Judgment B.L. Yadav, J. 1. BY the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the order dated 17th July, 1974 is sought to be quashed by issuing a writ of Certiorari. 2. THE facts of the case need not detain much. Plot No. 494, area .15 and plot no. 986, area .04 were recorded in the basic year in the names of petitioners. Respondent nos. 2 and 3, namely Moti Chand and Girja Prakash, sons of Ram Ratan, filed objection under Section 9-A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, (for short the Act), claiming bhumidhari rights on the basis of sale deeds dated 3-4-65 and 30-8-65 and also the compromise dated 25-8-65 and 3-4-65 in a suit filed in the Civil Court for redemption of mortgage and possession, and that by over-sight even though in the registered sale deed dated 3-4-65 (Annexure 4 to the petition), these plots were mentioned, but with different area. To be precise plot no. 986/1 was mentioned with an area of 10 (to the west) and plot no. 494/1 was mentioned with an area 17 (to the west) and the present area could not be mentioned. After the execution of this sale deed a compromise dated 3-4-65 (Annexure CA 1), was arrived at on the same date and it was mentioned In para C (Sa) of the said compromise that the plaintiffs as bhumidhars of the plots in dispute have executed the sale deed dated 3-4-65 in favour of respondent nos, 2 and 3, namely, Moti Chand and Girja. But these two plots with the area specified above were not mentioned in the sale deed. On a correct interpretation of the sale deeds and the compromise these plots would be deemed to have been included in the sale deed. Primarily it was a case of rectification of instrument. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 were entitled to be recorded as bhumidhars of these plots and they were incorrectly entered in the name of the petitioners. It was accordingly prayed that the basic year entries may be expunged. These plots with areas specified may be entered in the name of respondent nos. 2 and 3 as bhumidhars. The petitioners, on the other hand, contested the case of respondent nos. 2 and 3 alleging that these two plots did not find place in the sale deed dated 3-4-65, rather plot no. These plots with areas specified may be entered in the name of respondent nos. 2 and 3 as bhumidhars. The petitioners, on the other hand, contested the case of respondent nos. 2 and 3 alleging that these two plots did not find place in the sale deed dated 3-4-65, rather plot no. 986/1 with an area of 10 (to the west) and plot no, 494 with an area of 17 (to the west) were sold which were sub-divisions of plot nos. 986 and 494. The plot no. 494 area .15 and plot no. 986 area .04 which were in dispute were of the vendors and were not sold. The plots sold were the basis for the compromise and as these plots in dispute were not sold, the respondents nos. 2 and 3 cannot seek rectification of the instrument nor they can become bhumidhars. A suit under Section 229-B of the UP ZA and LR Act was also filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 in respect of the plots in dispute for declaration of bhumidhari rights and the same was dismissed in default in 1970 and no restoration application or appeal was filed for more than three years till the commencement of the consolidation operation. The restoration was filed only when the objections were filed in consolidation operation and that the relief of rectification of the instrument was never sought by an appropriate suit in the civil court within the limitation prescribed. From the compromise and the sale deed, if read together, the only irresistible conclusion was that the petitioners never intended to transfer these plots, with these areas in favour of respondent nos. 2 and 3 and the basic year entries in favour of the petitioners were correct and the objection of respondents nos. 2 and 3 may be dismissed. 3. THE Consolidation Officer by his order dated 9-11-73 (Annexure 2 to the petition), dismissed the objection of respondent nos. 2 and 3 and their appeal failed on 5-6-74 (vide annexure-3 to the petition) met the same fate. But their revision was allowed by the impugned order dated 17-4-74. This order has been challenged by the present petition. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioners urged that on correct construction of the sale deeds dated 3-4-65 and 30-8-65 and both the compromise dt. But their revision was allowed by the impugned order dated 17-4-74. This order has been challenged by the present petition. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioners urged that on correct construction of the sale deeds dated 3-4-65 and 30-8-65 and both the compromise dt. 3-4-65 and 25-8-65 and copy of the plaint, the only inference possible was that in respect of the plots in dispute neither any sale deed was intended to be executed by the petitioners in respect of the plots in dispute nor in the compromise these plots were sought to be given to respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3. In case respondent nos. 2 and 3 had got any right they could have filed a suit for rectification of the instruments, namely, the sale deeds and the compromise under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, within a period of three years as provided by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. As no such suit was filed, the rights of respondent nos. 2 and 3 came to an end. The suit under Section 229-B of the UP ZA and LR Act for declaration of bhumidhari rights filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 was dismissed in default in 1970. No restoration application was filed by them till the commencement of consolidation operations after three years. Further in view of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as the sale deeds were document pertaining to the disposition of property rights and reduced to the form of a document and the rectification of instruments sought by the contesting respondents amounts to the varying, contradicting, adding to or substracting from the terms of the sale deeds, which Could not be done nor any evidence was admissible for that purpose. