JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan, J. - What ought the Court to do when it is presented with a petition under Art. 226 of Constitution and it contains, allegations which are of a personal nature, vexatious, defamatory and thus an abuse of the process of the Court? The allegations having been made without making those persons parties to the petition against whom the aspersions have been made. This Court was faced Dr. (Mrs.) Bharati Raj (sic). The petition seeks certain reliefs from the University of Allahabad and its Vice Chancellor; but this at present is irrelevant. 2. On a first reading of the writ petition, on its presentation, this Court noticed the existence of the following passages : "......It would not be out of place to say that the last several regimes of every Vice Chancellor of the University of Allahabad has witnessed numerous acts of nepotism, favouritism, arbitrariness, casteism, corruption and so on. Some good acts have also been witnessed - some of which are in the present regime of the Vice Chancellor along with largest and illegal acts too. The petitioner to some extent adopts the allegations of nepotism, favouritism btc. made in the writ petition of Ram Lal Singh v. The University of Allahabad and others in which this Hon'ble Court on 25-7-86 has been pleased to pass the following orders : "Learned counsel for the University is granted two weeks time to file C.A. & R.A. may be filed within one week thereafter. List the petition for admission in the week commencing 18th April, 1986. Since the allegations of bias, etc. have been made against the Vice Chancellor we cannot grant any interim order at this stage unless we have a detailed C.A. on the facts stated but we consider it expedient to direct that the selection which is going to take place on 26th July 1986 shall not be forwarded to the Executive Council till further orders of the Court. Sd. R. M. S. Sd/- K. P. S. ".......They also show the bias of the Vice Chancellor and others including Prof. D. D. Khanna and Dr. Sd. R. M. S. Sd/- K. P. S. ".......They also show the bias of the Vice Chancellor and others including Prof. D. D. Khanna and Dr. (Smt.) Asha Seth against the petitioner which has caused her great irreparable loss and even victimisation which has also been because of their collusion against the petitioner who has exposed various acts of frauds and corruption in the field of education and misappropriation of public money to the tune of about Rs. 5 lakhs per month. "........That it may not be out of place to point out that one of the close associates of the Vice Chancellor is Prof. D. D. Khanna above named who since 1975 has been the Secretary-cum-Manager of S. S. Khanna Girls' Degree College, Allahabad - an associated College of the Allahabad University. He has the unique achievement of having adorned the Court of every Vice Chancellor of the Allahabad University and has always successfully played his roles with ulterior motives and mala fide intentions at the cost of his opponents. He being a third divisioner throughout and without a post graduation in the subject of Military Science/Defence Studies-the department of which he was the Head, belongs to the lobby of the Vice Chancellor who has illegally made the former a coordinator in the Centenary celebrations of the Allahabad University. The Vice Chancellor through Prof. D. D. Khanna bears great ill will against the petitioner and her husband and have caused great harm to them in many ways and are still continuing to do so in collusion with the Registrar of the University, Dr. (Smt.) Asha Seth, Smt. Ranjana Kacker and a group of other unqualified teachers of the Allahabad University and its associated Colleges who have a lobby of their own and have been helping She Vice Chancellor in a most illegal way. They are all out to ruin the career of the petitioner and her husband......." "......4 merely to favour his henchmen......" "5.....That it is a known fact that the present Vice Chancellor is in hot waters and is thus favouring his henchmen in the maximum ways. This would be apparent from the present selection to the post in the aforesaid department." "6. That Dr. Banwari Lal Sharma of the Alld. University is on an indefinite fast since 23rd. July 1986. This would be apparent from the present selection to the post in the aforesaid department." "6. That Dr. Banwari Lal Sharma of the Alld. University is on an indefinite fast since 23rd. July 1986. His appeal and the AUTA's move on the same are attached as Annexures A/1 to A2/2, respectively to the writ petition." "11........because of which grudge and bias is carried against them by the Registrar and the Vice Chancellor with the result the petitioner has not been purposely selected for any of the posts in question........." "...... The case of victimisation of the petitioner along with the acts of frauds and cheating by many persons are apparent from the record of her above mentioned cases before this Hon'ble Court." 3. In the face of allegations the like of which have been reproduced above, this Court felt that the pleadings as they stood were unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous and vexatious. The Court also felt that the pleadings in their present form if permitted to remain on record may tend to prejudice, embarrass the persons against whom they have been made or delay the course of the writ petition itself and likewise the Court also felt that the pleadings if permitted to remain may tantamount to the abuse of the process of the Court. This Court decided to take an immediate decision calling upon counsel for the petitioner to strike off certain texts of the petition. One of the primary reasons why this Court came to this conclusion was that petitioner had chosen to make allegations which were possibly of a defamatory nature but without making those persons party respondents to the writ petition. The Court in the face of the record as it stood was faced with three alternatives. First, to call upon the petitioner to make all those persons against whom the allegations had been made, respondents to the writ petition, or strike off the pleadings and expunge the allegations as they had been made in the absence of those persons. This Court did not have any hesitation in choosing the Second alternative for reasons that the petitioner could not be given the liberty to make allegations which offended the principles of O. VI, R. 16 of the Civil P.C., more so when the petitioner had chosen to make such allegations behind the