Judgment :- 1. The tenant, against whom an order of eviction under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, has been concurrently passed by both the courts below, is the revision petitioner. 2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this revision petition are briefly as follows :—Eviction proceedings relate to a residential house in door No. 174/C/14, High Road, Tirunelveli Junction. The respondent, as landlord, sought eviction of the petitioner, who was his tenant, on the ground that he needs the premises for the occupation of his married daughter, who does not have a house of her own in Tirunelveli. The respondent has two sons and two daughters, the married daughter being the elder among the daughters. The respondent was residing in his premises in door No. 174/C/12 in the same High Road. The son in law, who also belongs to Tirunelveli, was doing business along with his brothers in Bangalore. The married daughter, along with her son, aged, about 4 years, was living with the respondent. The son-in-law intended starting a branch of his business in Tirunelveli Junction and the respondents daughter wanted a separate residence of her own for her family. The premises wherein the respondent w as living was not sufficient to accommodate his family and his married daughters family. The respondent, therefore, filed H.R.C. No. 16 of 1981 under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act requiring the petition premises for the occupation of his married daughter. 3. The above claim of the respondent was resisted by the petitioner inter alia on the ground that though it was true that the respondents daughters husband was doing business in Bangalore, the further averments that he intended to come to Tirunelveli and that the premises were required for his married daughter were all false, that the respondent was not in need of the premises for his married daughter and that, therefore, he was not liable to be evicted. 4. Before the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Tirunelveli, the respondent examined himself as P.W.1 and had Exts.P1 and P2 marked. The petitioner examined himself as R.W.1 and had Exts.R1 to R.15 marked. 4. Before the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Tirunelveli, the respondent examined himself as P.W.1 and had Exts.P1 and P2 marked. The petitioner examined himself as R.W.1 and had Exts.R1 to R.15 marked. Learned Rent Controller, on a consideration of the evidence before him, found that the married daughter, for whose benefit the premises were required, was not occupying a residential building of her own and finding that the claim of the respondent that the premises were needed for his married daughter was true, ordered eviction. Learned Appellate Authority concurred with the findings of the learned Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner in R.C.A. No. 19 of 1983. Hence the present revision. 5. The only contention that was raised in the present revision by Mr. P. Pepin Fernando, learned counsel for the petitioner, was that the interpretation of the second limb of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act by both the courts below was incorrect. According to the learned counsel, the respondent admitted that the house in which he was residing was his own and that, therefore, he could not ask for the present premises even though it was intended for the benefit of his married daughter, since S.10(3)(a)(i) of the Act requires that before the landlord could succeed in evicting the tenant on the ground of requirement for the occupation of a member of his family, it should be established that neither the landlord nor the family member, for whose benefit the premises were sought, should occupy a building of his or her own in the city. In the instant case, admittedly, the house in which the respondent was residing belonged to him and hence he was not entitled to claim the present premises, though it was for the benefit of another member of his family. Learned counsel referred to a decision of this Court, rendered by Ratnam, J. in Jagannatha Chettiar R. v. Swarnambal 1, wherein on similar facts, the learned Judge held that the landlord is disentitled to claim eviction. Learned counsel further submitted that since there was a conflict of views as amongst the learned Judges of this Court, Ratnam, J., taking one view and the other learned Judges taking a different view, in the cases I shall refer to later, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench for resolving the above conflict. 6. Learned counsel further submitted that since there was a conflict of views as amongst the learned Judges of this Court, Ratnam, J., taking one view and the other learned Judges taking a different view, in the cases I shall refer to later, the matter may be referred to a larger Bench for resolving the above conflict. 6. Per contra, Thiru N. Sivamani, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that interpretation of the second limb of S.10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was incorrect and was also opposed to several pronouncements of this Court and all that the second limb of the above section required was that the landlords should prove that when he seeks eviction for the purpose of accommodation of any member of his family, the particular member, for whose benefit the premises were required, should not be occupying any premises of his own in the City. The fact that the landlord, under the above circumstances, was occupying the premises of his own did not disentitle him from seeking eviction for the benefit of a member of his family so long as that member of the family was not occupying any premises of his own. Learned counsel places certain decisions of this Court to which I shall refer to later. 