G. T. NANAVATI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is original complainant. He filed Criminal Case No. 542 of 1980 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class Limbdi against opponents No. 1 to 3 who are original accoused. It was alleged against the accused that they had produced false and fabricated documents on 28-9-1978 in the proceedings under the Gujarat Rural Debtors Relief Act 1976 (hereafter referred to as the Act) before the Debut Settlement Officer. The learned Magistrate framed a charge against the accused on the basis of these allegations. Thereafter the accused gave application Exh. 9 and contended that in view of sec. 196 (1) (b) (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereafter referred to as the Code) only the Court has power to file a complaint in such cases and as the present complaint was filed by a private individual it deserves to be dismissed. The learned Magistrate held that the Debt Settlement Officer is a Court within the meaning of that term as defined by sec. 195 of the Code and on that basis he further held that the complaint filed by the complainant was not maintainable. He therefore dismissed the complaint and acquitted the accused. That order is challenged by the petitioner in this revision application. ( 2 ) WHAT is urged by the learned advocate for the petitioner is that the learned Magistrate has committed an error in holding that the Debt Settlement Officer is a Court as defined by sec. 195 (1) (b) of the Code. For the purpose of appreciating this submission it will be necessary to refer to the relevant portion of sec. 195 of the Code which reads as under:"195 (1) No Court shall take cognizance: (a ). . . . . . . . (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) namely secs. 193 to 196 (both inclusive) 199 200 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 when such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court or (iii) of any offence described in sec. 463 or punishable under sec. 471 sec. 475 or sec. 193 to 196 (both inclusive) 199 200 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 when such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court or (iii) of any offence described in sec. 463 or punishable under sec. 471 sec. 475 or sec. 476 of the said Code when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court or (iv ). . . except on the complaint in writing of that Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. (2 ). . . . . . . . . (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1) the term Court means a Civil Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4 ). . . . . . Thus sub-sec. (3) of sec. 195 makes it clear that for the purpose of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 195 the Court means a Civil Revenue or Criminal Court and the said term also includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of sec. 195. It was not contended by either side that the Debt Settlement Officer is a Revenue or Criminal Court. But an attempt was made on behalf of the accused to contend that the Debt Settlement Officer would be covered within the scope and ambit of the term Court in view of the facts that the source of his power emanates from a statute the power entrusted to him is a judicial power he has all the essential attributes of a Court and the resultant or end product of the exercise of such power by him results in a binding decision between the parties. In support of this contention the learned advocate for the accused relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Shaikh Mohammedbhikhan v. Chandrabhanu Cinema 1985 G. L. H. 1076 (1986 (1) G. L. R. 1 ). In support of this contention the learned advocate for the accused relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Shaikh Mohammedbhikhan v. Chandrabhanu Cinema 1985 G. L. H. 1076 (1986 (1) G. L. R. 1 ). That case has arisen under the Contempt of Courts Act and the Industrial Disputes Act and in absence of any definition of the term Court it was held that so far as industrial tribunals and labour Courts constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned they are not full-fledged Civil Courts governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure but they can be considered to be judicial authorities covered under the wider sweep of connotation of the word Court as found in the Contempt of Courts Act. Obviously that decision can have no application to the facts of this case because the term Court is defined by sec. 195 itself for the purpose of that section. The Debt Settlement Officer is obviously not a Civil Court nor is he a revenue or a Criminal Court. Gujarat Rural Debtors Relief Act confers on the Debt Settlement Officer powers as are vested in the Courts in respect of certain things as provided by sec. 18 of the said Act. It is also true that under sec. 20 of the Act all the proceedings before the Debt Settlement Officer are deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of secs. 193 210 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Nonetheless it is a fact that the Act does not declare the Debt Settlement Officer to be a Court for the purposes of sec. 195 of the Code. The Debt Settlement Officer does not fall within the term Court as defined by sec. 195 (3) of the Code. Therefore in absence of any such provision in the Act it cannot be said that the Debt Settlement Officer is a Court for the purpose of sec. 195 (1) (b) of the Code. ( 3 ) SIMILAR view has been taken by this court in respect of the Tribunal constituted under the Gujarat Secondary Education Act 1972 in Criminal Revision Application No. 552 of 1979 decided on 8-2-1980 reported in (1581) XVIII G. L. T. 151 (Arvind C. Pathak v. Sankalchand P. Desai ). ( 4 ) AS the Debt Settlement Officer is not a court as defined by sec. ( 4 ) AS the Debt Settlement Officer is not a court as defined by sec. 195 (3) of the Code the learned Magistrate committed an error in taking that view and dismissing the. complaint of the complainant. The judgment and order passed by him will have therefore to be set aside. ( 5 ) IN the result this revision application is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Limbdi in Criminal Case No. 542 of 1980 is set aside and the case is remanded to him with a direction to dispose of the same in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute. Revision allowed. .