JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by M. H. KANIA, Ag. C.J. - These are references under section 34(1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953. The accounting periods to which the references relate are (1) from 1st April, 1954, to 31st March, 1955, and (2) from 1st April, 1955, to 31st March, 1956. It is, however, common ground that in the later periods the Revenue does not claim to recover any sales tax after 6th September, 1955, in view of the change in law. The respondent-assessees run two spinning and weaving mills at Solapur. In the course of manufacturing textile goods these mills purchased coal from various collieries situated outside the then State of Bombay for being consumed in their business. As coal was a controlled commodity the procedure prescribed under the Colliery Control Order of 1945 was followed for obtaining coal that was required by the assessees. We are, however, not concerned with the facts relating to that matter as the question referred in that regard has already been answered by this Court. The coal in question was obtained from collieries in Bihar under allotment orders issued by the authorities. The collieries from whom the coal was to be obtained under the allotment orders were informed of allotment orders and the allottees arranged to take delivery from the collieries. The coal was despatched by collieries f.o.r. to the nearest railhead. The risk in transit was entirely of the allottees. The goods sold, namely, the coal, was supervised or inspected and actual delivery was obtained by the representatives of the mills at the nearest railhead which was also in Bihar and outside the then State of Bombay. The said purchases were brought to tax by the Sales Tax Officer concerned. The said purchases were treated as purchases of coal effected from unregistered dealers situated outside the State of Bombay and brought to tax by the Sales Tax Officer concerned. Revision petitions filed by the assessees to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax were dismissed. The assessees then went by way of a further revision to the Sales Tax Tribunal. The Sales Tax Tribunal set aside the levy of purchase tax on the ground that the purchases were not effected within the then Bombay State. On these facts two questions were referred by the Sales Tax Tribunal to us for determination. The assessees then went by way of a further revision to the Sales Tax Tribunal. The Sales Tax Tribunal set aside the levy of purchase tax on the ground that the purchases were not effected within the then Bombay State. On these facts two questions were referred by the Sales Tax Tribunal to us for determination. The said questions were as follows : (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the impugned transactions were not purchases within the meaning of section 2(13) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the impugned purchases were effected by the respondents outside the State of Bombay and that they were not in the State of Bombay as per explanation to article 286(1)(a) of the Constitution of India ? 2. As far as question No. 1 is concerned, it has been answered in the negative, that is by holding that the impugned transactions were purchases within the meaning of section 2(13) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, by a judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this Court comprising of N. L. Abhyankar and Vimadalal, JJ., on 26th February, 1968. We are, therefore, not concerned with that question. 3. As far as question No. 2 is concerned, from the judgment it appears that a contention was taken up by the Revenue before the Division Bench that the Tribunal appeared to have based its inference, namely, that the coal in question was actually delivered to the assessees at the railhead in Bihar from a single document, viz., a letter dated 28th February, 1955, produced by the assessees which showed that the charges of supervision were paid by the mills. On this argument both the sides agreed that an answer to the second question need not be recorded by the Court and both the parties may be allowed to establish their case as to whether the actual delivery of the coal was effected at Bihar or not. On this argument both the sides agreed that an answer to the second question need not be recorded by the Court and both the parties may be allowed to establish their case as to whether the actual delivery of the coal was effected at Bihar or not. Upon this agreement the Division Bench remanded the matter to the Tribunal with a direction that each side may be given a chance to lead evidence either before the Tribunal or any other authority, as it might direct to take up the matter, regarding actual delivery of coal. It was further ordered that after such evidence was tendered, the Tribunal would record a finding in this regard. The assessees preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court against the aforesaid order of remand made by the Division Bench and in that case Lakshmi Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay [1970] 26 STC 263 (SC) a Division Bench of the Supreme Court held that in a reference under section 34 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, the High Court has only to answer the question referred to the High Court and the High Court cannot remand the case to the Tribunal for recording evidence and that, if the statement of the case is not sufficient to enable the High Court to answer the question raised, the High Court can under section 34(4) refer the case to the Tribunal to make such additions thereto or alterations therein. After the supplementary statement is received, the High Court can proceed to answer the question. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, which is in the very reference before us, it is clear that we are enjoined by the Supreme Court to determine the question referred, namely, question No. 2, on the basis of such evidence as can be found from the judgment of the Tribunal. It is only if we are unable to answer this question on the facts found by the Tribunal that it is open to us to ask the Tribunal to submit a supplemental statement of case. There is some controversy as to whether, for the purposes of preparing such a supplemental statement of case, the Tribunal could record fresh evidence or whether it would be confined to the evidence already on record. There is some controversy as to whether, for the purposes of preparing such a supplemental statement of case, the Tribunal could record fresh evidence or whether it would be confined to the evidence already on record. It is not necessary for us, however, to go into that question, because in the present case it is not possible to say that the evidence on record before the Tribunal was not sufficient to answer the question referred to us. A perusal of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, which remanded the case to the said Tribunal, clearly shows that before the Division Bench both parties stated that they wanted a further opportunity to establish their case as to whether the coal in question was delivered to the assessees and it was in view of that understanding that an order of remand to that effect was passed by consent. The judgment of the Division Bench nowhere suggests that the evidence on record was not sufficient at all to enable it to answer the question raised. All that the judgment shows is that the Tribunal had come to its conclusion or inference as to the place of delivery of the goods only on the basis of a single document. It was submitted by Mr. Jetly that in these circumstances we should remand the case to the Tribunal for a supplemental statement of the case. We are unable to accept this submission because, as we have already pointed out that it is not possible to say that there is no material on the record of the Tribunal to answer the question raised, although the material comprises a single document. Moreover, as we have pointed out that accounting periods are from 1st April, 1954, to 31st March, 1955, and 1st April, 1955 to 31st March, 1956. There is hardly any likelihood that parties would be able to lead any further evidence at this stage and after such a long delay as to the place of delivery and it appears to us unfair to subject the assessees to such an inquiry after such a long period of time, when in all probability the inquiry will not result in any further material being available. It is not the contention of either party that there is any other material on record already before the Tribunal on which a supplemental statement of case could be prepared giving further facts relevant to the question referred to us. There is no warrant in these circumstances for sending the matter back to the Tribunal and asking for a supplemental statement of case. 3. We now propose to determine the question referred on the basis of the material which is on the record. Before discussing the controversy on merits we may point out that the question where the goods in question, namely, the coal was actually delivered assumes importance because of the provisions of article 286 of the Constitution and the explanation thereto, as this provision stood at the material time and section 46 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, which was enacted to ensure compliance with the requirement of article 286. In brief this section provides that the levy of sales tax under that Act would not apply where the sale or purchase takes place outside the State of Bombay. At the material time the relevant portion of article 286(1) read thus : "Article 286(1). - No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place - (a) outside the State; or (b) ................. Explanation. - For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State." 4. As we have already pointed out, the only material on record, as can be gathered from the order of the Tribunal, is that under the terms of the contract entered into between the assessees and the collieries in question and from the letter dated 28th February, 1955, it could be seen that the coal was delivered by the collieries in Bihar at the nearest railhead which was also in Bihar. Coal was sent by the collieries to the nearest railhead by railway on f.o.r. basis and at the railhead the coal was inspected by the agent of the assessees and taken delivery of. Thus the actual delivery of the goods in question was taken in Bihar outside the then State of Bombay, and hence the explanation to article 286(1) which had been incorporated also in section 46 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, did not operate so as to result in the sale being deemed to be a sale within the then State of Bombay. As the property in the goods passed in Bihar, in the absence of any circumstances showing an intention to the contrary, the sale must be held to have taken place in Bihar. 5. In the result the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessees. Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.