ORDER S. K. Dhaon. J. - This and the companion writ petition raise an identical controversy and. therefore, they can be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The petitioners in both the petitions are manufacturers. They introduced an incentive scheme with effect from 1st Dec. 1968. This scheme, inter ilia, provided :- ".......... the scheme is not in the character of wage; it is not a term of the contract of employment and the workmen cannot claim or assert to claim it as a part of wage........ The question is; whether the remuneration paid by the petitioners under the scheme to their employees constitute "wages" within the meaning of Section 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This phrase, as relevant to the present controversy is defined as all remuneration paid or payable, in cash to an employee, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled and includes any payment to an employee in respect of any period of authorised leave, lock-out, strike which is not illegal or lay-off and other additional remuneration, if any. paid at intervals not exceeding two months. The question is: Whether, in view of the aforequoted stipulation in the incentive scheme the remuneration falls within the definition given to the expression "wages" by the Legislature? The controversy, if any, has ceased to exist as the matter stands concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Harihar Poly fibres v. Regional Director, E.S.I. Corpn., AIR 1984 SC 1680 . Their Lordships observed : "..........Therefore wages as defined includes remuneration paid or payable under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied but further extends to other additional remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding two months, though outside the term of employment. Thus remuneration paid under the terms of the contract of the employment (express or implied) or otherwise if paid at intervals not exceeding two months is wages. The inter-position of the clause and includes any payment- to an employee in respect of any period of authorised leave, lock-out strike which is not illegal or lay-off between the first clause all remuneration paid or payable in cash to an employee, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, was fulfilled and the third clause. The inter-position of the clause and includes any payment- to an employee in respect of any period of authorised leave, lock-out strike which is not illegal or lay-off between the first clause all remuneration paid or payable in cash to an employee, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, was fulfilled and the third clause. 'other additional remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding two months', makes it abundantly clear that while 'remuneration' under the first clause has to be under a contract of employment, express or implied, 'remuneration' under the third clause need not be under the contract of employment but may be any additional remuneration' outside the contract of employment. So. there appears to our mind no reason to exclude 'House Rent Allowance'. 'Night Shift Allowance' 'Incentive Allowance' and 'Heat, Gas and Dust Allowance' from the definition of "Wages". 3. Petitioners have invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It is urged on their behalf that, in view of the representations and the conduct of the respondents, they should not be called upon to make their contribution towards insurance fund on the sum paid by them as incentive bonus. For a decision on the submission, the relevant facts are these. By separate notices the petitioners introduced the incentive scheme with effect from 1st Dec. 1968, in their respective establishments. The Regional Director of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation. Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) on 19th April. 1971, informed the petitioners that it had been decided not to charge contributions on payments made by them under the incentive scheme. On 10th Nov. 1971, the Regional Director took a somersault and directed the petitioners to make contributions on the remuneration paid by them under the incentive scheme. The contributions were to be made with effect from 1st Nov. 1971. On 18th Dec. 1971, the petitioners made a representation to the Corporation. In them, they asserted that according to Section 2(22) of the Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Braithwaite and Company, AIR 1968 SC 413 the payments made by them (the petitioners) as incentive bonus could not he termed as "wages". The Deputy Insurance Commissioner of the Corporation, on 26th Dec. 1973, issued a memorandum stating therein, inter alia, that it had been decided not to treat the incentive bonus as "wages" and in cases where writ etc. The Deputy Insurance Commissioner of the Corporation, on 26th Dec. 1973, issued a memorandum stating therein, inter alia, that it had been decided not to treat the incentive bonus as "wages" and in cases where writ etc. had been preferred by the employees challenging the decision of the Corporation to treat the remuneration given under the incentive scheme as "wages" the same should be got closed by giving a statement that the Corporation had decided not to charge contributions in such cases. To the memorandum a copy of the opinion given by the Ministry of Law was also attached. The said Ministry had opined that in view of the decision in Braithwait and Company (supra) payments made as incentive bonus should not be