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1986 DIGILAW 544 (ALL)

Madan Industries Ltd. v. Notified Area Committee, Hastinapur

1986-08-07

B.D.AGARWAL

body1986
ORDER 1. Hastinapur Town Development Board Act 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted by the State Legislature with the object to provide for the establishment of a Town Development Board at Hastinapur for the purpose of constructing and developing a township and settling therein displaced persons. The Hastinapur Town Development Board (in short, Board) was constituted under S. 1(3) of this Act. Section 1(3) of the Act provided : "(3) It shall cease to have effect on the expiry of December 31, 1968 except as respects things done or omitted to be done before that date and Sec. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904 shall apply upon the expiry of this Act, as if it had then been repealed by an Uttar Pradesh Act." 2. Power was conferred under S. 14 of the Act to the Board to impose taxes. S.14 read as under : "14. Power of the Board to impose taxes - (1) The Board may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, impose in the area of operation all taxes which a Municipal Board is authorised to impose under Chapter V, of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916, in accordance with the procedure and subject to the restrictions and conditions specified (2) Any tax imposed under sub-section (1) shall have effect from the date of its notification in the Official Gazette and shall, as far as may be, recovered in the manner provided in Chapter VI of the said Act." 3. On January 1, 1964 the Board with the previous sanction of the State Government, in exercise of powers under S. 14(1), issued Notification imposing with effect from January 1, 1964, a tax on the annual value of all buildings or lands or both situated within the area of operation of the Board at the rate of 10% of such value. The Board was dissolved by the State Government in consultation with the Central Government as contemplated under S. 41 of the Act by issuing Notification dated December 30, 1968. On the same date that is December 30, 1968 the State Government issued another Notification under S. 337 of the U.P. Municipalities Act whereby the provisions contained in Chapter XII of the Municipalities Act were extended to this area with effect from January 1, 1969. On the same date that is December 30, 1968 the State Government issued another Notification under S. 337 of the U.P. Municipalities Act whereby the provisions contained in Chapter XII of the Municipalities Act were extended to this area with effect from January 1, 1969. For purposes of assessment and recovery of tax the State Government appointed a Committee on May 17, 1969 under S. 338(2)/1(c) of the Municipalities Act. 4. The petitioner, a private limited company, owns a building besides land at Hastinapur where it runs a Spinning Mill. Notice dated May 17, 1970 was issued to the petitioner by the Notified Area Committee under S. 142 of the Municipalities Act intimating that the valuation has been estimated at Rs. 2,32,600/- in respect of the building and the land aforesaid and that objection, if any, may be filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of notice. Objections were filed by the petitioner on June 12, August 16, and December 5, 1970. The Notified Area Committee considered the objections and after giving a hearing to the petitioner made the assessment under order dated December 19, 1970. The annual value of the building and the land in question was thereunder estimated at Rs. 30,65,585/- and the tax assessed accordingly was Rs. 15,328/-. Against this the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Prescribed Authority under S. 160 of the Municipalities Act. The appeal was dismissed on March 13, 1973. Aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking that the order made by the Notified Area Committee dated 19th December, 1970 and the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 13th March 1973, be quashed by a writ of certiorari. Mandamus has been claimed also for direction to the opposite parties not to levy, assess or demand house tax from the petitioner. 5. Sri R. N. Bhalla, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that since the Act expired on December 31, 1968, and the Board was dissolved with effect from that date by Notification made by the State Government in consultation with the Central Government under S. 41 of the Act, the imposition of house tax through Notification dated January 1, 1964 by the Board ceased to be effective. In pursuance of the Notification made on January 1, 1964, it did not remain open to the Notified Area Committee, it is argued, to assess or realise the house tax since the Board stood dissolved and the Act itself was no longer alive. The submission, in my opinion, is devoid of merit. The Act was no doubt a temporary enactment. The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will, ipso facto, terminate as soon as the statute expires. The provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, in relation to the effect of repeal, do not ordinarily apply to a temporary Act. (Vide State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 : Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Bareilly, (1974) 1 SCC 202 at p. 216: AIR 1974 SC 396 at p. 404. It is said at the same time, however, that the Legislature can, and often does, avoid such anomalies by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision the effect of which is in some respects similar to that of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. Thus, if the repealing enactment makes a special provision regarding pending or past transaction, it is this provision that will determine whether the liability arising under the repealed enactment survives or is extinguished. So also, if there is a special provision made in the temporary Act the same will govern and override the general principle stated above. (Vide Bhupendra Kumar Bose (supra) : Qudrat Ullah (supra)). 