JUDGMENT PADMANABHAN, J.: Accused 1 to 4, 6, 13 and 18 are the appellants. In S.C. No. 10/83, on the file of the Sessions Judge, Palghat, there were altogether 19 accused including the appellants. They were charge-sheeted for offences punishable under sections 143, 148, 323, 341 and 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. All others, except the appellants, were found not guilty and acquitted. First accused was convicted for the offences punishable under sections 341 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and a fine of Rs.500/- for the offence under section 341 and rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.1,000/- for the offence under section 323. Second accused was convicted for the offences punishable under sections 323, 148, 302 read with sections 149 and 143 of the Indian Penal Code. For the offence under section 323, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. For the offence under section 148, the sentence awarded was rigorous imprisonment for three years. For the offence under section 302 read with section 149 he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Six months rigorous imprisonment was awarded to him for the offence under section 143. Third accused was convicted for the offence punishable under sections 323, 143, 148 and 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. For the offence under section 323, he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year. Six months rigorous imprisonment was awarded for the offence under section 143 and three years for the offence under section 148. For the offence punishable under section 302 read with section 149, life imprisonment was awarded. Fourth accused was convicted only for the offence under section 323 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.1,000/-. Sixth accused was convicted for the offences punishable under sections 143 , 148 and 302 read with section 149. For the offence under section 143, he was awarded rigorous imprisonment for six months. Three years rigorous imprisonment was awarded for the offence under section 148. The sentence awarded for the offence punishable under section 302 read with section 149 was imprisonment for life. 13th accused was convicted for the offences punishable under sections 143, 148 and 302 read with section 149. Three years rigorous imprisonment was awarded for the offence under section 148. The sentence awarded for the offence punishable under section 302 read with section 149 was imprisonment for life. 13th accused was convicted for the offences punishable under sections 143, 148 and 302 read with section 149. Rigorous imprisonment for six months, three months and imprisonment for life were awarded respectively for the offences. 18th accused was also convicted for the offences under sections 143, 148 and 302 read with section 149. Identical sentences were awarded for him also. Of these, the only person convicted and sentenced for the offence under section 341 was the first accused. 1 to 4 were convicted and sentenced for the offence under section 323. All the remaining accused were convicted and sentenced for the offences punishable under sections 143, 148 and 302 read with section 149. Accused 2, 3, 6, 13 and 18 are the persons against whom imprisonment for life was awarded. The charge against them is that on 28.7.1982 at about 7.30 p.m. in the road at Chithali junction they formed themselves into an unlawful assembly, committed rioting, wrongfully restrained and assaulted deceased Chamunni and murdered him in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly. 2. The accused are head-load workers stationed in Chithali junction. They belong to the C.I.T.U. affiliated to the Marxist Communist Party. Deceased Chamunni was also one among them till about seven months prior to the incident. All on a sudden he changed his political affinity and joined the Congress (I) Party. Since then the accused were enmical towards him. This is the motive alleged by the prosecution. 3. On 28.7.1982 at about 7.30 p.m. deceased Chamunni along with P.W.11 Thankappan and C.W.16 Kunhamani came to Chithali junction. After purchasing beedi from the shop of P.W.5, Sreedharan, they were standing in front of his shop and talking. By the time accused 1 to 3 came over there from a nearby barber shop. First accused told Chamunni that he wants to talk to him. So saying, he put a towel from behind on the neck of Chamunni and pulled him. Accused 2 and 3 kicked him from behind. Chamunni fell down. When attempted to get up he was again kicked by the first accused. There was a scuffle between the first accused and Chamunni. First accused fell beneath and Chamunni was above him. So saying, he put a towel from behind on the neck of Chamunni and pulled him. Accused 2 and 3 kicked him from behind. Chamunni fell down. When attempted to get up he was again kicked by the first accused. There was a scuffle between the first accused and Chamunni. First accused fell beneath and Chamunni was above him. Fourth accused came, caught hold of Chamunni and tried to pick him up. In that attempt the first accused also got up and waived a hook like weapon. In this action the thigh of fourth accused was injured. Chamunni was released. He pushed the 4th accused who fell down. Second and third accused beat Chamunni. When P.W.11 asked them why they are assaulting an innocent person, the first accused warned him that if he values his life, he will have to leave the place immediately. P.W.11 and his companion immediately left the place. When Chamunni attempted to escape from the scene, the 4th accused threw a stone at him. That hit the back of his neck and Chamunni fell down beneath a poola tree by the side of the Panchayat road. All the remaining accused who were engaged in loading tapioca in a nearby lorry rushed to the scene of occurrence on seeing this. They threw stones at Chamunni, hit him with stones and hand and kicked him. After this, accused 1, 4, 9 and 11 left the scene by bus. Some others dragged Chamunni, who by that time became semi-conscious. He was put in the adjacent paddy field on the north. P.W.1 went and reported the matter to P.W.3 brother of Chamunni. P.W.3 and others came. They took Chamunni from the paddy field. At that time the Sub Inspector, P.W.14 came in a jeep. Chamunni was removed to the Primary Health Centre. Coyalmannam. He was given medical aid. At 2 a.m. on 29.7.1982 he died. This is brief is the prosecution version of the incident. 