JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This petition is directed against an order dated 27.1.77 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer suspending the Petitioner. The relevant facts are that the Petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of Nyay Panchayat Mubankpur Mali, tahsil Kasganj, district Etah. On 4.11.1976, the Petitioner was served with a charge sheet by the Sub Divisional Officer listing certain charges against the Petitioner. It was stated that the Petitioner should submit his reply within a week failing which the Sub Divisional Officer will take further action against him. The Petitioner submitted his reply to these charges. Thereafter, the SDO passed the impugned order on 27.1.77, In the order it is stated that upon inquiry and on a perusal of the necessary papers, it seems that the Petitioner was guilty of serious irregularities besides misusing the powers Accordingly, the Petitioner was being suspended forthwith. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Petitioner has approached the court by way of petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. For the Petitioner it is urged that the impugned order amounts to suspension as a measure of punishment it does not disclose any reasons as to how the Petitioner has abused his position or in what respect he was guilty of irregularities. It is contended that the Petitioner's right to act as Sarpanch has been taken away in an arbitrary manner by the Sub Divisional Officer. Learned Counsel also submitted that there is nothing to indicate that the impugned order was passed under Clause (sg) of Section 95 of the Panchayat Raj Act under which Sarpanch could be suspended pending enquiry against him or a contemplated enquiry. No enquiry is either pending or contemplated. Consequently, the impugned order must be treated as one of suspension as a measure of punishment under the unlamented Section 95(g) of the Panchayat Raj Act. 3. Having heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, we find no merit in the above contention The only ground on which the Petitioner is describing the impugned order of suspension as a measure of punishment against him is that the same was preceded by an enquiry inasmuch as a charge sheet was submitted to him. The Petitioner on bis part had given a reply to the same. Thereafter, the impugned order of suspension was passed against him. 4. We are unable to agree. The Petitioner on bis part had given a reply to the same. Thereafter, the impugned order of suspension was passed against him. 4. We are unable to agree. Clause (ii) to the proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 95(gg)(4) provides that " no action shall be taken under Clause (gg) on the ground that proceedings under Clause (g) are pending or contemplated unless the State Government is prima facie satisfied that the grounds on which action is proposed under that clause exist. " The fact, therefore, that a charge sheet was given to the petitioner and that his reply was elicited in regard thereto is perfectly consistent with an attempt of the Sub Divisional Officer to comply with the provisions of Section (ii) of proviso to Section 95(gg)(4) The Sub Divisional Officer may have served a charge sheet on the Petitioner and required him to submit his reply in order to only satisfy himself that a prima facie case existed against the Petitioner warranting suspension under Clause (gg) of Section 95 Such an enquiry was, in our opinion, in the nature of a preliminary enquiry before initiating a formal enquiry necessary for taking action u/s 95(g) of the Act. 5. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the impugned order is not a final order of suspension passed as a measure of punishment, it was one passed pending enquiry or in contemplation thereof under Clause (gg) of Section 95. 6. As suspension pending enquiry or contemplated enquiry, the impugned order was not expected to contain elaborate reasons such as are mandatory and would have been necessary had the order been intended to be passed as a measure of punishment under Clause (g) of Section 95. 7. Another reason why we do not consider the impugned order as a final order is that whenever an order of suspension is passed as a measure of punishment, it is always limited in point of time. In the impugned order we do not find that any time limit has been mentioned during which the order of suspension shall be operative. This again is a circumstance which confirms that the impugned order is in substance one passed under Clause (gg) of Section 95. 8. Lastly, it may be mentioned that the statute as stands after its amendment in 1973 does not provide for suspension as a measure of punishment. This again is a circumstance which confirms that the impugned order is in substance one passed under Clause (gg) of Section 95. 8. Lastly, it may be mentioned that the statute as stands after its amendment in 1973 does not provide for suspension as a measure of punishment. The order was passed in 1977 i. e. 4 years after Clause (g) of Section 95 was amended in 1973. In unlamented Section 95(g), there was a provision of suspension as a measure of punishment. We may presume that the Sub Divisional Officer was aware of this legislative change. 9. For these reasons, we do not find any merit in this petition. The same is consequently dismissed. The interim orders passed by this Court are vacated.