JUDGMENT This is a second appeal by the unsuccessful defendant in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff landlords. 2. The premise, in suit, situated in Barabazar, Ranigunj originally belonged to one Dhirendra Nandi who had two sons Kanai and Ratan by his first wife and one son Radhanath by his second wife. The second wife and Kanai pre-deceased Dhirendra upon whose death in Aswin, 1361 B.S. the suit premises was inherited by Ratan, Jaladbatani, widow of Kanai and her three sons, each branch having a moiety share. Radhanath became insane during his boyhood and did not therefore, inherit the property. Thereafter Ratan, Jaladbarani and her three sons started realising rent from the defendant. In August, 1966 Ratan purchased the interest of Jaladbarani and her three sons in the suit premises and became the sole landlord of the defendant. 3. In June, 1967 Ratan, after service of the notice to quit, brought an action for ejectment of the defendant from the suit premises on the grounds of default in payment of rent and. reasonable requirement of the suit premises for his own occupation as fully set out in the plaint. 4. The defendant, while contesting the suit, challenged the validity of the notice to quit and also denied all the material averments in the plaint. The suit was decreed by the trial Court but on appeal by the defendant the appellate court, while upholding the validity of the notice, set aside the judgment and the decree of the trial court and remitted back the suit for retrial after taking additional evidence as to whether the plaintiff was in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation as contemplated by S. 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which, in the meantime, was enacted with retrospective effect by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969. 5. As against the order of remand plaintiff moved this court in revision and obtained a Rule. 5. As against the order of remand plaintiff moved this court in revision and obtained a Rule. At the time of hearing, the learned advocate appearing in support of the Rule submitted that save and except the findings of the courts below as to the validity of the notice to quit, be had no other objection to the order of remand and on such submission, the Rule was discharged with a direction to the trial Court for expeditious disposal of the suit. 6. After remand the suit was again decreed by the trial court which arrived at the finding that the suit premises was reasonably required by the plaintiff for his own occupation and that he was not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. On appeal by the defendant, the appellate court dismissed the appeal upholding the findings of the trial court, compelling the defendant to file this second appeal. Ratan died during the pendency of the suit and the present respondents are his heirs. 7. In assailing the judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court Mr. Dasgupta, appearing for the appellant, has canvassed the following points, namely,–– i) in determining the issue whether the suit premises is reasonably required by the plaintiff for his own occupation the lower appellate court not only misconceived and misunderstood the evidence on record but also overlooked a very material part of the evidence having bearing upon the issue; ii) the lower appellate court failed to take note of the fact that the case sought to be established during trial was completely at variance with the case made out in the plaint; iii) the lower appellate court fell into an error in holding, contrary to the decision of a Division Bench of this court, that since the plaintiff is living in a tenanted premises, his accommodation is not a reasonably suitable accommodation; and lastly iv) that the suit was incompetent under S. 13(3A) of the Act and was liable to be dismissed on that score alone. 8. In elaborating the points so taken, Mr. 8. In elaborating the points so taken, Mr. Dasgupta argues that though, in the plaint the case of the plaintiff was that he wanted to shift his place of business from his tenanted premises to the suit premises during trial there was a complete departure from the plaint case and evidence was led to the effect that the plaintiff intended to start a separate business for his second son in the suit premises. 9. Again, the reason for the contemplated new business, according to the evidence led during trial, was that the two sons of the plaintiff were at loggerheads but the admitted position is that they are jointly carrying on business of brass utensils under the name and style of "Nandi Brothers". This piece of material evidence, according to Mr. Dasgupta was completely overlooked by the lower appellate court resulting in the perverse finding that the two sons of the plaintiff could not pull on together and a separate business was required to be started for the second son. 10. It is further contended by Mr. Dasgupta that a monthly tenant governed by the Act enjoys sufficient immunity against eviction and that is why a Division Bench of this court has held that merely because the landlord is living in a tenanted premises that, by itself, cannot afford a ground for holding that he is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. The lower appellate court overlooked the above decision and committed a gross error in holding that the plaintiff has no reasonably suitable accommodation inasmuch as he is living in a tenanted premises. 