Saikia, J.- This revision under Rule 34 of the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in the Naga Hills Distrait is from the order dated 19.8.78 of the Additional Deputy its Commissioner, Mokokchung passed in an appeal which was of from the judgment of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Mokokchung. 2. The plaintiffs - petitioners instituted a declaratory suit in Dobashi' s Court at Mokokchung claiming, inter alia, that " they being legal heirs of the clan were eligible to use the names 'Wazatipongla' and 'Jamtisungla' and that the defendants - re­spondents were not entitled to use the said names. The Dobashi's court have in decided against the plaintiffs petitioners. They preferred an appeal under Rule 31 of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Naga Hills District (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Mokokchung having reason to doubt the justice of the/decision, decided that the case be tried de the novo, and transferred it to the Court of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Mokokchung to try it de novo and the learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner by his judgment & 51 dated 18.1.78 dismissed the suit with costs. From the judgment the of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, the plaintiffs - petitioners appealed under Rule 34 of the Rules to the Add­itional Deputy Commissioner who dismissed the appeal on 19. DJ 8.78 as time barred. The plaintiff-petitioners have come in this by revision against the said dismissal under the same Rule 34 of the Rules. 3. From the judgment the of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, the plaintiffs - petitioners appealed under Rule 34 of the Rules to the Add­itional Deputy Commissioner who dismissed the appeal on 19. DJ 8.78 as time barred. The plaintiff-petitioners have come in this by revision against the said dismissal under the same Rule 34 of the Rules. 3. When this petition was moved before a Single Bench of fed my learned brother Hansaria, J. at Kohima on 7.8.80 the following questions were found to have been involved in the peti­tion, namely, whether, after an appeal has been preferred to the Deputy Commissioner or the Additional Deputy Commissi­oner under Rule 31 of the Rules, the court could transfer the case to his Assistant as was the practice in vogue instead of trying it itself; whether such de novo disposal by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner or for that matter by the Additional Deputy Commissioner himself would be an orig­inal or appellate proceeding; and after such de novo disposal by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, whether an appeal shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner under the second part of Rule 34 or a revision would lie under the first part of the same Rule. This was considered to be important because for revision no period of limitation has been prescribed, whe­reas an appeal has to be preferred within 30 days "excluding the time required for obtaining a copy of the decision". Notice was issued to the learned Advocate General, Nagaland to ass­ist the Court as Amiens Curiae and the case was transferred from Kohima to the principal seat where a Division Bench issued Rule on, 18.9.80. 4. On 16.8,80 the petitioners filed an application for amend­ment of the petition and on 20.2.81 it was ordered to be taken up at the time of hearing. It is stated in the petition that at the time of filing the revision petition the petitioners' represe­ntative could not properly instruct their counsel, but after pe­rusing the records it was considered necessary to add the pro­posed paragraphs 13A to 13D and 17A to C and grounds V and VI in the petition for the ends of justice. The opposite parties have filed counter, but have not opposed the amendm­ent prayer at the hearing. Hence the amendment is allowed. 5. We have heard Mr. The opposite parties have filed counter, but have not opposed the amendm­ent prayer at the hearing. Hence the amendment is allowed. 5. We have heard Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, the learned Advocate General, Nagaland on the aforesaid questions of law and on interpretation of Rules 31 and 34 of the Rules. Rule 3t of the Rules reads: "31. An appeal shall lie from the decision of the mauzadar, gaonbura, chief, headman of a khel or other duly recognised village authorities (to the tribal court whenever constituted or otherwise) to the Deputy Com­missioner or his Assistant. A record shall be made of the matter in dispute and the decision of the village authorities. If necessary, the Court shall examine the parties, and, if the decision appears to be just, shall affirm and enforce it as one of its. If the Court sees reason to doubt the justice of the decision, it will try the case de novo, or refer it to a panchayat as above." (Emphasis added) 6. On the first question, the learned Advocate General sub­mits that though Rule 31 provides that "it will try the case de novo", as a matter of long standing practice in vogue, the Deputy Commissioner or the Additional Deputy Commissioner, once he holds that it is a fit case where there should be de novo trial, he may, instead of so trying it himself, transfer the case for such trial to the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, (for short, the Assistant to D. C.) and that un­less the Rule is thus interpreted, the Deputy Commissioner may be required to try all the de novo cases himself. As regards, the power of transfer to the Assistant to D. C., the learned Advocate General submits that a de novo proceeding being a new proceeding, under Rule 23 the Assistants to D. C. are aho entrusted with the administration of civil justice in Naga Hills, now State of Nagaland. Besides, S. 24 C. P. C. also empowers the District Court of its own motion to transfer a case. 7. Mr. N. N. Saikia, the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submits that under Rule 31 a de novo trial does not mean a fresh case and in the instant case the de novo trial was also held by the Assistant to the D. C. who was also in­cluded among the appellate authorities under Rule 31. Mr. 7. Mr. N. N. Saikia, the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submits that under Rule 31 a de novo trial does not mean a fresh case and in the instant case the de novo trial was also held by the Assistant to the D. C. who was also in­cluded among the appellate authorities under Rule 31. Mr. R. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submits that the plaintiffs' case before the Dabishi court was dismissed and thereafter they appealed to the Deputy Commissioner under Rule 31 and the Deputy Commissioner having failed to in­duce the parties to refer the case to Panchayat, directed de novo trial and transferred the case to the Assistant to D. C. before whom fresh written statements were examined afresh. 8. The relevant provision in Rule 31 is that "If the Court sees reason to doubt the justice of the decision, it will try the case de novo, or refer it to Panchayat as above". In this case there was no reference to a Panchayat and hence after the appellate Court saw reason to doubt the justice of the decision, it decided that the case be the de novo. Thus, only after the justice of the decision was doubted, the decision that the case be tried de novo, was taken. 'De novo' means afresh, anew, starting again. In Black's Law Dictionary the meaning of 'hearing de novo' is given as : "Generally, a new hearing or a hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire trial in same manner in which matter was originally heard and a review of previous hearing. On bearing 'de novo' court hears matter as court of original and not appellate juri­sdiction". Thus, de novo hearing is decided when the earlier hear in is taken to be of no consequence or legal effect. A de novo hearing has, therefore, to be held as a fresh hearing from the beginning. This interpretation is in conformity with the provision in Rule 31. We, therefore, held that a de novo proceeding held as ordered under Rule 31 of the Rules will be an original proceeding for all purposes and must be treated as such. 9. A de novo hearing has, therefore, to be held as a fresh hearing from the beginning. This interpretation is in conformity with the provision in Rule 31. We, therefore, held that a de novo proceeding held as ordered under Rule 31 of the Rules will be an original proceeding for all purposes and must be treated as such. 9. As regards the transfer of a case to the Assistant to the D. C. for de novo trial, we are inclined to agree with the learned Advocate General and hold that and novo trial moored under Rule 31 being an original or frosh proceeding the Assistant to D, C. is competent to hold de novo trial as also the Deputy Commissioner himself. Though there is no specific power of transfer of cases in the Rule, S. 24 C P. C. empowers the District Court to transfer a case as provided therein. It may also be said that the entrustment of a de novo trial is not strictly speaking a transfer. There can, therefore, be no bar to the entrustment of the de novo trial to an Assistant to the D. C, The learned Advocate General has stated that such entrustment has been the practice in vogue since a long time and is based on the reason that otherwise the Deputy Commissioner himself shall be required to try all cases where justice in the decisions was doubted. Curses curiae settle curiae. Every court is the guardian of its own records and master of its own practice; and where a practice has existed, it is convenient, except in cases of extreme urgency and nece­ssity, to adhere to it, because it is the practice, even though no reason can be assigned for it. In the instant case a reason, and a cogent one, has been assigned in support of the long standing practice. Again, amnis innovatio plus no date perturbed utilities proudest. Every innovation occasions more harm by its novelty; then benefit by its utility. Whenever a standing rule of law, of which the reason, perhaps, could not be rera-rabered or discerned, has been wantonly broken in upon by statutes or new resolutions, the wisdom of the rule has in the end appeared from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation; and the sages of law have therefore always sup­pressed new and subtle inventions in derogation of the common law. A change in the practice may result in inconveniences. The rules have been in existence since 1936 and were revised in 1937. Though the Rule itself uses the expression "it will try the case de novo", in view of the long standing practice in vogue and the inconveniences likely to result from the strict adherence to those provisions, we agree with the learned Ad­vocate General and hold that such entrustment of a case to the Assistant to the D. C. for de novo trill, is valid. There was, therefore, no infirmity in the transfer of the instant case to the Assistant to D. C. 10. De novo proceedings being thus an original proceeding both the remedies under Rule 34 would be available to the aggrieved party. Rule 34 reads: "34. The High Court or Deputy Commissioner may, on application or otherwise, call for the proceedings of any case decided by any officer subordinate to him and pass such order as he may deem fit. An appeal shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner ag­ainst the decision of any of his Assistants (and of any tribal Court) and to the High Court against an original decision of the Deputy Commissioner, if the value of the suit be Rs. 500/- or over, or if the suit involves a question of tribal rights or customs, or of right, or possession of immovable property; Provided that the petition of appeal accompanied by a copy of the order appealed against and by a clear st­atement of the grounds of appeal be filed within 301 days from the date of decision excluding the time required for obtaining a copy of the decision. An appeal which lies to the High Court may be presented to the Deputy Commissioner, who shall, if it be in order and presented in due time endorse upon it the date of receipt and transmit it with the records of the case to the High Court. The decree of the appellate court shall be transferred to the Court passing the original order for execution as a decree of its own." 11. The learned Advocate General submits that the second part of the Rule confers a statutory right of appeal to the aggrieved party who can appeal as of right. This part of the Rule has to be given full fore and proper importance. The learned Advocate General submits that the second part of the Rule confers a statutory right of appeal to the aggrieved party who can appeal as of right. This part of the Rule has to be given full fore and proper importance. However, under the first part of Rule 34, the High Court or the Deputy Commissioner is conferred the revisional power which can bi exercised 'on application or otherwise' by calling for the procee­ding of any case decided by any officer subordinate to him and the revisional court may pass such order as it may deem fit. Thus a discretion is conferred on the revision authority in order that no injustice results. The Rule does not say that revision does not lie where appeal lies. In other words, the right of revision and the right of appeal are not mutually exclu­sive. The learned Advocate General submits that the revisional power needs be understood to be as broad as the appellate power itself. Besides, no appeal lies if the value of the suit be below Rs. 500/- or if the suit does not involve the question of tribal rights or custom or of possession of immovable property. 12. In Ka Idis Mary Khar Kongor vs. Ka Theirit Lyngdoh, AIR 1959 Assam and Nagaland 92 (Full Bench), interpreting Rule 36 of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, which is in pari materla with Rule 34 of the Rules, it has been held that the High Court has very wide power in the matter of revision and it can go into facts like an appellate court. Their Lordships observed at para 10 : "It is now well settled that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in Civil matters under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code can be invoked only when there is a ques­tion of exercising or not exercising or illegally exercising juris­diction. Thus the power of the revisional authority under this section is very limited. The question is whether following the spirit of this section, the High Court should confine itself only to the question of jurisdiction in a civil revision under Rule 36. But for the reasons given above, the answer to this question is in the negative. The High Court may exercise the same powers under Rule 36 as in the case of a first appeal. But for the reasons given above, the answer to this question is in the negative. The High Court may exercise the same powers under Rule 36 as in the case of a first appeal. Under this Rule the revising authority may pass any order as it may deem fit. If this be so, there is no reason why the revising authority should not be competent to depreciate the evidence and pass an order setting aside the appreciation made by the lower authority". There is an important difference between remedy by way of revision and remedy by way of an appeal under Rule 34. While an appeal has to be filed within 30 days from the date of decision, excluding the time required for obtaining a copy of the decision, no limitation is prescribed for revision. 13. A question may arise as to whether the aggrieved party should be allowed to resort to the remedy of revision without resorting to the remedy by way of appeal. The learned Advocate General submits that in the absence of any such provision in the Rules imposition of such a restriction would not be justified. We are inclined to agree. In the absence of any speci­fic provision in the Rules it would not be permissible to lay down that where appeal lay the revision will not lie. Both the remedies are provided in the Rules. Another question may also arise whether the revisional power of the High Court sho­uld be resorted to where appeal did to the Deputy Commi­ssioner but was not filed. In Makharia Brothers vs. State of Nagaland and others, (1984) 2 Gauhati Lau Reports 276, lear­ned brother Hansaria, J. held that the direct approach to the High Court or the Deputy Commissioner under the first part of the Rule 34 is not inhibited by the provisions of appeal provided in the second part. 'The direct approach to the High Court might have been advisedly incorporated" in the Rules to give it a large supervisory power over all the judicial procee­dings. It may be pointed out that these Rules had been framed long before such a power came to be conferred on the High Court by Article 227 of the Constitution". I agree with this view. 14. It may be pointed out that these Rules had been framed long before such a power came to be conferred on the High Court by Article 227 of the Constitution". I agree with this view. 14. Rule 36 of the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937; Rule 39 of the Rules for the Administration of Justice in the North Cachar Hills Subdivision, 1937; Rule 34 of the Rules for the Administra­tion of Justice and Police in the Sibsagar, Njwgong and Mikir Hills Tracts, 1937; Rule 35 of the Rules for the Administra­tion of Justice and Po ice in the Garo Hills District, 1937; Rule 18 of the Rules for the Regulation of the Procedure of Officers appointed to Administer Justice in the Lushai Hills, 1937 are part materia. 