4. On the basis of Ext.P-1 first information statement given by P.W.1 from the Primary Health Centre, Coyalmannam. P.W.11 registered a case against 1 to 12 and 8 others, who could be identified by sight for the above said offenses. In the Primary Health Centre, it was P.W.8 who examined and attended the deceased. Ext.P-5 is the wound certificate issued by him; 5. P.W.11 registered a case against 1 to 12 and 8 others, who could be identified by sight for the above said offenses. In the Primary Health Centre, it was P.W.8 who examined and attended the deceased. Ext.P-5 is the wound certificate issued by him; 5. Accused 3, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12 were arrested by P.W.14 on 1.8.1982 at 4 a.m. Meanwhile, accused 1 and 4 got themselves admitted in the District Hospital. On receiving Ext.P-10 intimation from the hospital, P.W.13 went and recorded Ext. P-12 first information statement of the accused and registered a crime. P.W.15 arrested the first accused oh 31.7.1982 and P.W.1 6 arrested the 4th accused on 4.8.1982 when they were discharged from the hospital. 6. It was P.W.17, Circle Inspector of Police who conducted the investigation. He prepared Ext.P-2 inquest on 29.7.1982. The same day he prepared Ext.P-3 scene mahazar. Accused 2 and 10 were arrested on 31.7.1982. On 4.8.1982 P.W.17 arrested accused 5, 9 and 13 to 19. It was P.W.12, who prepared Ext.P-11 plan. Post-mortem on the dead body was conducted by P.W.9 and Ext.P-7 is the post-mortem certificate. After completing investigation, charge was laid by P.W.17. The case registered on the first information given by the first accused was also investigated by him and referred as false. 7. P.Ws.1, 5, 6, 7 and 11 are the occurrence witnesses. Among them, P.W.6 turned hostile. P.W.1 was present throughout at the scene of occurrence and it was he who gave Ext.P-1 first information statement. P.Ws.5, 6 and 7 are shop owners in the close vicinity of the scene of occurrence and as such persons competent to swear to the incident. P.W.11 is the person who came along with the deceased and was talking with him at the time of the incident. Even though the Counsel for the appellant attempted to depict them as enmical and interested witnesses the evidence do not justify such a contention to any extent. There is absolutely nothing to show that they are either interested in the prosecution or enmical towards the accused. Except regarding the appellants, their evidence was not able to fix the identity of the persons who took part in the attack, being members of the unlawful assembly. It is true that there are certain discrepancies in the evidence given by them before Court. Except regarding the appellants, their evidence was not able to fix the identity of the persons who took part in the attack, being members of the unlawful assembly. It is true that there are certain discrepancies in the evidence given by them before Court. It is only quite natural that regarding such an incident in which everso many persons are involved, occurrence witnesses may differ between themselves in the details. The question to be considered in such situations is whether they were giving a truthful version on the broad facts of the prosecution case. After having heard the Counsel for the appellants and the Public Prosecutor and after perusing the evidence we are satisfied that these witnesses were giving a truthful version of what they saw and heard. Of course, what we have stated above may not be applicable to P.W.6 who made an attempt to help the accused by his refusal to divulge their identity. But the broad facts of the incident were spoken to by him also. 8. The main ground on which the Counsel for the appellants attempted to challenge the prosecution case was the inability of the prosecution to explain the injuries found on the bodies of accused 1 to 4 we were told that Ext.P-1 first information statement given by P.W.1 is silent in this respect, but subsequently the prosecution introduced a new story for explaining the injuries. We were requested to reject the prosecution case and the evidence on this ground alone. 