Judgment B.L. Yadav, J. 1. THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 14-12-1972 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation Kanpur, Camp at Orai (Jalaun) and the order dated 29-9-1974 passed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), Jalaun at Orai. 2. THE facts of the case lie in a narrow compass and they are these. Plot No. 171/2 (area 3.70 acres) was recorded in the basic year in the name of Respondent No. 3 Lalloo alias Shambhu and in the names of the petitioners as co-tenure holders. Respondent No. 3 claimed to have 1/2 share and the petitioners shall have the remaining share. An objection under Section 9-A (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short the Act) was filed by respondent no. 3 alleging that he was minor in 1956 and his real brother Sudama, who was then major, sold the land including his share by a registered sale-deed dated 20-6-1956 when in fact there was neither any legal necessity or benefit of the estate and the permission of the District Judge was also not obtained before the execution of the sale-deed, hence the sale-deed is void and liable to be cancelled to the extent of half share. Earlier a suit for cancellation of the sale-deed dated 20-6-1956 (Suit No. 243 of 1967) was filed by him to the extent of his half share and also relief for joint possession was claimed. That suit was decreed for the relief of joint possession by the judgment dated 26-2-69 and against that judgment and decree the appeal was filed by the petitioners which was dismissed by the judgment dated 30-9-1969 by the First Civil Judge, Orai and against that judgment and decree Second Appeal No. 2447 of 1969 was filed by the petitioners against respondent no. 3 and his real brother Sudama but that was ordered to abate by this Court under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act by order dated 22-11-1979. Thereafter the matter was taken up by the parties before the consolidation authorities. The petitioners, on the other hand, contested the case of respondent no. 3 and alleged that the sale-deed was legal and valid and that the claim of respondent no. Thereafter the matter was taken up by the parties before the consolidation authorities. The petitioners, on the other hand, contested the case of respondent no. 3 and alleged that the sale-deed was legal and valid and that the claim of respondent no. 3 was time-barred, that the second appeal was still pending in the High Court, hence the result of the civil suit was of no assistance to respondent no. 3 and that his objection was liable to be rejected. 3. THE Consolidation Officer by order dated 24-7-1972 dismissed the objection of respondent no. 3. He filed an appeal which was allowed by the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) by this order dated 29-9-1972 and the revision filed by the petitioners was dismissed by order dated 14-12-72. Against these two last orders the present petition has been filed. 4. THE learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that even though respondent no. 3 might have been minor on the date when the sale-deed was executed but nevertheless the sale-deed cannot be said to be void rather it shall be only voidable and in respect of such a sale-deed only the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the Consolidation Authorities have no jurisdiction as held in Gorakh Nath Dubey v. Hari Narain Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 and also in the Full Eench decision of this Court reported in Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna, 1976 AWC 412 (FB). THE second point urged was that the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 had been wrongly applied inasmuch as the sale-deed dated 20-6-1956 was prior to the enforcement of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (i.e. on 27-8-1956) and that Act was not retrospective in its operation nor. the same was applicable to the agricultural holdings, that the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed must have been filed within the three years from the date of attaining majority but no suit was filed, hence the claim of respondent no. 3 was time-barred. The learned counsel for respondent no. 3, on the other hand, urged that as the second appeal arising out of the suit filed by respondent no. 3 for cancellation of the sale-deed and joint possession was ordered to abate on 22-12-79 under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act, just to enable the consolidation authorities to decide the dispute between the parties. 3, on the other hand, urged that as the second appeal arising out of the suit filed by respondent no. 3 for cancellation of the sale-deed and joint possession was ordered to abate on 22-12-79 under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act, just to enable the consolidation authorities to decide the dispute between the parties. It cannot, therefore, be urged that only the Civil Court has jurisdiction. The order of abatement dated 22-12-79 has become final and was binding on the parties as the same was not challenged by the petitioners. He placed reliance on a Full Bench reported in Parag v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, 1984 AWC 1034 (FB). He further urged that the Consolidation Authorities have got jurisdiction and that in the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed the relief for the joint possession was also claimed. The relief for joint possession was held to be within time. In respect of a relief for joint possession the period of limitation was 12 years. The Civil Court has also held the suit for cancellation of sale-deed and joint possession to be within time. Record of that second appeal has been summoned and it has been perused in the presence of the learned counsel for the parties. 5. HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties the first point for determination is as to whether in respect of the plots contained in the sale-deed in favour of the petitioners for half share of Lallu, who was minor on the date of the execution of the sale-deed, the Consolidation Authorities or the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the controversy between the parties. Suffice it to say that in view of the dictum laid down in Gorakh Nath Dube v. Hari Narain Singh (supra) as also in view of the Full Bench decision reported in Ram Nath v. Smt. Munna (supra) it is clear that in respect of voidable sale-deed the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In the instant case the respondent no. 3 has already filed a suit for cancellation of the sale-deed and joint possession. That suit was decreed for cancellation of sale-deed and for possession by the trial court. The first appeal filed by the petitioners was dismissed and their second appeal was pending and abated under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act by order dated 22-12-79. 3 has already filed a suit for cancellation of the sale-deed and joint possession. That suit was decreed for cancellation of sale-deed and for possession by the trial court. The first appeal filed by the petitioners was dismissed and their second appeal was pending and abated under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act by order dated 22-12-79. The legal effect of that order of abatement was that the controversy between the parties has to be decided by the Consolidation Authorities as the same was no longer pending in the Civil Court. 6. IN Parag v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (Supra) a Full Bench of this Court has held that once an order of abatement under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act has been passed and proceedings consequent upon that order are also started, lateron it cannot be challenged that order under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act was incorrectly passed abating the suit. Rather the order under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act would be binding on the parties and would operate as res judicata inasmuch as the plea of res judicata applies between the parties in different stages in the same litigation. It is better to quote the relevant portions of Paras 31 and 32 (on page 1042) of Parag v. Deputy Director of Consolidation (Supra) :- " The principles of res-judicata applies as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court whether the trial court or higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the patties to re-agitate the matter again at subsequent stage of the same proceeding ". The order of abatement passed in the second appeal was not challenged at the instance of the petitioners, hence that was binding on them. It is not now open to them to challenge the order of abatement and to urge that in respect of voidable sale-deed the Consolidation Authorities have no jurisdiction. 7. COMING to the second submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the suit for cancellation of the sale-deed became time-barred and no relief can be granted to the respondent no. 3, as the limitation of three years was applicable for cancellation of sale-deed in view of Art. 93 or 91 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. But in the instant case the respondent no. 3, as the limitation of three years was applicable for cancellation of sale-deed in view of Art. 93 or 91 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. But in the instant case the respondent no. 3 claimed relief of joint possession as the principal relief, and the same relief was granted by the Civil Court. For a relief of joint possession the limitation was 12 years and not 3 years. In this view of the matter the relief claimed by the respondent no. 3 cannot be said to be time-barred. 8. AS regards the third submission that the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 were not retrospective and sale-deed was dated 20-6-1956 and the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act came into force on 27-8-1956. No doubt that the sale-deed was executed prior to 27th August, 1956 when the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act came into force and the same was not retrospective in its operation. But before the enforcement of this Act in such matters where the property of minor was sought to be alienated or compromised Order Thirty two (32) Rule 7 CPC was applicable. Even though provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply in terms to consolidation proceedings but its spirit or substance has to be made applicable to secure the ends of justice. In respect of the land of the minor if any transfer or compromise was sought to be made, the permission of the District Judge must have been obtained. In the present case the permission of the District Judge was not obtained. The sale-deed in question, cannot, accordingly be said to have been legally executed. This submission is equally devoid of substance. In view of the discussions made hereinbefore, I do not find any merits in the writ petition and the same deserves to be dismissed. 9. IN the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no orders as to costs. Petition dismissed.