7. The short point that arises for consideration is whether the order of the learned Appellate Authority has to be set aside as being based upon an erroneous construction of the second limb of S.10(3)(a) (i) of the Act? 8. The facts that the respondent is residing along with his daughter in the premises belonging to him and that the respondents son-in-law, who also belongs to Tirunelveli, is doing business in Bangalore are all admitted. The daughter has a son of her own aged about 4 years. It is not denied by the petitioner that the present premises where the respondent is living with his family, is not sufficient to accommodate all. Both the courts below have concurrently found that the requirement of the premises by the respondent for the purpose of providing residence to his married daughter is true. These findings of facts, concurrently arrived at, have to be accepted. 9. I shall first refer to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention. These findings of facts, concurrently arrived at, have to be accepted. 9. I shall first refer to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention. The first of the decisions, exactly on that point, has been rendered by V. Ramaswami, J., in Annamalai & Co., v. Sital Achi 2. In that case, the landlady first sought eviction of the tenant from her premises in Goods Shed Street, Madurai Town under S.10(3)(a)(i) of the Act for the residence of herself and her husband and then sought, by another petition under S.10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) of the Act, eviction of a different tenant from her premises No. 29, Vaduga Kaval Kooda Street, Madurai Town for the purpose of residence and business of her adult married son. Eviction of the house in Goods Shed Street, Madurai Town was first ordered. Thereafter eviction of the tenant from the premises in No. 29, Vaduga Kaval Kooda Street, Madurai Town was ordered. By the time the appeal filed by the tenant of the premises in No. 29, Vaduga Kaval Kooda Street, Madurai Town, came up for hearing, the landlady has already obtained possession of her house in Goods Shed Street and was occupying the same. In the appeal filed by the tenant of the premises in Vaduga Kaval Kooda Street, it was urged that since the landlady was already in occupation of her own premises, she was not entitled to claim the premises in Vaduga Kaval Kooda Street for her son, since the same violated the second limb of S.10 (3)(a)(i) and (iii) of the Act. The contentions were repelled and eviction had been ordered. The same contention was put forth in the revision filed before this Court. Learned Judge, after referring to several decisions on this aspect, rejected the contention of the tenant and observed as follows:— “In my opinion the owner of a residential premises could invoke the provisions of S.10(3)(a)(i) if the building is required for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family. Learned Judge, after referring to several decisions on this aspect, rejected the contention of the tenant and observed as follows:— “In my opinion the owner of a residential premises could invoke the provisions of S.10(3)(a)(i) if the building is required for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family. The condition imposed under that section of ‘not occupying residential building of his own’ is to be understood with reference to the person for whose occupation the building is required Therefore even if the owner of the house is occupying another residential building of his own he could apply for eviction of a tenant of another building if that building was required for the occupation of any member of his family.” Learned Judge has also observed: “These decisions clearly go to show that even in a case where a landlady petitioner is in possession of either residential or nonresidential building she could apply for possession of another building if she satisfied the Court that building was required either for the purpose of residence or for purpose of business of any member of her family and such member is not in occupation of any residential or non residential building of his or her own,” Learned Judge also expressed, his view that any other construction of the second limb of S. 10(3)(a) (i) and (iii) of the Act would nullify the amendment introduced by Tamil Nadu Act 23/1973 including the words “any member of his family” in the place of the word “his son” under S. 10(3). 10. The above decision has subsequently been followed in Parthasarathy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1, wherein Venkataswami, J., while dealing with an application under S. 3A of the Act wherein the words are identical with S. 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) of the Act, on that aspect holding thus: “The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on a judgment of this Court reported in Annamalai & Co. v. Sital Achi 2, in support of his contention that notwithstanding the fact that the landlord is in occupation of a residential building he can apply under S.3A of the Act for release of building for the occupation of any member of his family if that family member is not in occupation of any other residential building of his/her own in the city. This position has not been challenged by the learned Government Advocate.” 