9. The burden of proof cast on the prosecution to explain the injuries sustained by the accused in the course of the same transaction is mainly intended to make it obligatory on the prosecution to present before Court a true and correct account of the entire incident without any addition or substraction. In an attempt to bring offenders to justice, the prosecution is bound to make an entire exposition of everything including facts and circumstances which may go in favour of any defence that is available to the accused by way of exceptions or otherwise. Exceptions are capable of taking actions out of penal provisions. Failure of the prosecution to present the entire picture may compel the Court to entertain reasonable doubts as to how the incident happened. Exceptions are capable of taking actions out of penal provisions. Failure of the prosecution to present the entire picture may compel the Court to entertain reasonable doubts as to how the incident happened. Absence of explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused during the course of the same transaction can in given cases lead to the conclusion that the theory of the incident spoken to by the prosecution witnesses and borne out by the circumstances do not represent what actually transpired and therefore there will be possibility of the defence version of acting in exercise of the right of private defence being reasonably probable. It is to avoid such probabilities and the consequent reasonable doubts and to ensure fairness of trial guaranteed by the Constitution that such explanations are insisted from the prosecution in order to ensure before conviction that the accused is guilty. Before convicting a person for an offence the Court must ensure, subject to burden of proof, that what occurred is actually a crime and no exceptions are involved. But that does not mean that the prosecution is bound in all cases to explain all injuries whether minor or major found on the accused or lead evidence to exclude all possible defences. Failure of the prosecution to explain very minor or superficial injuries found on the deceased or accused by itself is no ground to reject the prosecution case as observed in Surendran alias Sasi v. State of Kerala Surendran alias Sasi v. State of Kerala (1977) K.L.T. 17. During the course of the transaction itself it is possible that the accused may sustain injuries without being noticed by the witnesses, either as a natural consequence of the incident or by mistaken assaults from his own partisans. The accused may hide those injuries in their anxiety to escape from implication. There can also be the possibilities of self-infliction of injuries in an attempt to set up false pleas of self-defence. It is true that non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused in a murder case at or about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance. There can also be the possibilities of self-infliction of injuries in an attempt to set up false pleas of self-defence. It is true that non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused in a murder case at or about the time of occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, non-explanation of such injuries, as held in Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) Crl.L.J. 1736: (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 671: (1976) 4 S.C.C. 394 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2263 and State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima (1975)S.C.C. (Crl.) 384, may lead to any of the following results. (1) The accused inflicted the injuries on a member of the prosecution party in exercise of the right, of self-defence (2) the prosecution version will become doubtful and incapable of proving the guilt of the accused beyond doubt. (3) It does not affect the prosecution case at all. An inference that the prosecution suppressed the real facts may be legitimate in given cases. It may also tend to make the evidence of witnesses who suppressed the injuries of the accused unbelievable and the defence version of the incident probable. But all these conclusion are subject to the facts, evidence and circumstance of each case. There may be cases where non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not at all affect the prosecution case. In cases where injuries are very minor and superficial, it is not necessary to insist on explanation at all. The position will be the same even in cases where the evidence is to clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission to explain the injuries. In other words, in spite of the failure to explain the injuries, if the credibility of the prosecution evidence is not shaken, nothing prevents the evidence being accepted. The evidence in this case will have to be viewed in this back ground. How the non-explanation of the injuries of accused 1 and 4 have affected the prosecution case and evidence is a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case for which definite guidelines are not possible. 10. The evidence in this case will have to be viewed in this back ground. How the non-explanation of the injuries of accused 1 and 4 have affected the prosecution case and evidence is a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case for which definite guidelines are not possible. 10. After sustaining injuries, accused 1 and 4 managed to get themselves admitted in the hospital alleging that they were be laboured in the course of the same incident. As evidenced by Ext.P-8, the first accused had only tenderness. He had no visible injury and his only complaint was that he was knocked down by somebody. Ext.P-9 is the wound certificate of the 4th accused. He had a lacerated penetrating wound 1 } 1/2 cm. } 2 cm. on the outer aspect of left thigh and an abrasion near the left shoulder. In Ext.P-1 first information statement P.W.1 has not explained as to how these two accused happen to sustain injuries. In fact the first accused had no injury to be explained by the prosecution. If at all the prosecution had to explain anything, that was only the lacerated penetrating wound found on the body of the 4th accused. During investigation itself P.W.1 explained as to how the 4th accused sustained the above injury. We do not feel that the absence of this explanation in the first information statement is fatal to the