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2 and 3, on the other hand, urged that the correct interpretation of the sale deeds and the compromise was that these plots should have been included in the sale deed formed the basis of compromise, hence they became bhumidhars. The action contemplated under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, was just remedial and it has no effect to extinguish the rights of respondent nos. 2 and 3. Even though the limitation for filing the suit might have expired, but thereby only the remedy was lost and the substantial rights subsist. The action contemplated under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, was just remedial and it has no effect to extinguish the rights of respondent nos. 2 and 3. Even though the limitation for filing the suit might have expired, but thereby only the remedy was lost and the substantial rights subsist. For that they could agitate during the consolidation operations and the evidence adduced by respondent nos. 2 and 3 was just with a view to clarify and furnish further details in the contents of the sale deeds or the compromise and the same was not barred by Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. It was further urged that the impugned orders were perfectly correct and there was no ground for interference in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 5. THE first point for determination is as to whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation has correctly interpreted the sale deeds and compromise and whether he has correctly drawn inference. THE principal interpretation is that of para C (Sa) of the compromise dated 3-4-65 (Annexure CA-1). It is better to set out the relevant para as below : " Sa-Yah ki mudain ne bahasiat bhumidhar kul arajiyat nijai wa haq Shri Moti va Girja Prasad pisran Ram Lakhan Sakin Mauja Silauadha Pargana Mahaich Distt. Varanasi bajariye bainama dinank 3-4-1965 vay kar diya hai." 6. THE aforesaid sentence only means that the plaintiffs as bhumidhars have transferred the land in dispute in favour of respondent nos. 2 and 3 by a registered sale deed dated 3-4-65. In fact, in respect of interpretation of a document there is a maxim that when you have plain words (of a document) capable of only one interpretation, no explanation of them is required. (Absoluta Sententia Expositore Moindigfts). THE principal of interpretation of documents is to ascertain the intention of the parties and the same can be gathered from the language used coupled with the surrounding circumstances. THE aforesaid clause means that the sale deed was executed first on behalf of the petitioners in favour of respondent nos. 2 and 3, wherein plot nos. were given and even though the plaint (Annexure CA-2) might indicate plot no. 494 Ba area 15 and plot no. 986-Ba area 4 and separate plot nos. THE aforesaid clause means that the sale deed was executed first on behalf of the petitioners in favour of respondent nos. 2 and 3, wherein plot nos. were given and even though the plaint (Annexure CA-2) might indicate plot no. 494 Ba area 15 and plot no. 986-Ba area 4 and separate plot nos. 494-A area 17 and 986 area .10, but in the sale deeds these plots were deliberately not inserted rather in their place only plot no. 986/1 area 10 to the west (Janib Paschchim) and plot no. 494/1 area .17 to the west ( Janib Pashchim) was mentioned. It means that these two plots wese deliberately mentioned as sub-divisions with directions to the west and it was not the intention of the vendor to include plot nos. 494 area .15 and 986 area 4, otherwise there was no sense in mentioning the direction (to the west). If the intention of the parties would have been that the sale deed must be obtained in favour of these two plots in dispute, they would have been mentioned specifically. The sale deed (Annexure 4) is self explanatory and there appears no patent ambiguity in the words of the sale deed or the compromise so as to be explained by any other evidence. The details of these two plots specifying direction (to the west) leads to only one inescapable corollary that these were the plots intended by the parties to be sold. These plots formed the basis of compromise. At the best this can be said to be a patent ambiguity in the instrument of sale and the principle of interpretation in respect of such instrument is that .a patent ambiguity in the words of a written instrument cannot be cleared up by evidence extrinsic to the instrument (i. e. Ambiguites Verborum Patens Nulla Verificatione Excluditur). Further the plots in dispute mentioned in clause (c) of the compromise appear to be preceded or qualified by the sale deed dated 3-4-65 which has already been executed. It means that the plots forming the basis of compromise would be covered by registered sale deed, otherwise the sale deed dated 3-4-65 would not have been mentioned in the compromise. Further the plots in dispute mentioned in clause (c) of the compromise appear to be preceded or qualified by the sale deed dated 3-4-65 which has already been executed. It means that the plots forming the basis of compromise would be covered by registered sale deed, otherwise the sale deed dated 3-4-65 would not have been mentioned in the compromise. Similarly the contents of second compromise dated 25-8-65 