Judgment :- 1. The civil revision petition has been filed by the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 302 of 1983 challenging the order of the court below refusing amendment to the plaint. 2. I shall refer to such allegations are relevant to the present purpose. The respondent is in occupation of the plaint schedule property, which is the ground floor of a double-storeyed building, with its appurtenant land. This property originally belonged to one Datta Shetty, the husband of the revision-petitioner. Datta Shelly died in April 1980. Petitioners are the legal heirs of deceased Datta Shetty. After the death of Datta Shetty petitioners filed a rent control petition for eviction of the respondent. The respondent contended that she was not a building tenant and was a mortgagee in possession as per an agreement executed by deceased Datta Shetty on 5-5-1977 and that the agreement was for a period of 5 years. The Rent Control Court dismissed the eviction petition. The petitioners preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority challenging the order of the Rent Control Court. That R. C. A. was dismissed on the ground that the respondent was in possession of the building under a mortgage and that the period of mortgage has not expired. The revision-petitioners waited for the expiry of 5 years and filed the present suit. In the plaint the nature of rights of both parties are mentioned and the suit is styled as a suit for redemption of mortgage. The respondent filed written statement and contended that the mortgage sought to be redeemed by the plaintiffs is only a unregistered agreement and not a mortgage at all, and therefore a suit for redemption would not lie. Both parties adduced evidence in the case and the case was taken up finally for disposal. Meanwhile the plaintiffs filed application for amendment of the plaint to convert the suit to one for recovery of possession on the strength of title. This application was dismissed by the court below. 3. The learned counsel for the revision - petitioner contended that the suit in effect was for recovery of possession of the property held by the defendant and a suit for redemption was filed only because the defendant claimed that she was a mortgagee in respect of the property. This application was dismissed by the court below. 3. The learned counsel for the revision - petitioner contended that the suit in effect was for recovery of possession of the property held by the defendant and a suit for redemption was filed only because the defendant claimed that she was a mortgagee in respect of the property. The title of the petitioners was not disputed, and the amendment now sought for is only formal and the nature and character of the suit will not be changed. The counsel for the respondent contended that the suit is purely for redemption of the mortgage and since the mortgage deed was not registered, the suit itself is not maintainable. Therefore the same cannot be converted into one for recovery of possession on the strength of title. It was also contended that the cause of action for the suit for redemption is quite different from the cause of action in a suit for recovery of possession on the strength of title. In the latter case the plaintiff would be invoking a larger right, whereas in the former the cause of action arised from the terms of the mortgage. 4. The main reason for rejecting the prayer for amendment of the plaint was that it would change the nature and character of the suit. But on a careful reading of the entire plaint it would appear that the suit as such cannot be said to be one filed purely for redemption of the mortgage. The intention of the plaintiffs was only to get recovery of possession of the property. All the circumstances which ultimately led to the filing of the present suit have been explained in the plaint. The important question to be considered is whether in a suit for redemption of mortgage, the question of title can be decided. There is nothing wrong in deciding the question of paramount title in a suit on mortgage. 5. This view has been followed by the Division Bench of Madras High Court in the decision reported in Kasi Chettiar v. Ramasami Chettiar (AIR 1937 Madras 170). There the deceased person had mortgaged certain property in favour of the plaintiffs. The mortgagee not having been paid off and the mortgagor having died, the mortgagee brought a suit against the legal representatives of deceased mortgagor to enforce his mortgage security. There the deceased person had mortgaged certain property in favour of the plaintiffs. The mortgagee not having been paid off and the mortgagor having died, the mortgagee brought a suit against the legal representatives of deceased mortgagor to enforce his mortgage security. The legal representatives contested the suit saying that the mortgagor had no right to mortgage the property. Issues were framed regarding paramount title. Question arose whether the issue of title should or should not be decided in mortgage suit. The Court held that it was eminently a fit case to decide the question of title. 6. The decision in Ganba Piiku v. Ganpatsao (AIR 1937 Nagpur 376) also held the same view that in a suit on mortgage the question of paramount title can also be decided. In that case certain mortgage property was sold for arrears of rent and in the mortgage suit the auction-purchaser was made a party. He claimed paramount title and discharge as the property was sold free from encumbrances. As the auction-purchaser was in possession of the property, the mortgagee would get only a paper-decree, if the respective rights of the mortgagee and auction-purchaser were not settled. Therefore the Court allowed the amendment of the plaint and held that two reliefs can be combined, eventhough there were two causes of action in such a suit. 6A. The general rule of amendment is that all amendments are permissible if they are necessary to determine the real controversy in the suit. However, the amendment should not cause prejudice to the other side. It must be the endeavour of the Court to see that multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided as far as possible. All amendments are to be allowed which satisfy two conditions namely that will not cause injustice to the other side, and that it is necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendment should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading bad been originally correct and the amendment would cause him an injury which could be compensated in costs. 7. In the instant case, the defendants have no case that they had any title to the, property. Their case is that they are keeping in possession of the property on the basis of the unregistered agreement. 7. In the instant case, the defendants have no case that they had any title to the, property. Their case is that they are keeping in possession of the property on the basis of the unregistered agreement. The parties on either side were well aware of their rights. Even though the suit is styled as one for redemption of mortgage, it is in effect a suit for recovery of possession. The fact that the petitioners had earlier filed rent control petitions also shows they wanted possession of the property. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents cited two decisions, in Hansia v. Bakhtawarmal (AIR. 1958 Rajasthan 102) and D S. Thampi v. Charles (AIR 1969 Kerala 19). In both the above cases the suit was purely for redemption of the mortgage and it was after several years and only at the second appellate stage the plaintiffs wanted to convert the suit into one for recovery of possession of the plaintiffs' title. In Thampi's case the defendants therein claimed paramount title on the basis that they came into possession of the property as per an Otti deed So also in Hansia's case the amendment was sought after several years of the filing of the suit. In that suit also, the defendants denied the mortgage and asserted that the property belonged to themselves. Incidentally the mortgage was also not registered, and the suit was only a simple suit for redemption purely based on the mortgage. Therefore both the decisions stated above cannot be applied to the facts of this case. 9. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Hichhalbhai v. Jaswantlal (AIR. 1966 SC. 997) that the object of the rule for allowing amendment to the plaint was to avoid multiplicity of suits. If the proposed amendment is not allowed the plaintiff will be constrained to file a fresh suit almost seeking the similar relief and the rejection of the amendment application would be to encourage fresh litigation. The general principle that question relating to paramount title should as far as possible be excluded from the trial of a mortgage suit is not an absolute or inflexible rule to be applied without regard to circumstances. Directing the plaintiffs to file a fresh suit would lead to inconvenience or hardship to them. The general principle that question relating to paramount title should as far as possible be excluded from the trial of a mortgage suit is not an absolute or inflexible rule to be applied without regard to circumstances. Directing the plaintiffs to file a fresh suit would lead to inconvenience or hardship to them. Having regard to these various circumstances I am clearly of the opinion that the amendment should have been allowed by tire court below. Therefore the application for amendment is allowed and the respondents are at liberty to file additional written statements, if any. The plaintiffs shall amend the plaint within 2 weeks from the date, of receipt of the records from this Court by the trial court. The civil revision petition is allowed. The parties to bear their costs.