1. This application under section 401 read with section 39T of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for short, 'the Code' has been filed against the judgment and order dated 12.6.85 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Marigaon in M. R. Case No. 37 of 1982. 2. The petitioner approached the learned trial court under section 125 of the Code for directing the Opposite party to pay a maintenance of Rs. 150/- per month for her son. In the petition before the trial court the present petitioner alleged, in­ter alia, that they were married in Gandharva form and that thereafter there was a co-habitation as husband and wife as a result the son was born. The opposite party left the petitioner during five months of pregnancy and thereafter there was a 'mel' (meeting of the villagers) where witnesses were examined and on 22.3.82 the villagers gave the verdict that the opposite party should accept the present petitioner as his wife. Accor­ding to the petitioner there was exchange of garlands, but after some time the opposite party was taken away from the meeting by his supporters. The petitioner also filed a criminal case against the opposite party under section 493 Indian Final Code. In the present petition the petitioner has claimed maintenance Of Rs. 150/- per month for her son. The opposite party has opposed the petition and has denied all the allegations. Acco­rding to him the present petition has been filed to harass and defame him at the instigation of his co-villagers Ramakanta, Jagadish and others as he did not invite the first party to his marriage, as she was a woman of ill repute, The petitioner Existed herself and four other witnesses. The opposite party also examined three witnesses including himself. 3 Shri Horn Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the judgment and order of the court is liable to be set aside as the learned trial court did not consider the material evidence on record. He has further urged that there is a glaring difference between the objection filed by the oppo­site party and the evidence adduced by him. The learned Coun­sel has particularly drawn my attention to the fact that the trial court did not consider at all the evidence of P. Ws 1, 2 and 3 and also Ext. 1. He has further urged that there is a glaring difference between the objection filed by the oppo­site party and the evidence adduced by him. The learned Coun­sel has particularly drawn my attention to the fact that the trial court did not consider at all the evidence of P. Ws 1, 2 and 3 and also Ext. 1. In support of his contention Shri Horn Coudhury has placed before me the decision of the Apex Court in Ayadhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh, A.I. R. 1981 SC1415, In that case Supreme Court held that when the Sessions Judge acqui­tted the accused by ignoring the probative value of F. I. R. and reliable testimony of eye witness and without considering material evidence on record and his judgment was full of incon­sistencies and consisted of faulty reasoning, the order of the High Court in revision directing re-trial by setting aside the acquittal would be justified. Keeping in view the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court I propose to examine the findings of the trial court on the basis of the evidence on record. Shri Barua, learned Counsel for the opposite party, has drawn my attention to the evidence to show that the trial court arrived at the findings after consider ring the entire evidence on record and as such the judgment is not liable to be set aside Mr. Barua has also submitted that Ext. 1 is a suspicious document produced by the first party in the Court and as such it is not at all reliable. 4. Shri Horn Choudhury has also placed reliance in Shri Dulan Chandra Bora, (1984) 2 GLR 396, in support of his conten­tion that the petitioner has proved that she is the wife of the opposite party. In that case this court explained the term 'wife' in such a proceeding. 5. From the petition it appears that the present claim is not for maintenance of the petitioner but only for the maintena­nce of her son and so the present petition attracts the provisions of Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 125 of the Code. Since this is not a petition under cause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 125 it is not necessary to go into the question whether the petitioner is the wife of the opposite my and as such the above decision of this Court is not relevant for the present purpose. Since this is not a petition under cause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 125 it is not necessary to go into the question whether the petitioner is the wife of the opposite my and as such the above decision of this Court is not relevant for the present purpose. However, I would like to consider the question whe­ther from the evidence on record 1 can come to a finding that the petitioner is the wife of the opposite party. In her petition before the trial court the petitioner has alleged that the marriage was according to Gandharva form by exchange of garlands in the Mel. But the petitioner (P. W. 5) in her statement before the court has deposed that the opposite party promised that he would marry her at Kamakhya and thereafter the petitioner gave the vermilion container to the opposite party who put the vermilion on her head. Except this statement of the petitioner there is no other evidence on record to show that there was a marriage bet­ween the parties in any form or that they were living as husband and wife. The evidence on record also does not prove marriage between the parties. Ram Kanta (P. W. 1) has stated that in the Mel both the parties were asked to kneel down and take blessings from the villagers. But Jaliram (P. W. 2) has stated that in the Mel there was exchange of garlands only, In my opinion, these are material contradictions. I have carefully gone through Ext. 1 which is a document regarding the Mel. In the said docu­ment it was mentioned that both parties will abide by the decision of the Mel held on 22. 