as second part of the plaint (Annexure A-2) and para Ga is material and there also the words are that for the remaining plots in dispute respondent nos. 2 and 3 are bhumidhars and in their favour the sale deeds have been executed. This also means that the documents covered by the sale deed are the documents intended to be transferred or in other words this clause of the compromise connotes that respondents nos. 2 and 3 are the bhumidhars of the land in dispute as indicated in the registered sale deed executed in their favour. This also indicates that respondent nos. 2 and 3 were being held as bhumidhars only in respect of the plots sold and those plots did not contain the plots in dispute. While drawing inference from an instrument the Court has to be guided by the words used and the intention expressed in the instrument itself. By indicating the plot nos. 986/1 area 10 (to the west) and 494/1 area 17 (to the west), it was clear that on behalf of the petitioners these plots were deliberately mentioned and sought to be sold in favour of respondent nos. 2 and 3 and not the plots in dispute. I have accordingly no manner of doubt that the plots in dispute with specific area were not intended to be transferred nor given to respondent nos. 2 and 3. No other interpretation or inference was possible and the Deputy Director of Consolidation erred in holding otherwise. 7. THE second point is that in case respondent nos. 2 and 3 wanted that the sale deeds or the compromise decree did not indicate the true intention of the parties or that any fraud was committed on them, they could have availed remedy of filing a civil suit for rectification of the instrument, as provided under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It is better for the sake of convenience to set out section 26 of the said Act : "26. It is better for the sake of convenience to set out section 26 of the said Act : "26. When instrument may be rectified. (1) When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, a Contract or other instrument in writing, (not being the articles of association of a company to which the Companies Act 1956 (1 of 1956), applies) does not express then-real intention, then :- (a) Either party or his representative in interest may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified or (b) the plaintiff, may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified or (c) a defendant in any such suit as is referred to in clause (b), may, in addition to any other defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument. (2) If, any suit in which a contract or other instrument is sought to be rectified under sub-section (1), the court finds that the instrument through fraud or mistake, does not express the real intention of the parties, the court may, in its discretion, direct rectification of the instrument so as to express that intention, so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third person in good faith and for value. (3) A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the court thinks fit, may be specifically enforced. (4) No relief for the rectification of an instrument shall be granted to any party under this Section unless it has been specifically claimed : Provided that where a party has not claimed any such relief in his pleading, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the pleading on such terms as may be just for including such claim. " 8. A bare reading of Section 26 of the Act indicates that if through some fraud or mutual mistake of the parties the instrument does not represent the true intention the parties, in that event either party can avail the remedy of filing a suit for rectification of this instrument, i. e. the sale deeds and compromise in the instant case. Sub-clause (4) specifically provides that no rectification would be granted to any party unless it has been specifically claimed. Sub-clause (4) specifically provides that no rectification would be granted to any party unless it has been specifically claimed. In the instant case respondent nos. 2 and 3 did not file any such suit and even if they would have filed suit the mistake could have been not bilateral but only unilateral whereof section 26 of the Act requires bilateral mistake in the instrument. Even though the relief contemplated by Section 26 of the Act might be remedial but in case respondent nos. 2 and 3 were actually aggrieved by non-mentioning of these two plots, they could have filed a suit and that too only within a period of three years as provided under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. As the first sale deed was executed on 30-4-65 and the second was in August 1965 and the compromise also appears to have been executed on the same date, hence till 1968 the suit must have been filed. But what they did is that they filed a suit under section 229-B of the UP ZA and LR Act and did not specifically claim the relief of rectification of the instrument which was required by Section 26 (4) of the Specific Relief Act. In case no such specific relief was claimed, the same Could not have been granted indirectly by filing a suit under Section 229-B. Even if such suit was filed no positive relief should have been granted in favour of respondent nos. 2 and 3. The said suit was dismissed presumably in default in 1970 and no restoration application was filed within a period of thirty days nor any appeal was filed and respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed a restoration application after three years only when the consolidation operations commenced and they filed objections under Section 9-A (2) of the Act. This reflects that respondent nos. 2 and 3 never wanted to assert their rights within the