JUDGMENT K. N. Misra, J. - In the instant case the dispute relates to plots No. 2662, 2663 and 4400 situate in village Naurera, Pargana and Tahsil Patti, District Pratapgarh. These plots were recorded in the basic year Khatauni as Sirdari Plots in the name of Gaya Din, father of petitioner No. 1 and Gajadhar, the petitioner No. 2. An objection was filed by the Gaon Sabha through its Pradhan with the allegation that the land in. dispute is Gaon Sabha property being Talab and Bhitha and that the names of the petitioners Gaya Din and Gajadhar are wrongly recorded as Sirdartenant over' the said plots. In was prayed that their name's be expunged and the land in dispute be recorded as Gaon Sabha Property. Another objection was filed by one Bhagwati asserting that the land in dispute belongs to Gaon Sabha being Talab and Bhitha and the names of the recorded person be expunged as they did not hold any right, title of interest over the land in dispute'. It was asserted on behalf of the Gaon Sabha as well as by Bhagwati Prasad that a lease was illegally got executed in favour of Gajadhar Prasad (Petitioner No. 2) 4 This lease was cancelled by the subDivisional Officer vide order dated 18.10.1962 passed in proceedings under Section 198 (2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Against this order, an appeal was filed by Gajadhar Prasad, but it was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner vide order dated 18.1.1963. Aggrieved by it, Gajadhar Prasad had fileda revision which was1 also dismissed by the Board of Revenue by order dated 28.5.1963 and the' Order cancelling the lease was maintained, Thereupon Gajadhar Prasad had preferred writ petition in this court which was dismissed vide order dated 10.3.]9'69 and the Special Appeal filed against that order was also dismissed by this court vide order dated 27.11.1969. Thus the order dated 18.10.1962 passed by the SubDivisional Officer, cancelling the lease granted in favour of Gajadhar in respect of the land in dispute, was maintained. It was, thus, asserted oil behalf of the Gaon Sabha as well as by Bhagwati that the name of Gaya Din and Gajadhar Prasad be expunged as they did not hold any right,title or mtere'st in the aforesaid land, which is Gaon Sabha property being Talab and Bhitha. 2. It was, thus, asserted oil behalf of the Gaon Sabha as well as by Bhagwati that the name of Gaya Din and Gajadhar Prasad be expunged as they did not hold any right,title or mtere'st in the aforesaid land, which is Gaon Sabha property being Talab and Bhitha. 2. These objections' were contested by the' petitioner' arid it was asserted by them that the objection filed by Bhagwati Prasad was not maintainable as he had no locus standi to file objection on behalf of the Gaon Sabha, having not been authorised by if to file objection on its behalf. With regard to the objection filed by the Pradhan Of the Gaon Sabha it was asserted that the Pradhan of in his application dated f8.8.197'2 admitted the claim of the petitioners in respect of the land in dispute and had asserted that no1 objection w as filed on' behalf of the Gaon Sabha. 3. It appears that the Consolidation Officer framed issue's and vide order Dated 2.9.1972 disposed of the preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the objection which was raised and pressed by the petitioners as preliminary issue. It was held by the Consolidation Officer that the objection filed by Bhagwati Prasad was not maintainable as he could not file objection on behalf of the Gaon Sabha in the absence of resolution authorising him to do so. While recording this finding, the Consolidation Officer placed reliance upon certain decisions of this Court which have been referred by him in the impugned order dated 2.9.1972, He, however, held that the objection filed on behalf of Gaon Sabha by the Pradhan was maintainable and fixed 15.9.1972 for taking evidence and deciding the objection filed on behalf of the Gaon Sabha on merits. It also appears that the question of nonmaintainability of the objection filed by Gaon Sabha was challenged also on the ground that the earlier decree passed in a suit under Section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Suit No.48 of 1970 Gaya Din vs. Gajadhar decided on 31.3.1970) would operate as res judicata, and, as such, the objection raised by the Gaon Sabha in respect of land in dispute would not be maintainable and deserves to be dismissed on this preliminary ground. Consolidation Officer did not agree with the contention raised and held that since the lease in question was cancelled and the order of cancellation was maintained also by the Hon'ble High Court, and, as such, the case deserves to be decided on merits. Feeling aggrieved by this order, the petitioners preferred revision under section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (for short, the Act) before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, which was dismissed vide order dated 23.4.1973, a certified copy of which has been annexed by the petitioners. In this impugned order, date of order passed by the Consolidation Officer is mentioned as 30.11.1972. The petitioner has not annexed any such order dated 30.11.1972 passed by the Consolidation Officer and in the absence of it, it cannot be taken that the date of the order passed by the Consolidation Officer has been correctly mentioned. Learned counsel for the Petitioners, Sri B. K. Singh, however urged that the order dated 30.11.1972 which has been referred in the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is a subsequent order which the petitioner have also challenged although they have not annexed copy of that order in the writ petition. Learned counsel could not produce before me even during the course of argument copy of the order dated 30.11.1972. Be that as it may, the question remains as to whether the objection filed by Gaon Sabha through its Pradhan would be maintainable and could be decided on merits or not. The other question which crops up for consideration in this writ petition is whether the order dated 31.3.1970 passed in suit No. 48 of 1970 (Gaya Din Vs. Gajadhar and others) and order dated 19,10.1966 passed in case No. 61 of 1966 in respect of plot No. 4400 would operate as res judicata of not. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length and have perused the impugned orders very carefully, 4. Learned counsel had urged that the Pradhan .if the Gaon Sabha Could not file objection on behalf of the Gaon Sabha without prior resolution by the Land Management Committee authorising him to file objection under Section 9 of the Act in respect of the plots in dispute. Learned counsel had urged that the Pradhan .if the Gaon Sabha Could not file objection on behalf of the Gaon Sabha without prior resolution by the Land Management Committee authorising him to file objection under Section 9 of the Act in respect of the plots in dispute. In support of this Contention he referred to para 128 of the Gaon Sabha Manual and urged that since the conduct of Gaon Sabha litigation is not to depend upon the individual discretion of the Chairman of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti, and, as such, the resolution of the Samiti should have been passed authorising the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha to file objection in respect of the plots in dispute. In support of his contention, learned Counsel had placed reliance upon a decision of this court wherein it was held, that no resolution, as has been envisaged in para 128 has been passed to contest the case prior to the filing on the written statement and, as such, the written statement filed by the Gaon Sabha was without authority. This decision was rendered on the facts of the said Case wherein it was not established that there was any authority given by the Gaon Sabha or by the Chairman of the Land Management Committee for filing written statement. The question whether the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha, could file objection under Section 4 of the C. H. Act under his signatures without the resolution authorising hint to file objection or not was not raised nor considered in the case on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. 5. In (Saon Sabha Vs. Dy. director of Consolidation, Gyanpur, Varanasi (1983 RD 75) I had an occasion, to consider the question whether Ram Dular being the resident and one of the members of the Land Management Committee had a right to file appeal against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer by which the name of opposite party No. 3 Bimla Devi was directed to be mutated as heir and successor of the deceased tenureholder Sort. Mahadei. It was contended that the appeal filed by Ram Dular was not competent as no resolution of Land Management Committee was passed authorising him to file appeal or to pursue the revision. Mahadei. It was contended that the appeal filed by Ram Dular was not competent as no resolution of Land Management Committee was passed authorising him to file appeal or to pursue the revision. It was on these facts that it was held that the provisions contained in paragraph 128 of the Gaon Sabha Manual and Rule 110A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules prescribe the manner in which litigation is to be conducted by and on behalf of the Gaon Sabha. These provisions, which art mandatory would govern the litigations to be conducted on behalf of the Gaon Sabha in all proceedings under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Thus, where an objection under Section 9A(2) of the Act in respect of land leased by the Gaon Sabha is filed by d private person without any authority of Gaon Sabha and/of of Land Management Committee authorising that person to file objection, appeal and revision, the objection filed by that person would be wholly incompetent and the orders passed thereon and in appeal and revision therefrom, would be wholly without jurisdiction, more so when the action of that person in filing objection, appeal of revision was not ratified by the Land Management Committee. This decision is also of not any assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The question for consideration in it 'was whether a resident of the village can file objection, appeal or revision under the provisions of the C. H. Act without being authorised by the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha or the Land management Committee to initiate such proceedings on behalf of the Gaon Sabha. The various decisions which were 'cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner have been referred to in the above decision and so the same need not be discussed any further. 