11. In order to dispose of the points urged by Mr. Dasgupta, other than the point mentioned in Item No. (iv) above, it will be necessary to allude to paragraph 9 of the plaint where the facts and circumstances constituting reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff for his own occupation have been set out in details. 11. In order to dispose of the points urged by Mr. Dasgupta, other than the point mentioned in Item No. (iv) above, it will be necessary to allude to paragraph 9 of the plaint where the facts and circumstances constituting reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff for his own occupation have been set out in details. They may be summarized as under : a) the plaintiff has been carrying on business in a tenanted premises as a monthly tenant under the uncertainties of a monthly tenancy and the landlord has been insisting upon him to vacate the premises; b) the plaintiff has no premises in his khas possession where he can shift his business; c) the suit premises and the plaintiff’s place of business are both situated in the Barabazar area of Ranigunj town, the only place in the town where business of brass utensils is carried on; d) the two elder sons of the plaintiff who are sufficiently grown up are required to be engaged in separate businesses for augmenting the income of the family; e) for maintaining the peace and prosperity of the family the aforesaid two sons are to be established in separate businesses and necessary arrangements are also to be made for their separate residence with their respective families. 12. The above, according to the plaint case, are the facts and circumstances on account of which the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for his own occupation. 13. In view of the averments contained in paragraph 9 of the plaint it is not possible to hold that the plaintiff attempted to introduce a new case during trial by giving evidence to the effect that be intended to start a new business for his second son in the suit premises. Plaintiff's desire to start a new business for his second son has been specifically alleged in the above paragraph and, although, it has not been expressly mentioned therein that his two sons are at loggerheads, there are sufficient indications of an estrangement between them for which the plaintiff was anxious to see that they are established in separate businesses and live separately with their respective families. This, according to the plaintiff was absolutely necessary to maintain the peace and prosperity of the family. This, according to the plaintiff was absolutely necessary to maintain the peace and prosperity of the family. It is difficult to understand what more the plaintiff, as a father, could disclose to indicate that the relation between his two sons was not at all cordial and in the interest of the peace and prosperity of the family it was necessary to establish them in separate businesses and arrange for their separate residence with their families. I am therefore, unable to accept Mr. Dasgupta's contention that the plaint case and the evidence led during trial were completely different. 14. During argument Mr. Dasgupta has referred me to the evidence of Sukumar Ghosh (P.W.15) who slated in cross-examination that the aforesaid two sons of the plaintiff are jointly carrying on business of brass utensils in the plaintiff's tenanted premises under the name and style of "Nandi Brothers". It is, therefore, argued by Mr. Dasgupta that the story of an estrangement between the two brothers as deposed to by the plaintiff is nothing but a myth but, unfortunately, this material piece of evidence was completely overlooked by the appellate court. 15. Mr. Dasgupta's argument fails to take note of the fact that evidence is to be weighed and assessed in the light of the totality of circumstances and not piecemeal. During the trial after remand the plaintiff (P.W.6) stated as follows:- "The two brothers cannot jointly run the business as they are at daggers drown". He also spoke about the estrangement between his wife and the wife of his second son and his wife’s desire to live separately from her. The second son Banamali (P.W.7) deposed that though he and his elder brother are running the business under the name and style of "Nandi Brothers" it really belongs to his father and he wants to start a separate business of his own for which he has adequate funds. It is also in his evidence that he and his elder brother do not sit together at the place of business and that he visits the place only when his elder brother leaves the shop to take his meals. The totality of the circumstances emerging from the evidence, therefore, cannot leave any room for doubt that the two brothers cannot carryon the business together and to maintain peace in the family have to run separate businesses and should also be separate in mess and residence. The totality of the circumstances emerging from the evidence, therefore, cannot leave any room for doubt that the two brothers cannot carryon the business together and to maintain peace in the family have to run separate businesses and should also be separate in mess and residence. To establish estrangement between the two brothers it is not necessary to show that they openly fell out at the place of business or in the street so as to be seen and deposed to by others. 