period prescribed by seeking a relief for rectification of instrument and it is now too late in the day for them to claim relief after the commencement of consolidation operations. In fact, the remedy of rectification of instrument is an equitable discretionary remedy granted by a civil court in our country, when an instrument does not represent the true intention of the parties. In fact, the remedy of rectification of instrument is an equitable discretionary remedy granted by a civil court in our country, when an instrument does not represent the true intention of the parties. Further rectification is granted not of the Contract but of the instrument embodying the terms of the contract. It has to be exhibited in an unmistakable manner that the parties came to the clear terms but the instrument failed to carry it out. It is better to extract the relevant portion on page 806, from Hanbury and Maudsley on Modern Equity (Twelfth Edition), as follows :- "Rectification is a discretionary equitable remedy whereby an instrument, which does not accord with the intention of the parties to it may be corrected. It operates as an exception to the ' parole evidence rule ', whereby the oral evidence is not admissible to alter a written instrument. It must be emphasized that the Court does not rectify a mistake in the contract itself, but only a mistake in the instrument recording the contract. It must be very clearly shown that the parties had come to a genuine agreement and that the instrument had failed to record it. Thus where both a written agreement to sell and the ensuing conveyance incorrectly described the land which it had been agreed to sell, it was possible to obtain rectification on proof of the real oral agreement." See also Craddock Bros. v. Hunt, (1923) 2 Ch. 136. Further on page 807, relevant discussion is :- " Rectification is retrospective, and affects steps taken by the parties in the meantime. But the instrument remains binding in its un-corrected form until rectification is actually ordered. The plaintiff may obtain rectification and specific performance in the same action. " See also Freer v. Unwins Ltd, (1976) Ch. 288. 9. 136. Further on page 807, relevant discussion is :- " Rectification is retrospective, and affects steps taken by the parties in the meantime. But the instrument remains binding in its un-corrected form until rectification is actually ordered. The plaintiff may obtain rectification and specific performance in the same action. " See also Freer v. Unwins Ltd, (1976) Ch. 288. 9. IN Kerr on Fraud and Mistake (Sixth Edition) on page 612, the following statement appears to be relevant for the present case : "A person, however, who seeks to rectify an instrument, on the ground of mistake, must be able te prove not only that there has been a mistake, but must be able to show exactly and precisely the form to which the deed ought to be brought, in order that that it may be set right, according to what was really intended, and must be able to establish in the clearest and most satisfactory manner, that the alleged intention of the parties to which he desires to make it conformable, continued concurrently in the minds of all parties down to the time of its execution. The evidence must be such as to leave no fair and reasonable doubt upon the mind that the deed does not embody the final intention of the parties. See also Rooke v. Kensington, 25 LJ Ch. 795 ; Sells v. Sells, 29 LJ Ch. 500; Falck v. Williams, (1900) A? 196 ; Re Hare and O' More, (1901) 1 Ch. 93 and also Madhabji v. Ram Nath, ILR 30 Bom. 457. " " There can be no rectification, if the mistake be not mutual, or common to all parties to the instrument, or if one of the parties knew of the mistake at the time he executed the deed. Where one party only has been under mistake, while the other, without fraud, knew what the character of the deed was, and intended that it should be, the Court cannot interfere, for otherwise it would be forcing the latter a contract he never entered into, or depriving him of a benefit he had bona fide acquired by an executed deed. Rectification can only be had where both parties have executed an instrument under a common mistake, and have done what neither of them intended. Rectification can only be had where both parties have executed an instrument under a common mistake, and have done what neither of them intended. There must be evidence to satisfy that requisites for rectification on the ground of common mistake pointed out in Fowler v. Fowler by Lord Chelmsford, 4 D and J 265.........A mistake on one side may be a ground for rescinding, but not for correcting or rectifying an instrument. See also Ellis v. Hills, 67 LT 287. " 10. IN the instant case I am of the view that no such evidence has been led by respondent nos. 2 and 3 to prove that actually there was genuine agreement between the parties about the plots in dispute with the area to be transferred to them and that the instrument of sale or compromise failed to record. The learned counsel for respondent nos. 2 and 3 laid much stress on the interpretation of the sale deed and the deed of compromise, but no such mistake as pointed out was traceable. The sence of rectification is to bring the document to a correct form which was expressed and intended to be in pursuance of a prior agreement. As a matter of fact, it pie-supposes a prior agreement or contract and it requires proof that by common mistake the final concluded instrument fails to give proper effect to the prior contract. For this purpose evidence of what took place prior to the execution of the completed document is obviously admissible and indeed essential. See also Lovell and Christmas Ltd. v. Wall, (1924) AC 196 ; Shipley