointed till now. For this reliance was placed on sub- sec. (2) of S. 65 of the Act, which for better appreciation is extracted below : "65(1) Any casual vacancy among the members, other than ex officio members of any authority or body of the University shall be filled in the same manner in which the members whose vacancy is to be filled up was chosen, and the person filling the vacancy shall be a member of such authority or body for the residue of the term for which the person whose place he fills would have been a member. (2) A person, who is a member of an authority of the University as a representative of another body, whether of the University or outside, shall retain his seat on such authority for so long as he continues to be the representative of such body and thereafter till his successor is duly appointed." It permits a person to retain his seat on an authority of the University as representative member of another body so long he continues to be representative of that body and thereafter till the appointment of his successor. Therefore, one should he (i) a member of an authority of University (ii) he should be representative of another body (iii) and he should continue to be representative of that body to get benefit of this section to continue to retain his seat even beyond the period of his membership and till the appointment of his successor. By virtue of this sub-section, therefore, a member satisfying the conditions mentioned in it continues to retain his seat even after expiry of his term if his successor has not been appointed. It is not an extension of term which comes to an end after period mentioned in sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 but continuance for avoiding any break or absence of representation. That a member of the Executive council of Cl. (f) of S. 20 of the Act satisfies all the requirements cannot be seriously disputed as by virtue of being a member of Executive Council he is a member of an `authority' of the University. Since he is elected from amongst various members of the Court to represent them he is a representative in the authority of another body. Therefore, a plain reading of section presents no difficulty in coming to conclusion that since petitioner was a member of the Executive Council as representative of the Court he was and is entitled to retain his seat not only till March. 1986 but thereafter till his successor was or is appointed. 3. Problem, however, has arisen as it is part of S. 65 which deals with casual vacancies. Emphasis through various facts highlighted by learned senior counsel for University was to confine scope of this sub-section also to the field covered by sub-sec. (1). Prior to adverting to them it may be examined if its scope is circumscribed by its placement in a section which deals with a particular situation. Emphasis through various facts highlighted by learned senior counsel for University was to confine scope of this sub-section also to the field covered by sub-sec. (1). Prior to adverting to them it may be examined if its scope is circumscribed by its placement in a section which deals with a particular situation. Sub-section has already been extracted earlier. It provides the manner for filling up of casual vacancies and limits its period to the residue of the term. But there is nothing in it expressly or impliedly to connect it with sub-sec. (2). Scope of both is different. They operate in different field. One deals with manner of filling casual vacancy of any member representative or otherwise whereas the other with representative members of another body. Former limits the period of casual member to residue of the term. Latter permits retention of seat till appointment of successor. Sub- sec. (1) like sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 fixes the term of a casual member. Whereafter operation or sub-sec. (1) of S. 65 and sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 comes to an end. Normally, a sub-section has to be read as part of the section and its meaning should be called out by reading section in its entirety. But circumstances may negative it. Or by doing so the objective or purpose of its enactment may be defeated. Therefore, mere placement of sub-sec. (2) as part of S. 65 in absence of any other indication cannot by itself result in holding that it deals with casual vacancies only. Principal reason to disagree with such construction is the unusual consequence of limiting the term of member under sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 to the period specified but extending the same beyond residue of term for members coming in place of casual vacancies. Any interpretation or construction in absence of express words leading to starting (startling) results has to be avoided. No rationale which would lead to extension of term of casual member and limiting it to regular member could be put forward. Section 65 is one of the sections in Chapter XIII which deals with Misc. Matters. Purpose of the chapter is to provide for matters which could not be dealt with in other chapter either because it could not be provided or because instead of appending a proviso or explanation to every section it is incorporated at one place to apply to all. Matters. Purpose of the chapter is to provide for matters which could not be dealt with in other chapter either because it could not be provided or because instead of appending a proviso or explanation to every section it is incorporated at one place to apply to all. Various sections of the Chapter illustrate it fully. Section 65(1) is illustration of latter. That is, it is a provision which applies to any and every situation contemplated in it. It applies to any vacancy occurring in any authority or body of the University. In other words, it is of general application. Similarly sub-section (2) extends the term of every representative member till appointment of successor. It incorporates principle of continuity of representative member, normally essential in elective offices. In absence of it many of the authorities, may at times be reduced to official members only. It stands illustrated by Statutes 4.13 framed by the University which fixes term of a member of Court to three years from the date of first meeting takes place. If the election of the Court is delayed or its first meeting does not take place for long then it may cease to have its representative on the Executive Council. For instance, last election of Court took place in April, 1982. But its first meeting was held in