Judgment 1. - The sole petitioner has been found guilty for the offence punishable under S.387 of the I.P.C. and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years by the learned trial Court. On appeal, however, the order of conviction passed against him by the trial Court has been maintained but the sentence has been reduced from three years rigorous imprisonment to six months rigorous imprisonment. Hence this application. 2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that the informant had taken some loan from the petitioner, who happened to be a money lender. On the date of the occurrence i.e. on 5-8-1978 the petitioner came and asked the informant to pay the balance amount of Rs. 2800.00 at once and also abused him and his family members and also threatened to kill him. The petitioner is alleged to have further said that if all the money is not paid by 6-8-1978, he would take away the eyes of the informant and also kill him. 3. Learned counsel has stated that entirely a false case has been instituted and further it has been stated that, as a matter of fact, the offence committed under S.387 of the I.P.C. is not made out in the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. So far the contention that a false case has been instituted, I am afraid, that cannot be adjudicated at this stage at all when there has been concurrent findings of the two Courts below in that respect. 5. However, in my opinion, the offence as contemplated under S.387 of the I.P.C. is not at all applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is apparent that it cannot be said that there was extortion on the part of the petitioner because it would appear that the petitioner happened to be a money lender and the informant, in fact, had taken loan and, therefore, the petitioner had simply demanded back the money given to the informant. Thus the simple demand never constitutes an act of extortion. However, now I proceed to examine the allegation, considering the statement of the informant that the petitioner had given a threat that he would take away the eyes and he would kill him. Thus the simple demand never constitutes an act of extortion. However, now I proceed to examine the allegation, considering the statement of the informant that the petitioner had given a threat that he would take away the eyes and he would kill him. Even if demand of money was made, coupled with these statements, I am afraid, it is not a case of extortion by putting a person in fear of death or of grievous hurt. Absolutely, there is no visible sign of any overt act in support of that overt act. In order to constitute an offence as laid down under S.387 of the I.P.C., there ought to be some visible overt act which may reflect the natural and normal inference that the wrong doer had, in fact, put a person or had made an attempt to put any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt. In absence of any apparent overt act leading towards the act of extortion and thus putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt cannot be said to be an offence committed for extortion by threat. I am afraid, without any visible sign of physical act, simply use of words is not enough to constitute that offence and in the instant case, in absence of any physical act on the part of the petitioner and also any such material which may indicate that, as a matter of fact, the petitioner had practised extortion by threat of fear of death and hurt, the offence is not constituted. To illustrate, if any person is confronted by any wrong doer armed with dagger or pistol and thereafter he made some utterances demanding some money, that can be said to be an act of extortion, but in a broad day light within the hearing of every one having some financial relationship, if demand of the money is made by uttering some threats, that cannot be said to be an act of extortion as contemplated under S.387 of the I.P.C. Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled for acquittal. 6. In the result, this application is allowed. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner by both the Courts below is hereby set aside and he is acquitted. He shall be discharged from the liability of bail bond forthwith.