3. 82 and the matter was referred to four persons for decision and the said four persons came to the con­clusion that the opposite party did not abide by the decision of the Mel and as such he was ex-communicated from the village. The above decision was arrived at after examining witnesses. The trial court was right in rejecting the above decision on the ground of non-production of the statements of the witnesses. This docu­ment also does not show that there was a marriage or there was any co-habitation between the parties before the child was born. The above decision was arrived at after examining witnesses. The trial court was right in rejecting the above decision on the ground of non-production of the statements of the witnesses. This docu­ment also does not show that there was a marriage or there was any co-habitation between the parties before the child was born. I, therefore, hold that no marriage was performed in the Mel and that the co-habitation was also not proved in the said Mel. Knowing fully well that the petitioner was not the wife of the opposite party she has rightly not claimed maintenance for her­self under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 125 of the Code. It is, therefore, not necessary to consider the law laid down in Sri Dulan Barua (supra). 6. The main Point to be considered is whether from the record the court can come to a finding that there was co ha­bitation between the parties. In Bhaskaran vs. Kitnhipennu, 1960 Cr. L. J. 353 the Kerela High Court held that 'Magistrate ought not to pass order for maintenance on un-corroborated testimony of mother of child to prove paternity'. I respectfully agree with the above views that where paternity of the child of an unmarried woman is denied it is unsafe to act on the un-corroborated testi­mony of the woman. In the instant case there is absolutely no evidence to show that the parties were living as husband and wife. The petitioner Mayarani (P.W. 5) in her statement before the Court has stated that there was sexual intercourse between the parties only on one occasion at her house as a result of which the child was born. Mother of the petitioner Charubala (P.W. 4) has not proved any co-habitation between the parties. There is no corroboration of the statement of the petitioner re­garding her sexual intercourse with the opposite party. I, there­fore, hold that the petitioner has failed to prove co-habitation with the opposite party. 7. From the evidence adduced it appears that the petitio­ner is relying mainly on the admission of the opposite party be­fore her witnesses and also in the Mel. Both P.W. 1 and P.W.J have stated that in the Mel. the opposite party denied the allegation. But P.W. 2 has stated that in the Mel the opposite party admitted the allegation. 7. From the evidence adduced it appears that the petitio­ner is relying mainly on the admission of the opposite party be­fore her witnesses and also in the Mel. Both P.W. 1 and P.W.J have stated that in the Mel. the opposite party denied the allegation. But P.W. 2 has stated that in the Mel the opposite party admitted the allegation. P.W. 3 is the Secretary of the Bengali Society of the village and as such there is no reason to disbelieve him. In Ext. 1 also there is no indication that the opposite party admitted the allegation. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no admission of the opposite party in the Mel. Regarding his admission to P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 before the Mel I find it difficult to accept it as there are material con­tradictions in their statements. P.W. I has stated in cross-examina­tion that cohabitation between the parties took place both in the house of the petitioner and in another house which is closed to the house of the petitioner. P.W. 2 has stated in cross-examina­tion that the co-habitation between the parties took place in the house of her relation, but the imamates of the house did not know about this fact. These are material contractions and I am of the opinion that no reliance can be placed on the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. I have already dealt with Ext. 1. In view of what has been stated above I am of the opinion that the evi­dence on record does not prove that the parties were married or that they lived as husband and wife or that there was any cohabi­tation between the parties as a result of which the child was born. 8. The learned trial court, who had the advantage of see­ing and hearing the witnesses, after considering the evidence on record has come to a definite finding that the petitioner had failed to prove that 'the second party is the father of her ille­gitimate child'. The learned trial court has considered also the proceedings of the village Met which includes Ext. 1. I am, there­fore, of the opinion that there is no sufficient material on record to set aside the judgment and order of the trial court by ex­ercising the revisional power of this Court and hence the present petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. 1. I am, there­fore, of the opinion that there is no sufficient material on record to set aside the judgment and order of the trial court by ex­ercising the revisional power of this Court and hence the present petition is liable to be dismissed. 9. In the result the petition is dismissed.