prosecution as contended by the Counsel for the appellants. First information statement is intended only as an information to the police officer regarding the commission of a cognizable offence for the purpose of setting the law in motion. First information statement need not be an encyclopaedia of all the facts and circumstances narrated in their sequence or order. We cannot expect all such details with the sequence of events being mentioned in such a statement. In many cases, first information statements will be given shortly after commission of atrocious crimes. Informants may be persons who are mentally or physically affected by the crimes. In that mental and physical state they cannot be expected to give each and every minute detail. But when the first information is given by a person who had occasion to witness the incident, omission to mention a vital part of the incident may some times prove fatal to the prosecution. In that mental and physical state they cannot be expected to give each and every minute detail. But when the first information is given by a person who had occasion to witness the incident, omission to mention a vital part of the incident may some times prove fatal to the prosecution. That also depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 11. Here the prosecution case is that in a grappling, the deceased and the first accused fell down. First accused was beneath and the deceased was above him. It was at that time that the 4th accused pulled the deceased up. By that time the first accused also got the grip released and attempted to rise up. It is the prosecution case that in this position, the first accused waived some weapon which hit the thigh of the 4th accused wrongly and injured him. In an attack involving eversomany persons which took place in the night, a person like P.W.1 cannot be expected to narrate every such detail in the first information statement. During investigation, when he was subsequently questioned, he gave the above details also. We do not agree with the Counsel that this is a new development purposely introduced by the prosecution for explaining the injury found on the body of the 4th accused. The evidence is clinching. It shows that the deceased was unarmed and there was nobody to assist him. On the other hand, the aggressors were many in number. The possibility of the incident having taken place in the manner alleged by the defence is completely ruled out by the prosecution evidence. We do not feel that the explanation regarding the injury found on the body of the 4th accused is a mala fide development invented by the prosecution. After all, the injury sustained by the 4th accused is a minor one. The defence version of the incident is that at Chithali junction the deceased threatened the first accused with dire consequences and kicked him down. It is said that when the 4th accused came and attempted to rescue the first accused, he was stabbed by the deceased and thereafter accused 1 and 4 went away in a bus. This version is highly improbable also. In the first place, the place of occurrence is a stronghold of the accused. It is said that when the 4th accused came and attempted to rescue the first accused, he was stabbed by the deceased and thereafter accused 1 and 4 went away in a bus. This version is highly improbable also. In the first place, the place of occurrence is a stronghold of the accused. Secondly, all the accused were there near the scene of occurrence loading goods in a lorry. In such a situation, it is highly improbable and unlikely that the deceased will attempt to assault the first accused or anybody else single handed and unarmed. Even the first information statement given by the first accused shows that his partisans were nearby. The case registered on the basis of the first information given by the first accused was investigated by P.W.17. It was found false and referred. Neither the first accused nor the 4th accused took up the matter. In the box not only P.Ws.1 and 5 but the other witnesses also have stated as to how the 4th accused sustained injuries. Under such circumstances, we are of opinion that the prosecution has satisfactorily explained the injury found on the 4th accused. 12. The incident took place at a junction where there are eversomany shops. All the shops were open. The evidence of witnesses show that there were electric lights also. P.Ws.5, 6 and 7 are shop owners in the junction itself. P.Ws.1 and 11 are also persons who are familiar with the locality and familiar with the accused also. Most of the accused are known to them. The only difficulty is that on the date of incident the names of some of them were not specifically known to these witnesses. There is nothing to show that any of these witnesses are interested in the prosecution or enmical towards the accused. The mere fact that P.W.11 was the maistry in the estate in which the deceased was working and that he accompanied the deceased to the scene of occurrence will not make him an interested witness. Even if it is taken that he is an interested witness, there is nothing to show that his evidence is in any way infirm or tainted. So also the request made by him to the accused that the deceased should not be manhandled Cannot be taken as a circumstance to discredit his testimony. Even if it is taken that he is an interested witness, there is nothing to show that his evidence is in any way infirm or tainted. So also the request made by him to the accused that the deceased should not be manhandled Cannot be taken as a circumstance to discredit his testimony. P.W.11 was in the scene of occurrence only for a short time and during the course of incident he went away when threatened by the first accused. He identified only accused 3 and 4 and the overt acts during the first part of the incident. 