March, 1983, that is nearly after one year. In absence of sub-section (2) the functioning of Executive Council could have been without representative of the Court. That surely could not be legislative intent. A construction which defeats the objective of representation of various bodies on an authority of the university due to the chance of delay in elections of the body, not unusual these days, has to be avoided. In absence of explicit language if narrower construction of provision results in strange consequences, which is avoided by giving it wider construction than the latter should be adopted. It can be legitimately urged, as it was, that language being clear the Court should refrain from swelling in the intention and must confine to the apparent meaning. Principle cannot be disputed provided the language leaves no room for doubt. The sub- section does not even remotely manifest any interrelation between two sub-sections like sub-secs. (2) to (5) of S. 68A or sub-sec. (2) of S. 70. No word or expression has been used in sub-sec. Principle cannot be disputed provided the language leaves no room for doubt. The sub- section does not even remotely manifest any interrelation between two sub-sections like sub-secs. (2) to (5) of S. 68A or sub-sec. (2) of S. 70. No word or expression has been used in sub-sec. (2) which could establish its link with sub-sec. (1). For accepting argument of learned counsel for University the word casual shall have to be read before the word member in sub-sec. (2). Such course is permissible if the language is ambiguous. And not to narrow down a section. The two sub-sections appear to have been put together for one reason that they deal with continuity sub-sec. (1) by providing for continuance for the residue of terms of casual vacancy and sub-sec. (2) till appointment of successor. In facts it is in nature of independent section which has been put as sub-sec. (2) may be because it existed at same place in the earlier Act. In State of Orissa v. Debaki Devi, AIR 1964 SC 1413 . even provision since it did not refer to principal clause and the language was of general application. (See also Commr. of Income-tax v. P. Krishna, AIR 1965 SC 59 . And as said earlier if the sub-section is read as independent provision extending term of all representative members of a body or authority till appointment of successor then it not only avoids incongruity of giving this benefit to those who come in casual vacancy and denying to what may be described as full time members but also has the advantage of providing for continuity of representative members. The contention is also strengthened by S. 25 which by Act 5 of 1977 provided that term of members of Academic council shall be subject to S. 65. It dispels any doubt if there was any that legislature treats S. 65 as of general application and not confined to casual vacancy only. 4. Much was attempted to be made out of the word representatives used in sub-section and stretching it to be a technical word confined to limited class such as mentioned in S. 22, ignoring that no such word has been used in sub-sec. (1) even. If the word representative is understood as technical word which can apply to those members only such as are specifically described as representative member in S. 22 then sub-sec. (1) even. If the word representative is understood as technical word which can apply to those members only such as are specifically described as representative member in S. 22 then sub-sec. (2) shall be rendered surplusage. It would not apply to any member of Executive Council, Academic Council or any other authority. If on the other hand the word is understood in its ordinary meaning then it applies to all members who are sent to represent a body on an authority of the University. 5. Another effort to correlate sub-sec. (2) with sub-sec. (1) was by submitting that continuity contemplated is of the intervening period, between ceasure of a representative member and filling of casual vacancy. Fallacy in this argument appears to be twofold one the Legislative has not used the word cease in sub-sec. (2). Then a member who has ceased to be a member either by death or resignation etc. cannot continue till his successor is appointed. That would be unnatural and artificial construction of the section. Continuance till appointment of successor would apply to that member who has come in to fill the casual vacancy. Concept of ceasure and, continuance has to be rejected also because continuance is permitted by sub- sec. (2) till appointment of successor only of a member who has continued to be representative. Once a member ceases to be representative for whatever reason the sub-section cannot apply. It visualises continuance for the term, full or residue and then by fiction till appointment of successor. 6. Emphasis on outer limit fixed by sub-sec. (2) of S. 20 and omission of a provision or explanation extending it has no merit for reasons already explained. Assistance sought from S. 20(3) which limits the term of a member of Executive Council to two terms does not appear to be relevant. Continuance till appointment of successor is not altering the period fixed by sub-sec. (2) of S. 20, nor it is extending the term from two to three. 7. Reliance was also placed on word `his' used in sub-section. It was urged that it indicated that provision could apply only to a person who has filled in a casual vacancy. How the word `his' can result in reaching to this conclusion is not clear. It cannot relate to a person or a member mentioned in S. 65 only. 7. Reliance was also placed on word `his' used in sub-section. It was urged that it indicated that provision could apply only to a person who has filled in a casual vacancy. How the word `his' can result in reaching to this conclusion is not clear. It cannot relate to a person or a member mentioned in S. 65 only. If it applies to S. 65(1) there is no reason not to extend its application to persons mentioned in S. 20. 