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1986 DIGILAW 586 (ALL)

RAGHUVIR SAHAI v. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, JHANSI

1986-08-21

A.N.VERMA, D.S.SINHA

body1986
A. N. VARINA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner No. 1 is a holder of an arms license for a rifle while the petitioner No. 2 has a license for a double barrel gun. They are aggrieved by an order passed by the District Magistrate, Jhansi suspending their licenses and directing them to surrender their weapons as well as to show cause why the said licenses should not be cancelled. ( 2 ) THE District Magistrate has passed the impugned order suspending the licenses of the petitioners on the ground that on account of various reports submitted to him, he was satisfied that it was necessary for the security of public peace and safety to suspend the petitioners licenses. The order states that from the various reports submitted to the District Magistrate by the Police and other officers, it was apparent that owing to the bitterness of the local politics and groupism in the village, there was every likelihood that the petitioners would misuse the weapons held by them necessitating immediate suspension of their licenses for public peace and security. ( 3 ) THE contention of the petitioners is that the impugned order is completely without jurisdiction inasmuch as the Arms Act under which the impugned order has been passed does not empower the District Magistrate to suspend a license pending enquiry. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the said Act authorizes the District Magistrate to suspend a licence only after he is satisfied upon the material brought before him that for the security of public peace and safety, it is necessary to suspend a license, but this power is available only when the order of suspension is being passed as a final order of suspension for a specified period and not while the District Magistrate is still enquiring into the allegations or complaints against a license holder. In support, the learned counsel placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of CP. Sahu v. State1. ( 4 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the opinion that the impugned order of suspension is one which has been passed not as a final order of suspension under section 17 (3) but only pending an enquiry which is not permissible under the law. Sahu v. State1. ( 4 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the opinion that the impugned order of suspension is one which has been passed not as a final order of suspension under section 17 (3) but only pending an enquiry which is not permissible under the law. In C. P. Sahus case (Supra), a Full Bench of this Court (of which one of us was a member) had occasion to consider the question whether the Arms Act countenances suspension of a license pending enquiry. On an analysis of the relevant provisions, the scheme of the Act and judicial precedents on the subject, the Full Bench answered the question in the negative. But it added that the statute does not provide for any pre-decisional notice or opportunity to the holder of an arms license before the District Magistrate passes an order revoking or suspending a license (as distinct from suspension pending enquiry) as a final order under section 17 (3) of the Act. ( 5 ) THE law laid down by the Full Bench in CP. Sahus case (Supra) was reviewed by a larger Full Bench in the case of Kailash Nath and others v. State of UP. and another2 and while it endorsed the opinion of the Full Bench in C. P. Sahus case to the effect that the Arms Act did not contemplate any prior notice or opportunity to the holder of an arms license before the same was revoked or suspended, it qualified the statement of law made in that case by adding that the principles of natural justice would not be satisfied until the holder of the licence was afforded an opportunity of being heard even though the same may be given after the revocation or suspension of the license. Kailash Naths case was concerned with an order where the license had been revoked by the District Magistrate and not one in which the District Magistrate may have suspended the license pending enquiry as in the present case. Kailash Naths case was concerned with an order where the license had been revoked by the District Magistrate and not one in which the District Magistrate may have suspended the license pending enquiry as in the present case. ( 6 ) AFTER laying down the law thus on the lines indicated above the Full Bench in Kailash Naths case served that it was not necessary to quash the order of revocation and that it would be sufficient if the District Magistrate was directed to allow the petitioners two weeks time within which they may file their objections before the District Magistrate who may dispose of the same within three weeks of the filing of the objections. ( 7 ) THE opinion in C. P. Sahus case in so far as it ruled that the enactment did not envisage suspension pending an enquiry was, however, not disapproved by the larger Full Bench in the case of Kailash Nath (Supra ). ( 8 ) THE upshot of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that if the District Magistrate was on the material that had been placed before him satisfied that it was necessary for the security of the public peace or public safety to revoke or suspend the petitioners licenses for any specified period, it was open to him to pass such an order straightway. However, if he chose to suspend the licences only pending an enquiry and before being fully satisfied on the material brought on the record that it was necessary to revoke or suspend the license in order to secure public peace and safety, he would certainly have no jurisdiction to suspend the petitioners licenses pending such an enquiry. As in our opinion, the District Magistrate has suspended the licenses pending an enquiry, it is apparent that his satisfaction that it was necessary for public peace and security that the licenses of the petitioners deserved to be suspended must be treated as tentative and not final within the meaning of section 17 (3) of the Act. The District Magistrate has by the impugned order called upon the petitioners to show cause why their licenses should not be revoked. The impugned order is thus clearly unwarranted in law. The District Magistrate has by the impugned order called upon the petitioners to show cause why their licenses should not be revoked. The impugned order is thus clearly unwarranted in law. ( 9 ) WE, however, wish to make it clear that if on the basis of the material which was brought to the notice of the District Magistrate before passing of the impugned order or subsequently thereto, the District. Magistrate is satisfied that the licenses of the petitioners ought to be revoked or suspended for any specified period, he can pass such an order straightaway subject to the condition that he shall immediately after passing of the order allow the petitioners reasonable time to submit their representations against that order and thereafter dispose of the representations or objections within three weeks of the receipt of the representation or objection. ( 10 ) IN the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Subject to the observations made above, the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate on 14. 5. 1976 against the petitioners are quashed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .