JUDGMENT S. Saghir Abmad, J. - The Petitioner, who is officiating Naib Tahsildar, has been placed under suspension by order dated 29-7-86 on the ground that he has been arrested while accepting illegal gratification. It is not disputed that the Petitioner was arrested and sent to jail and was released on bail after about a week. 2. The order of suspension is challenged on the ground that District Magistrate, who has passed this order was not competent to pass it, as he was not the appointing authority of the Petitioner who, on the relevant date, was officiating on the post of Naib Tahsildar. It has, therefore, been contended that the order is liable to be quashed and the Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated. 3. Rule 49A(2) of the U.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules provides as under: 49A(2). A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed, or, as the case may be, continued to be placed, under suspension by an order of the appointing authority (a) With effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether detention is on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty eight hours, and (b) with effect from the date of his conviction if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forth-with dismissed or removed consequent to such conviction. Explanation - The period of forty-eight hours referred to in Clause (b) of this Sub-rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment alter the conviction and for this purpose intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. 4. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that there has to be an order by the appointing authority for placing an incumbent under suspension. 5. In cases where a Government servant is detained in custody, whether the detention is on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, he is to be " deemed " to have been placed under suspension. 5. In cases where a Government servant is detained in custody, whether the detention is on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, he is to be " deemed " to have been placed under suspension. The contention that the deeming clause will apply only where there is an order of suspension passed by the appointing authority cannot be accepted, as Clause (2) clearly lays down that a government servant shall be " deemed " to have been placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority. The fictional suspension has two aspects. Not only that a government servant is to be deemed to have been placed under suspension, the further fiction is that he shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority. 6. What is the meaning of the word 'deemed" may now be considered. The word 'deemed' is used in the modern statutes for many purposes, e.g., to give a special glossary to an expression or an artificial construction to a void or phrase. The word 'deemed 'has also been used to give artificial conception. As observed by the Supreme Court in Hira H. Advani v. State of Maharashtra AIR 71 SC 44 (54) the meaning to be attached to the word 'deemed" depends upon the context in which it is used. When a thing is deemed to be something else, it is to be treated as if it is that thing, though in fact it is not. See The Additional Income Tax Officer, Salem Vs. E. Alfred, AIR 1962 SC 663 . A deeming provision creates a legal fiction the effect of which is that a position which otherwise would not obtain is deemed to obtain under the given circumstances. See K. Kamaraja Nadar Vs. Kunju Thevar and Others, AIR 1958 SC 687 . In Triloki Nath Vs. State, AIR 1950 All 657 it was laid down that where certain order is to be deemed to be an order made under certain Section of the statute, it must mean that for all purposes that order has been passed under that particular Section. 7. Kunju Thevar and Others, AIR 1958 SC 687 . In Triloki Nath Vs. State, AIR 1950 All 657 it was laid down that where certain order is to be deemed to be an order made under certain Section of the statute, it must mean that for all purposes that order has been passed under that particular Section. 7. Having regard to the principles enunciated above, a Government servant, who has been detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours, has to be treated to have been placed under suspension by an order passed by the appointing authority although, in fact, such an order has not been passed. Such a legislative intent has been clearly expressed by the use of the word " deemed " which, as observed earlier, brings into effect a fictional suspension. 8. In the instant case, even if the order by which the Petitioner has been suspended is ignored as having been passed by an authority who was not competent to pass it, the fiction created by Sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A will apply and the Petitioner who was detained in jail on a criminal charge for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority. 9. Mr. S.C. Misra, counsel for the Petitioner, then contended that even if the Petitioner is treated to have been placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority as contemplated by Sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A, the said order would come to an end on the release of the Petitioner from the detention and, therefore, if the period of suspension was to be continued then the appointing authority should have taken action under the provisions of Sub-rule (1A) which provides as Under: 49A (1A).A government servant in respect of, or against, whom an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending may, at the discretion of the appointing authority under whom he is serving, be placed under suspension until the termination of all proceedings relating to that charge, if the charge is connected with his position as a government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. 10. This rule does not contemplate the detention of an employee in custody which is contemplated only by Sub-rule (2). 