backs of those persons. This Court did not have any hesitation in choosing the Second alternative for reasons that the petitioner could not be given the liberty to make allegations which offended the principles of O. VI, R. 16 of the Civil P.C., more so when the petitioner had chosen to make such allegations behind the backs of those persons. The third course which the Court had contemplated was to summon the petitioner at the Bar of the Court to explain why she took the liberty to make sweeping allegations against named persons without making them party respondents to the writ petition. The Court felt certain reservations in taking this step. The reasons are that the record shows on the format of the petition and the accompanying affidavit, that the petitioner's husband is none other than Mr. Baldeo Raj who is otherwise learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in the circumstances, may not have any hesitation in appearing for his wife, but the Court had felt a delicacy in summoning the petitioner at the Bar. Between the petitioner and counsel there exists a relationship of wife and husband in matrimony. The logical step in summoning the petitioner to the Bar was to seek clarifications whether she had made the allegations on her own or whether the pleadings had been suggested to her by counsel i.e. her husband. The Court felt that it may not be appropriate to seek this explanation as it may possibly be a communication between the petitioner as as wife to counsel who was also her husband. Thus, in the present situation, no law restrains the Court to summon the petitioner yet we thought that we would leave the sanctity of the communication between the wife as petitioner and her husband as counsel as confidential though not privileged. The Court had observed that it did not think this communication as privileged but it had to protect itself in preventing parties at the Bar in overshooting the limits of free expression which was likely to hurt the reputation of strangers who had not been made parties and thus permitting litigants to abuse the process of the Court in making unwarranted and vaxatious allegations. This Court, on 8 August 1986 thus called upon learned counsel for the petitioner to strike of certain passages of the writ petition. This Court, on 8 August 1986 thus called upon learned counsel for the petitioner to strike of certain passages of the writ petition. The Court indicated in this order that it proposed to give reasons for this exercise subsequently. This Court also places on record that upon the direction of the Court to strike of certain passages of the writ petition, counsel for the petitioner candidly admitted that these expression ought not to having been made. Counsel for the petitioner, thus, in accordance with the directions of the Court expressed that he was deleting the passages without reservations and, this he did. 4. This then is the resume' of the proceedings which prompted the Court to take immediate remedial measures in having struck such pleadings from the record of the writ petition, which offended the sanctity of pleading at the Bar, the dignity of the Court and the general principles contained in Order 6, Rule 16 of the Code as aforesaid. 5. The law does not prescribe the standard of formulae pleadings as indeed it cannot because it is difficult to make a strait jacket stipulation that the pleading would be made in a particular manner. But the law does prescribe what ought not be said, and indeed if said, then a person making the averment must take the responsibility for it. It is here that the gentlemen at the Bar are cast with the obligation that pleadings before the Court must be clean. The Bar is not privileged to make reckless charges, even on the instructions of the client. The independence of the Bar needs to be preserved and protected as it must have every rightful opportunity for the proper discharge of its duties and obligations. But then, this independence will stand negated if it does not correlate with a corresponding duty and discipline that no one at the Bar of the Court can have a licence to cast aspersions against anyone without any reasonable cause. Merely because a client suggests to counsel that certain allegations, which are otherwise grave and scandalous in nature, must be made does not mean that counsel should under sufferance acquiesce to the temptation of the suggestion of the client. Merely because a client suggests to counsel that certain allegations, which are otherwise grave and scandalous in nature, must be made does not mean that counsel should under sufferance acquiesce to the temptation of the suggestion of the client. It is here that counsel are upon good faith and honourable conduct to exercise independent judgment and set only such pleadings on record which appear to them to be correct with a sense of personal responsibility. It is the duty of a lawyer to ensure beyond a reasonable doubt that the charges which his client is making, are true. This self-imposed standard has to be set by the Bar so as to ensure that the code of conduct; even when making an allegation, is that of a gentleman. If this self-imposed discipline at the Bar is let, then the Court would step in to protect itself and parties against unfair attacks and insinuations. There are situations in which mala fides may be allaged by a petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, but then such allegations must be for a reasonable cause and the petitioner must make those persons against whom he makes allegations, parties to the case. Even the Court will examine the standards of allegations as they must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. 6. In the past, Courts have occasions to express themselves, in similar situations. 