8. Various English decisions were cited in support of the submission that since heading of a section was its index and preamble the sub-sec. (2) must be construed in its light to apply to casual vacancy only. On principle there could hardly be any dispute. It appears to be fairly settled as well. But no rule of construction or interpretation can override the fundamental principle of plain reading. Even in Inglis v. Robertson and Baxter, (1898) AC 616 described as the classic case on the subject Lord Watson held S. 3 dealt with mercentile agents because it was not in a statute which contemplated an alteration of general law with regard to contracts of pledge in Scotland. That is his Lordship was persuaded to cut down the language of general applicability because of general law of the land. Further Ss. 2 to 7 of the Act came under the heading `Disposition by Mercantile Agents'. Section 2 created a fiction and deemed a sale, disposition or pledge by a mercantile agent as valid if he was in possession of goods or documents of title with consent of the owner. Section 3 provided that a pledge of the documents of title to goods shall be deemed to be a pledge of goods. A bare perusal indicates that S. 3 in the context was dealing with what had been dealt with in S. 2, namely disposition of goods by mercantile agents. It was only to such disposition that it was to be deemed to be of goods. Lord Herschell on whose observations entire argument was built ruled out applicability of S. 3 on facts. It was only to such disposition that it was to be deemed to be of goods. Lord Herschell on whose observations entire argument was built ruled out applicability of S. 3 on facts. His Lordship rejected the argument that S. 3 applied to all disposition not only because it was a group of sections headed as Mercantile Agents' while it has to be taken into account but because the Legislative intention as discussed was to confine the section to mercantile agents only. Similarly corporation of City of Toranto v. Toranto Rly. Co. (1907) AC 315 is of no assistance as the principle of construing the heading as giving key to the interpretation was followed as it was consistent with the language of the words in the section which was for consideration. In Martins v. Fowler, 1926 AC 746 also their Lordships found the construction of the section was consistent with its heading. In all these decisions the Court construed the section on its language or setting and found it supported by the heading as well. They do not throw any light on a situation where legislative intent discerned from plain and clear language of a sub-section stands whittled by the heading. Wider meaning having advantage of bringing uniformity and extending applicability both to casual and regular vacancy cannot be cut down by adding some words in the sub-section whose meaning otherwise appears to be unambiguous only because of heading of section. 9. Merits apart two submissions more in nature of preliminary objection were advanced one relating to entertainability of this petition in view of remedy of reference to Chancellor under S. 68 and other to hearing and deciding as fresh election had taken place on 16th July. For both few facts are necessary to be mentioned. When petitioner did not receive any intimation of the meeting held in April 1986 he presented this petition in person at residence before a Bench of which one of us (R.M. Sahai, J.) was a member as members of Bar were on strike. Since intimation for moving the petition had already been given the Registrar of the University was present. The petitioner pressed for interim order. It was urged by him that in view of S. 66 his participation would not render proceedings invalid even if it was ultimately held that he could not retain his seat after March 1986. Since intimation for moving the petition had already been given the Registrar of the University was present. The petitioner pressed for interim order. It was urged by him that in view of S. 66 his participation would not render proceedings invalid even if it was ultimately held that he could not retain his seat after March 1986. It was opposed by the University. Matter appeared to be urgent. The Bench, therefore, wanted to know if the meeting may be adjourned. The Registrar took leave, went to the University and stated on return that meeting was being adjourned. Therefore, the University was granted three days' time to file counter-affidavit. On next day the legal Assistant of the University appeared. He stated that Registrar was out of station. He however, filed a written submission in nature of comments on the petition instead of counter-affidavit raising mainly availability of alternative remedy of approaching the Chancellor. Considering that meeting had been adjourned the Bench directed petitioner to approach the Chancellor along with written submission of University within three days and fixed the case after three weeks on 19th May, expecting the reference to be disposed of in meantime. By the time the petition was listed the members of Bar had called off the strike. But due to rush of work it could not be taken up although affidavits had been exchanged. When petition was listed in July after vacations the reference had not been decided by the Chancellor. On the other hand some of the counsel made mention that some of the teachers who had been recommended for being appointed as professors were likely to suffer great hardship if this petition is not decided and the meeting of Executive Council is not held before 1st week of August. We, therefore, asked the learned senior counsel of the University to convey the University that since there was no stay order the meeting of the Executive Council may be held. In the meantime the petition was also taken up. If in these circumstances the petition is not decided immediately the petitioner shall be deprived of this right to participate in the meeting and the Court shall be deprived of its representatives. Availability of alternative remedy, therefore, or even its availing cannot deprive petitioner from getting an adjudication from the Court specially when petition after lapse of few months may become infructuous. 10. Availability of alternative remedy, therefore, or even its availing cannot deprive petitioner from getting an adjudication from the Court specially when petition after lapse of few months may become infructuous. 10. As regards second objection the election of Court took place on 17th July, 1986. But its term commences under statute 4.13 from first meeting held by it. That admittedly has not taken place. Nor anything has been brought on record which may indicate that it is likely to take place in near future. For previous term election took place in April 1982 and the first meeting in March 1983 that is nearly after one year. To say, therefore, that petition has become infructuous or academic is not correct. 11. For reasons stated above this petition succeeds and is allowed. A direction is issued to opposite parties to treat petitioner as a member of the Executive Council till his successor is appointed.