Judgment :- 1. A question of jurisdiction and the applicability of the proviso to S.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure arises for determination in this Civil Revision Petition. The plaintiff filed the suit in the Sub Court, Alleppey, alleging that the defendant-company having a rubber estate in Pathanamthitta District, proposed to sell the estate at a very low price of Rs. 30,000/-and prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant-company and the Managing Director from disposing of or otherwise encumbering the plaint schedule property on that basis. Admittedly the office of the company was within the jurisdiction of the Alleppey Sub Court and the defendant also was residing within its jurisdiction. The property, however, is in Pathanamthitta District outside the jurisdiction of that court. 2. The defendants, therefore, contended that the Sub Court, Alleppey did not have jurisdiction to try the suit. That contention was raised as a preliminary issue and was considered by the trial court and was accepted. In appeal, however, the District Court found jurisdiction in the Alleppey Sub Court and allowed the appeal. 3. It is against this that this revision petition has been filed by the defendants. 4. S.16 of the C.P.C. reads thus: "16. Suits to be instituted where subject-matter situate. Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits (a) for the recovery of immovable property with or without rent or profits, (b) for the partition of immovable property, (c) for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon immovable property, (d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property, (e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property. (f) for the recovery of movable property actually under distraint or attachment, shall be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate: Provided that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant may, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience, be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, or in the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. Explanation. In this section "property means property situate in India." 5. Explanation. In this section "property means property situate in India." 5. S.16 of the C.P.C. provides that suits (a) for the recovery of immovable property, (b) for the partition of immovable property, (c) for foreclosure, sale or redemption of a mortgage of immovable property or a charge imposed upon an immovable property, (d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property, (e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property and (f) for the recovery of movable property actually under distraint or attachment, shall be instituted in the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate. However, there is a proviso which says that a suit to obtain relief respecting, or compensation for wrong to, immovable property, held by or on behalf of the defendant, can be filed not only in the court where the property is situate but also in the court where the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. If the relief sought can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant, the suit can, of course, be instituted in the court in whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate. In the present case, the property admittedly, is situate beyond the jurisdiction of the Alleppey Sub Court. Defendants, however, reside within that jurisdiction. The only question, therefore, is whether the relief claimed can be obtained entirely through the personal obedience of the defendants. One of the earliest decisions to consider this point is the decision reported in Arunachella Chettiar v. Muthiah Chettiar (XVII I. C. (1912) 758). It was a case where. the plaintiff asked for a declaration that the mortgages executed in favour of the defendants were invalid and the properties were outside the jurisdiction of the Sub Court though the defendants were residents within that jurisdiction. The court held thus:- "The proviso to S.16, Civil Procedure Code, has no application to such a case, as the relief is not one that can be rendered to the plaintiff by the personal obedience of the defendants". 6. In Mahadeo v. Ramchandra (AIR 1922 Bombay 188) it was observed thus: "...S.16 of the Civil Procedure Code, sub-section (e) and the proviso to the section. 6. In Mahadeo v. Ramchandra (AIR 1922 Bombay 188) it was observed thus: "...S.16 of the Civil Procedure Code, sub-section (e) and the proviso to the section. Sub-section (e) excludes from the jurisdiction of the Courts, outside whose local limits the property is situate, suits for compensation for wrong to such immovable property: and the word "wrong" refers to torts affecting immoveable property such as trespass, nuisance, infringements of easements, etc. The proviso makes it clear that even although a wrong to immoveable property is alleged, yet, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through the defendants personal obedience, then the suit can be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate, onin the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain. So that assuming for the moment that the suit was one for mesne profits relating to land in British India, and the land had been outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court at Belgaum, still if the decree directed something to be done which could be done through the personal obedience of the defendant, such as the payment of money, then the Belgaum Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit." 7. In Chellamma v. Bhogaraju (AIR 1933 Madras 436) the Madras High Court held that a suit by the vendor to enforce specific performance of a contract to purchase land is a suit for land within the meaning of S.16 and the proviso extended the section to a suit by the vendee. 8. The same view was taken subsequently by the Madras High Court in Muhammad Eusoof v. Subramanian Chettiar (AIR 1950 Madras 272). 9. In Panchanan v. Tarapada (AIR 1961 Calcutta 193) also the same view was taken when it was held thus: "The Indian Courts have jurisdiction to pass a decree for specific performance of a contract with respect to land situated in India even though the vendor is a party residing in Pakistan and a foreigner who never submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court in India but on whom writ has been served." 10. There is yet another decision of the Madras High Court in Pulickel Estates (1947) Ltd. v. Joseph ((1955) 2 M. L. J. 228). There is yet another decision of the Madras High Court in Pulickel Estates (1947) Ltd. v. Joseph ((1955) 2 M. L. J. 228). It was a case where the suit was filed at Ottapalam, claiming Rs. 28,000/- as damages for breach of contract to sell immovable properties. The contract was entered into in Madras but the sale did not take place. In the plaint there was also a prayer for the creation of a charge in favour of the plaintiff over the properties. Justice Balakrishna Aiyar in that case held that the defendant had no right to the property and the claim was only for money due to the plaintiff. The learned judge observed thus: "Though the disputes between the parties stemmed out of immovable property, the Court was not called upon to determine any fright or interest in immoveable property. Clause (d) does not, therefore, apply either. Clearly therefore S.16 has no application to the case". To the argument that even then, the proviso applied, the learned judge held thus: "The proviso to S.