16. On a perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court I am satisfied that all these circumstances were carefully considered and no part of any material evidence was overlooked by it before reaching the conclusion, in agreement with the trial court, that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for his own occupation. 17. With regard to the third point Mr. Dasgupt has cited before me the decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Sonbati Devi v. Achyutanand Dey, reported in 87 CWN 278 where Their Lordships have held that in deciding the question of reasonable accommodation, the court is bound to decide, among other things, whether the present accommodation of the landlord is reasonably suitable. The court has also to consider whether the landlord's existing accommodation is appropriate or proper and whether it satisfies his requirement. It has also been observed that there is no reason to hold that regardless of other relevant facts, the possession of a premises by the landlord as tenant ought to be always considered as unsuitable and without more a landlord living in a tenanted premises would be entitled to recover possession of his own premises let out by him. According to the above decision, there must be a present threat of ejectment of the landlord. 18. Plaintiff deposed that the landlord was trying to dispose of the house in which he carries on business and insisting upon him to vacate the house. On the basis of the above evidence which was conceded by D.W.1, both the courts below held that the plaintiff's tenanted accommodation is not a safe one. 19. Mr. Dasgupta contends that there can be no basis for the above conclusion inasmuch as during this long 18 years during which the suits and the appeals have been pending, the landlord has not commenced any action for the plaintiff's ejectment. 19. Mr. Dasgupta contends that there can be no basis for the above conclusion inasmuch as during this long 18 years during which the suits and the appeals have been pending, the landlord has not commenced any action for the plaintiff's ejectment. To my mind, the question whether there is any present threat of the plaintiff's ejectment loses its importance on the face of a host of other circumstances referred to already which unerringly point out that the plaintiff's present accommodation is not appropriate or proper and cannot satisfy his requirements. The lower appellate court therefore, rightly held, concurring with the trial court, that the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for his own occupation and that he does not possess any reasonably suitable accommodation. There is absolutely no ground for disturbing any of the above findings. 20. That now takes us to the last point canvassed by Mr. Dasgupta. His contention is that although the plaintiff was a co-sharer landlord of the suit premise to the extent of his inherited one-half share, the remaining one-half share was acquired by him by purchase only on 12.8.66 (Sale Deed Ext. 1) that is, within three years preceding the institution of the suit. It is, therefore, strongly argued by Mr. Dasgupta that the suit was incompetent under S. 23(3A) of the Act and was liable to be dismissed on that score alone. Section 13(3A) is extracted below:–– "(3A). Where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (f) or clause (ff) of sub-s. (1) shall be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest." The Proviso to the Sub-section being unnecessary for our purpose is omitted. 21. It is the admitted position that the original plaintiff Ratan Nandi became the sole landlord of the suit premises on 12.8.66 that is, a little over ten months before the institution of the suit which was commenced on 29.6.67. The question, therefore, is whether in the above circumstance the suit came within the mischief of sub-s. (3A) quoted above and was liable to be dismissed on that score. 22. In repelling the above contention Mr. The question, therefore, is whether in the above circumstance the suit came within the mischief of sub-s. (3A) quoted above and was liable to be dismissed on that score. 22. In repelling the above contention Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the respondent vehemently argues that Ratan was already a co-sharer landlord and the acquisition of the remaining one-half share of Jaladbarani and her three sons only enlarged his interest in the suit premises but his status qua landlord remained the same as before. Therefore, sub-s. (3A) of S. 13 could have no application to the case. Mr. Mukherjee has relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Jagannath Sen v. Sriram Pasricha reported in 1975(1) CLJ 412 . On going through the decision I find that it has no direct bearing upon the point before us except that it lays down that a co-owner is as much an absolute owner as a sole owner is with reference to the interest held by him. 23. In my considered view, the opening words of Sub-s. (3A) namely, "where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer" refer only to a person who had no interest in the premises before the transfer that is, a transferee-landlord and not to a person who was already a co-sharer landlord of the tenant sought to be evicted as well as a co-owner of the premises itself. 