treated as "wages" for computing the contributions to be made by the employers under the Act. This was followed by another communication from the Regional Director of the Corporation in June, 1974, according to which a decision had been taken to withdraw the demand for contributions in respect of incentive bonus. In the meanwhile, the petitioners preferred separate writ petitions in this Court challenging the demand raised by the respondents calling upon them (the petitioners) to make contributions on the payments made under the incentive scheme. Affidavits were exchanged between the parties in the said petitions. Counsel for the Corporation made a statement in this Court in the two petitions that the demands relating to contributions on the remuneration paid as incentive bonus had been withdrawn. In view of this statement of the learned counsel, the two petitions were disposed of by this Court as having become infructuous. In March, 1976, the Regional Director of the Corporation sent separate notices to the petitioners wherein a stand was taken that the incentive bonus paid by them to the employees under the scheme will attract contributions under the Act. It will be profitable to extract the material portion of the said notice "........Consequently "Inam" or "Incentive Bonus" of the kind in question will attract contributions under the ESI Act if it is paid at intervals not exceeding two months. The decision in this Circular will be effective from 1st Feb. 1976." 4. The Supreme Court in Motilal Sugar Mills' case, AIR 1979 SC 62 1 by a landmark judgment made a significant development in the law relating to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The decision in this Circular will be effective from 1st Feb. 1976." 4. The Supreme Court in Motilal Sugar Mills' case, AIR 1979 SC 62 1 by a landmark judgment made a significant development in the law relating to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It held that the doctrine is applicable against the Government in the exercise of its governmental, public or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of the doctrine. In the case of Jeet Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1285 it was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable against the exercise of executive functions of the State, the sheet-anchor of the reasoning. being the doctrine of executive necessity. The mist created in Jeet Ram's case has now been cleared and the decision in Motilal Sugar Mills' case has been restored to its original prestige by a recent decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 806 . In the last case it is laid down : "The true principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his word or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is made and it is in fact so acted upon by other party. the promise or representation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so. having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. the promise or representation would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so. having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. It has often been said in -England that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot itself be the basis of an action: it can only be a shield and not a sword: but the law in India has gone far ahead of the narrow position adopted in England and as a result of the decision of this Court in Motilal Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCR 641 : ( AIR 1979 SC 62 ), it is now well settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also found a cause of action". 5. The petitioners had introduced the incentive scheme on a clear understanding that the remuneration paid by them under it to its employees will not be treated as wages under a contract express or implied. Obviously the petitioners had made such a stipulation with the avowed object of taking out such a payment from the ambit of the provisions as contained in Section 2(22) of the Act so as to escape the liability of making their contributions under the Act on the remuneration paid by them to their employees under the Scheme. The decisions taken by the Corporation from time to time that such payments did not fall within the expression "wages" and the petitioners were not liable to make any contributions on such payments amounted to "a clear and unequivocal promise or representation" and such promise or representation undoubtedly affected the statutory liability of the petitioners to make contributions under the Act. The respondents cannot get away from the fact that their representations to the petitioners were not only intended to create legal relations in praesenti but also to affect the legal relationship which may arise in future. The respondents were fully aware that the petitioners would act on the representation or promise made by them (the respondents) and they (the petitioners) will not be liable to make any contributions on the amounts paid as incentive bonus. The respondents were fully aware that the petitioners would act on the representation or promise made by them (the respondents) and they (the petitioners) will not be liable to make any contributions on the amounts paid as incentive bonus. We have already shown that the respondents accepted the representation made by the petitioners that the remuneration paid by them (the petitioners) to their employees as incentive bonus did not attract the provisions of S. 2(22) of the Act. We have also shown that the respondents accepted the case set up by the petitioners without any reservation whatsoever. Had the respondents stuck to their original stand that the payments made by the petitioners under the incentive scheme would also be the subject matter of contributions under the Act, the petitioners could have withdrawn the incentive scheme itself or could have taken some other steps permissible to them under the law to reduce their pecuniary liability of making contributions. It is manifest that the petitioners altered their position on account of the promise made by the respondents. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the action of the respondents calling upon the petitioners to make contributions under the Act on the amounts paid as incentive bonus is unjust and inequitable. It, therefore, follows that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is attracted to the case of the petitioners in the first blush. 6. A combined reading of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Motilal Sugar Mills. ( AIR 1979 SC 62 1 ) and Godfrey Philips India Ltd., ( AIR 1986 SC 806 ) indicates that the Government can wriggle out of the clutches of the doctrine in certain situations. 7. The first exception is the exercise of Legislative powers or Legislative functions and no amount of promise or representation made by the Government can prevent it from exercising its Legislative functions. 8. The second exception is the consideration of public interest. A Court is entitled to determine whether subsequent events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government, a liability which has arisen out of the promise or representation made by it (the Government). The Court will have to be satisfied that the interest of the public lies only by permitting the Government to observe the promise or representation made by it in its breach. The Court will have to be satisfied that the interest of the public lies only by permitting the Government to observe the promise or representation made by it in its breach. A heavy onus is cast upon the Government to demonstrate before the Court that after balancing the injustice or inequity caused to a person who has acted upon the unequivocal promise or representation of the Government and the interest of the public, the interest of the public is so overriding that the Government should be released from the grip of the doctrine. In the instant case, no foundation has been laid by the respondents that the interest of the public is overriding. Neither any averment has been made, nor any figure given, nor any date supplied to exhibit that a substantial amount will remain uncontributed by the petitioners towards the insurance fund if they are exempted from making contributions on the amount paid by them as incentive bonus. 9. The third exception is that the Government may give a reasonable notice that from a future date it will not be possible for it to abide by the promise or representation made by it. The idea is that the status quo ante may be restored even if no public interest is involved. The focus is that a reasonable opportunity should be given to the promised to restore his position. In the cases before us, the last notice calling upon the petitioners to make contributions on the amounts paid by them as remuneration under the scheme was given in March, 1976, with a rider that the decision under the said notice would be effective from 1st Feb., 1976. On the face of it, the decision to resume the realisation of contributions from the petitioners had been given a retrospective effect. Indeed, by such a notice the respondents could not and did not afford a reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to restore their positions. 10. The fourth exception is that the promise or representation itself was illegal. The doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. It cannot apply in the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. 11. 10. The fourth exception is that the promise or representation itself was illegal. The doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. It cannot apply in the teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. 11. The decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Braithwaite and Company, (1968 Lab IC 3(A) ( supra) was the sole basis upon which the Corporation took the view that the remuneration given by the petitioners to their employees as incentive bonus under the scheme did not fall in the expression "wages" within the meaning of S. 2(22) of the Act. The Supreme Court in Harihar Polyfibers' case (1984 Lab IC 1570) (supra) considered the case of Braithwaite and Company. It held that that case related to the payment of an ex gratia reward styled as an 'Inam' (a bounty) which was admittedly not claimed to be an 'additional remuneration', if any, to be paid at intervals not exceeding two months. But claimed to be 'remuneration paid or payable to an employee if the terms of contract were fulfilled'. The Supreme Court took the view that the case of Braithwaite and Company was confined to the interpretation of the first part of the definition of "wages" as contained in S. 2(22) and had no bearing to 'additional remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding two months'. It is trite that a Court of law does not legislate a law. It merely declares what the law was from its very inception. The declaration of the law made by the Supreme Court in Harihar Polyfibers case, therefore, means that it was always the law