SUDHIR RANJAN ROY, J. ( 1 ) THE Customs Appellate Tribunal by its impugned order dated April 27, 1983 having classified the subject machine, the hot blocker, imported by the petitioner No. 1 from West Germany for their rolling mill at Belur, under heading No. 84. 59 (1) of Chapter 84 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 for payment of customs duty, instead of it being classified under heading No. 84. 22 of the said Schedule, the petitioners have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this court for a direction upon the respondents to recall the said order to classify the machine under heading No. 84. 22 and refund the sum of Rs. 31,66,108. 24 paise together with interest being the excess amount of customs duty realised by the customs authorities from the petitioner No. 1. ( 2 ) THE petitioner No. 1, as it appears, in the year 1954 installed at its Belur factory a hot rolling mill. The function of the mill is to roll aluminium alloy ingots into slabs/sheets. To facilitate handling of longer rolled slabs/sheets of lower thickness in coiled form the machine in question, namely, the hot blocker, was installed by the petitioner No. 1 in its factory. Since the only purpose for such installation is to facilitate handling, for the purpose of payment of customs duty, it should have been classified according to the petitioners, under heading No. 84. 22 of the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 instead of its being classified under the residuary heading No. 84. 59 (1) of the |aid Schedule. ( 3 ) THE customs authorities, however, took a different view and classified the machine under the residuary heading No. 84. 59 (1) which requires payment of import duty at the rate of 60% instead of 40% which is the rate of duty in case of machines falling under heading No. 84. 22. ( 4 ) THE respondents opposed the application by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. ( 5 ) MR. Diparikar Gupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that since the sole purpose behind the installation of the blocker was to facilitate handling of rolled aluminium slabs/sheets, it should have been categorised as a machine for "lifting, handling, loading or unloading" as provided by item no. 84. 22 of Chapter 84 of the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. 84. 22 of Chapter 84 of the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. According to Mr. Gupta though coiling of the rolled sheets is the main function of the blocker, it is the purpose and not function which should determine its classification under one head or the other of the First Schedule of the Tariff Act. In support of his contention he referred to clause 5 of Chapter 84 of the Act which provides that, "a machine which is used for more than one purpose, is, for the purpose of classification, to be treated as if its principal purpose were its sole purpose". Laying particular emphasis on the word "purpose" as used in clause 5 Mr. Gupta contended that the intention of the legislature was to treat the purpose behind the installation of a machine rather than its function as the sole criterion for its classification under one head or the other of the tariff schedule and that being so, the finding of the customs authorities that the function of the blockef being only to coil the rolled sheets, it was a machine for coiling and in the absence of any such classification in the tariff schedule, it should come under the residuary item No. 84. 59 (1), is nothing but perverse and accordingly this court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction should direct the recalling of the said perverse order and should further direct that the machine in question be classified under item No. 84. 22. ( 6 ) ON the order hand, Mr. Das, the learned counsel appearing for the customs authorities, submitted that since under no circumstances it could be said that the impugned machine is a lifting, handling, loading or unloading machine, its sole function being coiling, it could not be classified under item No. 84. 22 as suggested on behalf of the petitioners. He further submitted that the appellate Tribunal having taken a reasonable view of the matter, this court should not interfere with the said finding of the tribunal in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. According to Mr. Das, since the petitioners also had alternative remedies by way of reference to the High Court under Section 130 and appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 139 (E) (b) of the Customs Act, 1962, they could not take recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Das, since the petitioners also had alternative remedies by way of reference to the High Court under Section 130 and appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 139 (E) (b) of the Customs Act, 1962, they could not take recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution. Moreover, there being a long delay in filing the instant application under article 226, the court should be reluctant to grant the petitioners the relief prayed for. ( 7 ) NOW, the primary question involved in the matter is, under which item of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 the impugned machine should be classified for payment of customs duty. The Supreme Court in Dunlop India Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 597 has held that when an article has, by all standards, a reasonable claim to be classified under an enumerated item in the tariff schedule, it will be against the very principle of classification to deny it the parentage and consign it to an orphanage of the residuary clause. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, the Appellate Tribunal has overruled the petitioners' claim for classification of the machine under item No. 84. "22 of the tariff schedule and has consigned it to residuary clause No. 84. 59 (1) since according to the Tribunal the subject, being a machine for coiling, cannot be classified under any other item of the tariff schedule. ( 9 ) IN this connection Mr. Das, the learned counsel appearing for the customs authorities, contended that the writ court, not being a court of appeal, has no jurisdiction to embark into an enquiry regarding the correctness or otherwise of the finding of the Appellate Tribunal since it is based on proper reasonings and under no circumstances it can be said to be perverse. In support of this contention the learned Counsel relied upon a few decisions of the Supreme Court. The first decision referred to by him is Collector of Customs v. V. K. Ganga Setty, where the Supreme Court has held that if there were two constructions which an entry could reasonably bear and one of them, which was in favour of the revenue, was adopted, the court has no jurisdiction to interfere merely because the other interpretation favourable to the subject appeals to the court as the better one to adopt. ( 10 ) SIMILARLY in Girdharilal Bansidhar v. Union of India it has been observed that a court dealing with a petition under article 226 of the Constitution is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the customs authorities and therefore the correctness of the conclusion reached by those authorities on the appreciation of the several items in the Handbook or in the Indian Tariff Act which is referred to in these items, is not a matter which falls within the writ jurisdiction of the High Court where there is no procedural irregularity and the order is based on elaborate investigation. ( 11 ) AND in V. V. Iyer v. Jasjit Singh the Supreme Court has made it clear that where two alternative interpretations are possible and a reasonable view relating thereto is adopted by the customs authorities which is favourable to Revenue, such findings of the authorities cannot be intereferred with by the High Court under article 226 even though another view contrary to one adopted is in favour of the subject. ( 12 ) IN the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court the powers of interference of a writ court in such matters are restricted only to cases where the authorities have adopted a construction which no reasonable person could adopt, i. e. , if the construction is perverse. ( 13 ) THE question is whether the order impugned in the instant case answers that description. Because, unless that is so. , it will be out of the harm's way of this court exercising writ jurisdiction. ( 14 ) COMING now to the merits, the relevant portion of item No. 84. 22 of Chapter 84 of the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 is as hereunder :-"lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery. . . not being machinery falling within heading no. 84. 23. . . . 40%" ( 15 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Gupta, appearing in support of the writ application the subject machines squarely comes under the said item being merely a handling machine, its sole purpose being to facilitate handling of the rolled aluminium sheets and for conveying them from one rolling mill to the other. ( 16 ) I am, however, afraid that this extremely guarded approach of Mr. Gupta to the problem is a later development and for obvious reasons. ( 16 ) I am, however, afraid that this extremely guarded approach of Mr. Gupta to the problem is a later development and for obvious reasons. Incidentally, some development was also made at the stage of the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The real and untainted story can, however, be found from annexure 'd' to the writ petition which is the Memo of Appeal of petitioner No. 1 before the Appellate Collector of Customs, and the case made out there clearly lends support to the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal and gives a complete go-by to the stand now being taken by the petitioners before this court. It seems that at that stage proper legal advice was not available to the petitioner No. 1. In passing I may mention here incidentally that in explaining the case of his clients Mr. Gupta submitted that it is not that the subject machine is a part of the whole manufacturing process. As a matter of fact, the manufacturing operation may still go on without the machine since the sheets could still be rolled in the existing rolling mills, hot and cold. The purpose of installation of the blocker is simply to facilitate handling of rolled aluminium sheets of unwieldy lengths and dimensions. To make his contention more lucid Mr. Gupta cited the instance of a washerman whose function is to wash the dirty linen and deliver them to the respective customers. He could, as contended by Mr. Gupta, do it even without their being folded. But he folds the linen only to facilitate their handling and for convenient delivery. It cannot be said that he could not carry on his business without folding the linen after washing them. ( 17 ) BUT let us now see what was the case of the petitioner No. 1 in paragraphs 10 and 11 of annexure 'd' to the writ petition :-"in fact, the rolling mill will cease to function if the hot blocker is not mounted on the roller table and as such, no sheet can be manufactured without the subject machine. From these it can be inferred that the hot blocker is an integral part of the rolling mill for production of hot rolled coils. The commodity that will be produced from the total rolling mill arrangement is hot rolled coils which is sold in the market as it is" (emphasis supplied ). From these it can be inferred that the hot blocker is an integral part of the rolling mill for production of hot rolled coils. The commodity that will be produced from the total rolling mill arrangement is hot rolled coils which is sold in the market as it is" (emphasis supplied ). ( 18 ) THEN again, in paragraph 12 it has been stated : "it is evident that the hot blocker is such a machine which is designed to produce a commodity, i. e. , hot rolled coils in conjunction with the rolling mill". (emphasis suplied ). In my view, the above quotations from annexure 'd' to the writ petition at once make it clear that the subject machine is an integral part of the entire rolling mill and the mill will cease to function without it. Furthermore, the commercial commodity that the rolling mill produces and markets is "hot rolled coils". ( 19 ) THAT being so, there is absolutely no scope for concluding that the subject machine has simply been installed to facilitate handling of rolled aluminium sheets as contended by Mr. Gupta appearing in support of the writ petition. Consequently, in my view, the Appellate Tribunal was quite justified in concluding, though rather in a confused manner, that the subject machine could not be classified as machine for handling, etc. , so as to bring it under item No. 84. 22 as claimed by the petitioners. ( 20 ) ON the own showing of the petitioner No. 1, the subject machine is a machine for coiling the rolled aluminium sheets. And this coiling is not to facilitate handling of the rolled sheets as sought to be established here before this court, but coiling is its main purpose besides also being its main function, since the commodity which the petitioner No. 1 produces and markets is "hot rolled coils" and manufacture of such coils is not possible without the blocker, that is the subject machine. ( 21 ) SO, the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the machine in question is a coiling machine and not a handling machine, far from being perverse, is the only reasonable finding that could be arrived at in the circumstances of the case. ( 22 ) BEFORE the Appellate Tribunal an alternative plan for classifying the machine under item No. 84. ( 22 ) BEFORE the Appellate Tribunal an alternative plan for classifying the machine under item No. 84. 59 (2) was taken by the petitioner No. 1 unsuccessfully, but no such plea was taken before this court. As a matter of fact, Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the machine in question could not be classified under the said heading. ( 23 ) THUS, the machine can neither be classified under item No. 84. 22 nor under item No. 84. 59 (2) of Chapter 84 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. As a matter of fact, there is no specific tariff item under which a coiling machine can be classified and that being so, it has rightly been consigned to the residuary item No. 84. 59 (1), namely, "machines and mechanical appliances, having individual functions, not falling within any other heading of this Chapter : (1) Not elsewhere specified". And under that heading the rate of duty is 60% as rightly charged by the customs authorities. ( 24 ) THUS, the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal being just and proper this court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction has even no authority to interfere with it. Moreover, the petitioners have not come before this court with clean hands since certain very vital facts, as enumerated in annexure 'd' have been suppressed here with the object of getting a favourable order, and that being so, the other points agitated on behalf of the customs authorities having become redundant, do not require any discussion. ( 25 ) THE writ petition accordingly fails and is dismissed on contest. ( 26 ) THE rule issued be discharged and interim order, if any, do stand vacated. ( 27 ) NO order is made for costs. ( 28 ) THE customs authorities are given liberty to encash the bank guarantees. .