10. This rule does not contemplate the detention of an employee in custody which is contemplated only by Sub-rule (2). This rule lays down that where an investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending against a government servant, such government servant shall be placed under suspension by the appointing authority if the charge vas connected with his position as government servant or was likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude. It is obvious that while exercising discretion Under Sub-rule (1A), the appointing authority has to consider not only the nature of the charge but also that it relates to his position as a government servant or that the charge was likely to embarrass such government servant in the discharge of his duties or that the charge involves moral turpitude. These factors have to be objectively considered by the appointing authority and the discretion has to be exercised on that basis. Since the government servant against whom investigation, inquiry or trial relating to a criminal charge is pending need not be, or, may have been, arrested at any stage, the appointing authority is not required under this Sub-rule to consider these fact Ors. 11. Moreover, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A not only contemplates immediate suspension, it also contemplates "continued suspension ". The fiction created by Sub-rule (2) is that the Government servant, who has been detained in custody for more than 48 hours shall be treated not only to have been initially placed under suspension by an order of the appointing authority, he shall be deemed to be under continued suspension. The contention of the Petitioner that the order of suspension " deemed " to have been passed under this Sub-rule shall lapse on his being released from detention, cannot, therefore, be accepted as he shall be treated to be under continued suspension. 12. Mr. Misra has relied upon a decision of this Court in K.P, Tewari v. State of U.P. 1983 (1) LCD 154 and has contended on that basis that after the government servant is released on bail, the appointing authority is required to consider the question of suspension in accordance with the provisions of Sub-rule (1-A). 12. Mr. Misra has relied upon a decision of this Court in K.P, Tewari v. State of U.P. 1983 (1) LCD 154 and has contended on that basis that after the government servant is released on bail, the appointing authority is required to consider the question of suspension in accordance with the provisions of Sub-rule (1-A). We have gone through the decision in which the suspension order was passed after the government servant was released on bail the suspension order was passed only on the ground that the Petitioner was in custody since 4th August, 1982 and the case was pending against him in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The appointing authority had not taken into consideration the fact of his being released on bail and had further not taken into consideration the question whether the charge against him involved moral turpitude. The decision rests on entirely different footing and is not an authority on the provisions contained in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A. 13. Mr. Misra then contended that the Petitioner has come before this Court against the order passed by the District Magistrate who, according to the service rules, was not competent to place the Petitioner under suspension. We have already observed that even if this order is ignored on the ground that it was passed by an authority who was not competent, the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A cannot be ignored under which the Petitioner shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension. 14. Mr. Misra's next submission that the order of suspension" deemed to have been passed " Under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 49A will be co-terminus with the termination of the disciplinary proceedings or the criminal case and, therefore, an interpretation which works so harshly against a government servant may not be placed on this provision, is also without substance. The law requires that a government servant who has been detained for more than forty-eight hours shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension. Once the law permits fictional suspension, a specific order of suspension is not required to be passed. But this does not mean that the fictional suspension cannot, at any stet, be terminated. It is always open to the appointing authority to set aside even the" deemed '' suspension and reinstate the Government servant. Once the law permits fictional suspension, a specific order of suspension is not required to be passed. But this does not mean that the fictional suspension cannot, at any stet, be terminated. It is always open to the appointing authority to set aside even the" deemed '' suspension and reinstate the Government servant. Sub-rule (2) does not prohibit the appointing authority from terminating the deemed suspension and putting back the employee concerned on duty even during the tendency of criminal proceedings or investigation. 15. No other point has been pressed. 16. We may, however, point out at the end that the jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution, which we have been called upon to exercise in the instant case, is discretionary and we are definitely not in favor of exercising our discretion in respect of an employee who was caught while accepting illegal gratification. 17. In view of the above the petition is dismissed summarily. 18. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced Mr. Misra made an oral request that he may be granted a certificate that the case is fit for appeal in the Supreme Court. In our opinion, the case does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be decided by the Supreme Court, as the provisions of Rule 49A(2) are explicit and clear. The prayer is rejected. 19. A copy of this order shall be supplied to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on payment of necessary charges within 10 days.