13. It is true that occurrence witnesses have given evidence more or less only in a general way. In this connection it has to be appreciated that they were witnessing and swearing to an incident in which there were eversomany participants. The venue of attack was also not a single place. The time when the occurrence took place has also to be taken into account. Accurate and specific evidence under such circumstances is rather difficult. 14. An attempt was made by the Counsel to discredit P.Ws.1 and 5 on the ground of interest or relationship. P.W.1 is the servant of one Haridas who is said to be a police constable. Haridas is the brother-in-law of P.W.5 and a neighbour of one Balan, brother of the deceased. Based on these facts alone, it was contended that P.Ws.1 and 5 are interested witnesses and they cannot be believed. We are not in a position to agree with this contention. 15. While narrating the prosecution story of the incident, we have referred to the specific acts alleged against each accused. P.Ws.1 and 5 have identified all the appellants and specified overt acts also. The fact that they are head-load workers stationed at Chithali junction is not disputed. P.W.1 said that accused 5 onwards were engaged in loading goods in a lorry near the shop of P.W.6 when the incident started. This part of the evidence is supported by P.W.5 and some other witness. Ext.P-12 corroborates their version. The fact that all the appellants attacked the deceased and accused 2, 3, 6, 13 and 18 dragged him is evident from the depositions of P.Ws.1 and 5 P.Ws.7 and 11 have supported their evidence in certain aspects. This part of the evidence is supported by P.W.5 and some other witness. Ext.P-12 corroborates their version. The fact that all the appellants attacked the deceased and accused 2, 3, 6, 13 and 18 dragged him is evident from the depositions of P.Ws.1 and 5 P.Ws.7 and 11 have supported their evidence in certain aspects. Motive alleged by the prosecution has also been spoken to by the witnesses and it is not in serious dispute also. Even the size of the stone was mentioned by P.W.1. It has to be remembered that both accused 1 and 4 sustained injuries during the course of the same incident. The fact that 4th accused pelted a granite piece at the deceased and the deceased fell down was spoken to by P.Ws.1 and 5. They have also spoken to the arrival of accused 6, 11, 13 and 18 and the attack made by them against the deceased by kicking, fisting and hitting with stones. The trial Court was therefore correct in finding that the prosecution was able to establish the overt acts alleged against the appellants. 16. It was argued by the Counsel that without a test identification parade, the evidence of the occurrence witnesses cannot be accepted. It is true that as observed in Kannan v. State of Kerala Kannan v. State of Kerala (1979) 2 S.C.J. 373: (1980) MLJ. (Crl.) 1: (1979) 3 S.C.C. 319 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1127, where a witness identifies an accused who is not known to him, in the Court for the first time, his evidence is absolutely valueless unless there has been a previous test identification parade to test his powers of observation. The idea of holding test identification parade under section 9 of the Evidence Act is to. test the veracity of the witness on the question of his capability to identify an unknown person whom the witness may have seen only once. In such a case, if no test identification parade is held, it may be wholly unsafe to rely on the testimony of the witness regarding the identification of the accused for the first time in Court. As held in Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1979) MLJ. In such a case, if no test identification parade is held, it may be wholly unsafe to rely on the testimony of the witness regarding the identification of the accused for the first time in Court. As held in Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1979) MLJ. (Crl.) 76: (1978) Crl.L.J.1137 “Identification parades have been in common use for a very long time, for the object of placing a suspect in a line up with other persons for identification is to find out whether he is the perpetrator of the crime. This is all the more necessary where the name of the offender is not mentioned by those who claim to be eye witnesses of the incident but they claim that although they did not know him earlier, they could recall features in sufficient details and would be able to identify him if and when they happened to see him. The holding of a test identification in such cases is as much in the interest of the investigating agency or the prosecution as in the interest of the suspect of the accused.” In this case, as we have earlier stated, the occurrence witnesses and the accused are not persons unknown to each other. They belong to the same locality. P.W.5, 6 and 7 and all the accused are doing their business or work, as the case may be, at Chithali junction itself. All the accused are having their office and place of rest also at Chithali Junction itself. P.Ws.1 and 1½ are also persons who know most of them very well. Simply because the names of some of the accused were not known to them at the time of the occurrence and for that reason the accused were shown to them at the time of investigation, the evidentiary value of their identification in Court cannot be questioned on the principles laid down in the decisions cited, which are inapplicable in the instant case. We do not feel any doubt at all in accepting the identification made by the witnesses. 