JUDGMENT 1. This is defendant-tenant's second appeal against the decree of eviction passed by Additional District Judge No. 2, Ajmer. 2. The original plaintiff Bala Prasad filed the present suit in the year 1971 against the appellant on the ground of bonafide and reasonable necessity and for carrying on business by his son Satish Chandra in the disputed shop. The suit was contested. The trial court after framing issues and recording evidence, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for eviction, by its order dated 7.2.1976. The appellant went in appeal During the pendency of the first appeal. the defendant applied for amendment of the written statement. The amendment was allowed and an additional issue No. 1 B was framed and the case was remanded back by the first appellate Court vide its order dated 1.9.1980 to the trial court for recording fresh evidence and to give a fresh finding on Issues No 1, 1-A and 1B. After remand, the trial court recorded additional evidence afresh led by the parties and vide its findings dated 3.7.1981, came to the conclusion that the suit premises were not required reasonably and bonafide by the plaintiff and also decided the issue regarding comparative hardship in favour of the defendant. It further held under Issue No.1-B that no quarter has been allotted to the plaintiff's son Satish Chandra at Chittorgarh. After receiving the findings of the trial court, the first appellate court after hearing arguments set aside the findings of the trial court and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs, for eviction. It is against this judgement and decree that the present appeal has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has very vehemently argued the appeal and has submitted that the approach of the first appellate court is against law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the following authorities (1) Mattulal V. Radhey Lal (AIR 1574 SC 1996). , (2) M. M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma ( AIR 1981 SC 1113 ) ; (3) Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad ( AIR 1981 SC 1711 ) , and (4) Variety Emporium v. B.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina (1985 (1) SCC 261). 4. He has therefore, submitted that the judgement of the learned first appellate court should be set aside. , (2) M. M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma ( AIR 1981 SC 1113 ) ; (3) Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad ( AIR 1981 SC 1711 ) , and (4) Variety Emporium v. B.R.M. Mohd. Ibrahim Naina (1985 (1) SCC 261). 4. He has therefore, submitted that the judgement of the learned first appellate court should be set aside. He has further submitted that Bala Prasad plaintiff has died during the pendency of the suit and Satish Chandra has been brought on record as his legal representative, After filing of the suit. Satish Chandra has been employed in a cement factory, and has been drawing a sum of Rs. 1600/- and has been made permanent there. Therefore, the only need as disclosed in the plaint having been fulfilled, the landlord cannot he said to have any reasonable or bonafide necessity. He has further submitted that the landlord has to satisfy to the court that his need continues till the final decree of eviction is passed by the court and since Satish Chandra has been permanently employed and he had not deposed before the trial court after the remand that he still wanted to do this business in the suit premises and did not want to continue in service. There is no evidence on record that the plaintiff requires the suit premises reasonably and bonafide. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the observations of the Supreme Court in the authorities cited by learned counsel for the appellant are based on the peculiar facts of those cases and do not lay down a general rule so as to apply to the facts of this case as well. He has submitted that the finding regarding bonafide and reasonable need and comparative hardship are both findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence, and therefore, sitting in second appeal this court should not interfere. He has placed reliance on the following authorities (5) Deity Pattabhiramswamy v. S. Hanymayya & other ( AIR 1959 SC 57 ) , (6) Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh & others ( AIR 1961 SC 1097 ) , ( 7) Ramchandra Ayyar and another v. Ramalingam Chettiar and another ( AIR 1963 SC 302 ) ; (8) Mst. He has placed reliance on the following authorities (5) Deity Pattabhiramswamy v. S. Hanymayya & other ( AIR 1959 SC 57 ) , (6) Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh & others ( AIR 1961 SC 1097 ) , ( 7) Ramchandra Ayyar and another v. Ramalingam Chettiar and another ( AIR 1963 SC 302 ) ; (8) Mst. Kharbuja Kour v. Jang Bahadur Rai & other ( AIR 1963 SC 1203 ) , (9) K. Doraiswami Nadu v. The Church of Christ ( AIR 1980 SC 2123 ) ; (10) Chatirmal v. Ramdas (AIR 1979 Rajasthan 87 FB) and (11) Hasan Ali v. Hafiz Mustak All 1,1986 RLR 481). 6. He has submitted that in all these authorities it has been observed that howsoever gross or erroneous or inexcusable error may seem to be, the High Court has no jurisdiction under section 100 Civil Procedure Code to correct that error. 7. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the whole matter and have also perused the judgement of the two courts below as also records of the case. 8. The suit was filed in the year 1971 and the need mentioned therein was that the son of the plaintiff Satish Chandra wanted to carry on his business in the suit premises as he was sitting idle. The trial proceeded and during the course of litigation. Satish Chandra got a job in cement factory and merely because he had accepted that offer and had joined the service, it cannot be said that Satish Chandra has given up the idea of doing his own business in the suit premises. The suit had been pending since 1971 and now we are in 1986. It is not expected that a person who wants to start his business in the suit premise should sit idle for all the time to come and should not accept any job so as to meet his two ends and wait for the ultimate result of the litigation. The case of M. M. Quasim (supra) is quite distinguishable. In that case, the landlord had some other vacant premises in his possession, and therefore, the Supreme Court had occasion to observe that when the landlord could conveniently occupy some other alternative accommodation, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. The case of M. M. Quasim (supra) is quite distinguishable. In that case, the landlord had some other vacant premises in his possession, and therefore, the Supreme Court had occasion to observe that when the landlord could conveniently occupy some other alternative accommodation, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. In the present case, there is no evidence to show that the plaintiff had any other alternative accommodation where his son could carry on his business. It is true that the courts should not allow injustice to be prepetuated but the court's duty is to see that injustice is not done either to the landlord or to the tenant. It has to strike the balance and then come to a definite conclusion. In the present case, the respondent has moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 Civil Procedure Code and has produced some documents to show that the shop which was owned by the tenant appellant and which was occupied by some other tenant had been got vacated by the appellant during the pendency of the first appeal and he did not occupy his own shop, though the appeal was pending in this case; instead he sold his shop to somebody else during the pendency of this litigation. In reply to the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the appellant has not disputed this fact, but has explained that since he had to pay some debts, he had no option but to sell his own shop. 9. Be that as it may, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think that any injustice was being done to the tenant and therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact in this appeal. 10. In the result, this appeal is dismissed but looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own cost. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he has been occupying and carrying on his business in the suit premises for the last more than 30 years therefore, he should be granted reasonable time to vacate the suit premises. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he has been occupying and carrying on his business in the suit premises for the last more than 30 years therefore, he should be granted reasonable time to vacate the suit premises. I think in the interest of justice, he should be granted at-least four months' time to handover the vacant possession to the plaintiff-respondents, provided the appellant pays arrears of rent, if any, within one month from today and goes on paying rent regularly to the plaintiff respondents by 15th of each month and also file an undertaking in this court within one month from today to the effect that he will hand over vacant possession of the suit premises to the respondents on or before 31.12.1986.Appeal Dismissed. *******