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure picks out certain categories of suit out of the categories provided in the principal section and provides that in respect of them a suit can be filed where the defendant resides. But those categories are limited to instances where the relief asked for can be entirely obtained by compelling the personal obedience of the defendant. In other words clauses (a) to (f) of S.16 of the Code take in six categories of cases. Out of these the proviso picks out cases or groups of cases in relation to which the plaintiff can be given complete relief by compelling the personal obedience of the defendant. The proviso therefore has not the effect of enlarging the scope of the principal section. It only engrafts an exception to the main clauses". 11. The later decision of the Madras High Court in m/s. Raghavan & Co. v. M/s. Rambilas Nandlal ((1965) I M. L. J. 313) is also relevant. The Head Note states: "The dominant principle underlying the enactment of the proviso to S.16 of the Civil Procedure Code, is that the relief sought can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant. v. M/s. Rambilas Nandlal ((1965) I M. L. J. 313) is also relevant. The Head Note states: "The dominant principle underlying the enactment of the proviso to S.16 of the Civil Procedure Code, is that the relief sought can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant. From this point of view the other criterion of 'immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant' mentioned in that proviso may not be so important in some cases and may justifiably be ignored. When the proviso is applied to S.16(e), namely, suits for compensation for wrong to immovable property the benefit of the proviso would have to be curtailed if the criterion of immovable property held by or on behalf of the defendant is to be strictly applied to such a case. Then the proviso will apply only to some cases such as compensation for wrong done to immovable property while the defendant is till in possession, say as lessee or mortgagee and would exclude the benefit of the proviso to a case where the defendant, after committing the wrong has surrendered possession of the property to the plaintiff. There is no reason in principle or in convenience as to why the benefit of the Proviso which is applicable to the first kind of cases where the defendant is till in possession on the date of the suit should be denied to a case where the defendant after committing the wrong has surrendered possession". 12. Chitaley in his exhaustive Commentaries and lucid analysis of the ingredients of S.16 of the Code states thus: "This proviso is based on the well-known maxim, equity acts in personam, whereby the Court looks to the fulfilment of its decree to the person of the defendant. The principle on which this maxim itself is based is that courts can give relief in suits respecting immovable property situate abroad by enforcing their judgments by process in personam, i. e. by arrest of the person of the defendant or by attachment of his personal property. But in order to do this it is essential that the defendant must either reside or carry on business or personally work for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court." 13. But in order to do this it is essential that the defendant must either reside or carry on business or personally work for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court." 13. It is contended on behalf of the appellants-defendants that the right claimed is in respect of immovable property situate outside the jurisdiction of the Alleppey court and any act done by the defendants with reference to that property can be enforced only in the Pathanamthitta court and no personal obedience can be enforced, in Alleppey and thus the proviso to S.16 has no application. 14. The counsel for the respondent-plaintiff contended that even if S.16(d) does not apply, the proviso is attracted as personal obedience of the defendant can be enforced in Alleppey. 15. It is not that all suits, in which some rights in respect of immovable property arise for determination, can be instituted only in the court in whose jurisdiction the immovable property is situate. There may be certain reliefs claimed respecting an immovable property, but which require the personal obedience of the defendant. In those cases, both the courts, where the defendant resides and where the property is situate, have jurisdiction. This is the plain object of the proviso. Thus a defendant in Kerala can be restrained from performing a dance in an auditorium in Delhi either by the Kerala or Delhi Court. 16. The section categorises suits which have to be filed in courts where the properties are situate. The proviso is not divorced from the main provision; and an alternate forum is provided under this proviso and thus it carves out an exception to the specific categories provided for, in the principal section. 17. The proviso to S.16 can apply only to those cases where the relief claimed can be personally enforced against the defendant even when the claim is in relation to an immovable property. Where there is an action "in personam" with reference loan immovable property, the personal relief can be enforced through court and the court in which that relief can be enforced in its entirely through the personal obedience of the defendant, gets jurisdiction to try the case notwithstanding the fact that the immovable property is situate outside its jurisdiction. Where there is an action "in personam" with reference loan immovable property, the personal relief can be enforced through court and the court in which that relief can be enforced in its entirely through the personal obedience of the defendant, gets jurisdiction to try the case notwithstanding the fact that the immovable property is situate outside its jurisdiction. The contention that the decree in such cases cannot be enforced and no action can be taken for disobedience of an injunction passed in such suit cannot be accepted for, the violation of a decree for injunction can be enforced by the court which granted the decree and against the person who committed disobedience. He can personally be proceeded against and his properties wherever they are can be attached for such disobedience. 18. I am, therefore, satisfied that in this case where the question relates only to an execution of a contract in future, the Alleppey court had jurisdiction to grant the relief to prevent the defendants from entering into that contract and it is a relief which can be obtained entirely through the personal obedience of the defendants. The lower court was, therefore, right in holding that the Alleppey court had jurisdiction and the trial court was wrong when it is stated that it had none. It was brought to the notice of the lower court, rightly, that after the filing of the suit, a new court has been established in Shertallai and therefore this suit stands transferred to Shertallai Sub Court from the Alleppey Sub Court. In the result, there is no merit in this revision petition. The C.R.P. is dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, no costs.