17. P.W.6 is a hostile witness. But the trial Court has accepted portions of his evidence in order to lend corroboration to the testimonies of other witnesses. According to the Counsel, this approach of the Sessions Judge is highly illegal. We do not feel any doubt at all in accepting the identification made by the witnesses. 17. P.W.6 is a hostile witness. But the trial Court has accepted portions of his evidence in order to lend corroboration to the testimonies of other witnesses. According to the Counsel, this approach of the Sessions Judge is highly illegal. In support of the contention, the decision in Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka (1980) 1 S.C.C. 30 : (1980) S.C.C. (Crl.) 59: (1979) Crl.L.J. 1374: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1848, was relied on. The following passage in an earlier decision in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) Crl.L.J. 295: (1976) 1 S.C.C. 727 : (1976) S.C.C. (Crl.) 60: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 294, quoted with approval in that decision reads: “Even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the Court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the order evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” P.W.6 is admittedly a shop owner near the scene of occurrence. His presence at the scene of occurrence is not disputed. He has spoken to the incident and agreed with the other witnesses that the deceased sustained injuries. He only refused to divulge the identity of the assailants. This is not a case in which the whole of the testimony of this witness is impugned. He does not stand squarely and totally discredited. He has spoken to the incident and agreed with the other witnesses that the deceased sustained injuries. He only refused to divulge the identity of the assailants. This is not a case in which the whole of the testimony of this witness is impugned. He does not stand squarely and totally discredited. We do not feel that there was anything wrong on the part of the Sessions Judge in accepting that part of his evidence found believable for the purpose of corroborating the evidence of other witnesses. 18. Lastly, it was contended that there is no proof of any unlawful assembly or that its common object was to murder the deceased. So also it was argued that the prosecution miserably failed in proving the identity of the members of the unlawful assembly. The Sessions Judge has split up the incident into two parts. We feel that he has rightly done so. During the first part of the incident, as the evidence shows, accused 1 to 4 alone were the participants. It was in the second part that all the accused are alleged to have taken part. Meanwhile, accused 1, 4, 9 and 11 left the place by bus. The finding of the Sessions Judge was that unlawful assembly was formed only at the second stage and common object developed only at that stage. The evidence substantiated this finding also. 19. An assembly which was lawful when it assembled can become unlawful subsequently. That is Explanation 1 to section 141 of the Indian Penal Code. Common object required under section 141 differs from common intention required under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Common object can develop on the spot also. It is true that when a sudden quarrel arises as a result of remonstrance and counter remonstrance and an unpremeditated free fight takes place, it cannot be said that the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly. As to whether there was an unlawful assembly consisting of the accused formed with a particular common object depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Here, all the accused are head-load workers belonging to a particular political ideology. The deceased was also in the same group, but he changed his political faith a few months before the incident. At first accused 1 to 4 alone were attacking him on account of enmity. Here, all the accused are head-load workers belonging to a particular political ideology. The deceased was also in the same group, but he changed his political faith a few months before the incident. At first accused 1 to 4 alone were attacking him on account of enmity. The attack was made at a time when they alone came from the company of others for some personal purpose and saw the deceased who came there. The meeting and attack were casual. But the deceased was the common enemy of not only accused 1 to 4 but other members of their group also. It was on seeing the attack by accused 1 to 4 that the others came and joined. Thereafter the attack was joint. In these circumstances, the Sessions Judge was right in concluding that the common object was formed on the spot on account of previous enmity and all the participants identified and unidentified formed themselves into an unlawful assembly in furtherance of the common object of which the crime was committed during the second stage of the incident. 