6. In the present case the question which crops up for Consideration is Whether the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha could or could not file objection under section 9A (2) of the C. H. Act without prior resolution of the Gaon Sabha authorising him to file objection, in respect of the land in dispute. The relevant rule 110A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules is quoted below : 110A. The relevant rule 110A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules is quoted below : 110A. Conduct of Correspondence and execution of documents and contracts (1) In the absence of the Chairman of the Land Management Committee, any member of the Committee authorised by him in writing, or in the absence of such authorisation, any member authorised by the Committee under a resolution to this effect, shall be entitled to sign any correspondence. contract or document and to do all other things necessary for the conduct of suits and proceedings. (2) (Emphasis Supplied) It would appear from the extracted Rule 110A that in the absence of the Chairman of the Land Management Committee any member of the Committee who is authorised by him in writing, or in the absence of such authorisation any other member authorised by the committee under a resolution passed to that effect, would be entitled to conduct suit or proceedings on behalf of the Gaon Sabha. Thus, this Rule does not prescribe that in the absence of a resolution passed by the Land Management Committee, the Chairman cannot conduct any suit or proceeding on behalf of the Gaon Sabha. To me it appears that no prior resolution of the Gaon Sabha authorising the Chairman would be necessary for filing any suit or other proceedings on behalf of the Gaon Sabha as is also evident from para 128 of the Gaon Sabha manual although it provides that the conduct of the Gaon. Sabha litigation shall not depend upon the individual discretion of the Chairman of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti (Land Management Committee) but shall be a matter of a resolution of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti as a whole. It has been specifically provided in Para128 of the Gaon Sabha Manual that in urgent cases, the Chairman can take action on his own and seek ratification of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti afterwards by including in the agenda of the next meeting. It, therefore, cannot be said that a prior resolution of Land Management. Committee authorising the Chairman to file suit or other proceedings on behalf of the Gaon Sabha, would be necessary. The Chairman can take action on his own and seek ratification afterwards. 7. In the present case it has not been indicated that action taken by the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha in filing objection under Section 9 (2) of the CH. The Chairman can take action on his own and seek ratification afterwards. 7. In the present case it has not been indicated that action taken by the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha in filing objection under Section 9 (2) of the CH. Act in respect of the land in dispute was not got ratified in the next meeting of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti. It is not disputed that in respect of the land in dispute, the Gaon Sabha had initiated proceedings for the cancellation of the lease which was cancelled by order dated 18.10.1962 passed by SubDivisional Officer under Section 198 (2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The petitioners had thereupon filed appeal, revision and Writ Petition in this court and the Gaon Sabha had diligently contested those proceedings and the same were decided in its favour. The writ petition filed by the Petitioner against the order cancelling lease was dismissed on 20.3.1959 and Special Appeal was also dismissed on 27th November, 1969. In view of these facts it cannot be said that the Gaon Sabha was not interested in contesting the claim of the petitioners in respect of the land, which was based on a lease said to have been illegally executed in their favour by the Gaon Sabha. Since the order cancelling the lease Of the petitioner was not incorporated in the Revenue Records, and, as such, an. objection Could be filed by the Gaon Sabha under Section 9 (2) of the U.P. C. H Act. It was held by bivision Beneh of this Oourt in Shyam Sunder Vs. (1973 ALJ 53) That : A Gaon Sabha is a juristic person incorporated by statute. I is covered by the word 'person' occurring in Sees. 9 (1) (a) and 9 (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The word 'person' is also wide 'enough to include the State Government, unless such inclusion would be repugnant to the context in which the word is used in Sec. 9 (1) (a) or Set. 9(2). The 'Context does not exclude 'the State Government. Tile result is that a Gaon Sabha of a State Government can file ail objection. 8. The word 'person' is also wide 'enough to include the State Government, unless such inclusion would be repugnant to the context in which the word is used in Sec. 9 (1) (a) or Set. 9(2). The 'Context does not exclude 'the State Government. Tile result is that a Gaon Sabha of a State Government can file ail objection. 8. Thus, in view of what has been said above, I find that the consolidation authorities have rightly held that objection filed on behalf of Gaon Sabha was maintainable and it has been correctly ordered to be decided on merits. 9. The next question which crops up for consideration is whether the order passed in aforesaid suits filed by Gajadhar Prasad and Gaya Din would operate as res judicata or not. It is not disputed that decree dated 31.3.1976 passed in suit No. 48 of 1970, (Gaya Din vs. Gajadhar) was based on a compromise between plaintiff 'Gay a Din and defendant Gajadhar. A Certified 'copy of the decree has been annexed to the writ petition and the perusal of it indicates that the said suit was filed on 16th March, 1970 and was decreed on the basis Of compromise filed between plaintiff Gaya Din and Defendant No. 1 Gajadhar on 31st March, 1970. It further indicates that the plaintiff Gaya Din has been given l/3'rd share in the aforesaid plots in dispute and 2/3rd share was mentioned to belong to Gajadhar, his real brother. This compromise was not signed on behalf of Gaon Sabha and the State Government, who were arrayed as opposite parties No. 2 and 3. It is also not evident from the decree that the SubDivisional Officer had proceeded to decide the case ex parte against the Gaon Sabha and the State Government, As already stated above, the suit was filed on 16th March 1970 and it was decreed in terms of 