JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J.—The question which arises for the consideration of the Court at this stage is whether this case is required to be transferred to the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") in view of the enactment and coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). . 2. The petitioner is a retired Judicial Officer having been a member of the Higher Judicial Service of Himachal Pradesh. At the material time, the petitioner was holding the post of Registrar of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. While holding the post of Registrar, he made an application to the Chief Justice seeking correction of the date of birth recorded in his service record, Under the orders of the Chief Justice, the application was forwarded to the State Government "for consideration”. After exchange of certain correspondence, the State Government informed the Registrar of the High Court that it was not possible to accede to the request with regard to the correction of the date of birth since it was not proved that the date of birth originally given was under a bona fide mistake. By a notification dated November 30, 1974, issued by the State Government, it was notified that the petitioner shall retire on superannuation on the afternoon of the same day, The petitioner accordingly stood retired on superannuation on and with effect from November 30, 1974, The petitioner challenges herein the determination relating to his birth date arrived at accordingly and his consequential retirement on superannuation on the basis of the birth date originally recorded in his service record. 3. Part X1V-A, containing Articles 323-A and 323-B, was introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, with effect from January 3, 1977. The two Articles comprising this part empower the appropriate legislature to provide, by law, for the adjudication or trial of Certain disputes, complaints etc. through the machinery of administrative tribunals. 3. Part X1V-A, containing Articles 323-A and 323-B, was introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, with effect from January 3, 1977. The two Articles comprising this part empower the appropriate legislature to provide, by law, for the adjudication or trial of Certain disputes, complaints etc. through the machinery of administrative tribunals. The Court herein is concerned with Article 3}3-Af the material part of which reads as follows: — "323-A. (1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. (2) A law made under clause (1) may— (a) provide for the establishment of an administrative tribunal for the Union and a separate administrative tribunal for each State or for two or more States ; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals ; (c) xx xx xx xx xx (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1); (e) provide for the transfer to each such administrative tribunal of spy cases pending before any court or other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment ; (f) xx xx xx xx xx (g) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees) as Parliament may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals. (3) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force." 4. (3) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force." 4. In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (!) of Article 323-A, Parliament enacted the Act which received the assent of the President on February 27, 1985. The Act was subsequently amended by an Ordinance, namely, the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, promulgated on January 22, 1986. The Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1986, which replaces the Ordinance, received the assent of the President on March 25, 1986. 5. The relevant provisions of the Act may be noticed at this stage. Section 2 provides that the provisions of the Act shall not apply, inter alia, to "any officer or servant of the Supreme Court or of any High Court". Section 3 is the definition section. The word "post" is defined to mean "a post within or outside India. The word service" is similarly defined to mean "service within or outside India". Section 4 provides *for the establishment of Administrative Tribunals, Sections 14 and 15 provide for the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central and of State Administrative Tribunal respectively. 6. The material part of section 15 reads as follows:— “15. The word service" is similarly defined to mean "service within or outside India". Section 4 provides *for the establishment of Administrative Tribunals, Sections 14 and 15 provide for the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central and of State Administrative Tribunal respectively. 6. The material part of section 15 reads as follows:— “15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to— (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State ; (b) all service matters concerning a person (not being a person referred to in clause (c) of this sub-section or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 14 appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other authority under the control of the State Government or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by State Government; (c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by any such local or other authority or corporation or society or other body as is controlled or owned by the State Government, at the disposal of the State Government for such appointment. (2) xx xx xx xx xx (3) xx xx xx xx xx (4) xx xx xx xx xx” Section 28 of the Act reads as follows: "28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court. (2) xx xx xx xx xx (3) xx xx xx xx xx (4) xx xx xx xx xx” Section 28 of the Act reads as follows: "28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme Court. — On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or post or service matters concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, no court except— (a) the Supreme Court ; or (b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force, shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters." Section 29 of the Act reads as follows: "29. (1) Transfer of pending cases. — Every suit or other proceeding pending before any court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before