20. In order to enter a finding regarding unlawful assembly and common object, it is not necessary that identity of all the members of the assembly must be established beyond doubt before Court. It if it is proved that the assembly consisted of more than 5 persons and the common object is also proved, the fact that identity of some of the participants or their actions are not established is not at all fatal to the prosecution case. Even if the persons whose identity and acts are established are only less than five, conviction with the aid of section 149 is not illegal provided there is evidence to show that including the unidentified persons, there were more than five members and the crime was committed in prosecution of the common object. But there must be clear finding regarding the unlawful assembly and the common object in prosecution of which the crime was committed. Identity of the persons comprising the assembly is only a matter relating to determination of the guilt of the individual accused. But there must be clear finding regarding the unlawful assembly and the common object in prosecution of which the crime was committed. Identity of the persons comprising the assembly is only a matter relating to determination of the guilt of the individual accused. Even when it is possible to convict only less than five persons, section 147 still applies if on the evidence the Court is able to hold that the person or persons found guilty were members of an unlawful assembly of five or more persons, known or unknown or identified or unidentified, as held in Kapildeo Singh v. The King Kapildeo Singh v. The King 1950 S.C.J. 143: (1949) F.C.R. 834: 63 L.W. 501: A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 80. So also, section 149. applies not only to offences actually committed in furtherance of the common object but also to offences that the members of the assembly knew are likely to be committed. The failure of the prosecution to prove identity of the persons named as offenders among the members of the unlawful assembly will not in any way affect the criminality of those who are proved to be members of the unlawful assembly if the other conditions for the applicability of section 149 are established. Likewise, in considering common object it is not necessary that individual acts alone should be taken into consideration. Knowledge of the likelihood that a particular result will follows as a cumulative effect of the actions of the members, committed in furtherance of the common object, could also be taken into account in deciding what the common object was. 21. In this case, there is no individual overt act which by itself, could be taken as coming under any of the four parts in section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. But the deceased was already severally attacked by accused 1 to 4 in the first instance. After sustaining the injuries, he ran away to a distance. He was again attacked by all the members of the unlawful assembly while under disability by the first attack. By the pelting of a granite piece by the 4th accused, he fell down. It was at this point that the other members arrived and joined hands with the others in attacking him. It is seen from the evidence that he was kicked, fisted and hit with stones all over the body by several persons including the appellants. By the pelting of a granite piece by the 4th accused, he fell down. It was at this point that the other members arrived and joined hands with the others in attacking him. It is seen from the evidence that he was kicked, fisted and hit with stones all over the body by several persons including the appellants. Thereafter he was dragged to a distance and put in a field. The medical evidence shows that all his ribs on the right side and two on the left were fractured and there was fracture of the sternum also. Various other injuries, internal and external, were there indicating the force and thereby the intention with which they were inflicted. P.W.9 has given his opinion that death was due to shock on account of the multiple injuries. According to him, the internal injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It may be true that each individual injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. That fact cannot negative murderous common object of the unlawful assembly. 22. The conduct evidently shows that when all the members joined together for the attack as soon as seeing deceased being assaulted by accused 1 to 4, they developed a common object among themselves and formed themselves into an unlawful assembly to achieve that common object. It was an unarmed solitary person who was already suffering disability by the first part of the attack who was again attacked by them jointly. Naturally they must have been known that the forcible kicking, beating, hitting with stones and dragging by so many persons will cause injuries, the cumulative effect of which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. They must also be fixed with the intention to cause such bodily injuries also. They must at least have known that their joint attack will be so imminently dangerous that in all probability it will cause death or such bodily injuries as are likely to cause death. In inflicting the injuries they acted without any excuse at all for incurring the risk of causing death or the injuries aforesaid. In our opinion there was the common object to cause death and the intention required under the first part of section 300 itself is there. In inflicting the injuries they acted without any excuse at all for incurring the risk of causing death or the injuries aforesaid. In our opinion there was the common object to cause death and the intention required under the first part of section 300 itself is there. We do not agree with the Counsel that causing grevious hurt alone could be taken as the common object of the unlawful assembly. The learned Sessions Judge was within the limits of law and evidence in convicting the appellants for the various offences. After hearing the Counsel, we are also not satisfied of any reason for interfering with the different sentences. 23. The convictions and sentences are confirmed and the criminal appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.