7. In 1935 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court made the following observations after agreeing with a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court delivered by Chief Justice Mears, Mr. Justice Walsh and Mr. Justice Sulaiman : "It is necessary at this point to state that although an advocate has his duty towards his client to perform, he has other duties and responsibilities as well. He has no right whatever even on the instructions of his client recklessly to make charges of fraud. His responsibility to the Court, and I may also add to the Bar whose traditions it is his duty to maintain, make it incumbent upon him to satisfy himself that there are reasonable grounds for making such charges. On this point there are observations with which I entirely agree in the judgment of Mears, C. J. and Walsh and Sulaiman, JJ. On this point there are observations with which I entirely agree in the judgment of Mears, C. J. and Walsh and Sulaiman, JJ. in (1924) ILR 46 All 121 at p. 124, where it is said : "Members of the legal profession are under no duty to their clients to make grave and scandalous charges either against Judges or the opposite parties on the mere wish of their clients.They are not puppets compelled to obey the dictates of their clients where matters of good faith and honourable conduct are conferred. They are responsible to the Court for the fair and honest conduct of a case. They are not mere agents of the man who pays them, but are acting in the administration of justice, and in matters of this kind they are bound to exercise an independent judgment and to conduct themselves with a sense of personal responsibility. If they fail to act with reasonable care and caution, they are unfit to enjoy the privileges conferred upon them by law, and serious breaches must be visited with punishment." I have already stated my opinion that the charge of fraud was recklessly made and I very much regret that it should have been made by an Advocate who has been in legal practice for some years and who cannot reasonably plead ignorance of his duty and responsibility." (AIR 1935 Mad 578: N. Thangavelu Mudaliar v. Chengalvaroya Gurukal). 8. Then more than 60 years ago, again in two matters before a Full Bench, the Allahabad High Court had the occasion to express itself as follows : "As pointed out in the matter of Dwarka Prasad Mithal, ( AIR 1924 All 253 ) (FB), the members of the legal profession are responsible for the fair and honest conduct of a case and they cannot be allowed to make personal attacks or reckless and unfounded charges of impropriety or inattention against a tribunal when the real ground is that the Advocate concerned has failed to make an impression by his arguments on the Court concerned and lost his case in spite of every effort. We are alive to the necessity of preserving and protecting the independency of the Bar and allowing them every rightful opportunity for the proper discharge of their duties, but we cannot allow them to cast aspersions on the conduct of the presiding judge before whom they have occasion to argue their cases, if they happen to argue without success." ( AIR 1924 All 565 (FB) : In the matter of W.S. Day, Vakil.) 9. The other was in the matter of Babu Dwarka Prasad Mithal, Vakil where the Court said : "Members of the legal profession are under no duty to their clients to make grave and scandalous charges either against judges or the opposite parties on the mere wish of their clients. They are not puppets compelled to obey the dictates of their clients where matters of good faith and honourable conduct are concerned. They are responsible to the Court for the fair and honourable conduct of a case. They are agents not of the man who pays them, but are acting in the administration of justice, and in matters of this kind they are bound to exercise an independent judgment, and to conduct themselves with a sense of personal responsibility. If they fail to act with reasonable care and caution they are unfit to enjoy the privileges conferred upon them by law, and serious breaches must be visited with punishment." ( AIR 1924 All 253 (FB) : In the matter of Babu Dwarka Prasad Mithal, Vakil). 10. Twenty five years ago this Court reminded the members of the Bar or litigants in these words : "But these privileges carry with them a corresponding obligation on counsel not to abuse them but to take every possible care and precaution to ensure that the allegations of misconduct made by his client against an official are true. It is the duty of counsel to be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the charge, is true. The very impunity enjoyed by counsel places upon him a self-imposed standard of care much higher than in normal cases just as gentleman is supposed to pay of his debts of honour before he satisfies those enforceable in law. The code of chivalry at the Bar must be higher, and never lower than that prevailing elsewhere. The very impunity enjoyed by counsel places upon him a self-imposed standard of care much higher than in normal cases just as gentleman is supposed to pay of his debts of honour before he satisfies those enforceable in law. The code of chivalry at the Bar must be higher, and never lower than that prevailing elsewhere. However, if self-imposed discipline fails, it becomes the duty of the Court to protect officials against unfair attacks and insinuations of this kind." ( AIR 1960 All 164 : Harbans Lal Arora v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway). 11. Thus, this Court expresses its concern on the situation which has occasioned these observations. How is the situation to be remedied. The Court can do no more than express itself to prevent the abuse of its Bar and to preserve the sanctity and cleanliness of pleadings. Though, mere observations of the Court may not be a remedy. 12. If standards of pleadings -and practice at the Bar are to become strict so that they work within the constraints of an inner discipline, then the law which directly governs the discipline of the legal profession, may need radical chariges. At present the Advocates Act, 1961 gives a license to practise but without corresponding obligations of duties upon counsel to set the standards of practise by training. The Bar Council of India set the standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette. The Standards, under Section IV-A make a reference, by implication, to training. There is no specific standard of training for a person who is being called to the Bar; the Advocate-on-record at the Bar of the Supreme Court being an exception. The duration of training, the method of training and standards to judge that training has been imparted, are absent. Is the legal profession an exception to the rule applicable to all other vocations and disciplines that an entry into them is subject to the rigorous training? The clergy train, the solicitors sign their articles, so do the chartered accountants. The doctors, engineers and architects go through a reasonably gruelling course, which if successfully completed, permits them to practice the vocation they have sought. Are lawyers-an exception that (they) will not be trained? Will the standards of the legal profession be maintained and survive, if they are not set?