a High Court. (2) xx xx xx xx xx (3) xx xx xx xx xx (4) Where any suit, appeal or other proceeding stands transferred from any court or other authority to a Tribunal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2),— (a) the court or other authority shall, as soon as may be after such transfer, forward the records of such suit, appeal or other proceeding to the Tribunal ; and (b) xx xx xx xx xx (5) xx xx xx xx xx" Section 33 of the Act reads as follows: "33, Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act." 6-A. By a notification dated December 31, 1985, issued under sub-section (4) of section 1, the provisions of the Act, insofar as they relate to the Tribunal for this State, were brought into force, on and with effect from January 1, 1986. By a notification dated August 26, 1986, issued under sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Act, the Tribunal was established on and with effect from September I, 1986 and the said day was notified as the appointed day within the meaning of clause (c) of section 3. By two separate notifications of even date, the appointments of the Chairman and a member of the Tribunal were notified. 7. The question which arises against the aforesaid statutory and factual background is whether the jurisdiction, powers and authority are now vested in the Tribunal to decide the present case and whether the jurisdiction, powers or authority of this Court to deal with and decide the dispute herein raised is excluded and whether, therefore, the case stands transferred to the Tribunal. The answer to these questions depends on the determination of two issues; (1) whether the dispute requiring adjudication in the present case is with respect to the conditions of service of the petitioner and, therefore, a service matter and (2) whether the power, authority and jurisdiction to decide such a dispute is exclusively vested in the Tribunal by reason of the fact that the petitioner is a person governed by the provisions of the Act. 8. 8. Now, it cannot be gainsaid that a dispute with respect to the date of birth and, consequentially, regarding the precise date of retirement on superannuation is a matter concerning the conditions of service and, therefore, a service matter. It cannot be disputed, at the same time, that the adjudication and determination of such a dispute is within the competence of the ordinary courts of civil jurisdiction and also of the High Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, unless it is established that the jurisdiction of those courts is expressly, or by necessary implication, barred. The Act indubitably confers the power, authority and jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to exclusively deal with and decide a service matter and, therefore, the jurisdiction of civil courts and of the High Court to adjudicate upon the same must be regarded as having been expressly excluded on a combined reading of sections 15 and 28, provided, however, the person in connection with whom such a dispute is raised is governed by the provisions of the Act. The further question requiring consideration, therefore, is whether the petitioner is a persons who is governed by the provisions of the Act. 9. The petitioner was, at the material time, the Registrar of the High Court and, as such, an officer of the High Court. Section 2, Clause (c) of the Act specifically excludes the application of the provisions of the Act to any officer of the High Court. Under the circumstances, the conclusion is inevitable that power, authority and jurisdiction of this Court to deal with and decide the dispute concerning the correct date of birth and, consequentially, regarding the precise date of retirement on superannuation of the petitioner, cannot be regarded as having been affected in any manner whatever by the enactment of the Act. 10. The question, however, may be examined from a different angle as well. The Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (hereinafter to be referred as the "HJS") is a combined cadre consisting of officers holding purely judicial posts as well as those holding posts which are primarily administrative in character. Amongst the posts of the latter category is included the post of the Registrar of the Himachal Pradesh High Court. The Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (hereinafter to be referred as the "HJS") is a combined cadre consisting of officers holding purely judicial posts as well as those holding posts which are primarily administrative in character. Amongst the posts of the latter category is included the post of the Registrar of the Himachal Pradesh High Court. The recruitment to the HJS and the conditions of service of the members thereof are governed by the Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1973, enacted in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner was thus holding a cadre post as a member of the HJS and the questions which, therefore, arise are whether the provisions of the Act apply to the members of the Higher Judicial Service and, if so, whether the petitioner, who although was an officer of the High Court, but was still a member of the HJS, is, such, governed by the provisions of the Act. 11. Article 233, clause (1), provides that appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any state shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Article 234 provides that the appointments of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him, in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Article 235 provides that the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a state and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in the said Article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of his service prescribed under such law. Article 336 defines the expressions "district judge" and "judicial service" as follows:— "(a) the expression District Judge includes Judge of a-city civil court. Additional District Judge, Joint District Judge, Assistant District Judge, Chief Judge of a small Cause Court, Chief Presidency Magistrate, Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and Assistant Sessions Judge ; (b) the expression ‘Judicial Service means a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of District Judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of District Judge." One more provision of the Constitution which needs to be noticed at this stage is Article 50 which finds place in Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) and provides that the State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the Public Services of the State. 