that any additional remuneration, if any, paid at intervals not exceeding two months' will fall in the definition of "wages" in S. 2(22). As a natural corollary, the payments made by the petitioners to their employees as incentive bonus constituted "wages" within the meaning of S. 22(2). Therefore, the view taken by the Corporation to the contrary in the promise or representation made by them to the petitioners was illegal and not in accordance with law. 12. As a natural corollary, the payments made by the petitioners to their employees as incentive bonus constituted "wages" within the meaning of S. 22(2). Therefore, the view taken by the Corporation to the contrary in the promise or representation made by them to the petitioners was illegal and not in accordance with law. 12. We have examined the scheme of the Act carefully and we do not find any provision empowering either the Corporation or any of its officers acting on its behalf to exempt any employer from making a contribution towards insurance fund on any sum paid by it (the employer) as incentive bonus, if the same fulfils the conditions as enumerated in S. 2(22). Therefore, the promise or representation made to the petitioners by the Corporation was contrary to law. Section 2(4) defines "contribution" to mean : "the sum of money payable to the Corporation by the principal employer in respect of an employee and includes any amount payable by or on behalf of the employee in accordance with the provisions of the Act". 13. "Employee", as relevant to the present controversy, means : any person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment to which the Act applies (S. 2(9)). Section 38, inter alia, provides : "All employees in factories or establishments to which this Act applies shall be insured in the manner provided by this Act". Section 39 says that the contribution payable under the Act in respect of an employee shall be paid to the Corporation. The rates at which the contribution shall be paid is referred to in S. 39(2). In S. 40 it is laid down that the principal employer shall pay in 'respect of every employee, whether directly employed by him or by or through an immediate employer, both the employer's contribution and the employees contribution. In S. 45-B it is provided that any contribution payable under the Act will be recovered as arrears of land revenue, S. 85 provides for the punishment for failure to pay contribution etc. It is the petitioners' own case that their establishments fall within the category of "factory" within the meaning of the Act. A conspectus of the provisions referred to above gives a clear indication that a duty is cast upon the Corporation to realise contributions from employers on the wages paid by them to their employees. It is the petitioners' own case that their establishments fall within the category of "factory" within the meaning of the Act. A conspectus of the provisions referred to above gives a clear indication that a duty is cast upon the Corporation to realise contributions from employers on the wages paid by them to their employees. Correspondingly, an obligation or liability has been imposed upon employers by the statute to make contributions to the Corporation on the amount paid by them as wages. The statute prohibits non-making of contributions by an employer and even goes to the length of making the non-payment penal. It is thus clear that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel so as to entitle them.to escape the liability of making contributions on the amount paid by them as incentive bonus. 14. As a second string to the bow, the petitioners have asserted that. in any view of the matter, the payment of incentive bonus does not attract "wages" within the meaning of S. 2(22), as the payments were made at interval exceeding two months. No doubt, a clear averment to that effect has been made in the writ petition. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents there is no definite assertion that the payments were made at intervals not exceeding two months. It is also asserted that the petitioners have failed to place any material in support of the assertion made on this part of the case. On the material on record, it is difficult, if not impossible, to record any categorical finding either way. Section 76(g) of the Act provides that any matter which is in dispute between a principal employer and the Corporation or between a person and the Corporation in respect of any contribution or benefit or other dues, payable or recoverable under the Act. shall be decided by the Employees' Insurance Court in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The petitioners, if so advised. may invoke the jurisdiction of the Employees' Insurance Court for adjudicating upon the limited question as to whether they had paid the incentive bonus to their employees under their respective schemes at intervals not exceeding two months. If the Court finds that the case set up by the petitioners is correct, they (the petitioners) shall not be called upon to make contributions on the amount paid by them as incentive bonus. If the Court finds that the case set up by the petitioners is correct, they (the petitioners) shall not be called upon to make contributions on the amount paid by them as incentive bonus. If the petitioners fail to substantiate their cases, they shall make contributions in accordance with the impugned notices. 15. The writ petitions, in substance, fail. They are dismissed, but without any order as to costs.