6. Section 1(3) of the Act, we are concerned with, did contain the express provision quoted above to the effect that upon the Act ceasing to have effect on the expiry of December 31, 1968 the provisions relating to the repeal of an Act would apply except as respect things done or omitted to be done before that date, and S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act shall be applicable. This, thus, is an express provision which makes S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act applicable to the situation created due to the expiry of the temporary Act. This, thus, is an express provision which makes S. 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act applicable to the situation created due to the expiry of the temporary Act. Section 6(c) of the U.P. General Clauses Act lays down that where an enactment is repealed then unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. There is, in the present, no different intention appearing and rather S. 1(3) of the Act expressly makes S. 6 of the General Clauses Act applicable on the expiry of the temporary Act. Accordingly, the liability incurred under the Act which has long expired does not extinguish nor is the same affected adversely due to the expiry of the Act. 7. In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 , the Supreme Court observed that when the repeal of an Act is held by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the Court has to look into the provisions of the new Act, but this is only for the purpose of determination whether there is indicated a different intention. The line of inquiry would be not whether the new Act gives life to the old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. In Jindas Oil Mills v. Godhra Electricity Co., AIR 1969 SC 1225 , which Sri Bhalla cites for the petitioner, the distinguishing feature was that there was no question of any vested right being affected. There was no dispute that the charges fixed could be altered and the controversy related to the procedure to be adopted in making the alteration. This controversy did not touch any vested right and, therefore, it was held that the procedure in question must necessarily be regulated by the law in force at the time of the alteration of the charges. That decision is consequently of no assistance to the petitioner relating to the point at issue in the present where a liability was incurred prior to December 31, 1968 in view of the Notification made by the Board under S. 14 of the Act imposing the house tax with effect from January 1, 1964 and this liability is neither extinguished nor affected due to the Act having ceased to be operative on the expiry on December 31, 1968. Nor does the Full Bench decision in Tarak Chandra Mukherjee v. Ratan Lal Ghoshal, AIR 1957 Cal 257 relied for the petitioner, lay down any proposition to the contrary. In that case also at page 263 it was observed that the temporary Act will then have expired under its own terms and the position in regard to rights and liabilities, accrued and incurred under it before its repeal and in regard to proceedings under the Act respecting them, whether pending or intended, will then be as in the case of an expired temporary statute. It was further stated that whether or not such rights and liabilities can still be claimed and enforced and whether proceedings under the Act in regard to that can still be instituted or continued, will depend on the general incidents of temporary statutes and the construction of the particular Act. In this light also it will be recalled that the position in the present continues to be governed by. the express provision made in S. 1(3) of the Act read with S. 6(c) of the U.P. General Clauses Act. 8. For the respondents, Sri A.K. Sharma, the learned counsel, has invited reference to the Notification of the State Government dated March 1, 1968 issued under S. 338(1)(a) of the Municipalities Act whereby the provisions of S. 33A of this Act were extended to all Notified Areas. Section 338A lays down, inter alia, that where a Municipality is created in place of a Town Area or Notified Area, all taxes imposed on the date immediately preceding the creation of the Municipality be taken to have been imposed by the Board under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall, until modified or changed, continue to be realisable. This, in other words, means that upon the creation of a notified area all taxes imposed by the Board on the date immediately preceding January 1, 1969 when the Notified Area Committee came to be created, would be deemed to have been imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act and continue to be so realisable, until modified or changed. Thus flows from the Notification made on 1-3-1968 read with S. 333A(i) vide Annexure-II to the counter affidavit. Thus flows from the Notification made on 1-3-1968 read with S. 333A(i) vide Annexure-II to the counter affidavit. Consequently, despite the Board being dissolved and the Notified Area Committee