11. M.N. Chandurkar, C.J. in Messrs. Indian Plywood Manufacturing Co. v. Balaramiah Chetty 3, after referring to the decision in Annamalai and Co. by its Partner v. Sital Achi 2, has held that under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act the landlord can apply for eviction if the person for whose benefit the non-residential premises are required is not already in occupation of a non-residential building of his own. Referring to the case Annamalai & Co., by its Partner v. Sital Achi 2, the learned Chief Justice has observed in paragraph 6 as follows:— “Now this decision has taken the considered view on a construction of S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, that if a landlord is to be disentitled from claiming non-residential premises on the ground that members of his family required the said premises for their own use, then this can be done only if the members of the family are also in occupation of a non-residential building of their own. Strictly speaking, this decision would conclude the controversy in the present case.” From the above decisions, it is clear that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if the landlord is in occupation of the premises belonging to him, who is not occupying any building of his own he would be disentitled from claiming eviction for the benefit of any member of his family is untenable. This Court has uniformly held that when the premises are sought for by the landlord for the benefit of any member of his family it is only that member of the family for whose benefit the premises are required who should not occupy premises of his or of her own. The fact that the landlord occupies premises of his own would not disentitle him from claiming eviction for the benefit of a member of his family, who does not occupy any premises of his own. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner however, relied on the decision of Ratnam, J. in Jagannatha Chettiar, R. v. Swarnambal 1, who, according to him, has taken a different view on the interpretation of the second limb of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner however, relied on the decision of Ratnam, J. in Jagannatha Chettiar, R. v. Swarnambal 1, who, according to him, has taken a different view on the interpretation of the second limb of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. A perusal of the judgment would clearly indicate that the facts in that case are totally different and that, therefore, the view expressed by the learned Judge on those facts is really not in conflict with the laws expressed by this Court in the other decisions, referred to above. In Jagannatha Chettiar, R. v. Swarnambal 1 the landlord has initially sought eviction on the ground that he required the premises for his daughter. He had also claimed that neither himself nor his daughter was occupying any other building of their own. The tenant has resisted the eviction on the ground that the landlord was not living in rented premises, but the premises in which he was residing was his own. It is seen from the facts set out in the above judgment, that though initially the landlord has sought eviction for the benefit of his daughter, who did not have a house of her own, during evidence he had made it clear that eviction was sought for to enable him to go and live with his married daughter and son-in-law and that he could not do so in his house since the accommodation in the house, where he was residing, was not sufficient. The following observations of the learned Judge make this fact clear: “If the landlord is desirous of living with his married daughter and son-in-law, then he can do so in his own premises at door No 13, Arasappa Mudali St., Madras. The circumstance that the accommodation available in that premises may not be equate or sufficient is certainly not aground under the Act to direct the eviction of the tenant in occupation in the absence of the fulfilment of the requirements of S 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act.” This passage makes it clear that what the land lord wanted was that he was desirous of living with his married daughter and son-in-law. He could not do the same in the house in which he was residing since the accommodation was inadequate. He therefore, wanted the petition premises for his daughter to enable him to take up his residence with his daughter. He could not do the same in the house in which he was residing since the accommodation was inadequate. He therefore, wanted the petition premises for his daughter to enable him to take up his residence with his daughter. The requirement, therefore, was primarily that of the landlord. The need, was the need of the landlord and with that of the daughter. It was admitted that the building which the landlord was then occupying was his own. Hence under the second limb of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act it was not open to the landlord to seek eviction to enable him to live with his daughter in a different house When he himself was living in his own premises. Learned Judge, therefore, held that the second limb of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act was not satisfied. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the view taken by the learned Judge in this case is different from the views expressed by this Court in the other decisions, already referred to above. 13. It emerges, therefore, as a proposition of law that the condition imposed under S.10(3)(a)(i) of the Act “not occupying residential building of his own” is to be understood with reference to the person for whose occupation the building is required. The second limb of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act could only be interpreted as requiring that the person for whose benefit the presises are sought for should not occupy any building of his or of her own. The fact that the landlord who seeks eviction is himself occupying a building of his own would not be a bar to the landlord seeking eviction for the occupation of a member of his family, who does not occupy any premises of his or her own. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the contrary. Since there is no conflict as among the opinion expressed by the learned Judges of this Court, the question of referring the matter to a larger Bench does not arise. 14. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed. No costs.