15. The question may arise as to whether once having resorted to Rule 34 by way of appeal or revision before the Deputy Commissioner, further appeal or revision to the High Court will lie ? We are of the view that if the party already appealed under Rule 34, the remedy by way of revision under the first part of the Rule to the High Court will still be availa­ble. On the other hand if the party directly approached the High Court either in appeal or revision under the Rule, no further remedy will be available in the High Court. In case of direct approach to the High Court learned brother Hansaria, J. would like to add the following reasonable rider : "Though the High Court can be approached against any decision of any subordinate officers, it would be within the discretion of the Court whether to entertain the same or not, if an appeal, where lies, has not been preferred. While deciding this aspect, the court may have to consider the status of the parties, the point involved, the importance of the subject matter, the time taken in approaching, the reason for not preferring appeal, and such other relevant factors". However, the Court should bear in mind that direct approach is not inhibited by the provi­sion in order that no injustice results. 16. Coming to the impugned order dated 19.8.78 we find that the Assistant to D. C. dismissed the petitioner's suit on 18.1.78. However, the Court should bear in mind that direct approach is not inhibited by the provi­sion in order that no injustice results. 16. Coming to the impugned order dated 19.8.78 we find that the Assistant to D. C. dismissed the petitioner's suit on 18.1.78. Application for the copy was filed on 10.2.78 and espy was issued by Court on 18.5 78 and the appeal was filed on 17.6.78 under Rule 34. It was urged before the Additional De­puty Commissioner that the appeal was barred by time as the period of 21 days from 18.1.78 to 10.2.78 would not be exclu­ded it being not time required for obtaining a copy and the appeal should have been filed within 27.5.78 where it was filed on 17.6.78. Admittedly no decree was prepared and as such it could not be said that the application for copy would be within time as no decree was prepared till then. 17. Mr. N. N. Saikia submits that in view of the provi­sion in Rule 34 to exclude the time taken to obtain a copy the period of 21 days from 18.1.78 to 10.2.78 is to be included within time required for obtaining copy. We find the submission not tenable. Admittedly the Limitation Act, 1963 was app­licable in Nagaland at the relevant time. The Limitation Act, 1963 received the assent of the President of India on 5th Octo­ber, 1963 and it was published in the Gazette of India on 5th October, 1963. The Act came into force from 1st January, 1964, vide Notification No. S.O.3J18 dated the 20th October, 1963 (Vide Gazette of India Pt. II Sec. 3(ii) Sec. 9). The Naga­land Code Schedule VI gives the list of Central Acts in force in erstwhile Naga Hills-Tuensang Area immediately before 1st December, 1963. It includes the Limitation Act, 1963, "in force proprie vigore in all the districts". There is, therefore, no do­ubt about application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the ins­tant case. However the provision ' excluding the time required for obtaining a copy of the decision" appears in Rule 34 itself de hors the Limitation Act, 1963. Similar provision is contained in Section 12 of the Limitation Act which provides : “12. (I) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such pe­riod is to be reckoned shall be excluded. Similar provision is contained in Section 12 of the Limitation Act which provides : “12. (I) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such pe­riod is to be reckoned shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appeal­ed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded shall also be excluded. Thus under the above provisions in computing the period of limitation for an appeal, the following periods shall be excluded (a) the day on which the period begins to run; (b) the day on which the judgment was pronounced; (c) the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order; (d) the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment. 18. It is settled law that time "required" means time "pro­perly required". Time "requisite" also means "properly requir­ed", and it throws upon the party the burden of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default as was held in T.N. Surty v. Chettiar, AIR 1928 P. C. 103. The words 'requisite' and 'obtaining' mean that some definite step should be taken by the appellant towards the attainment of the copy. The appellant ought to be diligent in applying for copies of the judgment and decree. Time requisite means the time bey­ond the appellant's control occupied by the copyist department after an application for copy has been duly made. The time of putting in the requisites after notification has also to be seen. Time requite for obtaining a copy ends on the date when the copy is ready for delivery aid not when the applicant act­ually takes delivery. The time of putting in the requisites after notification has also to be seen. Time requite for obtaining a copy ends on the date when the copy is ready for delivery aid not when the applicant act­ually takes delivery. In other words, "time requisite means only the interval between the time when the copy is applied for and the time when it is ready for delivery, excluding time taken by the applicant to file requisites after notice. 19. Under O. 41 R. 1 the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and unless the appellate court dispenses therewith of the judgment on which it is founded. Thus every memorandum of appeal has to be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from. Copy of the decree means certified copy of the decree. Where a decree has been prepared, the court is not to grant exempt­ions from filing of the copy of the decree. There may, howe­ver, be circumstances where an appeal may be competent even though a copy of the decree may not have been filed e. g. where at the time where the appeal is filed the decree has not been prepared by the court, or where the court did not frame a formal decree. See Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal, 1967 SC 1470 (1472). 20. Where a decree has been prepared, and a party applies for copies of judgment and of decree at different times, the aggregate of the periods may be deducted in sub-sec (2) of S. 12 of Limitation Act. Tae appellant is entitled to apply for the two at different times and entitled to exclusion of bath periods. The date of decree for the purpose of the Limitation Act is the date of judgment. But if the decree appealed from is signed on a date subse­quent to the date of delivery of judgment, the period between the date of the judgment and the date of signing the decree shall not be excluded, unless the appellant has applied for a copy of the decree before it is signed and has been delayed by reason of the decree not having been signed. Time requisite for copy does not begin until an application for a copy has been made, and the period during which the decree remained unsigned, i.e. the period between the of judgment and the date of signing the decree, cannot be excluded unless the application for a copy of the decree has been made before it is signed. Where no application was made before the decree was signed he cannot ask the court to deduct the period be­tween date of judgment and signing of the decree. (See AIR 1977 SC 2319 ). These are simplified principles to be borne in mind in determining limitation in appeals. 21. In the instant case the certified copy of the judgment of the learned Assistant to D.C. has not been annexed to the petition. It is not definitely known whether the decree was not prepared at all or was prepared after the appeal was filed or the court could not draw up any decree because of the nature of the dispute. Under the circumstances the time required for obtaining copy of the decree cannot be calculated. It is also not clear whether any application was made for obtaining copy of only the last paragraph of the judgment in the spirit of O. 20 R. 6A of the C.P.C. In computing the time required for obtaining a copy, this provision may also be relevant. 22. O. 20. R. 6A, C.P.C. provides : "(1) The last paragraph of the judgment shall state in precise terms the relief which has been granted by such judgment. 22. O. 20. R. 6A, C.P.C. provides : "(1) The last paragraph of the judgment shall state in precise terms the relief which has been granted by such judgment. (2) Every endeavour shall be made to ensure that the decree is drawn up as expeditiously as possible, and, in any case, within fifteen days from the date which the judgment is pronounced : but where the decree is not dra­wn up within the time aforesaid, the Court shall if requ­ested so to do by a party desirous of appealing against the decree, certify that the decree has not been drawn up and indicate in the certificate the reasons ibr1 the delay, and thereupon- (a) an appeal may be preferred against the decree without filing a copy of the decree and in such a case the last paragraph of the judgment shall, for the purposes of Rule 1 of Order XL7, be treated as the decree; and (b) so long as the decree is not drawn up, the last paragraph of the judgment shall, be deemed to be the decree for the purpose of execution and the party interested shall be entitled to apply for a copy of that paragraph only without being required to apply for a copy of the whole of the judgment; but as soon as a decree is drawn up, the last paragraph of the judgme­nt shall cease to have the effect of a decree for the purpose of execution or for any other purpose : Provided that, where an application is made for obta­ining a copy of only the last paragraph of the judgment, such copy shall indicate the name and address of all the parties to the suit." 23. While referring to the spirit of the above provisions of O. 20 R. 6A we are aware of the provision in Rule 35 of the Rule, namely, that the High Court and the Court of the Deputy Commissioner shall be guided by the spirit, but not be bound by the letter, of the Code of Civil Procedure. 24. For the foregoing reasons we set aside the impugned order and send back the appeal to the Additional Deputy Com­missioner for disposal in accordance with law. 24. For the foregoing reasons we set aside the impugned order and send back the appeal to the Additional Deputy Com­missioner for disposal in accordance with law. The Court shall allow the appellant to file an application under the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, if he so likes, and the respond­ents to oppose such application if they are so advised. After hearing the parties if the delay is condoned, it shall decide the appeal in acceptance with law. We leave the parties to-bear their own costs of this revision.