JUDGMENT : S.P. Bharucha, J.—The petitioner joined the service of the Union of India in the Saman Bhandar Nirikshanalaya (Inspectorate of General Stores) in 1963 as a Viewer 'D' . On 6th May 1981 he was issued a notice informing him that his services were no longer required and that they would stand terminated on the expiry of a period of 3 months from the date of the service of the notice upon him. On 24th September 1981 the petitioner was served with an order which stated that his service stood terminated with effect from 5th August 1981. In the Daily Orders of the Inspectorate dated 9th September 1981, it was stated that, consequent upon reduction in the industrial establishment, the petitioner had been rendered surplus. 2. The petition seeks to quash the notice dated 6th May 1981 and the order dated 24th September, 1981. 3. It was submitted by Mr. Dharap, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the termination of the petitioner's services was, as the Daily Orders dated 9th September, 1981 showed, due to his having been rendered surplus. The petitioner was, therefore, retrenched. The requirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, had, admittedly, not been complied with. The termination of the petitioner's services was, hence, void ab-initio and he was entitled to an order of reinstatement with full back wages. 4. It was pointed out by Mr. Dharap that the petition expressly averred that the petitioner was covered by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the reply to this averment was only in the form of a denial. The affidavit in reply also says that the petitioner was governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, for the purpose of service conditions and not by the provisions of the said Act. 5. In the petition, there is an assertion that the Inspectorate is a factory registered under the Factories Act and that it is, therefore, an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the said Act. It is not disputed that the Inspectorate is a factory Registered under the Factories Act. 6. What was submitted by Mr. Master, learned counsel for the respondents, was that the Inspectorate belonged to the Defence Department, that it was not engaged in commercial production, and that it carried on a sovereign function of Government. It is not disputed that the Inspectorate is a factory Registered under the Factories Act. 6. What was submitted by Mr. Master, learned counsel for the respondents, was that the Inspectorate belonged to the Defence Department, that it was not engaged in commercial production, and that it carried on a sovereign function of Government. It was, therefore, not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the said Act. 7. Industry is defined by Section 2(j) of the said Act to mean any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or a vocation of workmen. u/s 2(s), workman is defined to mean any person employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, but does not include any person subject to the Air Force, Army and Navy Acts. 8. It is nobody's case that the petitioner is subject to the Air Force, Army or Navy Acts. 9. In the affidavit in reply to the petition nothing is stated which can lead to the conclusion that the Inspectorate carries on a function which falls outside the scope of the definition of industry under the said Act. Nothing is stated in that affidavit which can lead to the conclusion that the Inspectorate carries out any sovereign function of Government. 10. The Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and Others, noted in the context of Government's sovereign functions that there could not be a blanket exclusion of every employee engaged by Government. In departments falling under general rubrics like justice, defence, taxation legislature. Only those categories were excluded from the operation of the said Act as were primarily engaged and supportable employee in the discharge of an essential function of a constitutional Government. 11. It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner is covered by the provisions of the said Act and that, inasmuch as the prerequisites to retrenchment provided for by Section 25F were not satisfied, the termination of his service is bad ab-initio. 12. Mr. Master submitted that, assuming that the said Act was applicable, the petitioner's remedy lay in approaching the forum provided under that Act and not by way of a writ under Article 226. In Writ Petition No. 1434 of 1981, Gulam Mohd. 12. Mr. Master submitted that, assuming that the said Act was applicable, the petitioner's remedy lay in approaching the forum provided under that Act and not by way of a writ under Article 226. In Writ Petition No. 1434 of 1981, Gulam Mohd. Gulam Mustafa Salod v. Union of India, decided on 26th July, 1981, Pratap J. was concerned with the case of a Government servant who had obtained an award from the Labour Court. The relief claimed in the petition before the learned judge was not for setting aside the award but for setting aside the order by which the petitioner's services had been terminated. The learned Judge held that it was not necessary to challenge the award and drive a Government servant back to the Labour Court when it was open to him to challenge directly by way of writ petition the order terminating his services. Agreeing, with respect, with the aforesaid judgment, I have followed it in Writ petition No. 140 of 1982, Kishore B. Dave v. The Dean, J. J. Group of Hospitals. Accordingly, there is no merit in the submission that the petitioner cannot claim relief in this Court... 13. Mr. Master submitted that even if the orders terminating the petitioner's services were to be set aside, he should not be reinstated because there was presently no vacancy. I am afraid that is the last thing that will trouble the Court. The termination having been effected without complying with the mandatory requirements of law, the termination is bad ab-initio. The effect of declaring is that the petitioner is deemed to continue in service upto date and he becomes entitled to full back wages. 14. This petition was argued before me almost fully on 13th December, 1985. It was adjourned to see if some compromise could be worked out. That compromise not having been reached, it was heard by me again on 7th Feb., 1986 and the judgment was deferred till over the week end. Today, as I was on the point of commencing judgment, Mr. Master submitted that this was really a dispute covered by the Central Administrative Tribunal. It is not a dispute covered by the Central Administrative Tribunals Act as enacted. The advocates of the respondents have still not been able to produce before the Court a copy of the Ordinance amending this Act. Master submitted that this was really a dispute covered by the Central Administrative Tribunal. It is not a dispute covered by the Central Administrative Tribunals Act as enacted. The advocates of the respondents have still not been able to produce before the Court a copy of the Ordinance amending this Act. In all these circumstances, it would not be just or equitable not to deliver judgment. Since I decide in favour of the petitioner upon the first point argued by Mr. Dharap it is not necessary to deal with the other point made out in the petition or to set out the facts relevant thereto. The petition is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) with costs. Rule accordingly. Application for stay refused.