having taken its place, the latter remained competent to assess, levy and realise the house tax in the said area the tax having been imposed earlier by the Board with effect from January 1, 1964 in pursuance of its Notification under S. 14 of the Act. 9. The other submission for the petitioner by his learned counsel has been that in estimating the valuation of the building and the land concerned the authorities have erred in not making deduction in respect of certain items. Section 140(1) of the Municipalities Act, relevant in this respect, provides, in so far as material, that in the case of factories, the annual value means a proportion not exceeding 5% to be fixed by rules made in this behalf of the sums obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building to the estimated value of the land appurtenant thereto. This is how annual value is to be estimated and there is no conflict between the parties on this principle. 10. The objections raised for the petitioner before the Notified Area Committee were in regard to the following items the value whereof was sought to be deducted : (a) Development expenses allotted to land. (b) Development expenses allocated to buildings. (c) Depreciation. (d) Mortgage expenses allocated to land. (e) Mortgage expenses allocated to building. (f) Fees paid to Architects, Surveyors etc. (g) False Ceiling. (h) Duct Room Insulation, water prooffings etc. (i) Fire Proof Doors etc. (j) Sanitary fittings. (k) Miscellaneous items not connected with the erection of buildings etc., copper plates, air tickets for the Architects, Inspection charges, testing charges etc. (1) Overhead tank and dust tower. (m) Humidificating ducts. (n) Return Air and supply Air Plenum. (o) Main Factory machinery foundation flooring. (p) Ring Frame underground ducts. (q) Humidification plant room partitioner and foundations. (r) Furnace Oil tank. (s) Cable trenches in corridor and deptts. (t) Underground Dust Cellar. (u) Cost of land unutilised so far. 11. Under the impugned order dated December 19, 1970 the Committee acceded to grant deduction in respect of Items (d), (e), (i), (o) and (r) only. For the rest the objections were turned down. (r) Furnace Oil tank. (s) Cable trenches in corridor and deptts. (t) Underground Dust Cellar. (u) Cost of land unutilised so far. 11. Under the impugned order dated December 19, 1970 the Committee acceded to grant deduction in respect of Items (d), (e), (i), (o) and (r) only. For the rest the objections were turned down. As a result the erection cost of the building came to be estimated at Rs. 30,65,565/- and at 10% the tax was calculated at Rs. 15,328/- only. There was thus relief given to the small extent since the tax assessed was fixed at Rs. 15,328/- in place of Rs. 23,360/- proposed. This was upheld by the Prescribed Authority in appeal also. He has taken note of the fact that Item (c) relating to depreciation was considered by the auditors in arriving at the valuation of the building. So far as Item (k) referred to above is concerned, there is no objection by Sri Sharma learned counsel for the respondents, to let this be deducted also since it may not be said to relate directly or necessarily to the erection of the building. In regard to the other items, which remained in dispute, the argument advanced for the petitioner is that they may not be treated as items of luxury but as being necessary to be had in order to run the Spinning Mill and, therefore, it was wrong not to have excluded them in estimating the cost of erection of the building. I have found myself unable to agree to this proposition. Each of these items is such which constitutes in itself a factor contributing to the cost of erection of the building. With these things provided, the cost in erection of the building is bound to vary and it would not be...........legitimate to say that for the purpose of estimating the present cost of erecting the building, we should proceed as if these items were not provided for. The building is to be taken as it is; with those items provided they have become indirectly part of the building itself and as such incapable of being excluded. The building is to be taken as it is; with those items provided they have become indirectly part of the building itself and as such incapable of being excluded. The cost of erection of the building shall have to be estimated, to put this in other words, taking also into account the value in respect of each of those items provided for or fitted in the said building, and in so far as the value estimated regarding those items is concerned, it is not in controversy before me. The result is that all that the petitioner is entitled to in this case by way of relief is that the estimated value in respect of Item (k) which is Rs. 50,000/- may be deducted from the estimated cost of the erection of the building and the tax assessed or realised shall be at 10% of the value thus arrived at. 12. For the above, the petition succeeds in part only and is allowed accordingly. The order made by the Notified Area Committee dated 19th December 1970, and affirmed in appeal on March 13, 1973, vide Annexures-8 and 10 respectively to the writ petition, shall stand modified to the extent only that the erection cost of the building shall be taken to be Rs. 30,15,585/- only. The Notified Area Committee, Hastinapur, respondent No. 1, is directed accordingly to make the assessment and realise at 10% calculated at this erection cost instead, of value being placed at Rs. 30,65,585/-. There will be no order as to costs.