24. The view that I have taken appears to be sufficiently fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1146 where the constitutional validity of sub-s. (3A) and also the retrospective effect given to it by the legislature were challenged. In deciding the questions Their Lordships elaborately discussed the object of the legislation and the social evil it sought to remove. In doing so, Their Lordships also alluded to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Bill, 1969 as well as the Ministers' speech at the time of introduction of the Bill in the legislature. I am extracting below some relevant portions of the judgment which, in my opinion, will clearly indicate the scope and applicability of sub-s. (3A). I am extracting below some relevant portions of the judgment which, in my opinion, will clearly indicate the scope and applicability of sub-s. (3A). "Indeed, for decades now, every State in India has on the statute book rent control law and what is more pertinent to the present case, tactics of circumvention have compelled the enactment of additional safeguards from time to time by vigilant statutory measures. West Bengal, a populous State, with an over-crowded city choked by the large human congregation in the country, enacted the basic Act whereby the plenary right of landlords to recover possession of their buildings was shackled in many ways. Industrial growth and other factors induced demographic congestion such as was witnessed in the urban areas of that State. Consequently, the legislature was faced with a fresh danger in the shape of ingenious transfers of ownership of buildings by indigenous but indigent landlords and the transferees resorting to eviction on a large scale equipped as they were with better financial muscles and motivated as they were by hope of speculative returns of buildings was countered by a legislative measure––the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969 (Act XXXIV of 1969) (hereinafter referred to as the amendment Act). By this legislation the new class of transferee landlords was subjected to a stringent trammel viz., that they should not sue for eviction within three years of the date of transfer (1148-1149)………………….Proceedings of legislature can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions, prevailing at or about the time of the enactment in question, which actuated the sponsor of the bill to introduce the same and the extent and urgency of the evil, sought to be remedied. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Bill, 1969, it is stated that it has been considered necessary that some mare reliefs should be given to the tenants against eviction. It is found from the speech of the Minister at the time of introducing the Bill in the legislature, that the problems of tenants are many; there are landlords of different kinds : there is one class-original owners who are the old inhabitants of the city : these owner-landlords are not affluent : they solely depend upon the rents received from the tenants. It has been ascertained from experience that two of the grounds of eviction namely, requirement of the premises for own use of the landlords and for the purpose of building and rebuilding, have been misused by the landlords. In the city of Calcutta and other words, there are millions of tenants who are left at the mercy of the landlords. In this background and after taking into account similar provisions in other States, it has been decided that some restriction ought to have been imposed upon transferee landlords prohibiting them from bringing ejectment suits against the tenants within three years from their purchase …………….(Page 1150)" 25. From what goes above, I am firmly of the opinion that the embargo imposed by sub-s. (3A) can never apply to the present case. Ratan, as has been seen, was already a co-sharer landlord of the defendant and also a co-owner of the premises to the extent of a moiety share. The purchase of the remaining moiety share of Jaladbarani and her three sons had merely the effect of enlarging his interest both as a co-sharer landlord and as a co-owner of the premises. Other than enlargement of his interest the transfer did not bring about any change in his status vis-a-vis the tenant. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that he acquired his interest in the suit premises as a landlord by purchase. In view of the foregoing discussions I find myself unable to accept the contention of Mr. Dasgupta that the suit was hit by sub-s. (3A) of S. 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and was liable to be dismissed. 26. For the foregoing reasons there appears to be no substance in the appeal and it must fail. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court are affirmed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.