12. It will be seen that under Article 235 of the Constitution, the control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto has been vested exclusively in the High Court. The word "court" denotes the establishment unto which is vested the judicial power of the State. The judicial power, it is true, is exercised by the Presiding Judge whose function it is to dispence justice. However, he is assisted in this task, amongst others, by the ministerial officers whose duty it is to record and attest his acts and decisions and to secure due order in the proceedings and to execute his commands. Both, the Presiding Judge and the ministerial staff, are, therefore the limbs of the court through which the work of administration of justice is carried out. The expression "court" must, therefore, comprehend both these organs, It is presumably for this reason that in the State of West Bengal and another v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447, it was observed at page 454 that the word "court" is used in Article 235 compendiously to denote the court proper as well as the Presiding Judge, It would not be out of place to mention in this connection that in Mohd. Ghouse v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 AP 497 at page 503, the word "court" occurring in Article 235 has been interpreted as including "not only the person presiding over that court but also all the functionaries of that court and any matters pertaining thereto. Ghouse v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 AP 497 at page 503, the word "court" occurring in Article 235 has been interpreted as including "not only the person presiding over that court but also all the functionaries of that court and any matters pertaining thereto. This decision was approved by the Calcutta High Court in Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of West Bengal, AIR 1961 Cal 1, similar view has also been taken in R. M. Gajjar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1978 Guj 102 (FB) and Amar Singh v. Chief Justice Punjab and Haryand High Court, AIR 1976 P & H 215 at page 225 (Paras 35 and 36). 13. Before proceeding further, the following observations from the decision in Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1966 SC 1987, might be profitably extracted so as to appreciate the high constitutional purpose in introducing the abovementioned set of Articles in the constitution: “........The Indian Constitution, though it does not accept the strict doctrine of separation of powers, provides for an independent judiciary in the States; it constitutes a High Court for each State, prescribes the institutional conditions of service of the Judges thereof, confers extensive jurisdiction on it to issue writs to keep all tribunals, including in appropriate cases the Govts. within bounds and gives to it the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals in the territory over which it has jurisdiction. But the makers of the Constitution also realised that it is the Subordinate Judiciary in India who are brought most closely into contact with the people, and it is no less important, perhaps indeed even more important, that their independence should be placed beyond question in the case of the superior Judges. Presumably to secure the independence of the judiciary from the executive, the Constitution introduced a group of articles in Chapter VI of Part VI under the heading Subordinate Courts. But at the time the Constitution was made, in most of the States the majistracy was under the direct control of the executive. Indeed it is common knowledge that in pre-independence India there was a strong agitation that the judiciary should be separate from the executive and that the agitation was based upon the assumption that unless they were separated, the independence of the judiciary at the lower levels would be a mockery. Indeed it is common knowledge that in pre-independence India there was a strong agitation that the judiciary should be separate from the executive and that the agitation was based upon the assumption that unless they were separated, the independence of the judiciary at the lower levels would be a mockery. So Article 50 of the Directive Principles of Policy states that the State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the States, Simply stated, it means that there shall be a separate judicial service free from the executive control." 14. In a series of decisions rendered thereafter by the Supreme Court, the scope and extent of the control jurisdiction of the High Court and its amplitude have been spelt-out. The position crystalised by those decisions is that the control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court under Article 235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation. It comprehends a wide variety of matters. Amongst others, it includes: (a) Disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank of District Judges, and initial posting and promotion to the cadre of District Judges. In the exercise of this control, the High Court can hold inquiries against a member of the subordinate judiciary, suspend him from service, impose punishment other than dismissal or removal, subject, however, to the conditions of service, and a right of appeal, if any, granted thereby and to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required by Article 311 (2). The High Court having been made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary and such control being exclusive, and not dual, an inquiry into the conduct of a member of the judiciary can be held by the High Court alone and no other authority. (b) Transfers, promotions and confirmation of such promotions, of persons holding posts in the judicial service inferior to that of a District Judge. (c) Transfers of District Judges. (d) Re-call of District Judges posted on ex-cadre posts or on deputation on administrative posts. (e) Award of selection grade to the members of the judicial service, including District Judges, being their further promotion after their initial appointment to the cadre. (c) Transfers of District Judges. (d) Re-call of District Judges posted on ex-cadre posts or on deputation on administrative posts. (e) Award of selection grade to the members of the judicial service, including District Judges, being their further promotion after their initial appointment to the cadre. (f) Confirmation of District Judges, who have been on probation or are officiating, after their initial appointment or promotion by the Governor to the cadre of District Judges under Article 233. (g) Premature or compulsory retirement of Judges of the District Courts and of Subordinate Courts. 