T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) FEVERISH arguments are made, but the fever would not abate hearing in this Court. After hearing counsel at length, I am of the firm opinion that they must fight out the battle royal in the Court below to purge the heat and I say this for a single and singular reason. ( 2 ) PETITIONER's counsel Shri Sahasrabuddhe has made a very short, but substantive submission, which I must accept. He has merely contended that the application for execution ought not to have been dismissed on the sole ground that it was barred by limitation. Shri Sinha, appearing on the other side, has cited decisions to submit that the application was not also otherwise maintainable. I would definitely note his submissions and also refer to the case law cited, but I would answer him simply saying that this point would still be available to him to be agitated at the Court below. Because, my firm view, as I have said, is this that the petitioner's application for execution was not time-barred and the decision, therefore, has to be set aside as it does not deal with any other point, but the point of limitation. Shri Sinha has not yielded the ground yet and stands firm and erect to submit forcefully that this is not the position and submits that the question of legal representation has to be linked up with the question of limitation. I do not agree and I would say, why not. ( 3 ) FIRST, the question of limitation. Shri Sinha has relied on Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to submit that the application for execution was time-barred because the decree was passed more than twelve years ago, namely, in 1959. However, that does not conclude the matter because that is not the sole and complete mandate of Article 136. It says :"when the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making the payment of delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place"termini a quo are ample and various; and not a single one. The different occasions and situations from which the period of twelve years has to be counted is given in the third column of the Schedule, which must be read fully and completely to give full effect to the meaning of the legislative provision contained in the first column of Article 136. In the instant case, on 4-5-1972, the following order was passed and this is rendered in the impugned order itself :"d. H. files application to dismiss the Execution against the present judgement-debtors. As per application, the case is now consigned to record room as dismissed subject to rights of the decree-holder against other parties except Gwalior Cables and Conductors and the State Government. Parties to bear their costs. Counsel Fee be taxed Rs. 100/-" ( 4 ) THE clear intent and purport of the aforesaid order evidently is to save the decree from being time-barred to the limited extent indicated therein in terms of the provisions of the third column of Article 136. The execution of the decree was dismissed merely against Gwalior Cables and Conductors and the State Government and the decree-holder's right was explicitly retained alive and effective as against the other parties. On the present application, therefore, which was filed in 1973 to pursue and continue further the same proceedings against other party in terms of the said order, it is beyond my comprehension how any plea of limitation can at all be taken or accepted. I have no doubt at all that the Court below has wholly misconceived the scope of Article 136 of the Limitation Act as it failed to direct its attention to what the Legislature has intended in the provision of the Col. 3, afore-quoted. ( 5 ) NOW, the other contentions of Shri Sinha and the case law he has cited. Shri Sinha's contention is that the present application by decree-holder against the deceased judgement-debtor is not maintainable as the legal representatives of the judgement-debtor have not been impleaded. That indeed is a valid defence, but the validity of the contention would be adjudged on its merits when the point is mooted and parties are heard. Shri Sinha's contention is that the present application by decree-holder against the deceased judgement-debtor is not maintainable as the legal representatives of the judgement-debtor have not been impleaded. That indeed is a valid defence, but the validity of the contention would be adjudged on its merits when the point is mooted and parties are heard. Shri Sinha has relied on the Full Bench decision in Katragadda Ramayya, AIR 1969 Andh Pra 250, which deals with a situation where execution petition was revived, which is not at all the case here because of what I have already observed with reference to the order passed in the Execution proceedings on 4-5-1972. This decision, in my opinion, therefore, has little relevance to the instant lis. The decision in Presidency Industrial Bank, AIR 1969 Bom 84 , however, does deal with the question of proper and substantial representation in Execution proceedings. It was held that if the judgement-debtors are impleaded after twelve years, the execution will be barred. That would indeed be so, but subject to the other conditions of Article 136. In the instant case, I have no doubt prima facie, subject to what may be contended in the Court below, that the last order in the execution proceeding having been passed on 4-5-1972, even though the legal representatives of the deceased judgement-debtors had not been impleaded earlier, the period of twelve years therefrom having not been elapsed, it would still be open to remedy the situation. However, I say no more to cause prejudice to any of the parties as I am leaving the question open. The third decision is also a Full Bench decision in Kanchamalai, AIR 1936 Mad 205 which, however, does not support what is contended by him. It does not say that a substitution in execution proceedings can be only by way of fresh application and because a fresh application would be barred, the substitution would be barred. On the other hand, it rather recognises and accepts the position that a legal representative in execution proceedings may even be brought on record otherwise, following the procedure prescribed under Section 50, C. P. C. ( 6 ) FOR the foregoing reasons. I hold that the impugned order, which suffers jurisdictional infirmity above-referred, must be set aside. Issue of limitation is decided in favour of the decree-holder upon holding that the application is not barred by time. I hold that the impugned order, which suffers jurisdictional infirmity above-referred, must be set aside. Issue of limitation is decided in favour of the decree-holder upon holding that the application is not barred by time. However, the question of maintainability of the application on the ground that legal representatives of the deceased have not been impleaded is kept open, which may be decided by the Court below after hearing parties on merits. ( 7 ) IN the result, the petition succeeds to the extent indicated, but there shall be no order as to costs in this petition. Order accordingly. .