U. D. C. v. Bradford Corporation, (1936) Ch. 375. The third point for determination is as to whether the oral evidence was admissible to contradict, vary, add to or substract from its terms in view of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. A bare reading of these two sections makes it clear that in case the terms of a contract or of any disposition of property have been reduced to a document, as in all other cases whereby the law permits or required to be reduced to the form of a document, to prove the contents of those documents, no other evidence shall be admissible except the document in itself or the secondary evidence where it is permissible. The reason for this is that the best evidence available must always be given. This is also known as best evidence rule. Sections 65 and 66 deal with secondary evidence and it has been provided as to when secondary evidence is admissible. On the other hand, section 92 provides that when a document exists or law requires the matter to be reduced to the form of a document, in that event oral evidence would be excluded to vary, contradict, add to or substract form the terms thereof. But where the document in writing is not, in fact, in issue rather it is used merely as an evidence to prove some fact, the oral evidence would certainly be admissible (by Explanation III). In other words, with few exceptions, it deals with the exclusion of extrinsic evidence to contradict, vary, add to or substract from the terms of the document. To put it differently, the rule on which both the sections are based, is that when the terms of a contract, grant or other disposition of property have been reduced to the form of a document then those terms should be proved by the document itself or by secondary evidence where it is possible. Some extrinsic evidence in the form of proviso to Section 92 has been made admissible. Extrinsic evidence is admissible only for interpretation of document or to explain doubt as to the true meaning of the document, or to determine the effect of instrument in case of doubt as to its true meaning. See The Godra Electric Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1975 SC 32 paras 17 and 19. The evidence of the acts done under it is a guide to the intention of parties in such cases. See Abdul Ahad v. Amrendra Singh Mitter, AIR 1950 SC 15 para 23 at page 21. 11. I am of the view that in the instant case no such evidence was available nor the same has been led by the contending respondents. On the other hand, from the evidence led on behalf of respondent nos. 2 and 3, the only inescapable conclusion is that the parties, particularly the petitioners never intended to transfer the plots in dispute. In case the intention would have been to transfer the present plots in dispute, there was no necessity of specifying the direction form which an area of .10 from plot no. 2 and 3, the only inescapable conclusion is that the parties, particularly the petitioners never intended to transfer the plots in dispute. In case the intention would have been to transfer the present plots in dispute, there was no necessity of specifying the direction form which an area of .10 from plot no. 986/1 was transferred nor such direction would have been mentioned while transferring the area of 17 from plot no. 494/1. This leads to only one inference that the plots in dispute with the area specified were never intended to be transferred by the petitioner to respondent nos. 2 and 3. 12. LEARNED counsel for respondent nos. 2 and 3 emphasized that the rectification sought in the instrument was with a view to make further clarification or specification or further details of the area of these two plots. But from a bare reading of the contents of these documents it is clear that, in fact, these two plots with the area specified were never intended to be transferred otherwise in the area transferred the direction (to the west), would not have been mentioned. Now in fact, the contesting respondents wanted by leading some evidence, to contradict, vary, add to or substract the terms of the document, which could not be permitted nor those evidence could be made admissible. Under the facts and circumstances of the case in any view of the matter the Intention of the petitioners was clear that they never wanted to transfer these two plots with the area specified, whereas it may be that respondent nos. 2 and 3 would have intended to purchase these plots with the area specified. But unless a mistake was common to both the parties, the rectification cannot be granted. In case it is accepted that the plots nos. 494 area .15 and 986 .04 were to be added to the terms of document that would mean to compel the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest to agree to a entirely different terms of the contract and not to agree to the terms for which both the parties agreed prior to the execution of the document. But this was not possible either in view of the provisions of section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or in view of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. But this was not possible either in view of the provisions of section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or in view of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. In view of the discussions made herein-before, the impugned order dated 17th July 1974 cannot be sustained as the same suffers from manifest error of law apparent on the face of record and the same deserves to be quashed. 13. IN the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 17th July 1974 is hereby quashed by issuing a writ of Certiorari. But under the circumstances, however, I refrain from making any order as to costs. Petition allowed.