15. The separation of the judiciary from the executive is thus a principle which has been accepted and proclaimed as fundamental to the governance of the country by the Constitution. In construing the relevant statutory provisions under consideration, this constitutional scheme of the independence of judiciary, secured by the constitution of a separate judicial service and the vesting of the exclusive control over the subordinate courts in the High Court, has a direct relevance, since the power of judicial review of the administrative actions taken in the exercise of its control jurisdiction by the High Court with respect to or against the members of the judiciary and the ministerial staff on the establishment of the subordinate courts could not ordinarily have been intended to be vested in any authority other than the High Court. 16. Delling now with the question whether a member of the Higher Judicial Service and, for that matter, any member of the subordinate judiciary or the staff of the subordinate courts is covered by the provisions of the Act, it will be seen that section 15, sub-section (I) of the Act, which is the relevant provision, confers the jurisdiction, power and authority on the Tribunal to deal with and decide cases in relation to requirement, and matters concerning recruitment, to "any civil service of the State" or to "any civil post under the State” and all service matters concerning a person appointed to "any civil service of the State" or "any civil post under the State". The precise question to be answered, therefore, is whether the posts held by the members of the judicial service of the State or by the ministerial officers and servants of the subordinate courts from part of any civil service of the State or are civil posts under the State. The precise question to be answered, therefore, is whether the posts held by the members of the judicial service of the State or by the ministerial officers and servants of the subordinate courts from part of any civil service of the State or are civil posts under the State. The question is no longer res integra as would appear from what follows. 17. A simalar question was raised for decision in Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and another etc. v. L. V. A. Dikshitulu and others etc., AIR 1979 SC 193, in the context of Article 371-D of the Constitution which, inter alia, provides for the constitution of an Administrative Tribunal for the State of Andhra Pradesh by a Presidential Order for deciding disputes in the matters of appointment, allotment or promotion, amongst others, to the specified class or classes of posts in "any civil service of the State" or "civil posts under the State" and also those pertaining to the seniority and other conditions of service of persons appointed, allotted or promoted to such posts. The Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Order, 1975, issued by the President in exercise of the powers vested under Article 371-D, conferred upon the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal all the jurisdiction, powers and authority which, immediately before the commencement of the Order, were exercisable by all Courts (except the Supreme Court) with respect to appointment, allotment or promotion to any "public post", seniority of persons appointed, allotted or promoted to such posts and all other conditions of service of such persons. The expression "public post" was defined to mean: "(a) all classes of posts in all civil services of the State; (b) all classes of civil posts under the State; and (c) all classes of posts under the control of any local authority within the State." 18. The two cases which reached the Apex Court arose out of the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal quashing and setting aside, in one case, the order of premature retirement of an officer on the establishment of the High Court passed by the Chief Justice on the administrative side and, in the other, a similar order in respect of a judicial officer passed by the High Court. It was not disputed that persons holding posts on the establishment of the High Court or in the subordinate judiciary do not hold their posts under the control of the State Government and that, as such, those class or classes of posts were not public posts falling within the purview of the phrase "civil posts under the State”. It was held that the posts held by such persons are not under the control of any local authority and that, therefore, they were not public posts covered by the expression "posts under the control of any local authority within the State". The sole question for consideration, therefore, was whether those were public posts within the meaning of the expression "posts in all civil services of the State”. 