'compromise dated 30th March, 1970. It is also not evident that notices were served on the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha or the State Government. The suit was. thus, hurriedly got decided on the terms of the compromise 10. It is well settled that that compromise decree would not operate as resjudicata and the parties to the compromise would be bound by the terms contained therein. The suit was. thus, hurriedly got decided on the terms of the compromise 10. It is well settled that that compromise decree would not operate as resjudicata and the parties to the compromise would be bound by the terms contained therein. The compromise decree would not operate as res judicata because the dispute between the parties is not decided on merits on the paints raised by them. It has been held by Hon'ble M. H. Beg, J. (as he then was) in Trilok Misir and another Vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, U. P., Lucknow Camp at Ballia and others (1969 AWR 857) that : In some respects, an ex. parte decree differs from a consent decree,, but in other respects both are alike. A court passing a consent decree has also to consider whether it is, prima facie legal. Deliberate nonappearance of the defendant may imply consent or admission SO' as to obviate the need to frame issues or to decide them in the same way as contested cases. The binding character of both types of decree rests appropriately on an equitable estoppel rather than on principles of res judicata vie.ved apart from an equitable estoppel by conduct. 11. In view of the above, I find that the said decree dated 31.3.1970 even though it be taken to be ex parte decree, cannot operate as res judicata as no notice appears to have been served on the Gaon Sabha and the State Government nor the case was proceeded ex parte against them. The consolidation authorities have, thus, committed no error in recording a finding to that effect, 12. Learned counsel had, however, urged that the earlier decree dated 19.10.1966 which is in respect of plot No. 4400 would operate as res judicata between the parties as it was a case decided on merits and the said order was not challenged in appeal. Annexure A which is copy of decree dated 19.10.1966, purports to be a decree passed in a suit No. 61 of 1966, Gajadhar Vs. Gaon Sabha decided on 19.10. 1966, This judgment was rendered in Hindi as is evident from Annexure 'A'. Learned counsel pointed out that a certified copy of the judgment dated 19.10.1966 contained in Annexure 'A' has also been filed by the Petitioner. Gaon Sabha decided on 19.10. 1966, This judgment was rendered in Hindi as is evident from Annexure 'A'. Learned counsel pointed out that a certified copy of the judgment dated 19.10.1966 contained in Annexure 'A' has also been filed by the Petitioner. A perusal of the certified copy indicates that it is a judgment rendered in English and was passed in suit No. 693 of 1966 decided on 19.10.1966, In Re : Gajadhar Vs. Gaon Sabha and others. Thus, it cannot be said that this certified copy of the judgment relates to the suit which was decided on 10.10.1966, a true copy of which has been annexed as Annexure 'A', In the certified copy of the suit No. 693 of 1966, Gaon Sabha, Naurera has been arrayed as defendant No. 1, but in the array of parties mentioned in this annexure, it is not mentioned that the Gaon Sabha is sued through its Pradhan. Thus, the Gaon Sabha was not even properly impleaded in the said suit, and, as such, it cannot be said to be competent suit filed against the Gaon Sabha in respect of the plot in dispute mentioned as plot No. 44CO, situate in village Naurera. Learned counsel had urged that since case was contested on behalf of the defendant, and, as such, it be taken that the Gaon Sabha was properly impleaded in the suit. I do not find any merit in the contention in view of the facts already stated above to the effect that Annexure 'A' relates to suit No. 61 of 1966 while the certified copy filed by the petitioners relate to another suit No. 263 of 1966, and so no reliance can be placed on them. In this Writ Petition petitioners have averred and placed reliance on the so called judgment passed in a suit No. 61 of 1966, which is in Hindi, which certified copy relates to suit No. 263 of 1966 which has not at all been referred in the writ petition nor any averment has been made that Gajadhar Prasad had filed suit No. 263 of 1966 in respect of plot No. 4400 and it was decreed in his favour on contest by the Gaon Sabha. If that be a fact that a suit in respect of plot No. 4400 was decreed in favour of Gajadhar against Gaon Sabha on 19.10.1966, then there appears to be no reason why the said decree was not sought to be relied upon in the writ Petition filed by the petitioners against order dated 19.10.1962 by which Patta granted by Gaon Sabha was cancelled. The said writ petition was decided on 20th March, 1969 and Special Appeal was decided on 27th Nov. 1969. Thus, if any order was passed against the Gaon Sabha relating to the land in dispute prior to those dates, it should have been brought on record in respect of the claim made by the petitioners. 13. Thus, in view of the above I do not find any merits in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid decree dated 19.10.1966 would operate as res judicata between the parties. In these proceedings under Section 9A (2) of the Act, title of the parties has to be decided on the basis of evidence led in support of their respective claims and the objection filed by the Gaon Sabha cannot be said to be not maintainable on the aforesaid grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Thus, in my opinion, no case is made out for interference by this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs, (Petition Dismissed)