JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - These are 25 connected writ petitions. S/Sri R. R. Y adav and Ashok Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners, at the very outset have made a statement that even though the petitioners are holding different posts in the office of the Regional Marketing Officers of various districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the facts and the questions of law involved in the writ petitions are similar. Arguments have thus been advanced only in the writ petition and have been adopted in the remaining writ petitions. 2. The brief facts, relevant for the purposes of deciding the present writ petition are that ad hoc, temporary and fixed period appointments were being made by the respondents under a Scheme "Rabi Kraya Yojana." The obvious meaning of Rabi Kraya Yojana being that under this Scheme purchases of food-grains were to be made during Rabi season. For that purpose additional staff had to be recruited by the respondents. The said appointment letter in the present writ petition is Annexure "4" from which it is clear that the petitioner, who had not been working at the time of making of the appointment, as his earlier appointments were for a time bound period, was appointed afresh on 23-4-1986 on the post of a Senior Accounts Clerk on ad hoc and temporary post up til 31st July, 1986. It was clearly mentioned in this appointment letter that the appointment was purely seasonal, temporary and time bound and that it could be terminated even before 31st July, 1980 without giving any notice. It was also mentioned that the appointment will automatically come to an end in the afternoon of 31st July, 1986 in case no earlier notice of termination is given. There is a specific mention in the appointment letter that the appointment is made under Rabi Kraya Yojana on temporary seasonal basis and that the posts are only sanctioned till 31st July, 1986. There is a specific mention in the appointment letter that the appointment is made under Rabi Kraya Yojana on temporary seasonal basis and that the posts are only sanctioned till 31st July, 1986. In the writ petition the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order, dated 23-4-1986 in so far as it mentions that the petitioner's services would stand terminated automatically w. e. f. 31st July, 1986 and also for a further writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to declare the petitioner in continuous service as holding the post of Senior Accounts Clerk and not to interfere in his holding the said post in pursuance of the order, dated 23-4-1986. The grounds which have been taken in support of the writ petition are that the petitioner is entitled to be absorbed in view of the various Government Orders and also on the principle that the petitioner is being discriminated as juniors to the petitioner are being discriminated as juniors to the petitioner are being retained in service. 3. It may be noticed that at the very out set the counsel for the petitioner was asked to make his submission on the question as to why the petitioner should not peruse the alternative statutory remedy available to him by filing a claim petition before the Public Services Tribunal established under the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act. It has not been disputed before us that such a claim petition challenging the action of the State Government can be filed by the petitioner as he was admittedly an employee of the State Government. There cannot be any dispute also that the Services Tribunal can grant the relief which has been claimed by the petitioner in this writ petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have also been filed in this court where interim orders have also been granted. Reference has been given in paragraph 17 of the writ petition in respect of Civil Misc. Writ No. 12787 of 1985 - Raghubir Singh v. State of U.P. and others. and Civil Misc. Writ No. 9080 of 1985 - Dharam Pal v. State of U.P. and others. and reference has also been made to three more writ petitions, viz. (1) Civil Misc. Writ No. Nil of 1986 Sri Shripal Singh and another v. Regional Food Controller, Meerut., (2) Civil Misc. and Civil Misc. Writ No. 9080 of 1985 - Dharam Pal v. State of U.P. and others. and reference has also been made to three more writ petitions, viz. (1) Civil Misc. Writ No. Nil of 1986 Sri Shripal Singh and another v. Regional Food Controller, Meerut., (2) Civil Misc. Writ No. Nil of 1986 - Suneel Kumar Sharma v. Regional Food Controller, Meerut., and (3) Civil Mise. Writ No. nil of 1986 - Shri Chand Sharma v. State of U.P. and others. We have perused the files of writ petitions. These writ petitions have not yet been admitted by this Court. It is thus clear that all these writ petitions will be listed before the Court for admission. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before us that as interim orders have been passed in these writ petitions, the present writ petitions should be admitted and interim orders be also passed in the case. Reliance has been placed on a Supreme Court decision reported in Sushil Chandra Pandey v. New Victoria Mills and another, 1982 UPLBEC 211 . and Bhagmti Prasad v. Zila Parishad, Allahabad and others, 1982 UPLBEC 368., for the proposition that in case the High Court has admitted the petition to hearing on parity of reasoning, the High Court should also have admitted the petition of the petitioner instead of rejecting it in limine. Learned counsel for the petitioner also cited before us a decision of a Division Bench of this court reported in Surendra Kumar Shukla v. Union of India and others, (12) ALR 10)., for the proposition that the petitioner has a right of employment which is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution and thus the petitioner should not be relegated to file a petition before the Services Tribunal. 