19. The Supreme Court observed that whereas the expression "civil service of the State" was an amorphous expression which has not been defined anywhere in the Constitution, the phrases "judicial service" and "District Judge” have been specifically defined in the Article 236 and given distinctive and defined meaning by the framers of the Constitution. Construed loosely, in its widest general sense, the expression civil service of the State, can b3 stretched to include the officers and servants of the High Court as well as the members of the subordinate judiciary. However, understood in its strict narrow sense, in harmony with the basic constitutional scheme embodied in Chapters V and VI, Part VI, and centralised in Articles 229 and 235 thereof, the phrase will not take in the High Court staff and sub-ordinate judiciary. However, understood in its strict narrow sense, in harmony with the basic constitutional scheme embodied in Chapters V and VI, Part VI, and centralised in Articles 229 and 235 thereof, the phrase will not take in the High Court staff and sub-ordinate judiciary. Applying certain cardinal principles governing the interpretation of statutes and invoking in aid the test as to the consequences which would flow if a wider construction were given to the expression "civil service of the State" so as to include in it the High Court staff and the members of the subordinate judiciary, it was held, inter alia, that the inevitable result of such an extensive construction would be that the control vested in the Chief Justice over the staff of the High Court, and in the High Court over the subordinate judiciary, would become shorn of its substance, efficacy and exclusiveness and that it would lead to internecine conflict and contradiction, rob Articles 229 and 235 of their content, make a mockery of the Directive Principle in Article 50 and the fundamental concept of the independence of the judiciary, which the Founding Fathers have with such anxious concern built into the basic scheme of the Constitution, A restricted construction, on the other hand, would ensure smooth working of the Constitution and harmony amongst its various provisions. Against the aforesaid background, it was further held that it would be proper to choose the narrow interpretation according to which members of the High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary would not fall within the purview of the phrase civil service of the State". Against the aforesaid background, it was further held that it would be proper to choose the narrow interpretation according to which members of the High Court staff and the subordinate judiciary would not fall within the purview of the phrase civil service of the State". The conclusion so reached was ultimately expressed in the following emphatic terms:— "In our opinion, non-use of the phrases judicial service of the State’ and District Judges (which have been specifically defined in Article 236), and officers and servants of the High Court which has been designedly adopted in Articles 235 and 229, respectively, to differentiate them in the scheme of the Constitution from the other civil services of the State, gives a clear indication that posts held by the High Court staff or by tie Subordinate Judiciary were advisedly excluded from the purview of Clause (3) or Article 371-D.................It follows as a necessary corollary that nothing in the order of the President constituting the Administrative Tribunal, confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to entertain, deal with or decide the representation by a member of the staff of the High Court or of the Subordinate Judiciary.” 20. In our opinion, this decision clinches the issue and unmistakably points in the direction that in the context of the legislation under consideration, the phrases "any civil service of the State” or "any civil post under the State” would not include members of the Judiciary or the ministerial officers and servants on the establishment of the subordinate courts. 21. True it is that one distinguishing feature between Dikshitulus case and the present case is the absence of a provision similar to Article 371-D, sub-Article (5), which provides that "the order of the Administrative Tribunal finally disposing of any case shall become effective upon its confirmation by the State Government or on the expiry of three months from the date on which the order is made, whichever is earlier". We do not think, however, that the absence of such a provision would make any difference in the ultimate decision. We do not think, however, that the absence of such a provision would make any difference in the ultimate decision. Even in the absence of such a provision, Dikshitulus case could not have been decided otherwise since the basic reasoning underlying the said decision is that a specific provision having been made in Part VI, Chapters V and VI in Articles 229, 235, and 236 of the Constitution for the officers and servants of the High Court as well as for members of the Subordinate Judiciary, considerations of harmonious construction and smooth working of the basic constitutional scheme of the independence of judiciary necessitated a narrower meaning being attributed to the phrase "civil services of the State” so as to exclude from its purview the High Court staff and members of the subordinate judiciary. True it is also that the present Act specifically excludes any officer or servant of the Supreme Court or High Courts by virtue of the provision contained in clause (c) of section 2. However, in our opinion, the mere fact that there is a specific exclusion with respect only to the officers or servants of the Supreme Court or of any High Court in the Act would not detract from the construction which has been hereinabove placed on the expressions "civil service of the State” or "any civil post under the State" in light of the decision in Dikshitulus case, The exclusion made by way of abundant caution does not lead to the conclusion that hereby members of the Judicial Service or the staff of the subordinate courts are by necessary implications covered by those expressions. 22. Against the aforesaid background, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court is not deprived of the jurisdiction to deal with and decide the question arising for decision in the present case, namely, the correctness or otherwise of the date of birth of the petitioner, who at the material time, was the Registrar of the High Court and, therefore, an officer on the establishment of the High Court, as also a substantive member of the Higher Judicial Service of the State. The reason being, firstly, that being an officer of the High Court covered by Article 229, there is a specific exclusion in regard to him in clause (c) of section 2 of the Act and, secondly, because being a member of the Higher Judicial Service, he cannot be regarded as a person appointed to any civil service of the State or holding any civil post under the State. In our opinion, therefore, the case is not required to be transferred to the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. 23. To be listed for hearing in due course before D. B. Order accordingly. -