6. As far as the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the writ petition be admitted on parity of reasoning, in our opinion, no help can be derived by the petitioner by relying on the writ petitions which have not yet been admitted even by this court. Moreover, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Tewari v. The Public Service Commission, U.P., Allahabad, (1972 AWC 724. Moreover, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Tewari v. The Public Service Commission, U.P., Allahabad, (1972 AWC 724. after considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Sushil Chandra Pandey v. Factory Manager, (supra) held : "Before dealing with the decision relied upon by the petitioner's learned counsel we consider it appropriate to point out that there is no such practice in the High Court as was canvassed before us in this petition. Every writ petition has to be decided on its own merits. Chapter XXII, Rule 2 of Rules of the Court lays down that if the court does not find sufficient reason to admit an application, it may reject it under this rule, therefore, the High Court is entitled to reject a petition under Article 226 (other than for have as corpus) in limine without issuing notice to the respondent if the Court find no sufficient reason to admit. Even in the absence of such a specific rule, it is competent for the High Court, to dismiss an application under Article 226 of the Constitution summarily where no prima facie case is shown. The Court is, therefore, entitled to consider whether a petition raises any prima facie or arguable question for decision. Establishment of a prima facie case is the essential preclude to the admission of a writ. Admission is not a matter of course. The admission of a case does not result in any decision being arrived at Hence, this case would not act as a precedent. The argument of conflicting decisions coming into existence would also not be available in such a case as a conflict is said to arise when there are two decided cases, one against the other, on the same point. * * * * * In Eknath Shankarra O. Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1177 ., paragraph, 25, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the question whether the effect of a decision given by a Single Judge is washed off by the mere admission of appeal against the same by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that another Judge of the same High Court as against which Court the appeal has been preferred in the Supreme Court would be found by the earlier decision, and that the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court would be immaterial." 7. The Supreme Court held that another Judge of the same High Court as against which Court the appeal has been preferred in the Supreme Court would be found by the earlier decision, and that the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court would be immaterial." 7. It may be pointed out that a number of writ petitions were filed before us which have been finally disposed of on 29th July, 1986, where we have already held that the appropriate remedy which is available to the petitioner is to file a claim petition before the Services Tribunal where all the questions which are being raised by the petitioners in the writ petitions will be gone into. It is thus clear that as far as this Bench is concerned, we have in similar circumstances held that the appropriate remedy of the petitioner is to pursue his alternative remedy. The Supreme Court also in the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Sugar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and others, AIR 1985 SC 330 . has held that it is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been emphasised that the courts must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by the statute. Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that vast majority of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. It was held that this practice needs to be strongly discouraged. 8. As far as the decision of this court in the case of Dr. Surendra Kumar Shukla (supra) is concerned, the same, in our opinion, has no application inasmuch as the Bench had come to the conclusion that the petitioner was a workman and the provisions of Section 25-F had not been complied with. It was also held that the petitioner had been out of employment since 1983 and it will be very hard to drive him to proceedings wider the Act specially when we find that the impugned order is void. It was also held that the petitioner had been out of employment since 1983 and it will be very hard to drive him to proceedings wider the Act specially when we find that the impugned order is void. In the present case, without expressing any opinion on merits, from the sequence of events it is clear that the petitioner was being appointed on ad hoc and temporary basis on purely seasonal basis for a limited period. The last appointment letter, which has been issued on 23-4-1986, as observed above, clearly shows that the petitioner was not in service on the date of issuing of the appointment letter and came in employment only in pursuance of the aforesaid appointment letter. The appointment letter again is for a fixed period and clearly mentions that the petitioner is being appointed on the post which is purely seasonal, temporary and for a time bound period. We may again re-iterate her that we are not adjudicating on merits of the case of the petitioner and considering it only from the angle as to whether the petitioner should be relegated to peruse his remedy before the Services Tribunal for being absorbed permanently on the post of senior accounts clerk when the appointment letter clearly mentions that the post is even sanctioned for a time bound period and has been created for a seasonal scheme of purchases of food grains during Rabi Season. It is thus clear that from the terms of the appointment letter the petitioner's employment automatically comes to an end on 31st July, 1986 and that he is not entitled to remain in service. However, as we have observed above, in case the petitioner wants to establish that despite the terms of the appointment letter he is entitled to be permanently absorbed in service, he should file a claim petition before the Services Tribunal, where all the grounds raised by the petitioner can be gone into and in case the petitioner establishes his case the services tribunal will be entitled to give entire relief to the petitioner. 9. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are thus of the opinion that the present are not fit cases for interference in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the petitioners have got an alternative statutory remedy of filing claim petitions. 9. Looking to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are thus of the opinion that the present are not fit cases for interference in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the petitioners have got an alternative statutory remedy of filing claim petitions. These writ petitions are accordingly dismissed in limine.